ARTICLE I

The Question Concerns Good, and in the First Article We Ask: DOES GOOD ADD ANYTHING TO BEING?

Difficulties:

It seems that it does, for

1. Everything is a being essentially. But a creature is good not essentially but by participation. Good, therefore, really adds something to being.

2. Since good includes being in its very notion, and yet good is rationally distinct from being, the formal character of good must add something to that of being. But it cannot be said to add a negation to being, as does the one, which adds undividedness, because the whole character of good consists in something positive. Hence it adds something to being positively, and thus it seems to add to being in reality.

3. The answer was given that it adds a relation to an end.--On the contrary, in this case good would be nothing but related being. But related being pertains to a definite category of being, which is called "relation" or "to something." Good would therefore be in a definite category. But this is contrary to what the Philosopher says, placing good in all the categories.

4. As can be gathered from the words of Dionysius, good tends to pour out itself and existence. A thing is good, therefore, by the fact that it is diffusive. But to pour out or diffuse implies an action, and an action proceeds from the essence through the mediation of a power. A thing is therefore said to be good by reason of a power added to the essence, and so good really adds something to being.

5. The farther we get from the first being, which is one and simple, the more we find difference in things. But in God being and good are really one, being distinguished only conceptually. In creatures, therefore, they are distinguished more than conceptually; and so, since there is no distinction beyond the conceptual except the real, they are distinguished really.

6. Accidentals really add something to the essence. But goodness is accidental to the creature; otherwise it could not be lost. Good therefore really adds something to being.

7. Whatever is predicated as informing something else really adds something to it, since nothing is informed by itself. Good, however, is predicated as informing, as is said in The Causes. It therefore adds something to being.

8. Nothing is determined by itself. But good determines being. It therefore adds something to being.

9. The answer was given that good determines being in concept.--On the contrary, corresponding to that concept there is either something in reality or nothing. If nothing, it follows that the concept is void and useless; but if there is something corresponding in reality, the point is established: good really adds something to being.

10. A relation is specified according to the term in respect to which it is predicated. But good implies a relation to a definite sort of being, an end. Good therefore implies a specified relation. Every specified being, however, really adds something to being in general. Hence good really adds something to being.

11. Good and being are interchangeable, like man and "capable of laughter." But though "capable of laughter" is interchangeable with man, it nevertheless really adds something to man, namely, a property. But a property is classed as an accident. Similarly, therefore, good really adds something to being.

To the Contrary:

1'. Augustine says: "Inasmuch as God is good, we are; but inasmuch as we are, we are good." It therefore seems that good does not add anything to being.

2'. Whenever things are so related that one adds something to the other either really or conceptually, one can be understood without the other. But being cannot be understood without good. Hence good does not add anything to being either really or conceptually. Proof of the minor: God can make more than man can understand. But God cannot make a being that is not good, because by the very fact of its being from good it is good, as Boethius makes clear. Therefore neither can the intellect understand it.

REPLY:

Something can be added to something else in three ways. (1) It adds some reality which is outside the essence of the thing to which it is said to be added. For instance, white adds something to body, since the essence of whiteness is something beyond that of body. (2) One thing is added to the other as limiting and determining it. Man, for instance, adds something to animal--not indeed in such a way that there is in man some reality which is completely outside the essence of animal; otherwise it would be necessary to say that it is not the whole of man which is animal but only a part. Animal is limited by man because what is contained in the notion of man determinately and actually, is only implicitly and, as it were, potentially contained in the notion of animal. It belongs to the notion of man that he have a rational soul; to the notion of animal, that it have a soul, without its being determined to rational or nonrational. And yet that determination by reason of which man is said to add something to animal is founded in reality. (3) Something is said to add to something else in concept only. This occurs when something which is nothing in reality but only in thought, belongs to the notion of one thing and not to the notion of the other, whether that to which it is said to be added is limited by it or not. Thus blind adds something to man, i.e., blindness, which is not a being in nature but merely a being in the thought of one who knows privations. By it man is limited, for not every man is blind. But when we say "a blind mole," no limitation is placed by what is added.

It is not possible, however, for something to add anything to being in general in the first way, though in that way there can be an addition to some particular sort of being; for there is no real being which is outside the essence of being in general, though some reality may be outside the essence of this being. But in the second way certain things are found to add to being, since being is narrowed down in the ten categories, each of which adds something to being--not, of course, an accident or difference which is outside the essence of being, but a definite manner of being which is founded upon the very existence of the thing. It is not in this way, however, that good adds something to being, since good itself, like being, is divided into the ten categories, as is made clear in the Ethics.

Good must, accordingly, either add nothing to being or add something merely in concept. For if it added something real, being would have to be narrowed down by the character of good to a special genus. But since being is what is first conceived by the intellect, as Avicenna says, every other noun must either be a synonym of being or add something at least conceptually. The former cannot be said of good, since it is not nonsense to call a being good. Thus good, by the fact of its not limiting being, must add to it something merely conceptual.

