On the Making of Man.

 I. Wherein is a partial inquiry into the nature of the world, and a more minute exposition of the things which preceded the genesis of man

 II. Why man appeared last, after the creation

 III. That the nature of man is more precious than all the visible creation

 IV. That the construction of man throughout signifies his ruling power .

 V. That man is a likeness of the Divine sovereignty .

 VI. An examination of the kindred of mind to nature: wherein, by way of digression, is refuted the doctrine of the Anomœans .

 VII. Why man is destitute of natural weapons and covering

 VIII. Why man’s form is upright and that hands were given him because of reason wherein also is a speculation on the difference of souls .

 IX. That the form of man was framed to serve as an instrument for the use of reason .

 X. That the mind works by means of the senses.

 XI. That the nature of mind is invisible.

 XII. An examination of the question where the ruling principle is to be considered to reside wherein also is a discussion of tears and laughter, and

 XIII. A Rationale of sleep, of yawning, and of dreams .

 XIV. That the mind is not in a part of the body wherein also is a distinction of the movements of the body and of the soul .

 XV. That the soul proper, in fact and name, is the rational soul, while the others are called so equivocally wherein also is this statement, that the

 XVI. A contemplation of the Divine utterance which said—“Let us make man after our image and likeness” wherein is examined what is the definition of

 XVII. What we must answer to those who raise the question—“If procreation is after sin, how would souls have come into being if the first of mankind h

 XVIII. That our irrational passions have their rise from kindred with irrational nature.

 XIX. To those who say that the enjoyment of the good things we look for will again consist in meat and drink, because it is written that by these mean

 XX. What was the life in Paradise, and what was the forbidden tree ?

 XXI. That the resurrection is looked for as a consequence, not so much from the declaration of Scripture as from the very necessity of things .

 XXII. To those who say, “If the resurrection is a thing excellent and good, how is it that it has not happened already, but is hoped for in some perio

 XXIII. That he who confesses the beginning of the world’s existence must necessarily also agree as to its end .

 XXIV. An argument against those who say that matter is co-eternal with God.

 XXV. How one even of those who are without may be brought to believe the Scripture when teaching of the resurrection .

 XXVI. That the resurrection is not beyond probability .

 XXVII. That it is possible, when the human body is dissolved into the elements of the universe, that each should have his own body restored from the c

 XXVIII. To those who say that souls existed before bodies, or that bodies were formed before souls wherein there is also a refutation of the fables c

 XXIX. An establishment of the doctrine that the cause of the existence of soul and body is one and the same.

 XXX. A brief examination of the construction of our bodies from a medical point of view.

XIV. That the mind is not in a part of the body; wherein also is a distinction of the movements of the body and of the soul56    This is chapter xv. in the Latin version and some Greek mss. The Bodleian ms. of the Latin gives the title:—“That the mind is sometimes in servitude to the body, and of its three differences, vital, spiritual, and rational.”.

1. But we have wandered far from our subject, for the purpose of our argument was to show that the mind is not restricted to any part of the body, but is equally in touch with the whole, producing its motion according to the nature of the part which is under its influence. There are cases, however, in which the mind even follows the bodily impulses, and becomes, as it were, their servant; for often the bodily nature takes the lead by introducing either the sense of that which gives pain or the desire for that which gives pleasure, so that it may be said to furnish the first beginnings, by producing in us the desire for food, or, generally, the impulse towards some pleasant thing; while the mind, receiving such an impulse, furnishes the body by its own intelligence with the proper means towards the desired object. Such a condition, indeed, does not occur in all, save in those of a somewhat slavish disposition, who bring the reason into bondage to the impulses of their nature and pay servile homage to the pleasures of sense by allowing them the alliance of their mind; but in the case of more perfect men this does not happen; for the mind takes the lead, and chooses the expedient course by reason and not by passion, while their nature follows in the tracks of its leader.

2. But since our argument discovered in our vital faculty three different varieties—one which receives nourishment without perception, another which at once receives nourishment and is capable of perception, but is without the reasoning activity, and a third rational, perfect, and co-extensive with the whole faculty—so that among these varieties the advantage belongs to the intellectual,—let no one suppose on this account that in the compound nature of man there are three souls welded together, contemplated each in its own limits, so that one should think man’s nature to be a sort of conglomeration of several souls. The true and perfect soul is naturally one, the intellectual and immaterial, which mingles with our material nature by the agency of the senses; but all that is of material nature, being subject to mutation and alteration, will, if it should partake of the animating power, move by way of growth: if, on the contrary, it should fall away from the vital energy, it will reduce its motion to destruction.

