A Treatise on the Anger of God

 Chap. I.—Of Divine and Human Wisdom.

 Chap. II.—Of the Truth and Its Steps, and of God.

 Chap. III.—Of the Good and Evil Things in Human Affairs, and of Their Author.

 Chap. IV.—Of God and His Affections, and the Censure of Epicurus.

 Chap. V.—The Opinion of the Stoics Concerning God Of His Anger and Kindness.

 Chap. VI.—That God is Angry.

 Chap. VII.—Of Man, and the Brute Animals, and Religion.

 Chap. VIII.—Of Religion.

 Chap. IX.—Of the Providence of God, and of Opinions Opposed to It.

 Chap. X.—Of the Origin of the World, and the Nature of Affairs, and the Providence of God.

 Chap. XI.—Of God, and that the One God, and by Whose Providence the World is Governed and Exists.

 Chap. XII.—Of Religion and the Fear of God.

 Chap. XIII.—Of the Advantage and Use of the World and of the Seasons.

 Chap. XIV.—Why God Made Man.

 Chap. XV.—Whence Sins Extended to Man.

 Chap. XVI.—Of God, and His Anger and Affections.

 Chap. XVII.—Of God, His Care and Anger.

 Chap. XVIII.—Of the Punishment of Faults, that It Cannot Take Place Without Anger.

 Chap. XIX.—Of the Soul and Body, and of Providence.

 Chap. XX.—Of Offences, and the Mercy of God.

 Chap. XXI.—Of the Anger of God and Man.

 Chap. XXII.—Of Sins, and the Verses of the Sibyls Respecting Them Recited.

 Chap. XXIII.—Of the Anger of God and the Punishment of Sins, and a Recital of the Verses of the Sibyls Respecting It And, Moreover, a Reproof and Exh

Chap. XVI.—Of God, and His Anger and Affections.

Some one will ask what this substance is. First of all, when evils befall them, men in their dejected state for the most part have recourse to God: they appease and entreat Him, believing that He is able to repel injuries from them. He has therefore an occasion of exercising pity; for He is not so unmerciful and a despiser of men as to refuse aid to those who are in distress. Very many, also, who are persuaded that justice is pleasing to God, both worship Him who is Lord and Parent of all, and with continual prayers and repeated vows offer gifts and sacrifices, follow up His name with praises, striving to gain His favour by just and good works. There is therefore a reason, on account of which God may and ought to favour them. For if there is nothing so befitting God as beneficence, and nothing so unsuited to His character as to be ungrateful, it is necessary that He should make some return for the services of those who are excellent, and who lead a holy life, that He may not be liable to the charge of ingratitude which is worthy of blame103    Criminosa.   even in the case of a man. But, on the contrary, others are daring104    Facinorosi.   and wicked, who pollute all things with their lusts, harass with slaughters, practice fraud, plunder, commit perjury, neither spare relatives nor parents, neglect the laws, and even God Himself. Anger, therefore, has a befitting occasion105    Materia.   in God.  

For it is not right that, when He sees such things, He should not be moved, and arise to take vengeance upon the wicked, and destroy the pestilent and guilty, so as to promote the interests of all good men. Thus even in anger itself there is also contained a showing of kindness.106    Gratificatio.   Therefore the arguments are found to be empty and false, either of those who, when they will not admit that God is angry, will have it that He shows kindness, because this, indeed, cannot take place without anger; or of those who think that there is no emotion of the mind in God. And because there are some affections to which God is not liable, as desire, fear, avarice, grief, and envy, they have said that He is entirely free from all affection. For He is not liable to these, because they are vicious affections; but as to those which belong to virtue,—that is, anger towards the wicked, regard towards the good, pity towards the afflicted,—inasmuch as they are worthy of the divine power, He has affections of His own,107    Proprios.   both just and true. And if He is not possessed of them, the life of man will be thrown into confusion, and the condition of things will come to such disturbance that the laws will be despised and overpowered, and audacity alone reign, so that no one can at length be in safety unless he who excels108    Prævaleat.   in strength. Thus all the earth will be laid waste, as it were, by a common robbery. But now, since the wicked expect punishment, and the good hope for favour, and the afflicted look for aid, there is place for virtues, and crimes are more rare. But109    An objection is here met and answered.   it is said, ofttimes the wicked are more prosperous, and the good more wretched, and the just are harassed with impunity by the unjust. We will hereafter consider why these things happen. In the meantime let us explain respecting anger, whether there be any in God; whether He takes no notice at all, and is unmoved at those things which are done with impiety.  

0124C CAPUT XVI. De Deo ejusque ira et affectibus.

Quaeret quispiam, quae sit ista materia? Primum accidentibus malis afflicti homines ad Deum plerumque confugiunt, mitigant, obsecrant, credentes eum 0125A posse ab his injurias propulsare. Habet igitur causam miserandi; nec enim tam immitis est hominumque contemptor, ut auxilium laborantibus deneget. Item plurimi, quibus persuasum est Deo placere justitiam, eumque qui sit dominus ac parens omnium, venerantur, et precibus assiduis ac frequentibus votis, dona et sacrificia offerunt, nomen ejus laudibus prosequuntur, justis ac bonis operibus demereri eum laborantes. Ergo est, propter quod Deus et possit, et debeat gratificari. Nam si nihil est tam conveniens Deo, quam beneficentia, nihil autem tam alienum, quam ut sit ingratus: necesse est ut officiis optimorum sancteque viventium praestet aliquid, ac vicem reddat, ne subeat ingrati culpam, quae est etiam homini criminosa. Contra autem sunt alii facinorosi et nefarii, 0125B qui libidinibus omnia polluant, caedibus vexent, fraudent, rapiant, perjurent; nec consanguineis, nec parentibus parcant; leges et ipsum etiam Deum negligant.

Habet igitur ira in Deo materiam. Non est enim fas eum, cum talia fieri videat, non moveri, et insurgere ad ultionem sceleratorum, et pestiferos nocentesque delere, ut bonis omnibus consulat: adeo et in ipsa ira inest et gratificatio. Inania ergo et falsa reperiuntur argumenta, vel eorum, qui, cum irasci Deum nolunt, gratificari volunt, quia ne hoc quidem fieri sine ira potest; vel eorum, qui nullum animi motum esse in Deo putant. Et quia sunt aliqui affectus, 0126A qui non cadunt in Deum, ut libido, timor, avaritia, moeror, invidia, omni prorsus affectu eum vacare dixerunt. His enim vacat, quia vitiorum affectus sunt: eos autem, qui sunt virtutis, id est, ira in malos, caritas in bonos, miseratio in afflictos, quoniam divina potestate sunt digna, proprios, et justos, et veros habet. Quae profecto nisi habeat, humana vita turbabitur; atque ad tantam confusionem deveniet status rerum, ut contemptis superatisque legibus, sola regnet audacia, ut nemo denique tutus esse possit, nisi qui viribus praevaleat. Ita quasi communi latrocinio terra omnis depopulabitur. Nunc vero quoniam et mali poenam, et boni gratiam, et afflicti opem sperant; et virtutibus locus est, et scelera rariora sunt. Atenim plerumque et scelerati feliciores 0126B sunt, et boni miseriores, et justi ab injustis impune vexantur. Considerabimus postea, cur ista fiant. Interim de ira explicemus, an sit aliqua in Deo; utrum nihil curet omnino, nec moveatur ad ea quae impie geruntur.