What is merely conceptual, however, can be of only two kinds: negation and a certain kind of relation. Every absolute positing signifies something existing in reality. Thus to being, the first intellectual conception, one adds what is merely conceptual--a negation; for it means undivided being. But true and good, being predicated positively, cannot add anything except a relation which is merely conceptual. A relation is merely conceptual, according to the Philosopher, when by it something is said to be related which is not dependent upon that to which it is referred, but vice versa; for a relation is a sort of dependence. An example is had in intellectual knowledge and its object, as also in sense and the sensible object. Knowledge depends upon its object, but not the other way about. The relation by which knowledge is referred to its object is accordingly real, but the relation by which the object is referred to the knowledge is only conceptual. According to the Philosopher the object of knowledge is said to be related, not because it is itself referred, but because something else is referred to it. The same holds true of all other things which stand to one another as measure and thing measured or as perfective and perfectible.

The true and the good must therefore add to the concept of being, a relationship of that which perfects. But in any being there are two aspects to be considered, the formal character of its species and the act of being by which it subsists in that species. And so a being can be perfective in two ways. (1) It can be so just according to its specific character. In this way the intellect is perfected by a being, for it perceives the formal character of the being. But the being is still not in it according to its natural existence. It is this mode of perfecting which the true adds to being. For the true is in the mind, as the Philosopher says; and every being is called true inasmuch as it is conformed or conformable to intellect. For this reason all who correctly define true put intellect in its definition. (2) A being is perfective of another not only according to its specific character but also according to the existence which it has in reality. In this fashion the good is perfective; for the good is in things, as the Philosopher says. Inasmuch as one being by reason of its act of existing is such as to perfect and complete another, it stands to that other as an end. And hence it is that all who rightly define good put in its notion something about its status as an end. The Philosopher accordingly says that they excellently defined good who said that it is "that which all things desire."

First of all and principally, therefore, a being capable of perfecting another after the manner of an end is called good; but secondarily something is called good which leads to an end (as the useful is said to be good), or which naturally follows upon an end (as not only that which has health is called healthy, but also anything which causes, preserves, or signifies health).

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Since being is predicated absolutely and good adds to it the status of a final cause, the essence of a thing considered absolutely suffices for the thing to be called a being on its account, but not thereby to be called good. Just as in the case of the other kinds of causes the status of a secondary cause depends upon that of the primary cause, but that of the primary cause depends upon no other; so also in the case of final causes secondary ends share in the status of final cause from their relation to the last end, but the last end has this status of itself.

And so it is that the essence of God, who is the last end of creatures, suffices for God to be called good by reason of it; but when the essence of a creature is given, the thing is not yet called good except from the relation to God by reason of which it has the character of a final cause. In this sense it is said that a creature is not good essentially but by participation. For from one point of view this is so inasmuch as the essence itself, in our understanding of it, is considered as something other than that relation to God by which it is constituted a final cause and is directed to God as its end. But from another point of view a creature can be called essentially good inasmuch as the essence of a creature does not exist without a relation to God's goodness. This is Boethius' meaning.

2. It is not only negation that expresses what is merely conceptual but also a certain type of relation, as has been said.*

3. Every real relation is in a definite category, but non-real relations can run through all being.

4. Though, according to the proper use of the word, to pour out seems to imply the operation of an efficient cause, yet taken broadly it can imply the status of any cause, as do to influence, to make, etc. When good is said to be of its very notion diffusive, however, diffusion is not to be understood as implying the operation of an efficient cause but rather the status of a final cause. Nor is such diffusion brought about through the mediation of any added power. Good expresses the diffusion of a final cause and not that of an agent, both because the latter, as efficient, is not the measure and perfection of the thing caused but rather its beginning, and also because the effect participates in the efficient cause only in an assimilation of its form, whereas a thing is dependent upon its end in its whole existence. It is in this that the character of good was held to consist.

5. Things can be really one in God in two ways. (1) Their unity may be merely from that in which they are, and not from their own formal characters. In this way knowledge and power are one; for knowledge is not really the same as power by reason of its being knowledge, but by reason of its being divine. Now things which are really one in God in this way are found to differ really in creatures. (2) The things which are said to be really one in God may be so by their very formal characters. In this way good and being are really one in God, because it is of the very notion of good that it does not differ in reality from being. Hence, wherever good and being are found, they are really identical.

6. Just as there is essential being and accidental being, so also there is essential good and accidental good; and a thing loses its goodness in just the same way as it loses its substantial or accidental act of being.

7. From the relationship mentioned above it comes about that good is said to inform or determine being conceptually.

8. The answer is clear from what has just been said.

9. To that concept something does correspond in reality (a real dependence of that which is a means to an end upon the end itself), as there also does in other conceptual relations.

10. Although good expresses a special status, that of an end, nevertheless that status belongs to any being whatsoever and does not put anything real into being. Hence the conclusion does not follow.

11. "Capable of laughter," though interchanged with man, still adds to man a distinct reality which is over and above man's essence. But nothing can be added to being in this way, as has been said.*

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. We grant this, because good as such does not really add anything to being.

2'. This argues that nothing is added even conceptually. To this it must be said that a thing can be understood without another in two ways. (1) This occurs by way of enunciating, when one thing is understood to be without the other. Whatever the intellect can understand without another in this sense, God can make without the other. But being cannot be so understood without good, i.e., so that the intellect understands that something is a being and is not good. (2) Something can be understood without another by way of defining, so that the intellect understands one without at the same time understanding the other. Thus animal is understood without man or any of the other species. In this sense being can be understood without good. Yet it does not follow that God can make a being without good, because the very notion of making is to bring into existence.