The Treatise of Athenagoras

 Chapter I.—Defence of the Truth Should Precede Discussions Regarding It.

 Chapter II.—A Resurrection is Not Impossible.

 Chapter III.—He Who Could Create, Can Also Raise Up the Dead.

 Chapter IV.—Objection from the Fact that Some Human Bodies Have Become Part of Others.

 Chapter V.—Reference to the Processes of Digestion and Nutrition.

 Chapter VI.—Everything that is Useless or Hurtful is Rejected.

 Chapter VII.—The Resurrection-Body Different from the Present.

 Chapter VIII.—Human Flesh Not the Proper or Natural Food of Men.

 Chapter IX.—Absurdity of Arguing from Man’s Impotency.

 Chapter X.—It Cannot Be Shown that God Does Not Will a Resurrection.

 Chapter XI.—Recapitulation.

 Chapter XII.—Argument for the Resurrection From the Purpose Contemplated in Man’s Creation.

 Chapter XIII.—Continuation of the Argument.

 Chapter XIV.—The Resurrection Does Not Rest Solely on the Fact of a Future Judgment.

 Chapter XV.—Argument for the Resurrection from the Nature of Man.

 Chapter XVI—Analogy of Death and Sleep, and Consequent Argument for the Resurrection.

 Chapter XVII.—The Series of Changes We Can Now Trace in Man Renders a Resurrection Probable.

 Chapter XVIII.—Judgment Must Have Reference Both to Soul and Body: There Will Therefore Be a Resurrection.

 Chapter XIX.—Man Would Be More Unfavourably Situated Than the Beasts If There Were No Resurrection.

 Chapter XX.—Man Must Be Possessed Both of a Body and Soul Hereafter, that the Judgment Passed Upon Him May Be Just.

 Chapter XXI.—Continuation of the Argument.

 Chapter XXII.—Continuation of the Argument.

 Chapter XXIII.—Continuation of the Argument.

 Chapter XXIV.—Argument for the Resurrection from the Chief End of Man.

 Chapter XXV.—Argument Continued and Concluded.

Chapter XVIII.—Judgment Must Have Reference Both to Soul and Body: There Will Therefore Be a Resurrection.

The arguments I just now proposed for examination, as establishing the truth of the resurrection, are all of the same kind, since they all start from the same point; for their starting-point is the origin of the first men by creation. But while some of them derive their strength from the starting-point itself from which they take their rise, others, consequent upon the nature and the life of men, acquire their credibility from the superintendence of God over us; for the cause according to which, and on account of which, men have come into being, being closely connected with the nature of men, derives its force from creation; but the argument from rectitude, which represents God as judging men according as they have lived well or ill, derives its force from the end of their existence: they come into being on the former ground, but their state depends more on God’s superintendence. And now that the matters which come first have been demonstrated by me to the best of my ability, it will be well to prove our proposition by those also which come after—I mean by the reward or punishment due to each man in accordance with righteous judgment, and by the final cause of human existence; and of these I put foremost that which takes the lead by nature, and inquire first into the argument relating to the judgment: premising only one thing, from concern for the principle which appertains to the matters before us, and for order—namely, that it is incumbent on those who admit God to be the Maker of this universe, to ascribe to His wisdom and rectitude the preservation and care of all that has been created, if they wish to keep to their own principles; and with such views to hold that nothing either in earth or in heaven is without guardianship or providence, but that, on the contrary, to everything, invisible and visible alike, small and great, the attention of the Creator reaches; for all created things require the attention of the Creator,11    [Noble testimony to a minute and particular Providence. Kaye, p. 191.] and each one in particular, according to its nature and the end for which it was made: though I think it would be a useless expenditure of trouble to go through the list now, or distinguish between the several cases, or mention in detail what is suitable to each nature. Man, at all events, of whom it is now our business to speak, as being in want, requires food; as being mortal, posterity; as being rational, a process of judgment. But if each of these things belongs to man by nature, and he requires food for his life, and requires posterity for the continuance of the race, and requires a judgment in order that food and posterity may be according to law, it of course follows, since food and posterity refer to both together, that the judgment must be referred to them too (by both together I mean man, consisting of soul and body), and that such man becomes accountable for all his actions, and receives for them either reward or punishment. Now, if the righteous judgment awards to both together its retribution for the deeds wrought; and if it is not proper that either the soul alone should receive the wages of the deeds wrought in union with the body (for this of itself has no inclination to the faults which are committed in connection with the pleasure or food and culture of the body), or that the body alone should (for this of itself is incapable of distinguishing law and justice), but man, composed of these, is subjected to trial for each of the deeds wrought by him; and if reason does not find this happening either in this life (for the award according to merit finds no place in the present existence, since many atheists and persons who practice every iniquity and wickedness live on to the last, unvisited by calamity, whilst, on the contrary, those who have manifestly lived an exemplary life in respect of every virtue, live in pain, in insult, in calumny and outrage, and suffering of all kinds) or after death (for both together no longer exist, the soul being separated from the body, and the body itself being resolved again into the materials out of which it was composed, and no longer retaining anything of its former structure or form, much less the remembrance of its actions): the result of all this is very plain to every one,—namely, that, in the language of the apostle, “this corruptible (and dissoluble) must put on incorruption,”12    1 Cor. xv. 54. in order that those who were dead, having been made alive by the resurrection, and the parts that were separated and entirely dissolved having been again united, each one may, in accordance with justice, receive what he has done by the body, whether it be good or bad.

