Chapter 50

Those things are relative which, in what they themselves are, are said to belong to other things, or they are those which in any other way whatsoever are related to another thing. Now, they are said to belong to others, as a father to a son, for the father is necessarily said to be father of a son. On the other hand, they are related to another, as great is to little or much to little. For ‘much is not said to belong to ‘little, but to be ‘much in relation to ‘little.’

One should know that, whenever a thing is considered in itself, it is not relative. When, however, it has a habitude to another thing, then it is said to be relative. Here, then, is the essence of relatives and here is their hypostasis; namely, in their being said to be relative to another, that is to say, in their having a habitude to another. For it is their mutual habitude which makes things relative.

Some relatives are called by the same name, as a friend is a friend of a friend and as an enemy is an enemy of an enemy. Others are called by different names, as a father is a father of a son and as a teacher is a teacher of a pupil.

And again, some things are relative by excess, as the greater is greater than the less. Others are relative according to the relation of the thing discerning to the thing discerned, as scientific knowledge is the knowledge of that which is scientifically knowable. For science discerns that which is scientifically knowable, or, in other words, cognition discerns that which is knowable. And also, sensation is a feeling of the sensible object, placing is a placing of that which is placeable, standing is a standing of that which can stand, reclining is a reclining of that which can recline, and so on. Still others are relative according to potency and impotency. They are relative according to potency, as are the thing heating and the thing heated; according to impotency, or the privation of potency, as when we say that the eye does not have the power to see the sphere without stars. Others are relative according to the relation between the cause and the thing caused, as a father is a father of a son.

Proper to relatives is the fact that they may be affirmed convertibly. Thus, a friend is a friend of a friend, and the second is a friend of the first; a teacher is a teacher of a pupil, and a pupil is a pupil of a teacher. It is also proper to relatives that they go naturally together. Going naturally together means positing and being posited together, removing and being removed together. Thus, when there is a father there will definitely be a son; and when there is no father there will be no son. For, of whom would a son be, if there were no father? He who does not have a son will not be a father. And so the son is taken away when the father is; and the father is taken away when the son is. However, it is not his hypostasis which is taken away, but only the relation. Thus, even though he who was a son does remain, he does not remain as a son, because, if he does not have a father, then how will he be a son? Now, should we speak of a son of one deceased, either we should not be saying this in the proper sense but by a misuse of terms, or we should be saying it implying that the father, by reason of the immortality of his soul, had not died and become non-existent.

One should know that each category is a most general genus containing genera, subaltern species, differences which divide the genera and constitute the species, most specific species, and individuals. The constituent differences are not called essential except only in the category of substance, nor are the individuals called hypostases except only in the category of substance.

One should know that, in so far as substance itself is a genus and has habitude to another, it falls in the category of relatives. Thus, genus is genus of species and species are species of genus, and so they belong to the relatives.

Furthermore, things which are relative and convertible have their habitude either in things which are self-subsistent, or substances, or in things which are not, or accidents. Now, if the habitude is in self-subsistent things, then their relation will either be natural, like that of the father and son, or like that of slave and master, or artificial, like that of pupil and teacher, or by preference, like that of friend and friend or enemy and enemy. If, however, the habitude is not in self-subsistent things but in accidents, then the relation will either be natural, like that of double and half, or not not natural. If it is not natural it will be either fortuitous, like that of slave and master, or artificial, like that of pupil and teacher, or by preference, like that of friend and friend or enemy and enemy. If, however, the habitude is not in self-subsistent things but in accidents, then the relation will either be natural, like that of double and half, or not natural (like that of great and small, for this relation is rather accidental than natural. Fortuity, however, and preference have no place with things that are not self-subsistent, unless it be that some self-subsistent thing that is possibly being affirmed accidentally should somehow appear as referable to another).

Now, relatives must first, as being considered in themselves, be put into one category. Then, as having a habitude to another, they must be put into the category of relatives. For a thing must first be without any relation, and then, afterwards, relation must be considered in it.

Habitude, which is the relation of one thing to another, is said to be a disposition, or affinity, of things which are predicated either of substance or of things connected with substance. Such may be either natural, or fortuitous, or artificial, or by preference.

