A Treatise on the Anger of God

 Chap. I.—Of Divine and Human Wisdom.

 Chap. II.—Of the Truth and Its Steps, and of God.

 Chap. III.—Of the Good and Evil Things in Human Affairs, and of Their Author.

 Chap. IV.—Of God and His Affections, and the Censure of Epicurus.

 Chap. V.—The Opinion of the Stoics Concerning God Of His Anger and Kindness.

 Chap. VI.—That God is Angry.

 Chap. VII.—Of Man, and the Brute Animals, and Religion.

 Chap. VIII.—Of Religion.

 Chap. IX.—Of the Providence of God, and of Opinions Opposed to It.

 Chap. X.—Of the Origin of the World, and the Nature of Affairs, and the Providence of God.

 Chap. XI.—Of God, and that the One God, and by Whose Providence the World is Governed and Exists.

 Chap. XII.—Of Religion and the Fear of God.

 Chap. XIII.—Of the Advantage and Use of the World and of the Seasons.

 Chap. XIV.—Why God Made Man.

 Chap. XV.—Whence Sins Extended to Man.

 Chap. XVI.—Of God, and His Anger and Affections.

 Chap. XVII.—Of God, His Care and Anger.

 Chap. XVIII.—Of the Punishment of Faults, that It Cannot Take Place Without Anger.

 Chap. XIX.—Of the Soul and Body, and of Providence.

 Chap. XX.—Of Offences, and the Mercy of God.

 Chap. XXI.—Of the Anger of God and Man.

 Chap. XXII.—Of Sins, and the Verses of the Sibyls Respecting Them Recited.

 Chap. XXIII.—Of the Anger of God and the Punishment of Sins, and a Recital of the Verses of the Sibyls Respecting It And, Moreover, a Reproof and Exh

Chap. VIII.—Of Religion.

But religion is overthrown if we believe Epicurus speaking thus:—  

“For the nature of gods must ever in itself of necessity enjoy immortality together with supreme repose, far removed and withdrawn from our concerns; since, exempt from every pain, exempt from all dangers, strong in its own resources, not wanting aught of us, it is neither gained by favours nor moved by anger.”31    Lucret., ii. 646.  

Now, when he says these things, does he think that any worship is to be paid to God, or does he entirely overthrow religion? For if God confers nothing good on any one, if He repays the obedience of His worshipper with no favour, what is so senseless, what so foolish, as to build temples, to offer sacrifices, to present gifts, to diminish our property, that we may obtain nothing?32    i.e. without any result.   But (it will be said) it is right that an excellent nature should be honoured. What honour can be due to a being who pays no regard to us, and is ungrateful? Can we be bound in any manner to him who has nothing in common with us? “Farewell to God,” says Cicero,33    De Nat. Deor., i. 44.   “if He is such as to be influenced by no favour, and by no affection of men. For why should I say ’may He be propitious? ’ for He can be propitious to no one.” What can be spoken more contemptible with respect to God? Farewell to Him, he says, that is, let Him depart and retire, since He is able to profit no one. But if God takes no trouble, nor occasions trouble to another, why then should we not commit crimes as often as it shall be in our power to escape the notice of men34    Hominum conscientiam fallere.   and to cheat the public laws? Wherever we shall obtain a favourable opportunity of escaping notice, let us take advantage of the occasion: let us take away the property of others, either without bloodshed or even with blood, if there is nothing else besides the laws to be reverenced.  

While Epicurus entertains these sentiments, he altogether destroys religion; and when this is taken away, confusion and perturbation of life will follow. But if religion cannot be taken away without destroying our hold of wisdom, by which we are separated from the brutes, and of justice, by which the public life may be more secure, how can religion itself be maintained or guarded without fear? For that which is not feared is despised, and that which is despised is plainly not reverenced. Thus it comes to pass that religion, and majesty, and honour exist together with fear; but there is no fear where no one is angry. Whether, therefore, you take away from God kindness, or anger, or both, religion must be taken away, without which the life of men is full of folly, of wickedness, and enormity. For conscience greatly curbs men, if we believe that we are living in the sight of God; if we imagine not only that the actions which we perform are seen from above, but also that our thoughts and our words are heard by God. But it is profitable to believe this, as some imagine, not for the sake of the truth, but of utility, since laws cannot punish conscience unless some terror from above hangs over to restrain offences. Therefore religion is altogether false, and there is no divinity; but all things are made up by skilful men, in order that they may live more uprightly and innocently. This is a great question, and foreign to the subject which we have proposed; but because it necessarily occurs, it ought to be handled, however briefly.  

0096A CAPUT VIII. De religione.

Dissolvitur autem religio, si credamus Epicuro illa dicenti: Omnis enim per se divum natura necesse est, Immortali aevo summa cum pace fruatur, Semota a nostris rebus, sejunctaque longe. Nam privata dolore omni, privata periclis, Ipsa suis pollens opibus, nihil indiga nostri, Nec bene pro meritis capitur, nec tangitur ira.Quae cum dicit, utrum aliquem cultum Deo putat esse tribuendum, an evertit omnem religionem? Si enim Deus nihil cuiquam boni tribuit, si colentis obsequio nullam gratiam refert, quid tam vanum, tam stultum, quam templa aedificare, sacrificia facere, dona conferre, rem familiarem minuere, ut nihil assequamur? 0096B Atenim naturam excellentem honorari oportet. Quis honos deberi potest nihil curanti et ingrato? An aliqua ratione obstricti esse possumus ei, qui nihil habeat commune nobiscum? «Deus, inquit Cicero, si talis est, ut nulla gratia, nulla hominum charitate teneatur, valeat. Quid enim dicam, propitius sit? esse enim propitius potest nemini.» Quid contemptius dici potuit in Deum? Valeat, inquit; id est, abeat et recedat, quando prodesse nulli potest. Quod si negotium 0097A Deus nec habet, nec exhibet, cur non ergo delinquamus, quoties hominum conscientiam fallere licebit, ac leges publicas circumscribere? Ubicumque nobis latendi occasio arriserit, consulamus rei, auferamus aliena, vel sine cruore, vel etiam cum sanguine si praeter leges nihil est amplius quod colendum sit.

Haec dum sentit Epicurus, religionem funditus delet; qua sublata, confusio ac perturbatio vitae sequetur. Quod si religio tolli non potest, ut et sapientiam, qua distamus a belluis, et justitiam retineamus, qua communis vita sit tutior; quomodo Religio ipsa sine metu teneri aut custodiri potest? Quod enim non metuitur, contemnitur: quod contemnitur, utique non colitur. Ita fit, ut religio, et majestas, et honor metu constet: metus autem non est, ubi nullus 0097B irascitur. Sive igitur gratiam Deo, sive iram, sive utrumque detraxeris, religionem tolli necesse est, sine qua vita hominum stultitia, scelere, immanitate completur. Multum enim refraenat homines conscientia, si credamus nos in conspectu Dei vivere; si non tantum quae gerimus, videri desuper, sed etiam quae cogitamus, aut loquimur, audiri a Deo putemus. Atenim prodest id credere, ut quidam putant, non veritatis gratia, sed utilitatis; quoniam leges conscientiam punire non possunt, nisi aliquis desuper terror impendeat ad cohibenda peccata. Falsa est igitur omnis religio et divinitas nulla est. Sed a viris prudentibus universa conficta sunt, quo rectius innocentiusque 0097C vivatur. Magna haec, et a materia quam proposuimus 0098A aliena quaestio est: sed quia necessario incidit, debet quamvis breviter attingi.