Chapter 51

Quality is that by which things are termed as being of such a sort. And again, quality is that from which those things which share it derive their names. Thus, from ‘prudence one who possesses prudence is said to be ‘prudent,’ and he who enjoys ‘warmth’ is said to be ‘warm.’

One should know that to tcoiov, or the being of such a sort, is more general than the quality. This is because the being of such a sort signifies both the quality and the thing which possesses it, that is, the quality, as ‘the warm,’ signifies that which has warmth. For, those who possess the quality are of such a sort, as, for example, those who have warmth are called ‘warm.’ And they who are warm are of such sort, but the warmth itself is a quality. Oftentimes, however, this quality is called of such a sort, and it is the same way with quantum and quantity.

Some of the qualities exist in animate and rational bodies, as various kinds of knowledge and virtues, sicknesses and health. And these are called habits and dispositions. Others exist in both animate and inanimate bodies, as heat and cold, form and shape, potency and impotency. Of these, some are potential and some actual. Now, if they are potential, they cause potency and impotency. If, on the other hand, they are actual, then either they will pervade the whole—as heat pervades the whole fire and as whiteness pervades all the milk and all the snow, and produce a passion and a passive quality —or they will be superficial and produce shape and form. There are, then, four kinds of quality: (1) habit and disposition, (2) potency and impotency, (3) affection and passive quality, and (4) shape and form.

Moreover, habit differs from disposition, because the habit does not change easily and is more permanent. Take prudence, for example, for one does not quickly change from prudence to imprudence. Similarly, knowledge may be a habit, too, for, when a person attains a thorough scientific understanding of something, this knowledge becomes firmly fixed in him and is hard to change. And the same is true of manliness, and discretion, and justice. Dispositions, however, are the easily moved and quickly changed, as, for instance, heat, cold, sickness, health, and the like. Thus, man is subject to these and he changes rapidly from hot to cold and from sick to healthy. These same, however—sickness, for example, health, and the like—will be habits if they are lasting and hard to change. Moreover, the term disposition is more general, because, since man is somehow ‘disposed" to them, they are both called ‘dispositions. On the contrary, that which is easily changed is called ‘disposition only.

A second kind of quality is that of potency and impotency. These are not in act, but they have a natural aptitude or power, or a natural inaptitude. Thus, we say that a boy is potentially musical because this boy, even though he does not actually possess the art of music, has an aptitude for its attainment. The brute beast, however, is unmusical, because it neither possesses the art of music nor is capable of attaining it. And that which is hard has the potentiality of not being speedily divided into parts.

A third kind of quality is the passive quality and the affection, such as heat, cold, whiteness, blackness, and the like. Now, the affection, like the disposition, is easily lost, as when one might blush for shame or turn pale from fear. The passive quality, on the other hand, is not easily altered or changed. Moreover, some of the passive qualities do not originate in an affection, that is to say, they do not come from anything extrinsic, but are intrinsic to the substance. It is in this way that the heat is present in the fire and the sweetness in the honey. For, neither is the heat extrinsic to the fire nor is the sweetness to the honey; and, since such things do not have prior existence, neither did they acquire heat and sweetness subsequently. Nevertheless, as far as our senses are concerned, they produce the same affection. Thus, because the fire is hot, it heats us; and because the honey is sweet, it tastes sweet to us. Other passive qualities, however, do originate in some affection, or temperament. These do at times produce an affection in our senses, but this is not the same affection and quality that they have. Such, for example, are colors. Thus, a whiteness arising from some affection and temperament will produce an affection in the eyes, that is to say, perception in the eyes, opening up of the eyes, and lighting up of the eyes, but it will not make us white. Now, the passive quality which is not extrinsic will either be inherent in the entire species, as is heat in all fire, or will not be, as blackness in the Ethiopians—for not all men are black. What is more, this third kind of quality is considered not only in connection with the body, but also in connection with the soul.

A fourth kind of quality is shape and form. Shape occurs in both animate and inanimate bodies, but form only in the animate. Thus, if one were to use the terms form or well-formed in regard to inanimate bodies, this would not be a proper use but an abuse of terms. Now, the term shape is the more general, because, whereas form is also called shape, the shape of inanimate things is not called their form. Moreover, straighteness, or erectness, and crookedness, or distortion, belong to quality.

