A Treatise on the Anger of God

 Chap. I.—Of Divine and Human Wisdom.

 Chap. II.—Of the Truth and Its Steps, and of God.

 Chap. III.—Of the Good and Evil Things in Human Affairs, and of Their Author.

 Chap. IV.—Of God and His Affections, and the Censure of Epicurus.

 Chap. V.—The Opinion of the Stoics Concerning God Of His Anger and Kindness.

 Chap. VI.—That God is Angry.

 Chap. VII.—Of Man, and the Brute Animals, and Religion.

 Chap. VIII.—Of Religion.

 Chap. IX.—Of the Providence of God, and of Opinions Opposed to It.

 Chap. X.—Of the Origin of the World, and the Nature of Affairs, and the Providence of God.

 Chap. XI.—Of God, and that the One God, and by Whose Providence the World is Governed and Exists.

 Chap. XII.—Of Religion and the Fear of God.

 Chap. XIII.—Of the Advantage and Use of the World and of the Seasons.

 Chap. XIV.—Why God Made Man.

 Chap. XV.—Whence Sins Extended to Man.

 Chap. XVI.—Of God, and His Anger and Affections.

 Chap. XVII.—Of God, His Care and Anger.

 Chap. XVIII.—Of the Punishment of Faults, that It Cannot Take Place Without Anger.

 Chap. XIX.—Of the Soul and Body, and of Providence.

 Chap. XX.—Of Offences, and the Mercy of God.

 Chap. XXI.—Of the Anger of God and Man.

 Chap. XXII.—Of Sins, and the Verses of the Sibyls Respecting Them Recited.

 Chap. XXIII.—Of the Anger of God and the Punishment of Sins, and a Recital of the Verses of the Sibyls Respecting It And, Moreover, a Reproof and Exh

Chap. VII.—Of Man, and the Brute Animals, and Religion.

Though philosophers have often turned aside from reason through their ignorance of the truth, and have fallen into inextricable errors (for that is wont to happen to these which happens to a traveller ignorant of the way, and not confessing that he is ignorant ,—namely, that he wanders about, while he is ashamed to inquire from those whom he meets), no philosopher, however, has ever made the assertion that there is no difference between man and the brutes. Nor has any one at all, provided that he wished to appear wise, reduced a rational animal to the level of the mute and irrational; which some ignorant persons do, resembling the brutes themselves, who, wishing to give themselves up to the indulgence of their appetite and pleasure, say that they are born on the same principle as all living animals, which it is impious for man to say. For who is so unlearned as not to know, who is so void of understanding as not to perceive, that there is something divine in man? I do not as yet come to the excellences of the soul and of the intellect, by which there is a manifest affinity between man and God. Does not the position of the body itself, and the fashion of the countenance, declare that we are not on a level with the dumb creation? Their nature is prostrated to the ground and to their pasture, and has nothing in common with the heaven, which they do not look upon. But man, with his erect position, with his elevated countenance raised to the contemplation of the universe, compares his features with God, and reason recognises reason.22    The reason of man, man’s rational nature, recognizes the divine reason, i.e., God. [Confert cum Deo vultum et rationem ratio cognoscit. Hence Milton’s “human face divine.”]    

And on this account there is no animal, as Cicero says,23    De Legibus, i. 8.   except man, which has any knowledge of God. For he alone is furnished with wisdom, so that he alone understands religion; and this is the chief or only difference between man and the dumb animals. For the other things which appear to be peculiar to man, even if there are not such in the dumb animals, nevertheless may appear to be similar. Speech is peculiar to man; yet even in these there is a certain resemblance to speech. For they both distinguish one another by their voices; and when they are angry, they send forth a sound resembling altercation; and when they see one another after an interval of time, they show the office of congratulation by their voice. To us, indeed, their voices appear uncouth,24    Incondita, “unformed, or rude.” [See p. 77, supra.]   as ours perhaps do to them; but to themselves, who understand one another, they are words. In short, in every affection they utter distinct expressions of voice25    [Vol. vi. note 3, p. 452, this series.]   by which they may show their state of mind. Laughter also is peculiar to man; and yet we see certain indications of joy in other animals, when they use passionate gestures26    Ad lusum gestiunt.   with a view to sports, hang down27    Demulcent.   their ears, contract their mouth, smooth their forehead, relax their eyes to sportiveness. What is so peculiar to man as reason and the foreseeing of the future? But there are animals which open several outlets in different directions from their lairs, that if any danger comes upon them, an escape may be open for them shut in; but they would not do this unless they possessed intelligence and reflection. Others are provident for the future, as  

“Ants, when they plunder a great heap of corn, mindful of the winter, and lay it up in their dwelling;”28    Virg., Æn., iv. 402.  

again,—  

“As bees, which alone know a country and fixed abodes; and mindful of the winter which is to come, they practice labour in the summer, and lay up their gains as a common stock.”29    Virg., Georg., iv. 155.  

