ARTICLE I

The Question Treats of Conscience. In the First Article We Ask: IS CONSCIENCE A POWER, A HABIT, OR AN ACT?

Difficulties (First Series):

It seems to be a power, for

1. After mentioning synderesis, Jerome says: "We see that this conscience is cast down headlong at times." From this it seems that conscience and synderesis are the same thing. But synderesis is in some sense a power. Therefore, conscience is, too.

2. Only a power of the soul is the subject of a vice. But conscience is the subject of the defilement of sin, as is clear from Titus (1:15): "Both their mind and their conscience are defiled." Therefore, conscience is a power.

3. It was said that the defilement is not in conscience as in a subject.--On the contrary, nothing numerically the same can be defiled and clean, unless it is the subject of defilement. But everything which is changed from defilement to cleanness while remaining numerically the same, is clean at one time and defiled at another. Therefore, everything which is changed from defilement to cleanness, or the converse, is a subject of defilement and cleanness. But conscience is changed from defilement to cleanness, according to Hebrews (9:14): "How much more shall the blood of Christ . . . cleanse our conscience from dead works to serve the living God." Therefore, conscience is a power.

4. Conscience is said to be a dictate of reason, a dictate which is nothing else but the judgment of reason. But a judgment of reason pertains to free choice from which it gets its name. Therefore, free choice and conscience seem to be the same thing. But free choice is a power. Therefore, so is conscience.

5. Basil says that conscience is "the natural power of judgment." But the natural power of judgment is synderesis. But synderesis is in some sense a power. Therefore, so is conscience.

6. Sin exists only in the will or in the reason. But sin exists in conscience. Therefore, conscience is the reason or the will. But reason and will are powers. Therefore, conscience is, too.

7. Neither a habit nor an act is said to know. But conscience is said to know, according to Ecclesiastes (7:23): "For thy conscience knoweth that thou also hast often spoken evil of others." Therefore, conscience is not a habit or an act. Therefore, it is a power.

8. Origen says that conscience is "a correcting and guiding spirit accompanying the soul, by which the soul is kept free from evil and made to cling to good." But spirit designates a power or even the essence of the soul. Therefore, conscience designates a power.

9. Conscience is an act, a habit, or a power. But it is not an act, because it does not always remain in act, for its act is not present in one who is asleep. Yet one who is asleep is said to have conscience. Nor is it a habit. Therefore, it is a power.

Difficulties (Second Series):

1. That it is not a habit is shown in this way: No habit of reason deals with individual things. But conscience is concerned with particular acts. Therefore, conscience is not a habit of reason. It is not a habit of any other power since conscience pertains to reason.

2. In reason there are only speculative and operative habits. But conscience is not a speculative habit, since it has an ordination to activity. Nor is it an operative habit, since it is neither an art nor prudence. And the Philosopher puts only these in the operative part. Therefore, conscience is not a habit.

That it is not an art is clear. That it is not prudence is proved in this way: Prudence is the correct ordering of acts, as is said in the Ethics. But it does not consider individual actions, for, since there are an infinite number of these, there can be no ordering of them. Again, it would follow that prudence, taken in itself, would be essentially increased as it considered many individual actions. But this does not seem to be true. However, conscience considers individual actions. Therefore, conscience is not prudence.

3. It was said that conscience is a habit by which the universal judgment of reason is applied to a particular undertaking.--On the contrary, two habits are not needed for something which one can do. But one who has habitual knowledge of a universal can make the application to singulars with the intervention of the sensitive faculty alone. Thus, from the habit by which one knows that all mules are sterile, he will know that this mule is sterile when through his senses he perceives that this is a mule. Therefore, a habit is not needed for the application of a universal judgment to a particular act. Thus, conscience is not a habit. We conclude as before.

