ARTICLE III

In the Third Article We Ask: ARE THE IRASCIBLE AND THE CONCUPISCIBLE POWERS ONLY IN THE LOWER APPETITE OR ALSO IN

THE HIGHER?

Difficulties:

It seems that they are also in the higher, for

1. The higher appetite extends to more things than the lower, since it is concerned with both corporeal and spiritual things. Now if the lower appetite is divided into two powers, the irascible and the concupiscible, then all the more should the higher be so divided.

2. To the higher part of the soul pertain those powers which belong to it alone, for the lower powers are common to the soul and the body. But the irascible and the concupiscible are powers of the soul alone. Thus it is said in Spirit and Soul: "The soul has these powers before being commingled with the body, since they are natural to it and are nothing but the soul itself as a whole. For the full and complete substance of the soul consists in these three: rationality, concupiscibility, and irascibility." Consequently the irascible and the concupiscible powers pertain to the higher appetite.

3. According to the Philosopher only the rational part of the soul is separable from the body. But the irascible and the concupiscible powers remain in the soul when it is separated from the body, as is said in Spirit and Soul. They therefore belong to the rational part.

4. The image of the Trinity is to be sought in the higher part of the soul. But according to some the image is ascribed to the rational, the irascible, and the concupiscible powers. Hence the irascible and the concupiscible belong to the higher part of the soul.

5. Charity is said to be in the concupiscible power; hope, in the irascible. But charity and hope are not found in the sensitive appetite, which cannot extend to immaterial things. The irascible and the concupiscible powers are therefore not only in the lower appetite but also in the higher.

6. Those powers are called human which man has beyond the other animals and which belong to the higher part of the soul. But two kinds of irascible powers are distinguished by the masters: one human and another not human; and the same is done with the concupiscible. The powers in question are therefore not only in the lower appetite but are also in the higher.

7. The operations of the sensitive powers, both apprehensive and appetitive, do not remain in the separated soul because they are exercised through organs of the body; otherwise the sensitive soul in brutes would be incorruptible, as being capable of having its operation by itself. But in the separated soul there remain joy and sadness, love and fear, and the like, which are attributed to the irascible and the concupiscible powers. The irascible and concupiscible powers are therefore not only in the sensitive part but also in the intellective.

To the Contrary:

Damascene, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Philosopher hold that they are in sense appetite only.

REPLY:

Since the acts of the appetitive parts presuppose the act of the apprehensive, the distinction of the appetitive parts from each other is also somewhat similar to the distinction of the apprehensive.

Among the apprehensive faculties we find that the higher apprehensive remains one and undivided with reference to things regarding which the lower apprehensive faculties are distinguished. By one and the same intellective power we come to know as to their natures all sensible things with reference to which the sense powers are distinguished. According to Augustine what a man sees and what he hears is different externally, but internally in the intellect it is the same. And the same is to be said of the appetitive powers: the higher appetitive is one and the same in regard to all the objects of appetite, though the lower appetitive powers are distinguished in regard to all the different appetible objects.

The reason for this is found in the nature of each. The higher power has a universal object; the lower powers have particular objects. Many things correspond essentially to particulars which have only an accidental reference to something universal. Since it is not an accidental difference but only an essential one which distinguishes a species, the lower powers are found to be specifically distinct while the higher power remains undivided. It is clear, for example, that the object of the intellect is the what, and that the same faculty of intellect extends to all things that have quiddity and is not distinguished by any differences that do not differentiate the very notion of quiddity. But since the object of sense is a body, which is capable of moving the sense organ, the sensitive powers must be differentiated according to differences in the manner of moving. Sight and hearing are accordingly distinct powers because color and sound move the sense in different ways.

The same is true of the appetitive powers. For the object of higher appetite is good taken absolutely, as was said above, whereas the object of the lower appetite is a thing in some way advantageous to the animal. But the arduous and the pleasurable are not suited to the animal under the same aspect, as appears from what has been said. Consequently the object of lower appetite is thereby essentially diversified, but not the object of higher appetite, which tends to what is good absolutely in any way whatever.

It should, however, be borne in mind that, just as the intellect has some of its operations directed to the same things as the senses, but in a higher way, since it knows universally and immaterially what sense knows materially and in particular; in the same way higher appetite has some of its operations directed to the same things as the lower appetites, though in a higher way. For the lower appetites tend to their objects materially and accompanied by a bodily passion; and it is from these passions that the irascible and concupiscible get their names. Now higher appetite has certain acts similar to those of lower appetite, though without any passion. The operations of higher appetite are accordingly sometimes given the names of passions. Thus the will for revenge is called "anger," and the repose of the will in some object of spiritual affection is called "love." By the same process the will itself which produces these acts is sometimes called "irascible" or "concupiscible," not properly but by a figure of speech; and even so there is no implication in this that there are in the will two distinct powers corresponding to the irascible and the concupiscible.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Even though the higher appetite extends to more things than the lower, yet, because it has good in general as its proper object, it is not divided into several powers.

2. That book is not Augustine's, nor need it be accepted as an authority. We can nevertheless say that it is either speaking of the irascible and concupiscible powers figuratively, or it is speaking of them from the point of view of their source; for all of the powers, even the sensitive, flow from the essence of the soul.

3. There are two opinions on the sensitive powers of the soul. Some say that these powers remain in the separated soul essentially; others say that they remain in the essence of the soul radically. And whichever opinion is taken, the irascible and the concupiscible powers do not remain in any other way than the rest of the sensitive powers. Thus it is said in the work mentioned that when withdrawing from the body, the soul takes with it sense and imagination.

4. In his work The Trinity Augustine investigates many sorts of trinities in our soul in which there is some resemblance to the uncreated Trinity, though the image in the proper sense of the term exists only in the mind. By reason of the resemblance mentioned some place the image in the rational, irascible, and concupiscible powers, though this is not said in a proper sense.

5. Charity and hope are not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, properly speaking, since the love of charity and the expectation of hope are without any passion. But charity is said to be in the concupiscible power inasmuch as it is in the will, viewed as having acts like those of the concupiscible; and in the same way hope is said to be in the irascible.

6. The irascible and concupiscible powers are said to be human or rational, not by their essence, as if they belonged to the higher part of the soul, but by participation, inasmuch as they obey reason and participate in its rule, as Damascene again says.

7. Joy and fear, which are passions, do not remain in the separated soul, since they take place with a bodily change. But there remain acts of the will similar to those passions.