One should know that in most cases the things which are of a sort derive their names from the qualities, as ‘hot comes from ‘heat. Some of them, however, get their names by equivocation. Thus, pouaiKr| or music, is the knowledge of music, but pouaiKi^, or musical, is what the woman who possesses this knowledge is. Still others, though rarely, have names which are entirely different. Thus, ‘upright comes from ‘virtue with a different name, for he who is virtuous is also called ‘upright.

One should know that the term affection is used in two ways. Thus, it may be said in respect to that which has already been affected, in which case it will come under the category of quality, as the garment which has already been made white is called white. Or it may be said in respect to that which is being affected now, in which case it will come under the category of passion, as with that which has not yet been made white but is being whitened now.

One should know that qualities are not corporeal but are incorporeal, for, if they were bodies, they would fall in the category of substance. All accidents too, are incorporeal and in themselves have no existence, unless they are considered in the substance.

One should know that the essential qualities come under substance, for they are parts of substance and divide it, and they are included in the definitions of the species of substance. Now, under whatever category the whole comes, under that category all its parts will also come. Heaviness and lightness are either considered in masses, as with things which are being weighed, and come under quantity; or they are considered in a substance, as in the elements, say, of fire and earth, in which case they come under substance, because they are essential differences. It is the same with density and rarity, or tenuousness, for either they will belong to the essence of the elements and come under substance, or they will be non-essential and come under the category of position, as in garments, for in such a case they are positions.

Quality has three properties or attributes. The first is that it admits of contrariety. Thus, heat is contrary to cold and white to black. The second is that they admit of more and less, for, where there is contrariety, there will also be more and less. The more is an increase in intensity, and the less a decrease. Therefore, it is possible to say that this species is more white and less cold than this other species. The third attribute and that which is most proper is that of like and unlike. Nevertheless, one must know that shape has no contrary.

(One should know that not all privations are expressed negatively. On the contrary, they may also be expressed positively, as blindness and deafness. And again, not every species is termed positively, for some may also be termed negatively. For example, although ‘intemperance’ is a species, it has been given not a positive name but a negative one. Declaration is called an affirmation, as would be ‘he is noble. Denial, however, is a negation, as would be ‘he is not noble.’ But, when we say ‘lawless,’ the less implies negation just as much as does the particle not.)

Moreover, if this particular whiteness is said to be equal to this other, it is not as a quality that it is said to be equal, but as a quantity. And, since similarity and dissimilarity are considered in place, too, the equality of this surface to this other does not lie in its quantity but in its sharing quality.