4. Every habit is either natural, infused, or acquired. But conscience is not a natural habit because such a habit is the same in all men. But not all men have the same conscience. Again, it is not an infused habit, because such a habit is always correct. But conscience is sometimes erroneous. Again, it is not an acquired habit, because, if it were, conscience would not exist in children or in a man before he had acquired it through many acts. Therefore, it is not a habit. We conclude as before.

5. According to the Philosopher, a habit is acquired from many acts. But one has conscience from one act. Therefore, conscience is not a habit.

6. The Gloss indicates that conscience in the damned is a punishment. But a habit is not a punishment; rather it is a perfection of the one who has it. Therefore, it is not a habit.

To the Contrary (First Series):

1'. Conscience seems to be a habit. For, according to Damascene, it is "the law of our understanding." But the law of our understanding is the habit of the universal principles of law. Therefore, conscience is a habit.

2'. The Gloss on Romans (2:14) says: "Although the Gentiles do not have the written law, they have the natural law, which each one understands and by which he is conscious of what is good and what is evil." From this it seems that the natural law is that by which one is conscious. But everyone is conscious through consciousness (conscientia). Therefore, conscience (conscientia) is the natural law. We conclude as before.

3'. Science denotes habitual knowledge of conclusions. But conscience is scientific knowledge. Therefore, it is a habit.

4'. A habit is formed by repeated acts. But one acts repeatedly according to conscience. Therefore, from such acts a habit is formed, which can be called conscience.

5'. On the first Epistle to Timothy (1:5), "Now the end of the commandment is charity, from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith," the Gloss says: "A good conscience, that is, hope." But hope is a habit. Therefore, conscience is, too.

6'. That which is implanted in us by God seems to be an infused habit. But, according to Damascene, just as the tendency to sin is implanted in us by the devil, so conscience is implanted in us by God. Therefore, conscience is an infused habit.

7'. According to the Philosopher, everything which is in the soul is habit, faculty, or passion. But conscience is not a passion, for by such things we do not merit or demerit, nor are we praised or blamed for them, as the Philosopher also says. Nor is conscience a power, for a power cannot be set aside, but conscience can be set aside. Therefore, conscience is a habit.

To the Contrary (Second Series):

1'. Conscience seems to be an act, for it is said to accuse and excuse. But one is not accused or excused unless he is actually considering something. Therefore, conscience is an act.

2'. Knowledge which consists in comparison is actual knowledge. But conscience denotes knowledge with comparison. For one is said to be conscious (conscire), that is, to know together (simul scire). Therefore, conscience is actual knowledge.

REPLY:

Some say that conscience can have three meanings. For, at times it is taken for the thing itself of which one is conscious, just as faith is taken for the thing believed. Sometimes it is taken for the power by which we are conscious, and sometimes for the habit. And some say that it is also taken for the act. The reason for this distinction seems to be that, since there is an act of conscience, and since an object, a power, a habit, and the act itself are considered with reference to the act, we sometimes find a name which is used equivocally for all four of these. Thus, the name understanding sometimes signifies the thing understood (intellectam), as names are said to denote concepts (intellectus); sometimes, it signifies the intellective power itself; sometimes, a habit, and, sometimes, an act.

However, with names such as these, the commonly accepted meaning should be followed, because words should be used in their more common signification, as is said in the Topics. But the name conscience, according to common usage, seems at times to be used for the thing of which one is conscious, as when one says: "I will reveal my conscience to you," that is, what is in my conscience. But this title cannot properly be given to the power or the habit, but only to the act. For all the things which are attributed to conscience fit only this meaning.

We must bear in mind that it is not customary to have one name for a power, an act, and a habit, unless the act is proper to the power or habit, as to see is proper to the power of sight, and to know is proper to the habit of knowledge. As a result, sight sometimes means the power and sometimes the act. Knowledge is used in a similar way. However, if there is an act which is proper to many or all habits or powers, it is not customary to indicate a power or a habit by such a name of the act. This is clear with the noun use, for it denotes the act of any habit and power, since use belongs to that of which it is the act. Hence, this name use so signifies an act that it does not mean a habit or a power at all.