{Περὶ τῶν πρός τι.} Πρός τι ταῦτά εἰσιν, ὅσα αὐτά, ἅπερ ἐστίν, ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον. Καὶ ἑτέρων μὲν εἶναι λέγεται ὡς πατὴρ υἱοῦ: ὁ γὰρ πατὴρ πάντως υἱοῦ λέγεται πατήρ. Πρὸς ἕτερον δὲ ὡς μέγα πρὸς μικρὸν καὶ πολὺ πρὸς ὀλίγον: οὐ γὰρ λέγεται ὀλίγου πολὺ ἀλλὰ πρὸς ὀλίγον. Χρὴ δὲ γινώσκειν, ὅτι, ὅταν τι καθ' ἑαυτὸ θεωρῆται, οὐκ ἔστι πρός τι, ἡνίκα δὲ σχῇ σχέσιν πρὸς ἕτερον, τότε λέγεται πρός τι. Ὥστε τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ εἶναι τῶν πρός τι καὶ αὕτη αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἡ ὑπόστασις, ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον λέγεσθαι ἤγουν ἐν τῷ ἔχειν σχέσιν πρὸς ἕτερον: ἡ γὰρ πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις τὰ πρός τι ποιεῖ. Τῶν δὲ πρός τι τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὀνόματι ὀνομάζονται, ὡς φίλος φίλου φίλος, ἐχθρὸς ἐχθροῦ ἐχθρός, τὰ δὲ ἑτέρῳ ὀνόματι, ὡς πατὴρ υἱοῦ πατήρ, διδάσκαλος μαθητοῦ διδάσκαλος. Πάλιν τῶν πρός τι τὰ μὲν καθ' ὑπεροχήν, ὡς τὸ μεῖζον ἐλάττονος μεῖζον, _τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ κρῖνον καὶ κρινόμενον, ὡς ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστητοῦ ἐπιστήμη: ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη κρίνει τὸ ἐπιστητὸν ἤγουν ἡ γνῶσις κρίνει τὸ γνωστόν, καὶ αἴσθησις αἰσθητοῦ αἴσθησις καὶ θέσις θετοῦ θέσις καὶ στάσις στατοῦ στάσις καὶ ἀνάκλισις ἀνακλιτοῦ ἀνάκλισις καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα: _τὰ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ ἀδυναμίαν, δύναμιν μὲν ὡς τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ θερμαινόμενον, ἀδυναμίαν δὲ τὸ κατὰ στέρησιν τῆς δυνάμεως, ὡς λέγομεν ἀδυναμίαν ἔχειν τὴν ὄψιν ὁρᾶν τὴν ἄναστρον σφαῖραν: _ τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ αἰτιατόν, ὡς πατὴρ υἱοῦ πατήρ. Ἴδιον δὲ τῶν πρός τι τὸ πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεσθαι: φίλος γὰρ φίλου φίλος καὶ φίλος φίλου φίλος, διδάσκαλος μαθητοῦ διδάσκαλος καὶ μαθητὴς διδασκάλου μαθητής: _καὶ τὸ ἅμα τῇ φύσει εἶναι. Τὸ δὲ ἅμα τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ τὸ συνεισφέρειν καὶ συνεισφέρεσθαι καὶ συναναιρεῖν καὶ συναναιρεῖσθαι: πατρὸς γὰρ ὄντος πάντως καὶ υἱὸς ἔσται, καὶ υἱοῦ ὄντος πάντως καὶ πατὴρ ἔσται καὶ πατρὸς μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲ υἱὸς ἔσται, _ τίνος γὰρ ἔσται υἱὸς μὴ ὄντος πατρός; _καὶ υἱοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲ πατὴρ ἔσται: ὁ γὰρ μὴ ἔχων υἱὸν οὐκ ἔσται πατήρ. Ὥστε συναναιρεῖται ὁ υἱὸς τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ τῷ υἱῷ, συναναιρεῖται δὲ οὐχ ἡ ὑπόστασις αὐτοῦ ἀλλ' ἡ σχέσις. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ μένει ὁ υἱός, ἀλλ' οὐχ υἱὸς μένει: μὴ ἔχων γὰρ πατέρα πῶς ἔσται υἱός; Εἰ δὲ καὶ λέγομεν υἱὸν τοῦ τετελευτηκότος, ἢ οὐ κυρίως λέγομεν ἀλλὰ καταχρηστικῶς, ἢ ὡς μὴ ἀπολομένου τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι χωρήσαντος διὰ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀθάνατον. Χρὴ δὲ εἰδέναι, ὅτι ἑκάστη κατηγορία γενικώτατον γένος ἐστὶ καὶ ἔχει καὶ γένη καὶ εἴδη ὑπάλληλα καὶ διαιρετικὰς τῶν γενῶν καὶ συστατικὰς τῶν εἰδῶν διαφορὰς καὶ εἰδικώτατα εἴδη καὶ ἄτομα: οὔτε δὲ αἱ συστατικαὶ διαφοραὶ λέγονται οὐσιώδεις, εἰ μὴ μόνης τῆς οὐσίας, οὐδὲ τὰ ἄτομα λέγονται ὑποστάσεις, εἰ μὴ τῆς οὐσίας μόνης. Χρὴ δὲ εἰδέναι, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ὡς γένος καὶ σχέσιν ἔχον πρὸς ἕτερον ὑπὸ τὰ πρός τι ἀνάγεται: τὸ γὰρ γένος εἰδῶν ἐστι γένος καὶ τὰ εἴδη γένους εἰσὶν εἴδη καὶ τῶν πρός τί εἰσιν. Ἔτι τὰ πρός τι καὶ πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λεγόμενα ἢ ἐν τοῖς αὐθεδράστοις ἔχουσι τὴν σχέσιν ἤγουν οὐσίαις, ἢ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς αὐθεδράστοις ἤγουν συμβεβηκόσι. Καὶ εἰ ἐν τοῖς αὐθεδράστοις, ἢ φυσικὴ αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἡ σχέσις ὡς πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ, ἢ οὐ φυσική. Εἰ δὲ οὐ φυσική, ἢ τυχικὴ ὡς δοῦλος καὶ δεσπότης ἢ τεχνικὴ ὡς μαθητὴς καὶ διδάσκαλος ἢ προαιρετικὴ ὡς φίλος καὶ φίλος, ἐχθρὸς καὶ ἐχθρός. Εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς αὐθεδράστοις ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν, ἢ φυσικὴ ὡς τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ, ἢ οὐ φυσική. Χρὴ δὲ τὰ πρός τι πρότερον ὑπ' ἄλλην κατηγορίαν ἀνάγεσθαι ὡς καθ' ἑαυτὸ θεωρούμενον καὶ τότε ὡς σχέσιν ἔχον πρὸς ἕτερον ὑπὸ τὰ πρός τι: δεῖ γὰρ πρότερον εἶναί τι ἀσχέτως καὶ τότε θεωρεῖσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ σχέσιν.