The Treatise of Athenagoras

 Chapter I.—Defence of the Truth Should Precede Discussions Regarding It.

 Chapter II.—A Resurrection is Not Impossible.

 Chapter III.—He Who Could Create, Can Also Raise Up the Dead.

 Chapter IV.—Objection from the Fact that Some Human Bodies Have Become Part of Others.

 Chapter V.—Reference to the Processes of Digestion and Nutrition.

 Chapter VI.—Everything that is Useless or Hurtful is Rejected.

 Chapter VII.—The Resurrection-Body Different from the Present.

 Chapter VIII.—Human Flesh Not the Proper or Natural Food of Men.

 Chapter IX.—Absurdity of Arguing from Man’s Impotency.

 Chapter X.—It Cannot Be Shown that God Does Not Will a Resurrection.

 Chapter XI.—Recapitulation.

 Chapter XII.—Argument for the Resurrection From the Purpose Contemplated in Man’s Creation.

 Chapter XIII.—Continuation of the Argument.

 Chapter XIV.—The Resurrection Does Not Rest Solely on the Fact of a Future Judgment.

 Chapter XV.—Argument for the Resurrection from the Nature of Man.

 Chapter XVI—Analogy of Death and Sleep, and Consequent Argument for the Resurrection.

 Chapter XVII.—The Series of Changes We Can Now Trace in Man Renders a Resurrection Probable.

 Chapter XVIII.—Judgment Must Have Reference Both to Soul and Body: There Will Therefore Be a Resurrection.

 Chapter XIX.—Man Would Be More Unfavourably Situated Than the Beasts If There Were No Resurrection.

 Chapter XX.—Man Must Be Possessed Both of a Body and Soul Hereafter, that the Judgment Passed Upon Him May Be Just.

 Chapter XXI.—Continuation of the Argument.

 Chapter XXII.—Continuation of the Argument.

 Chapter XXIII.—Continuation of the Argument.

 Chapter XXIV.—Argument for the Resurrection from the Chief End of Man.

 Chapter XXV.—Argument Continued and Concluded.

Chapter XXI.—Continuation of the Argument.

For if good deeds are rewarded, the body will clearly be wronged, inasmuch as it has shared with the soul in the toils connected with well-doing, but does not share in the reward of the good deeds, and because, though the soul is often excused for certain faults on the ground of the body’s neediness and want, the body itself is deprived of all share in the good deeds done, the toils on behalf of which it helped to bear during life. Nor, again, if faults are judged, is the soul dealt fairly with, supposing it alone to pay the penalty for the faults it committed through being solicited by the body and drawn away by it to its own appetites and motions, at one time being seized upon and carried off, at another attracted in some very violent manner, and sometimes concurring with it by way of kindness and attention to its preservation. How can it possibly be other than unjust for the soul to be judged by itself in respect of things towards which in its own nature it feels no appetite, no motion, no impulse, such as licentiousness, violence, covetousness, injustice, and the unjust acts arising out of these? For if the majority of such evils come from men’s not having the mastery of the passions which solicit them, and they are solicited by the neediness and want of the body, and the care and attention required by it (for these are the motives for every acquisition of property, and especially for the using of it, and moreover for marriage and all the actions of life, in which things, and in connection with which, is seen what is faulty and what is not so), how can it be just for the soul alone to be judged in respect of those things which the body is the first to be sensible of, and in which it draws the soul away to sympathy and participation in actions with a view to things which it wants; and that the appetites and pleasures, and moreover the fears and sorrows, in which whatever exceeds the proper bounds is amenable to judgment, should be set in motion by the body, and yet that the sins arising from these, and the punishments for the sins committed, should fall upon the soul alone, which neither needs anything of this sort, nor desires nor fears or suffers of itself any such thing as man is wont to suffer? But even if we hold that these affections do not pertain to the body alone, but to man, in saying which we should speak correctly, because the life of man is one, though composed of the two, yet surely we shall not assert that these things belong to the soul, if we only look simply at its peculiar nature. For if it is absolutely without need of food, it can never desire those things which it does not in the least require for its subsistence; nor can it feel any impulse towards any of those things which it is not at all fitted to use; nor, again, can it be grieved at the want of money or other property, since these are not suited to it. And if, too, it is superior to corruption, it fears nothing whatever as destructive of itself: it has no dread of famine, or disease, or mutilation, or blemish, or fire, or sword, since it cannot suffer from any of these any hurt or pain, because neither bodies nor bodily powers touch it at all. But if it is absurd to attach the passions to the soul as belonging specially to it, it is in the highest degree unjust and unworthy of the judgment of God to lay upon the soul alone the sins which spring from them, and the consequent punishments.

