Chap. III.—Of the Good and Evil Things in Human Affairs, and of Their Author.

First, no one ever said this respecting God, that He is only subject to anger, and is not influenced by kindness. For it is unsuitable to God, that He should be endowed with a power of this kind, by which He may injure and do harm, but be unable to profit and to do good. What means, therefore, what hope of safety, is proposed to men, if God is the author of evils only? For if this is so, that venerable majesty will now be drawn out, not to the power of the judge, to whom it is permitted to preserve and set at liberty, but to the office of the torturer and executioner. But whereas we see that there are not only evils in human affairs, but also goods, it is plain that if God is the author of evils, there must be another who does things contrary to God, and gives to us good things. If there is such a one, by what name must he be called? Why is he who injures us more known to us than He who benefits us? But if this can be nothing besides God, it is absurd and vain to suppose that the divine power, than which nothing is greater or better, is able to injure, but unable to benefit; and accordingly no one has ever existed who ventured to assert this, because it is neither reasonable nor in any way credible. And because this is agreed upon, let us pass on and seek after the truth elsewhere.  

CAPUT III. De bonis et malis in rebus humanis, eorumque auctore.

Primum illud nemo de Deo dixit unquam, irasci eum tantummodo, et gratia non moveri. Est enim disconveniens Deo, ut ejusmodi potestate sit praeditus, 0084B qua noceat, et obsit, prodesse vero, ac benefacere nequeat. Quae igitur ratio, quae spes salutis hominibus proposita est, si malorum tantummodo auctor est Deus? Quod si sit, jam majestas illa venerabilis, non ad judicis potestatem, cui licet servare ac liberare, 0085A sed ad tortoris et carnificis officium deducetur. Cum autem videamus, non modo mala esse in rebus humanis, sed etiam bona, utique si Deus est auctor malorum, esse alterum necesse est, qui contraria Deo faciat, et det nobis bona. Si est, quo nomine appellandus est? aut cur nobis, qui male faciat, notior est, quam ille, qui bene? Si autem nihil potest esse praeter Deum, absurdum est et vanum, divinam putare potestatem, qua nihil est majus, nihil melius, nocere posse, prodesse non posse. Et ideo nemo extitit, qui auderet id dicere; quia nec rationem habet, nec ullo modo potest credi. Quod quia convenit, transeamus et veritatem alibi requiramus.