On the Making of Man.

 I. Wherein is a partial inquiry into the nature of the world, and a more minute exposition of the things which preceded the genesis of man

 II. Why man appeared last, after the creation

 III. That the nature of man is more precious than all the visible creation

 IV. That the construction of man throughout signifies his ruling power .

 V. That man is a likeness of the Divine sovereignty .

 VI. An examination of the kindred of mind to nature: wherein, by way of digression, is refuted the doctrine of the Anomœans .

 VII. Why man is destitute of natural weapons and covering

 VIII. Why man’s form is upright and that hands were given him because of reason wherein also is a speculation on the difference of souls .

 IX. That the form of man was framed to serve as an instrument for the use of reason .

 X. That the mind works by means of the senses.

 XI. That the nature of mind is invisible.

 XII. An examination of the question where the ruling principle is to be considered to reside wherein also is a discussion of tears and laughter, and

 XIII. A Rationale of sleep, of yawning, and of dreams .

 XIV. That the mind is not in a part of the body wherein also is a distinction of the movements of the body and of the soul .

 XV. That the soul proper, in fact and name, is the rational soul, while the others are called so equivocally wherein also is this statement, that the

 XVI. A contemplation of the Divine utterance which said—“Let us make man after our image and likeness” wherein is examined what is the definition of

 XVII. What we must answer to those who raise the question—“If procreation is after sin, how would souls have come into being if the first of mankind h

 XVIII. That our irrational passions have their rise from kindred with irrational nature.

 XIX. To those who say that the enjoyment of the good things we look for will again consist in meat and drink, because it is written that by these mean

 XX. What was the life in Paradise, and what was the forbidden tree ?

 XXI. That the resurrection is looked for as a consequence, not so much from the declaration of Scripture as from the very necessity of things .

 XXII. To those who say, “If the resurrection is a thing excellent and good, how is it that it has not happened already, but is hoped for in some perio

 XXIII. That he who confesses the beginning of the world’s existence must necessarily also agree as to its end .

 XXIV. An argument against those who say that matter is co-eternal with God.

 XXV. How one even of those who are without may be brought to believe the Scripture when teaching of the resurrection .

 XXVI. That the resurrection is not beyond probability .

 XXVII. That it is possible, when the human body is dissolved into the elements of the universe, that each should have his own body restored from the c

 XXVIII. To those who say that souls existed before bodies, or that bodies were formed before souls wherein there is also a refutation of the fables c

 XXIX. An establishment of the doctrine that the cause of the existence of soul and body is one and the same.

 XXX. A brief examination of the construction of our bodies from a medical point of view.

XXIV. An argument against those who say that matter is co-eternal with God.123    Otherwise Chap. xxv. The Bodleian ms. of the Latin version has the title:—“That all matter exists in certain quantities.”

1. For after all that opinion on the subject of matter does not turn out to be beyond what appears consistent, which declares that it has its existence from Him Who is intelligible and immaterial. For we shall find all matter to be composed of certain qualities, of which if it is divested it can, in itself, be by no means grasped by idea. Moreover in idea each kind of quality is separated from the substratum; but idea is an intellectual and not a corporeal method of examination. If, for instance, some animal or tree is presented to our notice, or any other of the things that have material existence, we perceive in our mental discussion of it many things concerning the substratum, the idea of each of which is clearly distinguished from the object we contemplate: for the idea of colour is one, of weight another; so again that of quantity and of such and such a peculiar quality of touch: for “softness,” and “two cubits long,” and the rest of the attributes we spoke of, are not connected in idea either with one another or with the body: each of them has conceived concerning it its own explanatory definition according to its being, having nothing in common with any other of the qualities that are contemplated in the substratum.

2. 124    With this passage may be compared the idealistic doctrine of the De Anim. et Resurr.If, then, colour is a thing intelligible, and resistance also is intelligible, and so with quantity and the rest of the like properties, while if each of these should be withdrawn from the substratum, the whole idea of the body is dissolved; it would seem to follow that we may suppose the concurrence of those things, the absence of which we found to be a cause of the dissolution of the body, to produce the material nature: for as that is not a body which has not colour, and figure, and resistance, and extension, and weight, and the other properties, while each of these in its proper existence is found to be not the body but something else besides the body, so, conversely, whenever the specified attributes concur they produce bodily existence. Yet if the perception of these properties is a matter of intellect, and the Divinity is also intellectual in nature, there is no incongruity in supposing that these intellectual occasions for the genesis of bodies have their existence from the incorporeal nature, the intellectual nature on the one hand giving being to the intellectual potentialities, and the mutual concurrence of these bringing to its genesis the material nature.

3. Let this discussion, however, be by way of digression: we must direct our discourse once more to the faith by which we accept the statement that the universe took being from nothing, and do not doubt, when we are taught by Scripture, that it will again be transformed into some other state.