3. Thus, neither is there perception without material substance, nor does the act of perception take place without the intellectual faculty.

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΙΔʹ. Ὅτι οὐκ ἐν μέρει τοῦ σώματος ὁ νοῦς. Ἐν ᾧ καὶ διάκρισις τῶν τε σωματικῶν καὶ ψυχικῶν κινημάτων.

Ἀλλὰ πολὺ τῶν προκειμένων ἀπεπλανήθημεν. Δεῖξαι γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος προέθετο τὸ, μὴ μέρει τινὶ τοῦ σώματος ἐνδεδέσθαι τὸν νοῦν: ἀλλὰ παντὸς κατὰ τὸ ἴσον ἐφάπτεσθαι, καταλλήλως τῇ φύσει τοῦ ὑποκειμένου μέρους ἐνεργοῦντα τὴν κίνησιν. Ἔστι δὲ ὅπου καὶ ἐπακολουθεῖ ταῖς φυσικαῖς ὁρμαῖς ὁ νοῦς, οἷον ὑπηρέτης γενόμενος. Καθηγεῖται γὰρ πολλάκις ἡ τοῦ σώματος φύσις, καὶ τοῦ λυποῦντος αἴσθησιν ἐντιθεῖσα, καὶ τοῦ εὐφραίνοντος ἐπιθυμίαν, ὥστε ταύτην μὲν τὰς πρώτας παρέχειν ἀρχὰς, ἢ βρώσεως ὄρεξιν, ἤ τινος ὅλως τῶν καθ' ἡδονὴν τὴν ὁρμὴν ἐμποιοῦσαν, τὸν δὲ νοῦν ἐκδεχόμενον τὰς τοιαύτας ὁρμὰς, ταῖς οἰκείαις περινοίαις τὰς πρὸς τὸ ποθούμενον ἀφορμὰς συνεκπορίζειν τῷ σώματι. Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ μόνων τῶν ἀνδραποδωδέστερον διακειμένων, οἳ δουλώσαντες τὸν λόγον ταῖς ὁρμαῖς τῆς φύσεως, διὰ τῆς τοῦ νοῦ συμμαχίας τὸ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡδὺ δουλοπρεπῶς κολακεύουσιν. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν τελειοτέρων οὐχ οὕτως γίνεται. Καθηγεῖται γὰρ ὁ νοῦς, λόγῳ καὶ οὐχὶ πάθει τὸ λυσιτελὲς προαιρούμενος: ἡ δὲ φύσις κατ' ἴχνος ἕπεται τῷ προκαθηγουμένῳ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τρεῖς κατὰ τὴν ζωτικὴν δύναμιν διαφορὰς ὁ λόγος εὗρε, τὴν μὲν τρεφομένην χωρὶς αἰσθήσεως, τὴν δὲ τρεφομένην μὲν καὶ αὐξανομένην, ἀμοιροῦσαν δὲ τῆς λογικῆς ἐνεργείας, τὴν δὲ λογικὴν καὶ τελείαν δι' ἁπάσης διήκουσαν τῆς δυνάμεως, ὡς καὶ ἐν ἐκείναις εἶναι καὶ τῆς νοερᾶς τὸ πλέον ἔχειν: μηδεὶς διὰ τούτων ὑπονοείτω τρεῖς συγκεκροτῆσθαι ψυχὰς ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ συγκρίματι, ἐν ἰδίαις περιγραφαῖς θεωρουμένας, ὥστε συγκρότημά τι πολλῶν ψυχῶν τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν εἶναι νομίζειν. Ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἀληθής τε καὶ τελεία ψυχὴ, μία τῇ φύσει ἐστὶν, ἡ νοερά τε καὶ ἄϋλος, ἡ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων τῇ ὑλικῇ καταμιγνυμένη φύσει. Τὸ δὲ ὑλῶδες ἅπαν ἐν τροπῇ τε καὶ ἀλλοιώσει κείμενον, εἰ μὲν μετέχοι τῆς ψυχούσης δυνάμεως, κατὰ αὔξησιν κινηθήσεται: εἰ δὲ ἀποπέσοι τῆς ζωτικῆς ἐνεργείας, εἰς φθορὰν ἀναλύσει τὴν κίνησιν. Οὔτε οὖν αἴσθησις χωρὶς ὑλικῆς οὐσίας, οὔτε τῆς νοερᾶς δυνάμεως χωρὶς, αἰσθήσεως ἐνέργεια γίνεται.