Disputed Questions on Truth (De Veritate)

 QUESTION ONE

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 QUESTION TWO

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 ARTICLE XIV

 ARTICLE XV

 QUESTION THREE

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 QUESTION FOUR

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 QUESTION FIVE

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 QUESTION SIX

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 QUESTION SEVEN

 ARTICLE I

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 QUESTION EIGHT

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 ARTICLE XIV

 ARTICLE XV

 ARTICLE XVI

 ARTICLE XVII

 QUESTION NINE

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

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 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 REFERENCES

 QUESTION TEN

 ARTICLE I

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 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

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 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

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 ARTICLE XII

 ARTICLE XIII

 QUESTION ELEVEN

 ARTICLE I

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 ARTICLE IV

 QUESTION TWELVE

 ARTICLE I

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 ARTICLE IV

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 ARTICLE XIII

 ARTICLE XIV

 QUESTION THIRTEEN

 ARTICLE I

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 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 QUESTION FOURTEEN

 ARTICLE I

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 ARTICLE XII

 QUESTION FIFTEEN

 ARTICLE I

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 ARTICLE V

 QUESTION SIXTEEN

 ARTICLE I

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 QUESTION SEVENTEEN

 ARTICLE I

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 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 QUESTION EIGHTEEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

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 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

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 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

 QUESTION NINETEEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 QUESTION TWENTY

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 REFERENCES

 QUESTION TEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

 ARTICLE IX

 ARTICLE X

 ARTICLE XI

 ARTICLE XII

 ARTICLE XIII

 QUESTION ELEVEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 QUESTION TWELVE

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

 ARTICLE IX

 ARTICLE X

 ARTICLE XI

 ARTICLE XII

 ARTICLE XIII

 ARTICLE XIV

 QUESTION THIRTEEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 QUESTION FOURTEEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

 ARTICLE IX

 ARTICLE X

 ARTICLE XI

 ARTICLE XII

 QUESTION FIFTEEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 QUESTION SIXTEEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 QUESTION SEVENTEEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 QUESTION EIGHTEEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

 QUESTION NINETEEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 QUESTION TWENTY

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 QUESTION TWENTY-ONE

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 QUESTION TWENTY-TWO

 ARTICLE I

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 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

 ARTICLE IX

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 ARTICLE XI

 ARTICLE XII

 ARTICLE XIII

 ARTICLE XIV

 ARTICLE XV

 QUESTION TWENTY-THREE

 ARTICLE I

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 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

 QUESTION TWENTY-FOUR

 ARTICLE I

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 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

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 ARTICLE VIII

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 ARTICLE XII

 ARTICLE XIII

 ARTICLE XIV

 ARTICLE XV

 QUESTION TWENTY-FIVE

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 QUESTION TWENTY-SIX

 ARTICLE I

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 QUESTION TWENTY-SEVEN

 ARTICLE I

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 ARTICLE VII

 QUESTION TWENTY-EIGHT

 ARTICLE I

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 ARTICLE VIII

 ARTICLE IX

 QUESTION TWENTY-NINE

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

ARTICLE IV

In the Fourth Article We Ask: DOES ONE ANGEL SPEAK TO ANOTHER?

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

1. Commenting on the words of Job (28:17), "Gold or crystal cannot equal it," Gregory says: "In heaven everyone will be seen by others as now he does not even see himself." But while on earth a person does not have to speak to himself in order to know his own idea. Consequently, in heaven it will not be necessary for him to speak to another so that he can know it. Hence, speech is unnecessary for beatified angels.

2. In the same passage, Gregory writes: "When one's face is seen, in the same instant, his conscience will be penetrated." Therefore, in heaven speech is not required for one person to know another's concept.

3. Referring to angels, Maximus writes as follows: "When spiritual creatures meet and leave each other, one knows far more clearly what the other wishes to convey than were they to speak to each other. For, in some way, they silently discuss things and communicate their thoughts to each other." Now, since silence is opposed to speech, angels know what other angels want to signify, without having to speak.

4. All speech takes place through signs. Now, a sign must be something that can be sensed, because, as is said in the Sentences: "A sign is that which, besides impressing a species upon the senses, makes something else known." Consequently, since angels do not receive their knowledge from sensible things, they do not receive it by means of signs, and, hence, not through speech.

5. A sign seems to be something that is more known to us but less known according to nature. Accordingly, the Commentator distinguishes between a demonstration through a sign and a perfect demonstration, the latter being a demonstration which is causal. Now, angels do not receive their knowledge from things posterior in nature, consequently, not from signs. Hence, they do not receive knowledge by means of speech.

6. In all speech the speaker must arouse his listener to attention to his words, which, in our case, are produced by the voice of the speaker. But to listen to words of this kind is impossible for an angel. Therefore, speech is likewise impossible for him.

