Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth (De Veritate)

1. Singulars are potentially infinite in number. Now, in God there is an idea, not merely of what exists, but also of what can exist. If, therefore, there were ideas of singulars in God, there would be an infinite number of ideas in Him. This seems absurd, since they could not be actually infinite.

2. If singulars have ideas in God, either there is one idea for the individual and the species, or there are distinct ideas for them. If there were distinct ideas, then there would be many ideas in God for one thing, because the idea of the species is also that of the individual. On the other hand, if there is but one and the same idea for the individual and the species, then, since all the individuals of the same species have the same idea, there would be only one idea for all, and, consequently, singulars would not have distinct ideas in God.

3. Many singulars happen by chance. Now, such beings are not predefined. Since, as is evident from what has been said previously, namely, that an idea postulates predefinition, it seems that not all singulars have an idea in God.

4. Certain singulars are combinations of two species. For example, a mule is a combination of a horse and an ass. Now, if such things had ideas in God, it would seem that there would be two ideas for each one. This seems absurd, since it is unreasonable to affirm multiplicity in the cause and unity in the effect.

To the Contrary:

1'. Ideas are in God for the purpose of knowing and making. But God is one who knows and makes singulars. Therefore, there are in God ideas of singulars.

2'. Ideas are directed to the existence of things. But singulars have acts of existence more truly than universals do, because the latter subsist only in singulars. Therefore, it is more necessary for singulars to have exemplars than it is for universals.

REPLY:

Plato did not posit ideas of singulars but only of species. There were two reasons for this. First, according to him, ideas did not cause the matter but only the forms of things here below. Now, the principle of individuation is matter, and it is because of the form that each singular is placed under a species. Consequently, his ideas did not correspond to a singular in so far as it is singular but only by reason of its species. His second reason may have been this: An idea is related only to those things that are intended directly, as is clear from what was said. But the intention of nature is principally to preserve the species. Consequently, even though generation terminates in this or in that man, the intention of nature is simply to generate man. For this reason, the Philosopher also says that final causes should be assigned for the accidents common to a species, but not for the accidents found in singulars. For the latter, only efficient and material causes can be assigned; consequently, an idea does not correspond to a singular but to a species. Using the same argument, moreover, Plato did not posit ideas for genera, alleging that nature does not intend to produce the form of a genus but only that of a species. We, however, assert that God is the cause of singulars, both of their form and of their matter. We also assert that all individual things are determined by His divine providence. Hence, we must also posit ideas for all singulars.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Ideas are multiplied only in so far as they have different relations to things. As Avicenna says, however, it is not contradictory to multiply conceptual relations infinitely.

2. If we speak of idea in the proper sense, namely, inasmuch as it is the idea of a thing in so far as that thing is capable of being produced, then there is but one idea for the singular, the species, the genus, and for whatever is individuated in that singular, because Socrates the man and Socrates the animal do not have separate acts of existence. If, however, we are speaking of idea in its broader sense of a likeness or intelligible character, then, since the considerations of Socrates as Socrates, as a man, and as an animal all differ, a number of ideas or likenesses will correspond to him in this respect.

3. Although some things may happen by chance with respect to their proximate agent, nothing happens by chance with respect to the agent who knows all things beforehand.

4. The mule has a separate species, halfway between that of a horse and that of an ass. Therefore, the mule is not in two species but in one. This fact is due to the mixture of seeds, because the generative powers of the male cannot bring the material provided by the female to the perfection of his own species, since the material is outside his own species; so, instead, the male brings it to a term that is close to his species. For this reason, a separate idea is assigned to the mule and to the horse.