The Treatise of Athenagoras

 Chapter I.—Defence of the Truth Should Precede Discussions Regarding It.

 Chapter II.—A Resurrection is Not Impossible.

 Chapter III.—He Who Could Create, Can Also Raise Up the Dead.

 Chapter IV.—Objection from the Fact that Some Human Bodies Have Become Part of Others.

 Chapter V.—Reference to the Processes of Digestion and Nutrition.

 Chapter VI.—Everything that is Useless or Hurtful is Rejected.

 Chapter VII.—The Resurrection-Body Different from the Present.

 Chapter VIII.—Human Flesh Not the Proper or Natural Food of Men.

 Chapter IX.—Absurdity of Arguing from Man’s Impotency.

 Chapter X.—It Cannot Be Shown that God Does Not Will a Resurrection.

 Chapter XI.—Recapitulation.

 Chapter XII.—Argument for the Resurrection From the Purpose Contemplated in Man’s Creation.

 Chapter XIII.—Continuation of the Argument.

 Chapter XIV.—The Resurrection Does Not Rest Solely on the Fact of a Future Judgment.

 Chapter XV.—Argument for the Resurrection from the Nature of Man.

 Chapter XVI—Analogy of Death and Sleep, and Consequent Argument for the Resurrection.

 Chapter XVII.—The Series of Changes We Can Now Trace in Man Renders a Resurrection Probable.

 Chapter XVIII.—Judgment Must Have Reference Both to Soul and Body: There Will Therefore Be a Resurrection.

 Chapter XIX.—Man Would Be More Unfavourably Situated Than the Beasts If There Were No Resurrection.

 Chapter XX.—Man Must Be Possessed Both of a Body and Soul Hereafter, that the Judgment Passed Upon Him May Be Just.

 Chapter XXI.—Continuation of the Argument.

 Chapter XXII.—Continuation of the Argument.

 Chapter XXIII.—Continuation of the Argument.

 Chapter XXIV.—Argument for the Resurrection from the Chief End of Man.

 Chapter XXV.—Argument Continued and Concluded.

Chapter XXIV.—Argument for the Resurrection from the Chief End of Man.

The points proposed for consideration having been to some extent investigated, it remains to examine the argument from the end or final cause, which indeed has already emerged in what has been said, and only requires just so much attention and further discussion as may enable us to avoid the appearance of leaving unmentioned any of the matters briefly referred to by us, and thus indirectly damaging the subject or the division of topics made at the outset. For the sake of those present, therefore, and of others who may pay attention to this subject, it may be well just to signify that each of those things which are constituted by nature, and of those which are made by art, must have an end peculiar to itself, as indeed is taught us by the common sense of all men, and testified by the things that pass before our eyes. For do we not see that husbandmen have one end, and physicians another; and again, the things which spring out of the earth another, and the animals nourished upon it, and produced according to a certain natural series, another? If this is evident, and natural and artificial powers, and the actions arising from these, must by all means be accompanied by an end in accordance with nature, it is absolutely necessary that the end of men, since it is that of a peculiar nature, should be separated from community with the rest; for it is not lawful to suppose the same end for beings destitute of rational judgment, and of those whose actions are regulated by the innate law and reason, and who live an intelligent life and observe justice. Freedom from pain, therefore, cannot be the proper end for the latter, for this they would have in common with beings utterly devoid of sensibility: nor can it consist in the enjoyment of things which nourish or delight the body, or in an abundance of pleasures; else a life like that of the brutes must hold the first place, while that regulated by virtue is without a final cause. For such an end as this, I suppose, belongs to beasts and cattle, not to men possessed of an immortal soul and rational judgment.

Ἐξητασμένων δὲ ποσῶς τῶν προτεθέντων ὑπόλοιπον ἂν εἴη καὶ τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους διασκέψασθαι λόγον, ἤδη μὲν τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐμφαινόμενον, τοσαύτης δὲ μόνον ἐπιστασίας καὶ προσθήκης δεόμενον, ὡς μὴ δοκεῖν τι τῶν μικρῷ [πρόσθεν] εἰρημένων ἀμνημόνευτον καταλιπόντα παραβλάψαι τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἢ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γενομένην διαίρεσιν. τούτων τε οὖν ἕνεκεν καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐγκληθησομένων καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι τοσοῦτον ἐπισημήνασθαι μόνον ὅτι δεῖ καὶ τῶν ἐκ φύσεως συνισταμένων καὶ τῶν κατὰ τέχνην γινομένων οἰκεῖον ἑκάστου τέλος εἶναι, τοῦτο που καὶ τῆς κοινῆς πάντων ἐννοίας ἐκδιδασκούσης ἡμᾶς καὶ τῶν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς στρεφομένων ἐπιμαρτυρούντων. ἦ γὰρ οὐ θεωροῦμεν ἕτερόν τι τοῖς γεωργοῦσιν, ἕτερον δὲ τοῖς ἰατρεύουσιν ὑποκείμενον τέλος, καὶ πάλιν ἄλλο μέν τι τῶν ἐκ γῆς φυομένων, ἄλλο δὲ τῶν ἐπ' αὐτῆς τρεφομένων ζῴων καὶ κατά τινα φυσικὸν εἱρμὸν γεννωμένων; εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐναργὲς καὶ δεῖ πάντως ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἢ τεχνικαῖς δυνάμεσι καὶ ταῖς ἐκ τούτων ἐνεργείαις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἕπεσθαι τέλος, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τέλος ὡς ἰδιαζούσης ὂν φύσεως ἐξῃρῆσθαι τῆς τῶν ἄλλων κοινότητος· ἐπεὶ μηδὲ θεμιτὸν ταὐτὸν ὑποθέσθαι τέλος τῶν τε λογικῆς κρίσεως ἀμοιρούντων καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν ἔμφυτον νόμον καὶ λόγον ἐνεργούντων ἔμφρονί τε ζωῇ καὶ δίκῃ χρωμένων. οὔτ' οὖν τὸ ἄλυπον οἰκεῖον τούτοις ἂν εἴη τέλος, μετείη γὰρ ἂν τούτου καὶ τοῖς παντελῶς ἀναισθητοῦσιν· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῶν τὸ σῶμα τρεφόντων ἢ τερπόντων ἀπόλαυσις καὶ πλῆθος ἡδονῶν· ἢ πρωτεύειν ἀνάγκη τὸν κτηνώδη βίον, ἀτελῆ δ' εἶναι τὸν κατ' ἀρετήν. κτηνῶν γὰρ οἶμαι καὶ βοσκημάτων οἰκεῖον τοῦτο τέλος, οὐκ ἀνθρώπων ἀθανάτῳ ψυχῇ καὶ λογικῇ κρίσει χρωμένων.