A Treatise on the Anger of God

 Chap. I.—Of Divine and Human Wisdom.

 Chap. II.—Of the Truth and Its Steps, and of God.

 Chap. III.—Of the Good and Evil Things in Human Affairs, and of Their Author.

 Chap. IV.—Of God and His Affections, and the Censure of Epicurus.

 Chap. V.—The Opinion of the Stoics Concerning God Of His Anger and Kindness.

 Chap. VI.—That God is Angry.

 Chap. VII.—Of Man, and the Brute Animals, and Religion.

 Chap. VIII.—Of Religion.

 Chap. IX.—Of the Providence of God, and of Opinions Opposed to It.

 Chap. X.—Of the Origin of the World, and the Nature of Affairs, and the Providence of God.

 Chap. XI.—Of God, and that the One God, and by Whose Providence the World is Governed and Exists.

 Chap. XII.—Of Religion and the Fear of God.

 Chap. XIII.—Of the Advantage and Use of the World and of the Seasons.

 Chap. XIV.—Why God Made Man.

 Chap. XV.—Whence Sins Extended to Man.

 Chap. XVI.—Of God, and His Anger and Affections.

 Chap. XVII.—Of God, His Care and Anger.

 Chap. XVIII.—Of the Punishment of Faults, that It Cannot Take Place Without Anger.

 Chap. XIX.—Of the Soul and Body, and of Providence.

 Chap. XX.—Of Offences, and the Mercy of God.

 Chap. XXI.—Of the Anger of God and Man.

 Chap. XXII.—Of Sins, and the Verses of the Sibyls Respecting Them Recited.

 Chap. XXIII.—Of the Anger of God and the Punishment of Sins, and a Recital of the Verses of the Sibyls Respecting It And, Moreover, a Reproof and Exh

Chap. XIV.—Why God Made Man.

It follows that I show for what purpose God made man himself. As He contrived the world for the sake of man, so He formed man himself on His own account, as it were a priest of a divine temple, a spectator of His works and of heavenly objects. For he is the only being who, since he is intelligent and capable of reason, is able to understand God, to admire His works, and perceive His energy and power; for on this account he is furnished with judgment, intelligence, and prudence. On this account he alone, beyond the other living creatures, has been made with an upright body and attitude, so that he seems to have been raised up for the contemplation of his Parent.98    [I cease to note this perpetually recurrent thought. It had profoundly impressed our author as an element of natural religion.]   On this account he alone has received language, and a tongue the interpreter of his thought, that he may be able to declare the majesty of his Lord. Lastly, for this cause all things were placed under his control, that he himself might be under the control of God, their Maker and Creator. If God, therefore, designed man to be a worshipper of Himself, and on this account gave him so much honour, that he might rule over all things; it is plainly most just that he should worship Him99    Et Deum colere, etc. Some editions read, “et eum, qui tanta præstiterit,” omitting the word “colere.”   who bestowed upon him such great gifts, and love man, who is united with us in the participation of the divine justice. For it is not right that a worshipper of God should he injured by a worshipper of God. From which it is understood that man was made for the sake of religion and justice. And of this matter Marcus Tullius is a witness in his books respecting the Laws, since he thus speaks:100    i. 10.   “But of all things concerning which learned men dispute, nothing is of greater consequence than that it should be altogether understood that we are born to justice.” And if this is most true, it follows that God will have all men to be just, that is, to have God and man as objects of their affection; to honour God in truth as a Father, and to love man as a brother: for in these two things the whole of justice is comprised. But he who either fails to acknowledge God or acts injuriously to man, lives unjustly and contrary to his nature, and in this manner disturbs the divine institution and law.  

0122A CAPUT XIV. Cur Deus fecerit hominem.

Sequitur ut ostendam cur fecerit hominem ipsum Deus. Sicut mundum propter hominem machinatus est, ita ipsum propter se, tamquam divini templi antistitem, spectatorem operum rerumque coelestium. Solus est enim, qui sentiens, capaxque rationis, intelligere possit Deum, qui opera ejus admirari, virtutem potestatemque perspicere; idcirco enim consilio, mente, prudentia instructus est. Ideo solus praeter caeteras animantes recto corpore ac statu factus est, ut ad contemplationem parentis sui excitatus esse videatur. Ideo sermonem solus accepit, ac linguam cogitationis 0122B interpretem, ut enarrare majestatem domini sui possit. Postremo idcirco ei cuncta subjecta sunt, ut factori atque artifici Deo esset ipse subjectus. Si ergo Deus hominem suum voluit esse cultorem, ideoque illi tantum honoris attribuit, ut rerum omnium dominaretur; utique justissimum est et eum qui tanta praestiterit, amare et hominem, qui sit nobiscum divini juris societate conjunctus. Nec enim fas est cultorem Dei a Dei cultore violari. Unde intelligitur religionis ac justitiae causa esse hominem figuratum. Cujus rei testis est Marcus Tullius in libris de Legibus, ita dicens: «Sed omnium, quae in doctorum hominum disputatione versantur, nihil est profecto praestabilius, quam plane intelligi, nos ad justitiam esse natos.» Quod si est verissimum, Deus ergo vult omnes homines 0122C esse justos, id est, Deum et hominem caros habere: Deum scilicet honorare tamquam patrem, 0123A hominem diligere velut fratrem; in his enim duobus tota justitia consistit. Qui ergo aut Deum non agnoscit, aut homini nocet, injuste et contra naturam suam vivit, et hoc modo rumpit institutum legemque divinam.