7. As Plato says, speech was given to us so we could know signs of others' wills. But one angel knows the signs of another angel's will by knowing himself, because these signs are spiritual, and, by the same knowledge, an angel knows all spiritual things. Hence, since one angel knows the spiritual nature of another angel by knowing himself in the same way he knows his will. Therefore, he has no need of speech.

8. The forms within an angelic intellect are ordered to the knowledge of things, as in God the intelligible characters of things are ordered to their production, for angels' intellectual forms resemble these characters. Now, all things and whatever exists in a thing, whether it be interior or exterior, are produced by means of these intelligible characters. Therefore, when an angel knows another angel by means of the forms within his own intellect, he also knows all that is within that angel; and, as a consequence, he knows that angel's thought. Hence, the same must be said as before.

9. We have two kinds of speech, namely, internal and external. Now, we do not say that there is external speech in angels, because, if this were true, angels would have to form vocal speech to speak to each other. However, as Anselm and Augustine say, "Internal speech is nothing other than thought." Therefore, it is not necessary to assert that there exists in angels any kind of speech other than thought.

10. Avicenna says that we speak because we have a multitude of desires. This evidently arises from our many needs, because, as Augustine remarks, we desire a thing only if we do not have it. Now, since we cannot say that angels need many things, we cannot say that they speak to one another.

11. One angel cannot know another's thought through its essence, because it is not present through its essence, to the other's intellect. Hence, he must know the other's thought by means of a species. Now, of himself, an angel is able to know, by means of innate species, all that naturally exists in another angel. For the same reason, therefore, through these same species he knows all that takes place by the will of the other angel. Hence, it does not seem necessary to affirm the existence of speech in angels in order that one can make his thought known to another.

12. Signs and nods are directed to the sense of sight, not to that of hearing, but speech is directed to the sense of hearing. Now, angels indicate their thought "by signs and nods," for this is how the Gloss explains that verse in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13:1): "If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels. . . ." Therefore, angels do not use speech to communicate.

13. Speech is a motion of a cognitive power. Now, the motion of a cognitive power terminates in the soul, not in something outside. Therefore, through speech, an angel is not directed to the manifestation of his thought to another angel.

14. In all speech something unknown should be manifested by means of what is known. For example, we manifest our concepts by means of sensible sounds. Now, we cannot say that this is possible for angels, because, as Dionysius says, the nature of an angel, naturally known by other angels, has no shape. Hence, there is nothing in an angel's nature that can be used to indicate what is not known about it. Consequently, for angels speech is impossible.

15. Angels are spiritual lights. But when light is seen it totally manifests itself. Therefore, when an angel is seen, whatever is in him is totally known. Consequently, there is no need for speech among angels.

To the Contrary:

1'. We read in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13:1): "If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels. . . ." Now, tongues would be useless were there not speech. Consequently, angels speak.

2'. As Boethius says, what a lower power can do a higher power also can. Now, men can reveal their thoughts to other men. Therefore, angels can do the same. However, to reveal one's thought means to speak it. Hence, angels possess speech.

3'. Damascene says: "In their discourses, which are not oral, angels tell each other what their wills are, and also what are their plans and their thoughts." Now, discourse can be had only through speech. Therefore, angels possess the power of speech.

REPLY:

There must be some kind of speech among angels, for, as we proved earlier, one angel does not have direct and particular knowledge of what lies hidden in the heart of another; consequently, an angel must have some way of manifesting his thought to another. This way can be called angelic speech, for what we call speech in our own case is simply the manifestation of an interior word, which we mentally conceive.

We can understand how angels manifest their concepts to one another if we study the resemblance their speech has to things in nature, because, as Boethius says, forms in nature are quasi-images of immaterial things. Now, we find that a form exists in matter in three ways. First, it can exist imperfectly, that is, in a mode halfway between potency and act. This, for example, is how forms exist that are coming into existence. Second, it can exist in perfect act; and I mean a perfection such that the being having it is perfected in itself. Third, it can exist in perfect act in such a way that the being having the form also can communicate this perfection to another. Some things are bright themselves, but cannot illumine other things.

Intelligible forms exist in the intellect in a similar way. First, they can exist, as it were, halfway between potency and act, as a form possessed habitually. Second, they may exist in perfect act with respect to the knower. This is true when a knower actually thinks according to a form which he has within himself. Third, they may exist with a relation to some other being; and their transition from one being to the other (a transition, as it were, from potency to act) is made through the will. For the will of an angel causes him to turn actually to the forms he possesses, as it were, habitually; and, similarly, it makes his intellect actually more perfect with respect to the form within him, so that the angel is perfected, not only by this intellectual form itself, but also by the relation it has to another angel. When this takes place, his thought is perceived by the other angels; and, in this sense, one angel is said to speak to another.