It would be a long task if I should wish to trace out the things most resembling the skill of man, which are accustomed to be done by the separate tribes of animals. But if, in the case of all these things which are wont to be ascribed to man, there is found to be some resemblance even in the dumb animals, it is evident that religion is the only thing of which no trace can be found in the dumb animals, nor any indication. For justice is peculiar to religion, and to this no other animal attains. For man alone bears rule; the other animals are subjected30    Conciliata sunt.   to him. But the worship of God is ascribed to justice; and he who does not embrace this, being far removed from the nature of man, will live the life of the brutes under the form of man. But since we differ from the other animals almost in this respect alone, that we alone of all perceive the divine might and power, while in the others there is no understanding of God, it is surely impossible that in this respect either the dumb animals should have more wisdom, or human nature should be unwise, since all living creatures, and the whole system of nature, are subject to man on account of his wisdom. Wherefore if reason, if the force of man in this respect, excels and surpasses the rest of living creatures, inasmuch as he alone is capable of the knowledge of God, it is evident that religion can in no way be overthrown.  

0092B CAPUT VII. De Homine et Brutis, ac Religione.

Cum saepe philosophi per ignorantiam veritatis a ratione desciverint, atque in errores inciderint inextricabiles (id enim solet his evenire, quod viatori viam nescienti et non fatenti se ignorare, ut vagetur, dum percontari obvios erubescit) illud tamen nullus philosophus asseruit unquam, nihil inter hominem et pecudem interesse; nec omnino quisquam, modo qui sapiens videri vellet, rationale animal cum mutis et 0093A irrationabilibus coaequavit: quod faciunt quidam imperiti, atque ipsis pecudibus similes, qui cum ventri ac voluptati se velint tradere; aiunt, eadem ratione se natos, qua universa quae spirant; quod dici ab homine nefas est. Quis enim tam indoctus est, ut nesciat, quis tam imprudens, ut non sentiat, aliquid inesse in homine divini? Nondum venio ad virtutes animi et ingenii, quibus homini cum Deo manifesta cognatio est. Nonne ipsius corporis status et oris figura declarat, non esse nos cum mutis pecudibus aequales? Illarum natura in humum pabulumque prostrata est; nec habet quidquam commune cum coelo, quod non intuetur. Homo autem recto statu, ore sublimi, ad contemplationem mundi excitatus, confert cum Deo vultum; et rationem ratio cognoscit.

0093B Propterea nullum est animal, ut ait Cicero (I de Legibus) praeter hominem, quod habeat aliquam notitiam Dei. Solus enim sapientia instructus est, ut religionem solus intelligat; et haec est hominis atque mutorum, vel praecipua, vel sola distantia. Nam caetera, quae videntur hominis esse propria, et si non sint talia in mutis, tamen similia videri possunt. Proprius 0094A homini sermo est: tamen et in illis quaedam similitudo sermonis. Nam et dignoscunt invicem se vocibus; et, cum irascuntur, edunt sonum jurgio similem; et, cum se ex intervallo vident, gratulandi officium voce declarant. Nobis quidem voces eorum videntur inconditae, sicut illis fortasse nostrae: sed ipsis, quae se intelligunt, verba sunt; denique in omni affectu certas vocis notas exprimunt, quibus habitum mentis ostendant. Risus quoque est homini proprius; et tamen videmus in aliis animalibus quaedam signa laetitiae, cum ad lusum gestiunt, aures demulcent, rictum contrahunt, frontem serenant, oculos in lasciviam resolvunt. Quid tam proprium homini, quam ratio, et providentia futuri? Atqui sunt animalia, quae latibulis suis diversos et plures exitus pandant, ut si 0094B quod periculum inciderit, fuga pateat obsessis; quod non facerent, nisi inesset illis intelligentia et cogitatio. Alia provident in futurum; ut Ingentem formicae farris acervum Cum populant, hyemis memores, tectoque reponunt;ut apes, quae 0095A Patriam solae, et certos novere penates. Venturaeque hyemis memores, aestate laborem Experiuntur, et in medium quaesita reponunt.

Longum est, si exequi velim, quae a singulis generibus animalium fieri soleant humanae solertiae simillima. Quod si horum omnium, quae adscribi homini solent, in mutis quoque deprehenditur similitudo, apparet solam esse religionem, cujus in mutis nec vestigium aliquod, nec ulla suspicio inveniri potest. Religionis enim est propria justitia, quam nullum aliud animal attingit. Homo enim solus imperat; caetera sibi conciliata sunt. Justitiae autem Dei cultus adscribitur; quem qui non suscipit, hic a natura hominis alienus, vitam pecudum sub humana specie vivet. Cum vero a caeteris animalibus hoc pene solo 0095B differamus, quod soli omnium divinam vim potestatemque sentimus, in illis autem nullus sit intellectus Dei: certe illud fieri non potest, ut in hoc vel muta plus sapiant, vel humana natura desipiat; cum homini ob sapientiam et cuncta quae spirant, et omnis rerum natura subjecta sit. Quare si ratio, si vis hominis hoc praecellit et superat caeteras animantes, quod solus notitiam Dei capit, apparet religionem nullo modo posse dissolvi.