Chapter XV.—Argument for the Resurrection from the Nature of Man.

But while the cause discoverable in the creation of men is of itself sufficient to prove that the resurrection follows by natural sequence on the dissolution of bodies, yet it is perhaps right not to shrink from adducing either of the proposed arguments, but, agreeably to what has been said, to point out to those who are not able of themselves to discern them, the arguments from each of the truths evolved from the primary; and first and foremost, the nature of the men created, which conducts us to the same notion, and has the same force as evidence of the resurrection. For if the whole nature of men in general is composed of an immortal soul and a body which was fitted to it in the creation, and if neither to the nature of the soul by itself, nor to the nature of the body separately, has God assigned such a creation or such a life and entire course of existence as this, but to men compounded of the two, in order that they may, when they have passed through their present existence, arrive at one common end, with the same elements of which they are composed at their birth and during life, it unavoidably follows, since one living-being is formed from the two, experiencing whatever the soul experiences and whatever the body experiences, doing and performing whatever requires the judgment of the senses or of the reason, that the whole series of these things must be referred to some one end, in order that they all, and by means of all,—namely, man’s creation, man’s nature, man’s life, man’s doings and sufferings, his course of existence, and the end suitable to his nature,—may concur in one harmony and the same common experience. But if there is some one harmony and community of experience belonging to the whole being, whether of the things which spring from the soul or of those which are accomplished by means of the body, the end for all these must also be one. And the end will be in strictness one, if the being whose end that end is remains the same in its constitution; and the being will be exactly the same, if all those things of which the being consists as parts are the same. And they will be the same in respect of their peculiar union, if the parts dissolved are again united for the constitution of the being. And the constitution of the same men of necessity proves that a resurrection will follow of the dead and dissolved bodies; for without this, neither could the same parts be united according to nature with one another, nor could the nature of the same men be reconstituted. And if both understanding and reason have been given to men for the discernment of things which are perceived by the understanding, and not of existences only, but also of the goodness and wisdom and rectitude of their Giver, it necessarily follows that, since those things continue for the sake of which the rational judgment is given, the judgment given for these things should also continue. But it is impossible for this to continue, unless the nature which has received it, and in which it adheres, continues. But that which has received both understanding and reason is man, not the soul by itself. Man, therefore, who consists of the two parts, must continue for ever. But it is impossible for him to continue unless he rise again. For if no resurrection were to take place, the nature of men as men would not continue. And if the nature of men does not continue, in vain has the soul been fitted to the need of the body and to its experiences; in vain has the body been fettered so that it cannot obtain what it longs for, obedient to the reins of the soul, and guided by it as with a bridle; in vain is the understanding, in vain is wisdom, and the observance of rectitude, or even the practice of every virtue, and the enactment and enforcement of laws,—to say all in a word, whatever is noble in men or for men’s sake, or rather the very creation and nature of men. But if vanity is utterly excluded from all the works of God, and from all the gifts bestowed by Him, the conclusion is unavoidable, that, along with the interminable duration of the soul, there will be a perpetual continuance of the body according to its proper nature.