We would have the same way of speaking if our intellect could be directed to intelligibles without having to have recourse to media; but, because it is the nature of our intelligence to receive from the senses, sensible signs are used to express our interior concepts, and by these signs we manifest our heart's thoughts.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Gregory's statement can be understood of both physical and spiritual vision; for in heaven, after the bodies of the saints have been glorified, a saint will be able to see with his physical eyes the interior of another's body--something which is now impossible. It will be possible then, because glorified bodies will in some way be transparent. For this reason, Gregory compares them to glass. Similarly, one will be able to see with his spiritual eyes whether or not another person has charity, and, if so, how much he possesses--something which is likewise impossible now. From this it does not follow, however, that one will be able to know the actual thoughts of another, because these depend on the will.

2. The conscience is said to be penetrated, but this is with respect to its habits, not to its actual thoughts.

3. In this statement, silence is opposed to oral speech such as we have, not to spiritual speech such as angels have.

4. A thing cannot be called a sign in the proper sense unless one can come to know something else as if by reasoning from it. In this sense, signs do not exist among angels, because, as we proved in the previous question, angels' knowledge is not discursive. The signs we use are sensible, because our knowledge, which is discursive, has its origin in sense-objects. But we commonly call anything a sign which, being known, leads to the knowledge of something else; and for this reason an intelligible form can be called a sign of the thing which is known by its means. It is in this sense that angels know things through signs; and thus one angel speaks to another by means of signs, that is, through a species which actuates his intellect and puts it perfectly in relation to the other.

5. Although it is true that in natural things, whose effects are more known to us than their causes are, a sign is that which is posterior in nature, the notion of a sign, even properly speaking, is not such that a sign need be prior or posterior in nature, but only that it must be known previously by us. For this reason, at times we take effects as signs of causes, as when we judge health from the pulse, and at other times we take causes as signs of effects, as we take the dispositions of heavenly bodies as signs of stormy weather and rain.

6. When angels turn to others, as long as they put some of their intelligible forms into an actual relation to these others, the angels may be said to be arousing others' attention to them.

7. It is true that an angel knows all spiritual things with the same kind of knowledge, that is, intellectually. But whether the knowledge of a thing comes through knowing oneself or through knowing something else concerns, not the type of knowledge, but only the manner in which this knowledge has been received. Hence, even if one angel knows the nature of another angel by knowing himself, it does not follow that he also knows the speech of the other in the same manner, because the thought of one angel is not as intelligible to another as his nature is.

8. That reasoning would follow if the intellectual forms in an angel were as efficacious for the knowledge of things as the intelligible characters of things in God are for their production. But this is not true, since a creature is not in any respect equal to God.

9. Although angels do not speak exteriorly as we do, namely, through sensible signs, they do speak exteriorly in another manner. The direction of their thoughts to other angels can be called exterior angelic speech.

10. A multitude of desires is said to be the cause of speech merely because desires give rise to a multitude of concepts and these concepts could be expressed only by signs that differ greatly. Now, animals have just a few concepts, which they can express by a few natural signs. But, since angels have many concepts, they need speech. However, their having many concepts is a sign of no desire other than that of one angel's wanting to communicate his mental conception to another angel; and this desire is not a sign that he is imperfect.

11. One angel knows the thought of another through the innate species by which he knows that other angel, because through this same species he knows all that he knows about the other angel. Consequently, as soon as one angel relates himself to another angel according to an act of some form, the other angel knows his thought; and this depends on the will of the first angel. But the knowability of the angelic nature does not depend on the will of the angel. Therefore, angels do not need speech to know the nature of other angels but only to know their thoughts.

12. According to Augustine, sight and hearing differ only exteriorly. Interiorly, in the mind, they are one and the same, because, in the mind, seeing and hearing do not differ. They differ only as they are in the external senses. Consequently, in angels, who have only minds, there is no difference between seeing and hearing. However, angelic speech gets its name from its resemblance to what takes place in us, for we receive our knowledge from others through our sense of hearing. Moreover, we can distinguish between angelic nods and signs in the following way: the species may be called signs, and the reference of the species to others, nods. But the very ability to do this is called their speech.

13. Speech is a motion of a cognitive power; however, the motion is not in the cognition but in the manifestation of the cognition. Hence, this motion must have an order to another being. For this reason, the Philosopher also says: "Speech exists in order that one can signify something to another."

14. The essence of an angel does not have a material shape, but his intellect is, as it were, shaped by its intelligible forms.

15. Physical light manifests itself because of a natural necessity. Consequently, it manifests itself in the same way in regard to everything it contains. An angel, however, possesses a will; and his concepts cannot be manifested unless his will commands that they be manifested. This is why an angel needs speech.