This seems to be the case with conscience. For the name conscience means the application of knowledge to something. Hence, to be conscious (conscire) means to know together (simul scire). But any knowledge can be applied to a thing. Hence, conscience cannot denote a special habit or power, but designates the act itself, which is the application of any habit or of any knowledge to some particular act.

Moreover, knowledge is applied to an act in two ways. According to one way, we consider whether the act exists or has existed; according to the other, whether it is correct or not. According to the first mode of application, we are said to have conscience [that is, consciousness] of an act inasmuch as we know that the act has been placed or has not been placed, as happens in the common manner of speaking when one says: "As far as my conscience [consciousness] is concerned, this has not taken place; that is, I do not know or I did not know whether this took place." It is according to this manner of speaking that we understand the passage in Genesis (43:22): "We cannot tell [non est in conscientiis nostris] who put it (the money) in our bags"; and the passage in Ecclesiastes (7:23): "For thy conscience knoweth that thou also hast often spoken evil of others." It is according to this that conscience is said to bear witness of something, as in Romans (9:1): "my conscience bearing me witness. . . ."

According to the second mode of application, by which knowledge is applied to an act, so that one knows whether the act is right or not, there is a double course. There is one according to which we are directed through the habit of scientific knowledge to do or not to do something. There is a second according to which the act, after it has taken place, is examined with reference to the habit of knowledge to see whether it was right or not. This double course in matters of action is distinguished according to the double course which exists in things speculative, that is, the process of discovery and the process of judging. For the process by which through scientific knowledge we look for what should be done, as it were taking counsel with ourselves, is similar to discovery, through which we proceed from principles to conclusions. The other process, through which we examine those things which already have been done and consider whether they are right, is like the process of judging, through which we reduce conclusions to principles.

We use the name conscience for both of these modes of application. For, in so far as knowledge is applied to an act, as directive of that act, conscience is said to prod or urge or bind. But, in so far as knowledge is applied to act, by way of examining things which have already taken place, conscience is said to accuse or cause remorse, when that which has been done is found to be out of harmony with the knowledge according to which it is examined; or to defend or excuse, when that which has been done is found to have proceeded according to the form of the knowledge.

But we must bear in mind that in the first application, in which scientific knowledge is applied to an act to know whether it has taken place, it is application to a particular act of sensitive knowledge, as of memory, through which we recall what was done, or of sense, through which we perceive the particular act in which we are now engaged. But in the second and third applications, by which we deliberate about what should be done, or examine what has already been done, the operative habits of reason are applied to an act. These are the habit of synderesis and the habit of wisdom, which perfect higher reason, and the habit of scientific knowledge, which perfects lower reason. Of these, either all are applied at the same time, or only one of them is applied. We examine what we have done according to these habits, and, according to them, we take counsel about what should be done. Examination, however, concerns not only what has been done, but also what is to be done. But counsel concerns only what is to be done.

Answers to Difficulties (First Series):

1. When Jerome says: "We see that this conscience is cast down headlong at times," synderesis, which he calls a spark of conscience, is not indicated, but conscience itself, which he had mentioned earlier. Or we can say that the whole force of conscience, as examining or taking counsel, depends on the judgment of synderesis, just as the whole truth of speculative reason depends on first principles. Therefore, he calls conscience synderesis in so far as conscience acts by reason of its power. This answer is especially apt because he wanted to show how synderesis can fail. For it does not err in regard to universal principles, but only in regard to the application to individual acts. Thus, synderesis does not err in itself, but, in a sense, errs in conscience. Therefore, he joins conscience with synderesis to explain this failure of synderesis.

2. Defilement is not said to be in conscience as in a subject, but as the thing known is in knowledge. For one is said to have a defiled conscience when he is conscious within himself of some defilement.

3. A defiled conscience is said to be cleansed, in so far as one who was earlier conscious of sin knows later that he has been cleansed from the sin. Thus, he is said to have a pure conscience. Accordingly, it is the same conscience which first was unclean and later clean, not, however, in the sense that conscience is the subject of cleanness and uncleanness, but that through examination made by conscience both are known. It is not that it is numerically the same act by which one knew he was unclean before and knows he is clean afterwards, but that both are known from the same principles, just as consideration which proceeds from the same principles is called the same.

4. The judgments of conscience and of free choice differ to some extent and correspond to some extent. For they correspond in this, that both refer to this particular act. However, the judgment of conscience applies to it in so far as conscience examines it. On this point the judgment of both conscience and free choice differ from the judgment of synderesis. They differ from each other, since the judgment of conscience consists simply in knowledge, whereas the judgment of free choice consists in the application of knowledge to the inclination of the will. This is the judgment of choice.

Thus, it sometimes happens that the judgment of free choice goes astray, but not the judgment of conscience. For example, one debates something which presents itself to be done here and now and judges, still speculating as it were in the realm of principles, that it is evil, for instance, to fornicate with this woman. However, when he comes to apply this to the act, many circumstances relevant to the act present themselves from all sides, for instance, the pleasure of the fornication, by the desire of which reason is constrained, so that its dictates may not issue into choice. Thus, one errs in choice and not in conscience. Rather, he acts against conscience and is said to do this with an evil conscience, in so far as the deed does not agree with the judgment based on knowledge. Thus, it is clear that it is not necessary for conscience to be the same as free choice.

5. Conscience is called the natural power of judgment in so far as the whole examination or counseling of conscience depends on the natural power of judgment, as we said earlier.*

6. Sin is in the reason and the will as in a subject, but it is in conscience in a different way, as has been said.*

7. Conscience is said to know something not in a proper sense, but in the sense that knowledge is predicated of that by which we know.

8. Conscience is called spirit, that is, an impulse of our spirit, just as reason is called spirit.

9. Conscience is neither a power nor a habit, but an act. And, although the act of conscience does not always exist, and does not exist in one who is asleep, the act itself remains in its principle, that is, in habits which can be applied to act.

Answers to Difficulties (Second Series):

1-6. We concede the difficulties which prove that conscience is not a habit.

Answers to Difficulties to the Contrary (First Series):

1'. Conscience is called the law of our understanding because it is a judgment of reason derived from the natural law.

2'. One is said to be conscious within himself through the natural law, in the sense in which one is said to deliberate according to principles, but he is conscious within himself through conscience, in the sense in which he is said to deliberate by means of the very act of consideration.

3'. Although scientific knowledge is a habit, its application to something is not a habit, but an act. And this is what is indicated by the word conscience.

4'. From these acts there does not arise a habit of a different mode from the habit by which the acts are elicited, but either a habit of the same nature is formed, as the habit of love is formed from acts of infused charity, or an already present habit is strengthened, as in one who has acquired the habit of temperance from repeated acts, the habit itself is strengthened. Accordingly, since the act of conscience proceeds from a habit of wisdom and science, a new habit will not be formed from them, but those habits will be perfected.

5'. When conscience is called hope, the predication is causal in nature, inasmuch as a good conscience makes a man be of good hope, as the Gloss explains.

6'. Even natural habits exist in us because they were put there by God. Consequently, since conscience is an act proceeding from the natural habit of synderesis, God is said to have imprinted it in the way in which He is said to be the source of all knowledge of truth which is in us. For God endows our nature with the knowledge of first principles.

7'. Act is included in habit in that division of the Philosopher because he had proved that habits are formed from acts, and that habits were the principle of similar acts. Accordingly, conscience is not a passion nor a power, but an act, which is reduced to a habit.

Answers to Difficulties to the Contrary (Second Series):

We concede the difficulties which prove that conscience is an act.