A Treatise on the Anger of God

 Chap. I.—Of Divine and Human Wisdom.

 Chap. II.—Of the Truth and Its Steps, and of God.

 Chap. III.—Of the Good and Evil Things in Human Affairs, and of Their Author.

 Chap. IV.—Of God and His Affections, and the Censure of Epicurus.

 Chap. V.—The Opinion of the Stoics Concerning God Of His Anger and Kindness.

 Chap. VI.—That God is Angry.

 Chap. VII.—Of Man, and the Brute Animals, and Religion.

 Chap. VIII.—Of Religion.

 Chap. IX.—Of the Providence of God, and of Opinions Opposed to It.

 Chap. X.—Of the Origin of the World, and the Nature of Affairs, and the Providence of God.

 Chap. XI.—Of God, and that the One God, and by Whose Providence the World is Governed and Exists.

 Chap. XII.—Of Religion and the Fear of God.

 Chap. XIII.—Of the Advantage and Use of the World and of the Seasons.

 Chap. XIV.—Why God Made Man.

 Chap. XV.—Whence Sins Extended to Man.

 Chap. XVI.—Of God, and His Anger and Affections.

 Chap. XVII.—Of God, His Care and Anger.

 Chap. XVIII.—Of the Punishment of Faults, that It Cannot Take Place Without Anger.

 Chap. XIX.—Of the Soul and Body, and of Providence.

 Chap. XX.—Of Offences, and the Mercy of God.

 Chap. XXI.—Of the Anger of God and Man.

 Chap. XXII.—Of Sins, and the Verses of the Sibyls Respecting Them Recited.

 Chap. XXIII.—Of the Anger of God and the Punishment of Sins, and a Recital of the Verses of the Sibyls Respecting It And, Moreover, a Reproof and Exh

Chap. I.—Of Divine and Human Wisdom.

I have often observed, Donatus, that many persons hold this opinion, which some philosophers also have maintained, that God is not subject to anger; since the divine nature is either altogether beneficent, and that it is inconsistent with His surpassing and excellent power to do injury to any one; or, at any rate, He takes no notice of us at all, so that no advantage comes to us from His goodness, and no evil from His ill-will. But the error of these men, because it is very great, and tends to overthrow the condition of human life, must be refuted by us, lest you yourself also should be deceived, being incited by the authority of men who deem themselves wise. Nor, however, are we so arrogant as to boast that the truth is comprehended by our intellect; but we follow the teaching of God, who alone is able to know and to reveal secret things. But the philosophers, being destitute of this teaching, have imagined that the nature of things can be ascertained by conjecture. But this is impossible; because the mind of man, enclosed in the dark abode of the body, is far removed from the perception of truth: and in this the divine nature differs from the human, that ignorance is the property of the human, knowledge of the divine nature.  

On which account we have need of some light to dispel the darkness by which the reflection of man is overspread, since, while we live in mortal flesh, we are unable to divine by our senses. But the light of the human mind is God, and he who has known and admitted Him into his breast will acknowledge the mystery of the truth with an enlightened heart; but when God and heavenly instruction are removed, all things are full of errors. And Socrates, though he was the most learned of all the philosophers, yet, that he might prove the ignorance of the others, who thought that they possessed something, rightly said that he knew nothing, except one thing—that he knew nothing. For he understood that that learning had nothing certain, nothing true in itself; nor, as some imagine, did he pretend2    Simulavit: others read “dissimulavit,” concealed his knowledge.   to learning that he might refute others, but he saw the truth in some measure. And he testified even on his trial (as is related by Plato) that there was no human wisdom. He so despised, derided, and cast aside the learning in which the philosophers then boasted, that he professed that very thing as the greatest learning, that he had learnt that he knew nothing. If, therefore, there is no human wisdom, as Socrates taught, as Plato handed down, it is evident that the knowledge of the truth is divine, and belongs to no other than to God. Therefore God must be known, in whom alone is the truth. He is the Parent of the world, and the Framer of all things; who is not seen with the eyes, and is scarcely distinguished by the mind; whose religion is accustomed to be attacked in many ways by those who have neither been able to attain true wisdom, nor to comprehend the system of the great and heavenly secret.  

0079B CAPUT PRIMUM. De sapientia divina et humana.

Animadverti saepe, Donate, plurimos id existimare (quod etiam nonnulli philosophorum putaverunt), non irasci Deum; quoniam vel benefica sit tantummodo natura divina, nec cuiquam nocere, praestantissimae atque optimae congruat potestati; vel certe nil curet omnino, ut neque ex beneficentia ejus quidquam boni perveniat ad nos, neque ex maleficentia quidquam mali. Quorum error, quia maximus est, et ad evertendum vitae humanae statum spectat, 0079C coarguendus est a nobis, ne et ipse fallaris, impulsus 0080B auctoritate hominum, qui se putant esse sapientes. Nec tamen nos tam arrogantes sumus, ut comprehensam nostro ingenio veritatem gloriemur: sed doctrinam Dei sequimur, qui scire solus potest, et revelare secreta. Cujus doctrinae philosophi expertes existimaverunt, naturam rerum conjectura posse deprehendi. Quod nequaquam fieri potest, quia mens hominis, tenebroso corporis domicilio circumsepta, longe a veri perspectione summota est; et hoc differt ab humanitate divinitas, quod humanitatis est ignoratio, divinitatis scientia.

Unde nobis aliquo lumine opus est ad depellendas 0080C tenebras, quibus offusa est hominis cogitatio, quoniam 0081A in carne mortali agentes, nostris sensibus divinare non possumus. Lumen autem mentis humanae Deus est, quem qui cognoverit, et in pectus admiserit, illuminato corde mysterium veritatis agnoscet: remoto autem Deo coelestique doctrina, omnia erroribus plena sunt. Recteque Socrates, cum esset omnium philosophorum doctissimus, tamen ut caeterorum argueret inscitiam, qui se aliquid tenere arbitrabantur, ait se nihil scire, nisi unum, quod nihil sciret. Intellexit enim, doctrinam illam nihil habere in se certi, nihil veri; nec, ut putant quidam, simulavit ipse doctrinam, ut alios refelleret; sed vidit ex parte aliqua veritatem. Testatusque est etiam in judicio (sicut traditur a Platone) quod nulla esset humana sapientia: adeo doctrinam, qua tum philosophi 0081B gloriabantur, contempsit, derisit, abjecit, ut id ipsum pro summa doctrina profiteretur, quod nihil scire didicisset. Si ergo nulla est sapientia humana, ut Socrates docuit, ut Plato tradidit, apparet esse divinam, nec ulli alii, quam Deo veritatis notitiam subjacere. Deus igitur noscendus est, in quo solo veritas est. Ille mundi parens, et conditor rerum, qui oculis non videtur, mente vix cernitur. Cujus religio multis modis impugnari solet ab iis, qui neque veram sapientiam tenere potuerunt, neque magni et coelestis arcani comprehendere rationem.