Τῶν πρῴην ἡμῖν εἰς ἐξέτασιν προτεθέντων λόγων καὶ τὴν ἀνάστασιν πιστουμένων πάντες μέν εἰσιν ὁμογενεῖς, ὡς ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς φύντες ἀρχῆς· ἀρχὴ γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἡ τῶν πρώτων ἀνθρώπων ἐκ δημιουργίας γένεσις· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἐξ αὐτῆς κρατύνονται τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς ἐξ ἧσπερ ἔφυσαν, οἱ δὲ παρεπόμενοι τῇ τε φύσει καὶ τῷ βίῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐκ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ ἡμᾶς προνοίας λαμβάνουσιν τὴν πίστιν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἰτία, καθ' ἣν καὶ δι' ἣν γεγόνασιν ἄνθρωποι, συνεζευγμένη τῇ φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐκ δημιουργίας ἔχει τὴν ἰσχύν, ὁ δὲ τῆς δικαιοσύνης λόγος, καθ' ὃν κρίνει θεὸς τοὺς εὖ ἢ κακῶς βεβιωκότας ἀνθρώπους, ἐκ τοῦ τούτων τέλους· φύονται μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖθεν, ἤρτηνται δὲ μᾶλλον τῆς προνοίας. δεδειγμένων δὲ ἡμῖν τῶν πρώτων ὡς οἷόν τε, καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ διὰ τῶν ὑστέρων δεῖξαι τὸ προκείμενον, λέγω δὲ διὰ τῆς ὀφειλομένης ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων κατὰ δικαίαν κρίσιν τιμῆς ἢ δίκης καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον τέλους, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων προτάξαι τὸν κατὰ φύσιν ἡγούμενον καὶ πρῶτόν γε διασκέψασθαι τὸν περὶ τῆς κρίσεως λόγον, τοσοῦτον μόνον ὑπειπόντας φροντίδι τῆς προσηκούσης τοῖς προκειμένοις ἀρχῆς καὶ τάξεως ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς ποιητὴν τὸν θεὸν τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς παραδεξαμένους τῇ τούτου σοφίᾳ καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ τὴν τῶν γενομένων ἁπάντων ἀνατιθέναι φυλακήν τε καὶ πρόνοιαν, εἴ γε ταῖς ἰδίαις ἀρχαῖς παραμένειν ἐθέλοιεν, ταῦτα δὲ περὶ τούτων φρονοῦντας μηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι μήτε τῶν κατὰ γῆν μήτε τῶν κατ' οὐρανὸν ἀνεπιτρόπευτον μηδ' ἀπρονόητον, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀφανὲς ὁμοίως καὶ φαινόμενον μικρόν τε καὶ μεῖζον διήκουσαν γινώσκειν τὴν παρὰ τοῦ ποιήσαντος ἐπιμέλειαν. δεῖται γὰρ πάντα τὰ γενόμενα τῆς παρὰ τοῦ ποιήσαντος ἐπιμελείας, ἰδίως δὲ ἕκαστον καθ' ὃ πέφυκεν καὶ πρὸς ὃ πέφυκεν· ἀχρείου γὰρ οἶμαι φιλοτιμίας τὸ κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖν νῦν ἢ τὸ πρόσφορον ἑκάστῃ φύσει καταλέγειν ἐθέλειν. ὅ γε μὴν ἄνθρωπος, περὶ οὗ νῦν πρόκειται λέγειν, ὡς μὲν ἐνδεὴς