MONOLOGIUM

 PREFACE.

 CHAPTER I.

 CHAPTER II.

 CHAPTER III.

 CHAPTER IV.

 CHAPTER V.

 CHAPTER VI.

 CHAPTER VII.

 CHAPTER VIII.

 CHAPTER IX.

 CHAPTER X.

 CHAPTER XI.

 CHAPTER XII.

 CHAPTER XIII.

 CHAPTER XIV.

 CHAPTER XV.

 CHAPTER XVI.

 CHAPTER XVII.

 CHAPTER XVIII.

 CHAPTER XIX.

 CHAPTER XX.

 CHAPTER XXI.

 CHAPTER XXII.

 CHAPTER XXIII.

 CHAPTER XXIV.

 CHAPTER XXV.

 CHAPTER XXVI.

 CHAPTER XXVII.

 CHAPTER XXVIII.

 CHAPTER XXIX.

 CHAPTER XXX.

 CHAPTER XXXI.

 CHAPTER XXXII.

 CHAPTER XXXIII.

 CHAPTER XXXIV.

 CHAPTER XXXV.

 CHAPTER XXXVI.

 CHAPTER XXXVII.

 CHAPTER XXXVIII.

 CHAPTER XXXIX.

 CHAPTER XL.

 CHAPTER XLI.

 CHAPTER XLII.

 CHAPTER XLIII.

 CHAPTER XLIV.

 CHAPTER XLV.

 CHAPTER XLVI.

 CHAPTER XLVII.

 CHAPTER XLVIII.

 CHAPTER XLIX.

 CHAPTER L.

 CHAPTER LI.

 CHAPTER LII.

 CHAPTER LIII.

 CHAPTER LIV.

 CHAPTER LV.

 CHAPTER LVI.

 CHAPTER LVII.

 CHAPTER LVIII.

 CHAPTER LIX.

 CHAPTER LX.

 CHAPTER LXI.

 CHAPTER LXII.

 CHAPTER LXIII.

 CHAPTER LXIV.

 CHAPTER LXV.

 CHAPTER LXVI.

 CHAPTER LXVII.

 CHAPTER LXVIII.

 CHAPTER LXIX.

 CHAPTER LXX.

 CHAPTER LXXI.

 CHAPTER LXXII.

 CHAPTER LXXIII.

 CHAPTER LXXIV.

 CHAPTER LXXV.

 CHAPTER LXXVI.

 CHAPTER LXXVII.

 CHAPTER LXXVIII.

 CHAPTER LXXIX.

CHAPTER XI.

The analogy, however, between the expression of the Creator and the expression of the artisan is very incomplete.

BUT, though it is most certain that the supreme Substance expressed, as it were, within itself the whole created world, which it established according to, and through, this same most profound expression, just as an artisan first conceives in his mind what he afterwards actually executes in accordance with his mental concept, yet I see that this analogy is very incomplete.

For the supreme Substance took absolutely nothing from any other source, whence it might either frame a model in itself, or make its creatures what they are; while the artisan is wholly unable to conceive in his imagination any bodily thing, except what he has in some way learned from external objects, whether all at once, or part by part; nor can he perform the work mentally conceived, if there is a lack of material, or of anything without which a work premeditated cannot be performed. For, though a man 58can, by meditation or representation, frame the idea of some sort of animal, such as has no existence; yet, by no means has he the power to do this, except by uniting in this idea the parts that he has gathered in his memory from objects known externally.

Hence, in this respect, these inner expressions of the works they are to create differ in the creative substance and in the artisan: that the former expression, without being taken or aided from any external source, but as first and sole cause, could suffice the Artificer for the performance of his work, while the latter is neither first, nor sole, nor sufficient, cause for the inception of the artisan’s work. Therefore, whatever has been created through the former expression is only what it is through that expression, while whatever has been created through the latter would not exist at all, unless it were something that it is not through this expression itself.