[37] {Περὶ ποιοῦ καὶ ποιότητος.} Ποιότης ἐστί, καθ' ἣν ποιοί τινες ὀνομάζονται. Καὶ πάλιν ποιότης ἐστί, καθ' ἣν παρωνύμως τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῆς λέγεται: ἐκ τῆς φρονήσεως φρόνιμος λέγεται ὁ ἔχων τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ θερμὸς ὁ μετέχων θερμότητος. Χρὴ δὲ εἰδέναι, ὅτι τὸ ποιὸν καθολικώτερόν ἐστι τῆς ποιότητος: τὸ γὰρ ποιὸν σημαίνει τὴν ποιότητα καὶ τὸ μετέχον αὐτῆς ἤγουν τὴν θερμότητα καὶ τὸ θερμόν, τὸ ἔχον τὴν θερμότητα: ποιοὶ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν οἱ ἔχοντες τὴν ποιότητα, οἷον οἱ ἔχοντες θερμότητα θερμοὶ λέγονται. Οἱ μὲν θερμοὶ ποιοί εἰσιν, ἡ δὲ θερμότης ποιότης. Λέγεται δὲ πολλάκις καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ποιότης ποιόν, ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ καὶ τῆς ποσότητος. Τῶν δὲ ποιοτήτων αἱ μὲν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις [38] [καὶ λογικοῖς] ἐνυπάρχουσι σώμασιν ὡς ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ ἀρεταί, νόσοι καὶ ὑγίεια, καὶ λέγονται ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις, αἱ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐμψύχοις καὶ τοῖς ἀψύχοις ὡς θερμότης, ψύξις, μορφή, σχῆμα, δύναμις καὶ ἀδυναμία. Τούτων δὲ αἱ μέν εἰσι δυνάμει, αἱ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ: καὶ εἰ μὲν δυνάμει, ποιοῦσι δύναμιν καὶ ἀδυναμίαν: εἰ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ, ἢ διὰ βάθους κεχωρήκασιν, ὡς ἡ θερμότης δι' ὅλου τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ ἡ λευκότης δι' ὅλου τοῦ γάλακτος καὶ τῆς χιόνος καὶ ποιεῖ πάθος καὶ παθητικὴν ποιότητα, ἢ ἐπιπολῆς καὶ ποιοῦσι σχῆμα καὶ μορφήν. Εἰσὶν οὖν τῆς ποιότητος εἴδη τέσσαρα: ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις, δύναμις καὶ ἀδυναμία, πάθος καὶ παθητικὴ ποιότης, σχῆμα καὶ μορφή. Διαφέρει δὲ ἕξις διαθέσεως, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἕξις δυσμετάβλητός ἐστι καὶ χρονιωτέρα οἷον ἡ φρόνησις: οὐ γὰρ ταχὺ μεταβάλλεταί τις τῆς φρονήσεως εἰς ἀφροσύνην. Ὁμοίως καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ὅτε ἀκριβῶς τις ἐπίσταται, δυσμετάβλητός ἐστιν ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ γνῶσις, ἕξις ἐστί, καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ὁμοίως. Διαθέσεις δέ εἰσι τὰ εὐκίνητα καὶ ταχέως μεταβάλλοντα οἷον θερμότης, ψύξις, νόσος, ὑγίεια καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα: διάκειται μὲν γὰρ κατὰ ταῦτα ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ταχέως δὲ μεταβάλλεται ἐκ θερμοῦ ψυχρὸς γινόμενος καὶ ἐκ νόσου ὑγιής. Καὶ αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα οἷον ἡ νόσος καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐὰν ὦσι μόνιμα καὶ δυσμετάβλητα, ἕξεις εἰσί. Καθολικωτέρα δέ ἐστιν ἡ διάθεσις: ἀμφότεραι μὲν γὰρ διαθέσεις λέγονται, διάκειται γάρ πως κατὰ ταύτας ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν δυσμετάβλητος διάθεσις ἕξις λέγεται, ἡ δὲ εὐμετάβλητος διάθεσις