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΚΔʹ. Ἀντίῤῥησις πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας, συναΐδιον εἶναι τῷ Θεῷ τὴν ὕλην.

Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔξω τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον εὑρισκομένων ἡ περὶ τῆς ὕλης ὑπόληψις φαίνεται, ἡ ἐκ τοῦ νοητοῦ τε καὶ ἀΰλου ταύτην ὑποστῆναι πρεσβεύουσα: πᾶσαν γὰρ εὑρήσομεν ἐκ ποιοτήτων τινῶν συνεστῶσαν τὴν ὕλην, ὧν εἰ γυμνωθείη καθ' ἑαυτὴν, οὐδαμοῦ τῷ λόγῳ καταληφθήσεται. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἕκαστον ποιότητος εἶδος λόγῳ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου χωρίζεται. Ὁ δὲ λόγος νοητή τίς ἐστι, καὶ οὐχὶ σωματικὴ θεωρία. Οἷον, προκειμένου ζώου τινὸς ἢ ξύλου τῇ θεωρίᾳ, ἤ τινος ἄλλου τῶν ὑλικὴν ἐχόντων τὴν σύστασιν, πολλὰ περὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον τῇ κατ' ἐπίνοιαν διαιρέσει κατενοήσαμεν, ὧν ἑκάστου πρὸς τὸ συνθεωρούμενον ἀμίκτως ὁ λόγος ἔχει. Ἕτερος γὰρ ὁ τοῦ χρώματος, καὶ ἕτερος τοῦ βάρους ὁ λόγος, ὁ τῆς ποσότητος πάλιν, καὶ ὁ τῆς ποιᾶς κατὰ τὴν ἀφὴν ἰδιότητος. Ἤ τε γὰρ μαλακότης καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν εἰρημένων, οὔτε ἀλλήλοις, οὔτε τῷ σώματι κατὰ τὸν λόγον συμφέρεται. Ἑκάστου γὰρ τούτων ἴδιος, καθ' ὅ ἐστιν, ὁ ἑρμηνευτικὸς ὅρος ἐπινοεῖται, οὐδὲν ἐπικοινωνῶν ἄλλῃ τινὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον θεωρουμένων ποιότητι. Εἰ τοίνυν νοητὸν μὲν τὸ χρῶμα, νοητὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀντιτυπία, καὶ ἡ ποσότης, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἰδιωμάτων, ἕκαστον δὲ τούτων εἰ ὑφαιρεθείη τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, πᾶς ὁ τοῦ σώματος συνδιαλύεται λόγος: ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἴη, ὧν τὴν ἀπουσίαν τῆς τοῦ σώματος λύσεως αἰτίαν εὕρομεν, τούτων τὴν συνδρομὴν ἀποτίκτειν τὴν ὑλικὴν φύσιν ὑπολαμβάνειν. Ὡς γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι σῶμα, ᾧ τὸ χρῶμα, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα, καὶ ἡ ἀντιτυπία καὶ ἡ διάστασις, καὶ τὸ βάρος, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ἰδιωμάτων οὐ πρόσεστιν, ἕκαστον δὲ τούτων σῶμα οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἕτερόν τι παρὰ τὸ σῶμα, κατὰ τὸ ἰδιάζον εὑρίσκεται: οὕτω κατὰ τὸ ἀντίστροφον, ὅπου δ' ἂν συνδράμῃ τὰ εἰρημένα, τὴν σωματικὴν ὑπόστασιν ἀπεργάζεται. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ νοητὴ τῶν ἰδιωμάτων τούτων ἡ κατανόησις, νοητὸν δὲ τῇ φύσει τὸ Θεῖον: οὐδὲν ἀπεικὸς, ἐκ τῆς ἀσωμάτου φύσεως τὰς νοερὰς ταύτας ἀφορμὰς πρὸς τὴν τῶν σωμάτων γένεσιν ὑποστῆναι, τῆς μὲν νοητῆς φύσεως τὰς νοητὰς ὑφιστώσης δυνάμεις, τῆς δὲ τούτων πρὸς ἄλληλα συνδρομῆς τὴν ὑλώδη φύσιν παραγούσης εἰς γένεσιν Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν κατὰ τὸ πάρεργον ἡμῖν παρεξετάσθω: ἡμῖν δὲ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν πίστιν ἐπανακτέον τὸν λόγον, δι' ἧς ἐκ τε τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ὑποστῆναι τὸ πᾶν ἐδεξάμεθα, καὶ πάλιν εἰς ἄλλην τινὰ μεταστοιχειοῦσθαι κατάστασιν παρὰ τῆς Γραφῆς διδαχθέντες, οὐκ ἀμφιβάλλομεν.