MONOLOGIUM

 PREFACE.

 CHAPTER I.

 CHAPTER II.

 CHAPTER III.

 CHAPTER IV.

 CHAPTER V.

 CHAPTER VI.

 CHAPTER VII.

 CHAPTER VIII.

 CHAPTER IX.

 CHAPTER X.

 CHAPTER XI.

 CHAPTER XII.

 CHAPTER XIII.

 CHAPTER XIV.

 CHAPTER XV.

 CHAPTER XVI.

 CHAPTER XVII.

 CHAPTER XVIII.

 CHAPTER XIX.

 CHAPTER XX.

 CHAPTER XXI.

 CHAPTER XXII.

 CHAPTER XXIII.

 CHAPTER XXIV.

 CHAPTER XXV.

 CHAPTER XXVI.

 CHAPTER XXVII.

 CHAPTER XXVIII.

 CHAPTER XXIX.

 CHAPTER XXX.

 CHAPTER XXXI.

 CHAPTER XXXII.

 CHAPTER XXXIII.

 CHAPTER XXXIV.

 CHAPTER XXXV.

 CHAPTER XXXVI.

 CHAPTER XXXVII.

 CHAPTER XXXVIII.

 CHAPTER XXXIX.

 CHAPTER XL.

 CHAPTER XLI.

 CHAPTER XLII.

 CHAPTER XLIII.

 CHAPTER XLIV.

 CHAPTER XLV.

 CHAPTER XLVI.

 CHAPTER XLVII.

 CHAPTER XLVIII.

 CHAPTER XLIX.

 CHAPTER L.

 CHAPTER LI.

 CHAPTER LII.

 CHAPTER LIII.

 CHAPTER LIV.

 CHAPTER LV.

 CHAPTER LVI.

 CHAPTER LVII.

 CHAPTER LVIII.

 CHAPTER LIX.

 CHAPTER LX.

 CHAPTER LXI.

 CHAPTER LXII.

 CHAPTER LXIII.

 CHAPTER LXIV.

 CHAPTER LXV.

 CHAPTER LXVI.

 CHAPTER LXVII.

 CHAPTER LXVIII.

 CHAPTER LXIX.

 CHAPTER LXX.

 CHAPTER LXXI.

 CHAPTER LXXII.

 CHAPTER LXXIII.

 CHAPTER LXXIV.

 CHAPTER LXXV.

 CHAPTER LXXVI.

 CHAPTER LXXVII.

 CHAPTER LXXVIII.

 CHAPTER LXXIX.

CHAPTER X.

This tbought is a kind of expression of the objects created (locutio rerum), like the expression which an artisan forms in his mind for what he intends to make.

BUT this model of things, which preceded their creation in the thought of the creator, what else is it than a kind of expression of these things in his thought itself; just as when an artisan is about to make something after the manner of his craft, he first expresses it to himself through a concept? But by the expression of the mind or reason I mean, here, not the conception of words signifying the objects, but the general view in the mind, by the vision of conception, of the objects themselves, whether destined to be, or already existing.

For, from frequent usage, it is recognised that we can express the same object in three ways. For we express objects either by the sensible use of sensible signs, that is, signs which are perceptible to the bodily senses; or by thinking within ourselves insensibly of these signs which, when outwardly used, are sensible; or not by employing these signs, either sensibly or 56insensibly, but by expressing the things themselves inwardly in our mind, whether by the power of imagining material bodies or of understanding thought, according to the diversity of these objects themselves.

For I express a man in one way, when I signify him by pronouncing these words, a man; in another, when I think of the same words in silence; and in another, when the mind regards the man himself, either through the image of his body, or through the reason; through the image of his body, when the mind imagines his visible form; through the reason, however, when it thinks of his universal essence, which is a rational, mortal animal.

Now, the first two kinds of expression are in the language of one’s race. But the words of that kind of expression, which I have put third and last, when they concern objects well known, are natural, and are the same among all nations. And, since all other words owe their invention to these, where these are, no other word is necessary for the recognition of an object, and where they cannot be, no other word is of any use for the description of an object.

For, without absurdity, they may also be said to be the truer, the more like they are to the objects to which they correspond, and the more expressively they signify these objects. For, with the exception of those objects, which we employ as their own names, in order to signify them, like certain sounds , the vowel a for instance -- with the exception of these, I say, no other word appears so similar to the object to which it is applied, or expresses it as does that likeness which is expressed by the vision of the mind thinking of the object itself.

This last, then, should be called the especially 57proper and primary word, corresponding to the thing. Hence, if no expression of any object whatever so nearly approaches the object as that expression which consists of this sort of words, nor can there be in the thought of any another word so like the object, whether destined to be, or already existing, not without reason it may be thought that such an expression of objects existed with (apud) the supreme Substance before their creation, that they might be created; and exists, now that they have been created, that they may be known through it.