Disputed Questions on Truth (De Veritate)

 QUESTION ONE

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

 ARTICLE IX

 ARTICLE X

 ARTICLE XI

 ARTICLE XII

 QUESTION TWO

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

 ARTICLE IX

 ARTICLE X

 ARTICLE XI

 ARTICLE XII

 ARTICLE XIII

 ARTICLE XIV

 ARTICLE XV

 QUESTION THREE

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

 QUESTION FOUR

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

 QUESTION FIVE

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

 ARTICLE IX

 ARTICLE X

 QUESTION SIX

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 QUESTION SEVEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

 QUESTION EIGHT

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

 ARTICLE IX

 ARTICLE X

 ARTICLE XI

 ARTICLE XII

 ARTICLE XIII

 ARTICLE XIV

 ARTICLE XV

 ARTICLE XVI

 ARTICLE XVII

 QUESTION NINE

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 REFERENCES

 QUESTION TEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

 ARTICLE IX

 ARTICLE X

 ARTICLE XI

 ARTICLE XII

 ARTICLE XIII

 QUESTION ELEVEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 QUESTION TWELVE

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

 ARTICLE IX

 ARTICLE X

 ARTICLE XI

 ARTICLE XII

 ARTICLE XIII

 ARTICLE XIV

 QUESTION THIRTEEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 QUESTION FOURTEEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

 ARTICLE IX

 ARTICLE X

 ARTICLE XI

 ARTICLE XII

 QUESTION FIFTEEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 QUESTION SIXTEEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 QUESTION SEVENTEEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 QUESTION EIGHTEEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

 QUESTION NINETEEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 QUESTION TWENTY

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 REFERENCES

 QUESTION TEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

 ARTICLE IX

 ARTICLE X

 ARTICLE XI

 ARTICLE XII

 ARTICLE XIII

 QUESTION ELEVEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 QUESTION TWELVE

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

 ARTICLE IX

 ARTICLE X

 ARTICLE XI

 ARTICLE XII

 ARTICLE XIII

 ARTICLE XIV

 QUESTION THIRTEEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 QUESTION FOURTEEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

 ARTICLE IX

 ARTICLE X

 ARTICLE XI

 ARTICLE XII

 QUESTION FIFTEEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 QUESTION SIXTEEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 QUESTION SEVENTEEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 QUESTION EIGHTEEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

 QUESTION NINETEEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 QUESTION TWENTY

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 QUESTION TWENTY-ONE

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 QUESTION TWENTY-TWO

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

 ARTICLE IX

 ARTICLE X

 ARTICLE XI

 ARTICLE XII

 ARTICLE XIII

 ARTICLE XIV

 ARTICLE XV

 QUESTION TWENTY-THREE

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

 QUESTION TWENTY-FOUR

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

 ARTICLE IX

 ARTICLE X

 ARTICLE XI

 ARTICLE XII

 ARTICLE XIII

 ARTICLE XIV

 ARTICLE XV

 QUESTION TWENTY-FIVE

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 QUESTION TWENTY-SIX

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

 ARTICLE IX

 ARTICLE X

 QUESTION TWENTY-SEVEN

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 QUESTION TWENTY-EIGHT

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

 ARTICLE IX

 QUESTION TWENTY-NINE

 ARTICLE I

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III

 ARTICLE IV

 ARTICLE V

 ARTICLE VI

 ARTICLE VII

 ARTICLE VIII

ARTICLE III

In the Third Article We Ask: DOES GOD'S PROVIDENCE EXTEND TO CORRUPTIBLE THINGS?

Difficulties:

It seems that it does not, for

1. A cause and its effects are in the same order. Now, corruptible creatures are the cause of sin. This is evident. For example, women's beauty is an incitement to and cause of lust. Moreover, Wisdom (14:11) says: "The creatures of God have been turned into . . . a snare for the feet of the unwise." Now, since sin is outside the order of divine providence, it seems that corruptible beings are not subject to this order.

2. Nothing that a wise man arranges can destroy his work, because he would be contradicting himself were he to build and destroy the same thing. Now, we find among corruptible things some that are contrary to and destructive of others. Consequently, corruptible things were not arranged by God.

3. Damascene speaks as follows: "It must be true that all things happening according to God's providence take place according to right reason in a way that is best and most fitting in God's eyes--indeed, in a way that is better for them to take place." But corruptible things could become better, for they could become incorruptible. The providence of God, therefore, does not extend to corruptible things.

4. Whatever is corruptible has corruption in it by its very nature; otherwise it would not be necessary for all corruptible things to corrupt. But, since corruption is a defect, it is not provided for by God, who cannot be a cause of any defect. Corruptible natures, therefore, do not come under God's providence.

