The Fount of Knowledge I: The Philosophical Chapters

 Preface

 Chapter 1

 Chapter 2

 Chapter 3

 Chapter 4

 Chapter 4 (variant)

 Chapter 5

 Chapter 6

 Chapter 6 (variant)

 Chapter 7

 Chapter 8

 Chapter 9

 Chapter 10

 Chapters 9-10 (variants)

 Chapter 11

 Chapter 12

 Chapter 13

 Chapter 14

 Chapter 15

 Chapter 16

 The term subject is taken in two ways: as subject of existence and as subject of predication. We have a subject of existence in such a case as that of

 Chapter 17

 Chapter 18

 Chapter 19

 Chapter 20

 Chapter 21

 Chapter 22

 Chapter 23

 Chapter 24

 Chapter 25

 Chapter 26

 Chapter 27

 Chapter 28

 Chapter 29

 Chapter 30

 Chapter 31

 Chapter 32

 Chapter 33

 Chapter 34

 Chapter 35

 Chapter 36

 Chapter 37

 Chapter 38

 Chapter 39

 Chapter 40

 Chapter 41

 Chapter 42

 Chapter 43

 Chapter 44

 Chapter 45

 Chapter 46

 Substance, then, is a most general genus. The body is a species of substance, and genus of the animate. The animate is a species of body, and genus of

 Chapter 48

 Chapter 49

 Chapter 50

 Chapter 51

 Chapter 52

 Chapter 53

 Chapter 54

 Chapter 55

 Chapter 56

 Chapter 57

 Chapter 58

 Chapter 59

 Chapter 60

 Chapter 61

 Chapter 62

 Chapter 63

 Chapter 64

 Chapter 65

 Chapter 67 [!]

 Chapter 66 [!]

 Chapter 68

 Explanation of Expressions

Chapter 6 (variant)

Division is the first section of the thing. Thus, for example, the animal is divided into rational and irrational. Subdivision is the section and division of one part into two segments. Thus, for example, when the animal has been divided into rational and irrational, then we divide one part—say, the rational—into mortal and immortal. And we have redivision when we have made a division of a thing and then make another kind of division of the same thing over again. Thus, for example, man is divided into male and female—that is division. Then man is divided over again into soul and body—this is redivision. However, division and redivision is not always done, but only when everything is not covered by the first division. It is done in this case, because in both the male and the female body and soul are to be considered.

One should know that the two species into which the same genus is divided are said to be divided by dichotomy. For example, the animal is divided into rational and irrational; so, the rational and irrational are said to be divided by dichotomy.

There are, moreover, eight modes of division: either as genus into species, as the animal is divided into rational and irrational; or as species into individuals, as man is divided into Peter and Paul and all other individual men; or as the whole into parts. This last is of two kinds, for the parts are either alike or they are unlike. They are alike when they admit of the name and the definition of the whole and of one another, as when we cut up pieces of flesh into several pieces of flesh, for then each piece of the flesh is called flesh and admits of the definition of flesh. But they are unlike when they do not admit of the name or of the definition either of the whole or of each other, as when we divide Socrates into hands and head and feet. In this case neither the head, nor the hands, nor the feet admit of the name or of the definition of Socrates, nor do they of each other. Or division is that of an equivocal term divided into its various meanings. This is of two kinds, being either as a whole or as a part. It is as a whole as in the case of the term ‘dog/ for this is used for a land-dog, and a dog-star, and a sea-dog, which precisely are wholes and not parts of an animal. It is, however, as a part, when the word ‘tongue’ is used for the top part of the shoe, for the endpiece of the flute, and for the organ of taste in animals —which are all some sort of parts and not wholes. Or, again, division is that of substance into accidents, as when I speak of some men being white and some black. Or it is as that of accidents into substances, as when I speak of some white things being animate and others inanimate. Or it is as that of accident into accidents, as when I speak of some cold things being dry and others wet. Or it is as the division of those things which are derivative and relative. We have derivative in the case of a medical book and a medical instrument, which derive from medicine; whereas we have relative in the case of a healthful drug and healthful food, for these relate to one thing, namely health. Now, according to this mode the being is divided into substance and accident.

One must know that that which is by nature prior and posterior and that which is more and less is not divided into parts by any mode of division except that of those things which are derivative and relative.