δεῖται τροφῆς, ὡς δὲ θνητὸς διαδοχῆς, ὡς δὲ λογικὸς δίκης. εἰ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων ἕκαστόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ δεῖται μὲν τροφῆς διὰ τὴν ζωήν, δεῖται δὲ διαδοχῆς διὰ τὴν τοῦ γένους διαμονήν, δεῖται δὲ δίκης διὰ τὸ τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τῆς διαδοχῆς ἔννομον, ἀνάγκη δήπου, τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τῆς διαδοχῆς ἐπὶ τὸ συναμφότερον φερομένης, ἐπὶ τοῦτο φέρεσθαι καὶ τὴν δίκην, λέγω δὲ συναμφότερον τὸν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἄνθρωπον, καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπον γίνεσθαι πάντων τῶν πεπραγμένων ὑπόδικον τήν τε ἐπὶ τούτοις δέχεσθαι τιμὴν ἢ τιμωρίαν. εἰ δὲ κατὰ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου φέρει τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς εἰργασμένοις δίκην ἡ δικαία κρίσις καὶ μήτε τὴν ψυχὴν μόνην δεῖ κομίσασθαι τὰ ἐπίχειρα τῶν μετὰ τοῦ σώματος εἰργασμένων (ἀπροσπαθὴς γὰρ αὕτη καθ' ἑαυτὴν τῶν περὶ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ἢ τροφὰς καὶ θεραπείας γινομένων πλημμελημάτων) μήτε τὸ σῶμα μόνον (ἄκριτον γὰρ τοῦτο καθ' ἑαυτὸ νόμου καὶ δίκης), ὁ δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἄνθρωπος τὴν ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰργασμένων αὑτῷ δέχεται κρίσιν, τοῦτο δὲ οὔτε κατὰ τήνδε τὴν ζωὴν εὑρίσκει συμβαῖνον ὁ λόγος (οὐ γὰρ σῴζεται τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἐν τῷ παρόντι βίῳ διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς μὲν ἀθέους καὶ πᾶσαν ἀνομίαν καὶ κακίαν ἐπιτηδεύοντας μέχρι τελευτῆς διατελεῖν κακῶν ἀπειράτους καὶ τοὐναντίον τοὺς κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἐξητασμένον τὸν ἑαυτῶν βίον ἐπιδειξαμένους ἐν ὀδύναις ζῆν, ἐν ἐπηρείαις, ἐν συκοφαντίαις, αἰκίαις τε καὶ παντοίαις κακοπαθείαις) οὔτε δὲ μετὰ θάνατον (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν ἔτι τὸ συναμφότερον χωριζομένης μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, σκεδαννυμένου δὲ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος εἰς ἐκεῖνα πάλιν ἐξ ὧν συνεφορήθη καὶ μηδὲν ἔτι σῴζοντος τῆς προτέρας φυῆς ἢ μορφῆς, ἦ πού γε τὴν μνήμην τῶν πεπραγμένων), εὔδηλον παντὶ τὸ λειπόμενον, ὅτι δεῖ κατὰ τὸν ἀπόστολον τὸ φθαρτὸν τοῦτο καὶ σκεδαστὸν ἐνδύσασθαι ἀφθαρσίαν, ἵνα ζῳοποιηθέντων ἐξ ἀναστάσεως τῶν νεκρωθέντων καὶ πάλιν ἑνωθέντων τῶν κεχωρισμένων ἢ καὶ πάντῃ διαλελυμένων, ἕκαστος κομίσηται δικαίως ἃ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔπραξεν εἴτε ἀγαθὰ εἴτε κακά.