On the Making of Man.

 I. Wherein is a partial inquiry into the nature of the world, and a more minute exposition of the things which preceded the genesis of man

 II. Why man appeared last, after the creation

 III. That the nature of man is more precious than all the visible creation

 IV. That the construction of man throughout signifies his ruling power .

 V. That man is a likeness of the Divine sovereignty .

 VI. An examination of the kindred of mind to nature: wherein, by way of digression, is refuted the doctrine of the Anomœans .

 VII. Why man is destitute of natural weapons and covering

 VIII. Why man’s form is upright and that hands were given him because of reason wherein also is a speculation on the difference of souls .

 IX. That the form of man was framed to serve as an instrument for the use of reason .

 X. That the mind works by means of the senses.

 XI. That the nature of mind is invisible.

 XII. An examination of the question where the ruling principle is to be considered to reside wherein also is a discussion of tears and laughter, and

 XIII. A Rationale of sleep, of yawning, and of dreams .

 XIV. That the mind is not in a part of the body wherein also is a distinction of the movements of the body and of the soul .

 XV. That the soul proper, in fact and name, is the rational soul, while the others are called so equivocally wherein also is this statement, that the

 XVI. A contemplation of the Divine utterance which said—“Let us make man after our image and likeness” wherein is examined what is the definition of

 XVII. What we must answer to those who raise the question—“If procreation is after sin, how would souls have come into being if the first of mankind h

 XVIII. That our irrational passions have their rise from kindred with irrational nature.

 XIX. To those who say that the enjoyment of the good things we look for will again consist in meat and drink, because it is written that by these mean

 XX. What was the life in Paradise, and what was the forbidden tree ?

 XXI. That the resurrection is looked for as a consequence, not so much from the declaration of Scripture as from the very necessity of things .

 XXII. To those who say, “If the resurrection is a thing excellent and good, how is it that it has not happened already, but is hoped for in some perio

 XXIII. That he who confesses the beginning of the world’s existence must necessarily also agree as to its end .

 XXIV. An argument against those who say that matter is co-eternal with God.

 XXV. How one even of those who are without may be brought to believe the Scripture when teaching of the resurrection .

 XXVI. That the resurrection is not beyond probability .

 XXVII. That it is possible, when the human body is dissolved into the elements of the universe, that each should have his own body restored from the c

 XXVIII. To those who say that souls existed before bodies, or that bodies were formed before souls wherein there is also a refutation of the fables c

 XXIX. An establishment of the doctrine that the cause of the existence of soul and body is one and the same.

 XXX. A brief examination of the construction of our bodies from a medical point of view.

XI. That the nature of mind is invisible.38    The Bodleian ms. of the Latin version gives as the title:—“The definition of the human mind.”

1. What then is, in its own nature, this mind that distributes itself into faculties of sensation, and duly receives, by means of each, the knowledge of things? That it is something else besides the senses, I suppose no reasonable man doubts; for if it were identical with sense, it would reduce the proper character of the operations carried on by sense to one, on the ground that it is itself simple, and that in what is simple no diversity is to be found. Now however, as all agree that touch is one thing and smell another, and as the rest of the senses are in like manner so situated with regard to each other as to exclude intercommunion or mixture, we must surely suppose, since the mind is duly present in each case, that it is something else besides the sensitive nature, so that no variation may attach to a thing intelligible.

2. “Who hath known the mind of the Lord39    Rom. xi. 34.?” the apostle asks; and I ask further, who has understood his own mind? Let those tell us who consider the nature of God to be within their comprehension, whether they understand themselves—if they know the nature of their own mind. “It is manifold and much compounded.” How then can that which is intelligible be composite? or what is the mode of mixture of things that differ in kind? Or, “It is simple, and incomposite.” How then is it dispersed into the manifold divisions of the senses? how is there diversity in unity? how is unity maintained in diversity?

3. But I find the solution of these difficulties by recourse to the very utterance of God; for He says, “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness40    Gen. i. 26..” The image is properly an image so long as it fails in none of those attributes which we perceive in the archetype; but where it falls from its resemblance to the prototype it ceases in that respect to be an image; therefore, since one of the attributes we contemplate in the Divine nature is incomprehensibility of essence, it is clearly necessary that in this point the image should be able to show its imitation of the archetype.

4. For if, while the archetype transcends comprehension, the nature of the image were comprehended, the contrary character of the attributes we behold in them would prove the defect of the image; but since the nature of our mind, which is the likeness of the Creator evades our knowledge, it has an accurate resemblance to the superior nature, figuring by its own unknowableness the incomprehensible Nature.

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΙΑʹ. Ὅτι ἀθεώρητος ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις.

Τί τοίνυν ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν ὁ νοῦς, ὁ ἐν αἰσθητικαῖς δυνάμεσιν ἑαυτὸν ἐπιμερίζων, καὶ δι' ἑκάστης καταλλήλως τὴν τῶν ὄντων γνῶσιν ἀναλαμβάνων; Ὅτι γὰρ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐστὶν, οὐκ ἂν οἶμαί τινα τῶν ἐμφρόνων ἀμφιβάλλειν. Εἰ γὰρ ταὐτὸν ἦν τῇ αἰσθήσει, πρὸς ἒν πάντως εἶχε τῶν κατ' αἴσθησιν ἐνεργουμένων τὴν οἰκειότητα, διὰ τὸ ἁπλοῦν μὲν αὐτὸν εἶναι, μηδὲν δὲ ποικίλον ἐν τῷ ἀπλῷ θεωρεῖσθαι. Νυνὶ δὲ πάντων συντιθεμένων, ἄλλο μέν τι τὴν ἁφὴν εἶναι, ἄλλο δὲ τὴν ὄσφρησιν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως ἀκοινωνήτως τε καὶ ἀμίκτως πρὸς ἄλληλα διακειμένων, ἐπειδὴ κατὰ τὸ ἴσον ἑκάστῃ καταλλήλως πάρεστιν, ἕτερόν τινα πάντως αὐτὸν χρὴ παρὰ τὴν αἰσθητὴν ὑποτίθεσθαι φύσιν, ὡς ἂν μή τις ποικιλία τῷ νοητῷ συμμιχθείη. «Τίς ἔγνω νοῦν Κυρίου;» φησὶν ὁ Ἀπόστολος. Ἐγὼ δὲ παρὰ τοῦτό φημι, Τίς τὸν ἴδιον νοῦν κατενόησεν; Εἰπάτωσαν οἱ τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν φύσιν ἐντὸς ποιούμενοι τῆς ἑαυτῶν καταλήψεως, εἰ ἑαυτοὺς κατενόησαν; εἰ τοῦ ἰδίου νοῦ τὴν φύσιν ἐπέγνωσαν; Πολυμερής τίς ἐστι, καὶ πολυσύνθετος. Καὶ πῶς τὸ νοητὸν ἐν συνθέσει; ἢ τίς ὁ τῆς τῶν ἑτερογενῶν ἀνακράσεως τρόπος; Ἀλλ' ἁπλοῦς καὶ ἀσύνθετος: καὶ πῶς εἰς τὴν πολυμέρειαν τὴν αἰσθητικὴν διασπείρεται; πῶς ἐν μονότητι τὸ ποικίλον; πῶς ἐν ποικιλίᾳ τὸ ἕν; Ἀλλ' ἔγνων τῶν ἠπορημένων τὴν λύσιν ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἀναδραμὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν φωνήν: «Ποιήσωμεν» γὰρ, φησὶν, «ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν ἡμετέραν.» Ἡ γὰρ εἰκὼν ἕως ἂν ἐν μηδενὶ λείπηται τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον νοουμένων, κυρίως ἐστὶν εἰκών: καθ' ὃ δ' ἂν διαπέσῃ τῆς πρὸς τὸ πρωτότυπον ὁμοιότητος, κατ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέρος εἰκὼν οὐκ ἔστιν. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ἒν τῶν περὶ τὴν θείαν φύσιν θεωρουμένων ἐστὶ τὸ ἀκατάληπτον τῆς οὐσίας: ἀνάγκη πᾶσα καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τὴν εἰκόνα πρὸς τὸ ἀρχέτυπον ἔχειν τὴν μίμησιν. Εἰ γὰρ ἡ μὲν τῆς εἰκόνος φύσις κατελαμβάνετο, τὸ δὲ πρωτότυπον ὑπὲρ κατάληψιν ἦν: ἡ ἐναντιότης τῶν ἐπιθεωρουμένων τὸ διημαρτημένον τῆς εἰκόνος διήλεγχεν. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ διαφεύγει τὴν γνῶσιν ἡ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἡμέτερον φύσις, ὅς ἐστι κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος, ἀκριβῆ πρὸς τὸ ὑπερκείμενον ἔχει τὴν ὁμοιότητα, τῷ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἀγνώστῳ χαρακτηρίζων τὴν ἀκατάληπτον φύσιν.