[14] {Περὶ διαιρέσεως.} Διαίρεσίς ἐστιν ἡ πρώτη τομὴ τοῦ πράγματος, οἷον τὸ ζῷον διαιρεῖται εἰς λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον: (v. i. 20_27) ὑποδιαίρεσις δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς μέρους τῶν δύο τμημάτων τομὴ καὶ διαίρεσις, οἷον τοῦ ζῴου διαιρεθέντος εἰς λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον τὸ ἓν μέρος ἤγουν τὸ λογικὸν διαιροῦμεν εἰς θνητὸν καὶ ἀθάνατον: ἐπιδιαίρεσις δέ, ὅταν ποιήσας διαίρεσιν πράγματος ποιήσω πάλιν ἄλλην διαίρεσιν πράγματος τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον διαιρεῖται ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ _ἰδοὺ διαίρεσις_καὶ πάλιν διαιρεῖται ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα_ἰδοὺ ἐπιδιαίρεσις. Οὐ πάντοτε δὲ γίνεται διαίρεσις καὶ ἐπιδιαίρεσις, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὴ πάντα περιέχονται ὑπὸ τὴν πρώτην διαίρεσιν: ἰδοὺ γὰρ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄῤῥενι καὶ ἐν τῇ θηλείᾳ θεωρεῖται ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα. Χρὴ δὲ γινώσκειν, ὅτι ἀντιδιαιρούμενα λέγονται τὰ δύο εἴδη τὰ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους τμηθέντα, οἷον τὸ ζῷον διαιρεῖται εἰς λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον, ἃ ἀντιδιαιρούμενα λέγονται. Εἰσὶ δὲ διαιρετικοὶ τρόποι ὀκτώ: _ἢ ὡς γένος εἰς εἴδη, οἷον τὸ ζῷον διαιρεῖται εἰς λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον, _ἢ ὡς εἶδος εἰς ἄτομα, οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος διαιρεῖται εἰς Πέτρον καὶ Παῦλον καὶ εἰς τοὺς λοιποὺς κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπους, _ἢ ὡς ὅλον εἰς μέρη: καὶ τοῦτο διχῶς, ἢ ὁμοιομερῆ ἢ ἀνομοιομερῆ. Ὁμοιομερῆ μὲν οὖν εἰσιν, ὅτε τὰ μέρη ἐπιδέχονται τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὸν ὁρισμὸν τοῦ ὅλου καὶ ἀλλήλων, ὡς ὅταν τέμνωμεν σάρκα εἰς πολλὰς σάρκας, καὶ ἕκαστον μέρος τῆς σαρκὸς σὰρξ λέγεται καὶ τὸν ὁρισμὸν τῆς σαρκὸς ἐπιδέχεται. Ἀνομοιομερῆ δέ, ὅτε τὰ μέρη μήτε τὸ ὄνομα μήτε τὸν ὁρισμὸν ἐπιδέχονται μήτε τοῦ ὅλου μήτε ἀλλήλων, ὡς ὅταν διέλωμεν τὸν Σωκράτην εἰς κεφαλήν, πόδας καὶ χεῖρας: οὔτε γὰρ ἡ κεφαλὴ οὔτε οἱ πόδες οὔτε αἱ χεῖρες ἐπιδέχονται τὸ ὄνομα ἢ τὸν ὁρισμὸν τοῦ Σωκράτους οὔτε ἀλλήλων. _ἢ ὡς ὁμώνυμος φωνὴ εἰς διάφορα σημαινόμενα, καὶ τοῦτο διχῶς: ἢ ὡς ὅλον ἢ ὡς μέρος. Ὡς ὅλον μὲν ὡς ἡ κύων φωνή: φέρεται γὰρ κατά τε χερσαίου κυνὸς καὶ ἀστρῴου καὶ θαλαττίου, ἅπερ ὅλον τί εἰσι καὶ οὐ μέρος ζῴου: ὡς δὲ μέρος, ὅτε τὸ τῆς γλώσσης ὄνομα φέρεται κατὰ τοῦ ἄκρου τοῦ ὑποδήματος καὶ τοῦ ἄκρου τοῦ αὐλοῦ καὶ τοῦ γευστικοῦ μορίου τῶν ζῴων, ἅτινα μέρη εἰσὶ καὶ οὐχ ὅλα. _ἢ ὡς οὐσία εἰς συμβεβηκότα, ὡς ὅταν εἴπω: Τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μέν εἰσι λευκοὶ οἱ δὲ μέλανες: _ἢ ὡς συμβεβηκότα εἰς οὐσίας, ὡς ὅταν εἴπω: Τῶν λευκῶν τὰ μὲν ἔμψυχα τὰ δὲ ἄψυχα: _ἢ ὡς συμβεβηκὸς εἰς συμβεβηκότα, ὡς ὅταν εἴπω: Τῶν ψυχρῶν τὰ μὲν ξηρὰ τὰ δὲ ὑγρά, _ἢ ὡς τὰ ἀφ' ἑνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἕν: ἀφ' ἑνὸς μὲν ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἰατρικὸν βιβλίον, ἰατρικὸν ἐργαλεῖον, πρὸς ἓν δὲ ὡς ὑγιεινὸν φάρμακον, ὑγιεινὸν βρῶμα: πρὸς ἓν γὰρ βλέπουσι, τὴν ὑγίειαν. Κατὰ τοῦτον οὖν τὸν τρόπον διαιρεῖται τὸ ὂν εἰς οὐσίαν καὶ συμβεβηκός. Δεῖ δὲ γινώσκειν, ὡς οὐδὲ ἐν ἑνὶ τρόπῳ τῆς διαιρέσεως θεωρεῖται ἐν τοῖς τμήμασι τὸ φύσει πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον οὐδὲ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, εἰ μὴ ἐν τοῖς ἀφ' ἑνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἕν.