ARTICLE III

In the Third Article We Ask: IS GOD'S WILL SUITABLY DIVIDED INTO HIS EMBRACING WILL AND HIS INDICATIVE WILL?

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

1. What is done in creatures is a sign or indication not only of the divine will but also of the divine knowledge and power. But knowledge and power are not distinguished into power and knowledge which are God's essence and those which are indications of it. Then neither should God's will be thus distinguished into His embracing will (voluntas beneplaciti), which is the divine essence, and His indicative will (voluntas signi).

2. By the fact that God wishes something by His embracing will it is shown that the act of the divine will is brought to bear upon it with the result that it is pleasing to God. Then that upon which His indicative will is brought to bear is either pleasing to God or not. If it is pleasing to God, then He wills it with His embracing will; and in that case His indicative will should not be distinguished from His embracing will. If, however, it is not something pleasing to God, it is nevertheless designated as pleasing to Him by His indicative will; and consequently the indication of the divine will is false. And so in the true doctrine such indications of the divine will should not be affirmed.

3. Every will is in the one willing. But whatever is in God is the divine essence. Consequently, if indicative will is attributed to God, it will be the same as the divine essence. In this way it will not be distinguished from His embracing will; for that will is said to be embracing which is the very divine essence, as the Master says.

4. Whatever God wills is good. But the indication of His will ought to correspond to the divine will. There should therefore not be an indication of His will concerning evil. Since permission concerns evil, and likewise prohibition, it therefore seems that indications of the divine will should not be affirmed.

5. Not only are good and better found but also bad and worse. But on the basis of good and better two sorts of indicative will are distinguished: precept, which concerns good, and counsel, which concerns a better good. Then two signs or indications of will should be affirmed in regard to bad and worse.

6. God's will is more inclined to good than to evil. But the indication of will which regards evil, permission, can never be frustrated. Then precept and counsel, too, which are referred to good, should not be subject to frustration. Yet this is evidently false.

7. Things that stand in a sequence of dependence should not be opposed. But God's embracing will and His operation stand in a sequence of dependence; for God does not do anything which He does not will with His embracing will, and He wills nothing in creatures with His embracing will which He does not do, according to the words of the Psalm (113:3): "[The Lord] hath done all things whatsoever he would." God's operation should therefore not be listed under His indicative will, which is opposed to His embracing will.

REPLY:

In matters dealing with God there are two different ways of speaking: (1) In proper language. This is found when we attribute to God what pertains to Him in His own nature, although it always pertains to Him in a way that goes beyond what we conceive in our minds or express in speech. For this reason none of our language about God can be proper in the full sense. (2) In figurative, transferred, or symbolic language. Because God, as He is in Himself, exceeds the grasp of our mind, we must speak of Him by means of the things that are found in our world. Thus we apply the names of sensible things to God, calling Him light or a lion or something of the sort. The truth of such expressions is founded on the fact that no creature "is deprived altogether of participation in good," as Dionysius says. In every creature there are to be found certain properties representing the divine goodness in some respect. Thus the name is transferred to God inasmuch as the thing signified by the name is a sign of the divine goodness. Any sign, then, that is used instead of what is signified in speaking of God is a figurative expression.

Both of these two ways of speaking are used in regard to the divine will. There is found in God in a proper sense the formal character of will, as was said above; and so will is properly predicated of God. This is His embracing will (voluntas beneplaciti), which is distinguished into antecedent and consequent, as has been said. Because, however, will in us has some passion of the soul consequent upon it, the name of the will is predicated of God metaphorically like the names of the other passions. The name of anger is applied to God because there is found in Him an effect which is commonly that of an angry person among us, namely, punishment. As a consequence the punishment itself which God inflicts is called God's anger. In like manner whatever is commonly a sign or indication of will among us is called the will of God. For this reason we speak of His indicative will (voluntas signi) because the sign itself which is usually the sign or indication of the will is called will.

Now since the will can be considered both as prescribing a course of action and as setting the work in motion, in either sense certain signs are attributed to the will. From the viewpoint of its proposing a course of action regarding flight from evil, its sign is a prohibition. Regarding the pursuit of good there are two signs of the will. If the good is necessary and the will cannot attain its end without it, the sign of the will is a command. If the good is useful and by it the end can be acquired in an easier and more suitable fashion, the sign of the will is a counsel. From the viewpoint of setting the work in motion two signs are attributed to the will. One is express, and this is an operation; for the fact that a person does something indicates that he expressly wills it. The other is an interpretative sign, permission; for anyone who does not forbid what he can prevent, when interpreted seems to consent to it. This is what the name permission implies.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Although God is capable of doing all things and knows all things, yet He does not will all things. Consequently, besides the signs found in creatures, by which it is shown that He is knowing, powerful, and willing, certain signs are ascribed to His will to show what God wills and not only the fact that He is willing.--Or it may be said that knowledge and power are not accompanied by a passion, as the will is in our case. Thus the will comes closer to the things which are said metaphorically of God than do either power or knowledge. And so the signs of will we call will, metaphorically speaking, more than we call the signs of knowledge and power knowledge and power.

2. Although God does not will everything that He commands or permits, yet He does will something concerning it. He wills that we be obliged to what He commands and that there be in our power what He permits. It is this divine will which the command or permission signifies.

Or the answer can be given that His indicative will is not so called because it means that God wills the matter itself, but because what is ordinarily the indication of a will in our case is called will. It is not necessary that what is usually the sign of a certain thing be false when its usual term of reference does not correspond to it, but only when it is used in that signification. Although among us to command something is the sign of our willing it, yet is not necessary, whenever either God or man commands something, for him to signify that he wishes it to be. It consequently does not follow that it is a false sign.

That is why there is not always a falsehood in our actions whenever an action which usually signifies something is performed and that signification is not there. But in our words, if what they signify does not underlie them, there is necessarily falsity, because words have been instituted for the very purpose of being signs. Hence, if what is signified does not correspond to them, there is falsity there. Actions, on the other hand, have not been instituted to serve as signs but to get something done. That they signify anything is quite accidental to them. There is consequently not always falsity in them if what is usually signified does not correspond. There can be falsity only when they are made use of by the agent in order to signify something.

3. Indicative will is not in God but is from God; for it is an effect of God such as we usually term, when the effect of a man, that man's will.

4. Although the will of God does not concern evil with a view to its being done, it nevertheless does concern evil with a view to preventing it by forbidding it, or with a view to putting it within our power by permitting it.

5. Since everything to which the will tends has a relation to the end which is the reason for willing, but all evils lack a relation to that end, all evils are on the same footing not only in regard to the end but also in regard to the divine will. But to goods, which are referred to the end, the will stands in different relations according to the different relation which they have to the end. For this reason there are different indications for the good and the better, but not for the bad and the worse.

6. God's indicative will is not opposed to His embracing will on the basis of fulfillment and non-fulfillment. Although His embracing will is always fulfilled, something which is fulfilled can also belong to His indicative will. Hence, even the matters which God commands or counsels He sometimes wills with an embracing will. But His indicative will is distinguished from His embracing will because the one is God Himself, the other is an effect of His, as has already been explained.*

It should be noted that God's indicative will is related to His embracing will in three ways: (1) there is an indicative will which never coincides with an embracing will, as the permission by which God permits evil to be done, since He never wills evil to be done; (2) there is another which always coincides, as an operation; (3) there is another which sometimes coincides, sometimes not, as a precept, a prohibition, or a counsel.

7. This answer is clear from the above.