5. As Dionysius says, providence does not destroy nature but saves it. The role of God's providence, therefore, is to save things continually. But corruptible things are not continually saved. They are not, therefore, subject to God's providence.

To the Contrary:

1'. Wisdom (14:3) says: "But thy Providence, O Father, governeth all things."

2'. Wisdom (12:13) also says that it is God who "hast care of all things." Therefore, corruptible as well as incorruptible things fall under His providence.

3'. As Damascene says, it is illogical to hold that one being creates things and another exercises providence over them. Now, God is the efficient cause of all corruptible things. Consequently, He also provides for them.

REPLY:

As we said above, the providence by which God rules things is similar to the providence by which the father of a family rules his household or a king rules a city or kingdom. The common element in these rules is the primacy of the common good over the good of the individual; for, as we read in the Ethics, the good of the nation is more divine than that of the city, family, or person. Consequently, whoever is supervising must--if he is to rule wisely--pay more attention to what is good for the community than to what is good merely for an individual.

Some have not kept this point in mind, but considering only that there are corruptible things which, if taken in themselves, could be better, and not considering the order of the universe in which each and every thing is excellently arranged--some, I say, have said that those corruptible things are therefore not ruled by God but that only incorruptible things are. These persons are represented in Job (22:14) by the man who says: "The clouds are God's covert, and he doth not consider our things, and he walketh about the poles of heaven." Moreover, they assert that corruptible things act necessarily and without any ruler at all or are ruled by an opposing principle. The Philosopher, however, has refuted this position by taking an army as an example. In an army we find two orders, one by which the parts of the army are related to each other, and a second by which the army is directed to an external good, namely, the good of its leader. That order by which the parts of the army are related to each other exists for the sake of the order by which the entire army is subordinated to its leader. Consequently, if the subordination to the leader did not exist, the ordering of the parts of the army to each other would not exist. Consequently, whenever we find a group whose members are ordered to each other, that group must necessarily be ordered to some external principle.

Now, the corruptible and incorruptible parts of the universe are related to each other essentially, not accidentally. For we see that corruptible bodies benefit from celestial bodies, and always, or at least ordinarily, in the same manner. Consequently, all things, corruptible and incorruptible, must be in one order under the providence of an external principle outside the universe. For this reason, the Philosopher concluded that it was necessary to affirm the existence of a single rule over the universe, and of not more than one.

It must be noted, however, that a thing is provided for in two ways: for itself, or for other things. For example, in a home, care is taken of some things on their own account, namely, those things that constitute the essential goods of a household, such as sons, possessions, and the like; and other things, such as utensils, animals, and the like are cared for so that the essential things can use them. Similarly, in the universe, the things in which the essential perfection of the universe consists are provided for on their own account, and like the universe itself, these things stay in existence. But the things that do not endure are provided for, not for their own sake, but for the sake of other things. Consequently, spiritual substances and heavenly bodies, which are perpetual both as species and as individuals, are provided for on their own account both as species and as individuals. Corruptible things, however, are perpetual only as a species; hence, these species are looked after for their own sake, but the individual members of these species are not provided for except for this reason: to keep the species in perpetual existence.

If we thus understand the opinion of those who say that divine providence does not extend to corruptible things of this kind, except as they participate in the nature of a species, it need not be rejected; for this opinion is true if it is understood as referring to the providence of things by which they are provided for on their own account.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Of themselves, corruptible creatures do not cause sin. They are only its occasion and accidental cause. Now, an accidental cause and its effect do not have to belong to the same order.

2. A wise provider does not consider what is good for merely one of the things that fall under his providence. He is concerned rather with what is better for all. Consequently, even though the corruption of a thing in the universe is not good for that thing, it is good for the perfection of the entire universe, because the continual generation and corruption of individuals makes it possible for the species to be perpetual; and it is in this that the perfection of the universe essentially consists.

3. Although a corruptible thing would be better if it possessed incorruptibility, it is better for the universe to be made of both corruptible and incorruptible things than to be made merely of the latter, because the nature of the corruptible thing, as well as that of the incorruptible, is good, and it is better to have two goods than merely one. Moreover, multiplication of individuals in one nature is of less value than a variety of natures, since the good found in a nature, being communicable, is superior to the good found in an individual, which is incommunicable.

4. Darkness is brought about by the sun, not because of any action of the sun, but because the sun does not send out light. Similarly, corruption comes from God, not because of any positive action by Him, but because He does not give the thing permanency.

5. The things that are provided for by God on their own account last forever. But this permanency is not necessary for those things that are not provided for on their own account. These need remain only so long as they are needed by the things for which they are provided. Consequently, as is clear from the previous discussion,* certain things corrupt because they are not looked after for their own sakes.