μόνον. Δεύτερον εἶδος ποιότητος δύναμις καὶ ἀδυναμία, ἅτινα οὔκ εἰσιν ἐνεργείᾳ, ἔχουσι δὲ ἐπιτηδειότητα καὶ δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀνεπιτηδειότητα, ὥς φαμεν τὸν μὲν παῖδα δυνάμει μουσικόν, εἰ γὰρ καὶ μὴ ἔχει ἐνεργείᾳ τὴν μουσικήν, ἀλλ' ἔχει ἐπιτηδειότητα πρὸς τὸ δέξασθαι τὴν μουσικήν, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον ἄμουσον ὡς μήτε ἐνεργείᾳ ἔχον τὴν μουσικὴν μήτε δυνάμενον αὐτὴν δέξασθαι: καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν δὲ δύναμιν ἔχει τοῦ μὴ ταχέως διαιρεῖσθαι. Τρίτον εἶδος παθητικὴ ποιότης καὶ πάθος οἷον θερμότης, λευκότης, ψύξις, μελανία καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Τὸ μὲν οὖν πάθος εὐαπόβλητόν ἐστιν ὡς ἡ διάθεσις, ὡς ἄν τις ἢ διὰ αἰδὼ ἢ διὰ φόβον ὠχριάσῃ ἢ ἐρυθριάσῃ, ἡ δὲ παθητικὴ ποιότης δυσκίνητος καὶ δυσμετάβλητός ἐστι. Τῶν δὲ παθητικῶν ποιοτήτων τινὲς μὲν ἀπὸ πάθους οὐ γεγένηνται ἤγουν οὐκ ἀλλαχόθεν, ἀλλὰ κατ' οὐσίαν ὑπάρχουσιν ὡς τῷ πυρὶ ἡ θερμότης καὶ τῷ μέλιτι ἡ γλυκύτης: οὔτε γὰρ τῷ πυρὶ ἐπίκτητος ἡ θερμότης οὐδὲ τῷ μέλιτι ἡ γλυκύτης, οὔτε πρότερον μὴ ὄντα τοιαῦτα ὕστερον προσελάβοντο τὴν θερμότητα καὶ τὴν γλυκύτητα, ὅμως δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ποιοῦσι κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν αἴσθησιν: τὸ μὲν γὰρ πῦρ θερμὸν ὂν θερμαίνει ἡμᾶς καὶ τὸ μέλι γλυκὺ ὂν γλυκαίνει ἡμᾶς: _τινὲς δὲ ἀπό τινος πάθους ἤγουν κράσεως γεγόνασι καὶ ποιοῦσιν ἐνίοτε πάθος κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν αἴσθησιν ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ποιότητα, ἣν ἔχουσιν, οἷά εἰσι τὰ χρώματα: τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν ἔκ τινος πάθους καὶ κράσεως γινόμενον πάθος μὲν ποιεῖ περὶ τὴν ὅρασιν ἤγουν τὴν διάκρισιν καὶ ἐξάπλωσιν καὶ φωτισμόν, οὐ λευκαίνει δὲ ἡμᾶς. Ἡ οὖν παθητικὴ ἡ μὴ οὖσα ἐπίκτητος ἢ παντὶ τῷ εἴδει ἐνυπάρχει ὡς ἡ θερμότης ὅλῳ τῷ πυρί, ἢ οὐ παντὶ ὡς ἡ μελανία τοῖς Αἰθίοψιν: οὐ γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι μέλανες. Ταῦτα δὲ οὐ μόνον περὶ σῶμα θεωρεῖται ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ψυχήν. Τέταρτον εἶδος ποιότητος σχῆμα καὶ μορφή. Τὸ μὲν οὖν σχῆμα ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων φέρεται, ἡ δὲ μορφὴ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων μόνον. Εἰ δὲ ῥηθῇ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων μορφὴ ἢ εὔμορφον, οὐ κυρίως ἀλλὰ καταχρηστικῶς λέγεται. Καθολικώτερον οὖν ἐστι τὸ σχῆμα: καὶ ἡ μορφὴ γὰρ καλεῖται σχῆμα. Τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀψύχων σχῆμα οὐ καλεῖται μορφή. Ἡ δὲ εὐθύτης ἤγουν ὀρθότης καὶ ἡ καμπυλότης ἤγουν στρεβλότης τῆς ποιότητός εἰσιν. Χρὴ γινώσκειν, ὅτι τὰ ποιὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τῶν ποιοτήτων λέγονται ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς θερμότητος θερμόν, τινὰ δὲ καὶ ὁμωνύμως ὡς μουσικὴ ἐπιστήμη καὶ μουσικὴ γυνὴ ἡ ἔχουσα τὴν μουσικὴν ἐπιστήμην, τινὰ δέ, εἰ καὶ σπανίως, ἑτερωνύμως ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς σπουδαῖος: ὁ γὰρ ἐνάρετος σπουδαῖος λέγεται. Χρὴ γινώσκειν, ὅτι τὸ πάθος διττόν: ἢ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἤδη πεπονθέναι λέγεται, καὶ ἀνάγεται ὑπὸ τὴν ποιότητα, ὡς τὸ ἤδη λελευκασμένον ἱμάτιον λέγεται λευκόν, ἢ ἐν τῷ νῦν πάσχειν, καὶ ἀνάγεται ὑπὸ τὴν τοῦ πάσχειν κατηγορίαν, ὡς τὸ μήπω λευκανθὲν ἀλλὰ νῦν λευκαινόμενον. Χρὴ γινώσκειν, ὡς οὔκ εἰσιν αἱ ποιότητες σώματα ἀλλὰ ἀσώματοι. Εἰ γὰρ ἦσαν σώματα, ὑπὸ τὴν οὐσίαν ἦσαν: καὶ πάντα δὲ τὰ συμβεβηκότα ἀσώματά εἰσι καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἀνύπαρκτα, εἰ μὴ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ θεωρηθῶσι. Χρὴ γινώσκειν, ὅτι αἱ οὐσιώδεις ποιότητες ὑπὸ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀνάγονται: μέρη γὰρ αὐτῆς εἰσιν ὡς διαιροῦντα αὐτὴν καὶ εἰς τὸν ὁρισμὸν τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτῆς λαμβανόμενα, ὑφ' ἣν δὲ κατηγορίαν τὸ ὅλον, ὑπὸ ταύτην καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ ἀναχθήσονται. Τὸ βαρὺ καὶ κοῦφον ἢ ἐν ὄγκοις θεωρεῖται ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν σταθμιζομένων καὶ ἀνάγεται ὑπὸ τὸ ποσόν, ἢ ἐν οὐσίᾳ ὡς ἐν τοῖς στοιχείοις ἤγουν πυρὶ καὶ γῇ καὶ ἀνάγονται ὑπὸ τὴν οὐσίαν ὡς οὐσιώδεις διαφοραί, ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν καὶ μανὸν ἤγουν ἀραιόν: ἢ γὰρ οὐσιωδῶς ἐν τοῖς στοιχείοις καὶ ἀνάγονται ὑπὸ τὴν οὐσίαν, ἢ ἐπεισάκτως ἐν ἱματίοις καὶ ἀνάγονται ὑπὸ τὴν κεῖσθαι κατηγορίαν, θέσει γάρ εἰσι. Τρία δέ εἰσιν ἴδια τῆς ποιότητος ἤγουν παρακολουθήματα: πρῶτον τὸ ἐναντιότητα ἐπιδέχεσθαι: τὸ γὰρ θερμὸν ἐναντίον τῷ ψυχρῷ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι: δεύτερον τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον: ἔνθα γὰρ ἐναντιότης ἐστί, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον εὑρίσκεται. Τὸ δὲ μᾶλλόν ἐστιν ἐπίτασις, καὶ τὸ ἧττον ὕφεσις. Ἐνδέχεται οὖν εἰπεῖν τόδε τὸ εἶδος μᾶλλον τοῦδε λευκὸν καὶ ἧττον ψυχρόν. Τρίτον παρακολούθημα, τὸ καὶ ἰδιώτατον τοῦ ποιοῦ, τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον. Δεῖ δὲ γινώσκειν, ὅτι τὸ σχῆμα οὐκ ἔχει ἐναντίον. Χρὴ γινώσκειν, ὅτι οὐ πᾶσαι αἱ στερήσεις ἀποφατικῶς λέγονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ στερήσεις εἰσὶ καταφατικῶς λεγόμεναι ὡς τυφλότης καὶ κωφότης. Καὶ πάλιν οὐ πᾶν εἶδος καταφατικῶς ὀνομάζεται ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποφατικῶς, ὥσπερ ἡ ἀκολασία εἶδος οὖσα οὐ καταφατικῶς ἀλλ' ἀποφατικῶς ὠνομάσθη: ἡ γὰρ κατάθεσις κατάφασις λέγεται οἷον ‘καλός ἐστιν’, ἡ δὲ ἄρνησις ἀπόφασις οἷον ‘οὐκ ἔστι καλός’: ὅτε δὲ λέγομεν ‘ἄνομος εἶ’, τὸ « α » ἄρνησιν σημαίνει ὡς τὸ οὔ. Εἰ δὲ λέγεται τόδε τὸ λευκὸν ἴσον εἶναι τῷδε τῷ λευκῷ, οὐ καθὸ ποιότης λέγεται ἴσον εἶναι ἀλλὰ καθὸ ποσότης καὶ τὸ εἶναι τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν ταύτην ἴσην ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ, ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον θεωρεῖται οὐ καθὸ ποσόν, ἀλλὰ καθὸ μετέχει ποιότητος.