Κατορθωμάτων τε γὰρ τιμωμένων, ἀδικηθήσεται τὸ σῶμα σαφῶς ἐκ τοῦ κοινωνῆσαι μὲν τῇ ψυχῇ τῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς σπουδαζομένοις πόνων, μὴ κοινωνῆσαι δὲ τῆς ἐπὶ τοῖς κατορθωθεῖσι τιμῆς, καὶ συγγνώμης μὲν τυγχάνειν πολλάκις τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπί τινων πλημμελημάτων διὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἔνδειάν τε καὶ χρείαν, ἐκπίπτειν δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἐπὶ τοῖς κατορθωθεῖσι κοινωνίας, ὑπὲρ ὧν τοὺς ἐν τῇ ζωῇ συνδιήνεγκεν πόνους. καὶ μὴν καὶ πλημμελημάτων κρινομένων οὐ σῴζεται τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ δίκαιον, εἴ γε μόνη τίνοι δίκην ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐνοχλοῦντος τοῦ σώματος καὶ πρὸς τὰς οἰκείας ὀρέξεις ἢ κινήσεις ἕλκοντος ἐπλημμέλησεν ποτὲ μὲν κατὰ συναρπαγὴν καὶ κλοπήν, ποτὲ δὲ κατά τινα βιαιοτέραν ὁλκήν, ἄλλοτε δὲ κατὰ συνδρομὴν ἐν χάριτος μέρει καὶ θεραπείας τῆς τούτου συστάσεως. ἢ πῶς οὐκ ἄδικον τὴν ψυχὴν κρίνεσθαι καθ' ἑαυτὴν ὑπὲρ ὧν οὐδ' ἡντινοῦν ἔχει κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῆς φύσιν οὐκ ὄρεξιν οὐ κίνησιν οὐχ ὁρμήν, οἷον λαγνείας ἢ βίας ἢ πλεονεξίας [ἀδικίας] καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀδικημάτων; εἰ γὰρ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν τοιούτων γίνεται κακῶν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ κατακρατεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τῶν ἐνοχλούντων παθῶν, ἐνοχλοῦνται δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἐνδείας καὶ χρείας καὶ τῆς περὶ τοῦτο σπουδῆς καὶ θεραπείας (τούτων γὰρ ἕνεκεν πᾶσα ἡ κτῆσις καὶ πρὸ ταύτης ἡ χρῆσις, ἔτι δὲ γάμος καὶ ὅσαι κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεις, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ θεωρεῖται τό τε πλημμελὲς καὶ τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον), ποῦ δίκαιον ἐν οἷς πρωτοπαθεῖ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἕλκει πρὸς συμπάθειαν καὶ κοινωνίαν τῶν ἐφ' ἃ κινεῖται πράξεων, αὐτὴν κρίνεσθαι μόνην, καὶ τὰς μὲν ὀρέξεις καὶ τὰς ἡδονάς, ἔτι δὲ φόβους καὶ λύπας, ἐφ' ὧν πᾶν τὸ μὴ μέτριον ὑπόδικον, ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἔχειν τὴν κίνησιν, τὰς δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἁμαρτίας καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἡμαρτημένοις τιμωρίας ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν φέρεσθαι μόνην τὴν μήτε δεομένην τοιούτου τινὸς μήτε ὀρεγομένην μήτε φοβουμένην ἢ πάσχουσάν τι τοιοῦτον καθ' ἑαυτὴν οἷον πάσχειν πέφυκεν ἄνθρωπος; ἀλλὰ κἂν μὴ μόνου τοῦ σώματος, ἀνθρώπου δὲ θῶμεν εἶναι τὰ πάθη, λέγοντες ὀρθῶς διὰ τὸ μίαν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων εἶναι τὴν τούτου ζωήν, οὐ δήπου γε καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ ταῦτα προσήκειν φήσομεν, ὁπόταν καθαρῶς τὴν ἰδίαν αὐτῆς ἐπισκοπῶμεν φύσιν. εἰ γὰρ πάσης καθάπαξ τροφῆς ἐστιν ἀνενδεής, οὐκ ἂν ὀρεχθείη ποτὲ τούτων ὧν οὐδαμῶς δεῖται πρὸς τὸ εἶναι, οὐδ' ἂν ὁρμήσειεν ἐπί τι τούτων οἷς μηδ' ὅλως χρῆσθαι πέφυκεν· ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἂν λυπηθείη δι' ἀπορίαν χρημάτων ἢ κτημάτων ὡς οὐδὲν αὐτῇ προσηκόντων. εἰ δὲ καὶ φθορᾶς ἐστι κρείττων, οὐδὲν φοβεῖται τὸ παράπαν ὡς φθαρτικὸν ἑαυτῆς· οὐ γὰρ δέδοικεν οὐ λιμὸν οὐ νόσον οὐ πήρωσιν οὐ λώβην οὐ πῦρ οὐ σίδηρον, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ παθεῖν ἐκ τούτων δύναταί τι βλαβερὸν μηδ' ἀλγεινόν, οὐχ ἁπτομένων αὐτῆς τὸ παράπαν οὔτε σωμάτων οὔτε σωματικῶν δυνάμεων. εἰ δὲ τὸ τὰ πάθη ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἰδιαζόντως προσάπτειν ἄτοπον, τὸ τὰς ἐκ τούτων ἁμαρτίας καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ ταύταις τιμωρίας ἐπὶ μόνας φέρειν τὰς ψυχὰς ὑπερβαλλόντως ἄδικον καὶ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ κρίσεως ἀνάξιον.