Ἀρκούσης δὲ καὶ μόνης τῆς ἐπὶ τῇ γενέσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων θεωρουμένης αἰτίας δεῖξαι τὴν ἀνάστασιν κατὰ φυσικὴν ἀκολουθίαν ἑπομένην τοῖς διαλυθεῖσι σώμασιν, δίκαιον ἴσως πρὸς μηδὲν ἀποκνῆσαι τῶν προτεθέντων, ἀκολούθως δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις καὶ τὰς ἐξ ἑκάστου τῶν ἑπομένων ἀφορμὰς ὑποδεῖξαι τοῖς ἐξ αὑτῶν συνιδεῖν μὴ δυναμένοις καὶ πρό γε τῶν ἄλλων τὴν τῶν γενομένων ἀνθρώπων φύσιν, ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἄγουσαν ἔννοιαν καὶ τὴν ἴσην παρέχουσαν περὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως πίστιν. εἰ γὰρ πᾶσα κοινῶς ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσις ἐκ ψυχῆς ἀθανάτου καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῇ συναρμοσθέντος σώματος ἔχει τὴν σύστασιν καὶ μήτε τῇ φύσει τῆς ψυχῆς καθ' ἑαυτὴν μήτε τῇ φύσει τοῦ σώματος χωρὶς ἀπεκλήρωσεν θεὸς τὴν τοιάνδε γένεσιν ἢ τὴν ζωὴν καὶ τὸν σύμπαντα βίον, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐκ τούτων γενομένοις ἀνθρώποις, ἵν', ἐξ ὧν γίνονται καὶ ζῶσι, διαβιώσαντες εἰς ἕν τι καὶ κοινὸν καταλήξωσιν τέλος, δεῖ, πάντως ἑνὸς ὄντος ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ζῴου τοῦ καὶ πάσχοντος ὁπόσα πάθη ψυχῆς καὶ ὁπόσα τοῦ σώματος ἐνεργοῦντός τε καὶ πράττοντος ὁπόσα τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ἢ τῆς λογικῆς δεῖται κρίσεως, πρὸς ἕν τι τέλος ἀναφέρεσθαι πάντα τὸν ἐκ τούτων εἱρμόν, ἵνα πάντα καὶ διὰ πάντων συντρέχῃ πρὸς μίαν ἁρμονίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν συμπάθειαν, ἀνθρώπου γένεσις, ἀνθρώπου φύσις, ἀνθρώπου ζωή, ἀνθρώπου πράξεις καὶ πάθη καὶ βίος καὶ τὸ τῇ φύσει προσῆκον τέλος. εἰ δὲ μία τίς ἐστιν ἁρμονία τοῦ ζῴου παντὸς καὶ συμπάθεια, καὶ τῶν ἐκ ψυχῆς φυομένων καὶ τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιτελουμένων, ἓν εἶναι δεῖ καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις τέλος. ἓν δὲ τέλος ἔσται κατ' ἀλήθειαν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ζῴου κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σύστασιν ὄντος, οὗπέρ ἐστιν τέλος τὸ τέλος. τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ ζῷον ἔσται καθαρῶς, τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντων πάντων ἐξ ὧν ὡς μερῶν τὸ ζῷον. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἰδιάζουσαν ἕνωσιν ἔσται, τῶν διαλυθέντων πάλιν ἑνωθέντων πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ζῴου σύστασιν. ἡ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπων σύστασις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑπομένην δείκνυσιν τὴν τῶν νεκρωθέντων καὶ διαλυθέντων σωμάτων ἀνάστασιν· ταύτης γὰρ χωρὶς οὔτ' ἂν ἑνωθείη τὰ αὐτὰ μέρη κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλήλοις οὔτ' ἂν συσταίη τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡ φύσις. εἰ δὲ καὶ νοῦς καὶ λόγος δέδοται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς διάκρισιν νοητῶν, οὐκ οὐσιῶν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς τοῦ δόντος ἀγαθότητος καὶ σοφίας καὶ δικαιοσύνης, ἀνάγκη, διαμενόντων ὧν ἕνεκεν ἡ λογικὴ δέδοται κρίσις, καὶ αὐτὴν διαμένειν τὴν ἐπὶ τούτοις δοθεῖσαν κρίσιν· ταύτην δὲ διαμένειν ἀδύνατον, μὴ τῆς δεξαμένης αὐτὴν καὶ τὰ ἐν οἷς ἐστι διαμενούσης φύσεως. ὁ δὲ καὶ νοῦν καὶ λόγον δεξάμενός ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, οὐ ψυχὴ καθ' ἑαυτήν· ἄνθρωπον ἄρα δεῖ τὸν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ὄντα διαμένειν εἰς ἀεί, τοῦτον δὲ διαμένειν ἀδύνατον μὴ ἀνιστάμενον. ἀναστάσεως γὰρ μὴ γινομένης, οὐκ ἂν ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὡς ἀνθρώπων διαμένοι φύσις· τῆς δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσεως μὴ διαμενούσης, μάτην μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ συνήρμοσται τῇ τοῦ σώματος ἐνδείᾳ καὶ τοῖς τούτου πάθεσιν, μάτην δὲ τὸ σῶμα πεπέδηται πρὸς τὸ τυγχάνειν ὧν ὀρέγεται, ταῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ἡνίαις ὑπεῖκον καὶ χαλιναγωγούμενον, μάταιος δὲ ὁ νοῦς, ματαία δὲ φρόνησις καὶ δικαιοσύνης παρατήρησις ἢ καὶ πάσης ἀρετῆς ἄσκησις καὶ νόμων θέσις καὶ διάταξις καὶ συνόλως εἰπεῖν πᾶν ὅτι περ ἐν ἀνθρώποις καὶ δι' ἀνθρώπους καλόν, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡ γένεσίς τε καὶ φύσις. εἰ δὲ πάντων καὶ πανταχόθεν ἀπελήλαται τῶν ἔργων τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τῶν ὑπ' ἐκείνου διδομένων δωρεῶν τὸ μάταιον, δεῖ πάντως τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀτελευτήτῳ συνδιαιωνίζειν τὴν τοῦ σώματος διαμονὴν κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν.