Chap. XIX.—Cicero and Others of the Wisest Men Teach the Immortality of the Soul, But in an Unbelieving Manner; And that a Good or an Evil Death Must Be Weighed from the Previous Life.

But those who assert the advantage of death, because they know nothing of the truth, thus reason: If there is nothing after death, death is not an evil; for it takes away the perception of evil. But if the soul survives, death is even an advantage; because immortality follows. And this sentiment is thus set forth by Cicero concerning the Laws:430    This passage is not contained in Cicero’s treatise on the Laws, but the substance of it is in the Tusculan Questions   “We may congratulate ourselves, since death is about to bring either a better state than that which exists in life, or at any rate not a worse. For if the soul is in a state of vigour without the body, it is a divine life; and if it is without perception, assuredly there is no evil.” Cleverly argued, as it appeared to himself, as though there could be no other state. But each conclusion is false. For the sacred writings431    See Dan. xii.; Matt. iii., xiii., xxv.; John xii.   teach that the soul is not annihilated; but that it is either rewarded according to its righteousness, or eternally punished according to its crimes. For neither is it right, that he who has lived a life of wickedness in prosperity should escape the punishment which he deserves; nor that he who has been wretched on account of his righteousness, should be deprived of his reward. And this is so true, that Tully also, in his Consolation, declared that the righteous and the wicked do not inhabit the same abodes. For those same wise men, he says, did not judge that the same course was open for all into the heaven; for they taught that those who were contaminated by vices and crimes were thrust down into darkness, and lay in the mire; but that, on the other hand, souls that were chaste, pure, upright, and uncontaminated, being also refined by the study and practice of virtue, by a light and easy course take their flight to the gods, that is, to a nature resembling their own. But this sentiment is opposed to the former argument. For that is based on the assumption that every man at his birth is presented with immortality. What distinction, therefore, will there be between virtue and guilt, if it makes no difference whether a man be Aristides or Phalaris, whether he be Cato or Catiline? But a man does not perceive this opposition between sentiments and actions, unless he is in possession of the truth. If any one, therefore, should ask me whether death is a good or an evil, I shall reply that its character depends upon the course of the life. For as life itself is a good if it is passed virtuously, but an evil if it is spent viciously, so also death is to be weighed in accordance with the past actions of life. And so it comes to pass, that if life has been passed in the service of God, death is not an evil, for it is a translation to immortality. But if not so, death must necessarily be an evil, since it transfers men, as I have said, to everlasting punishment.432    [See vol. iii. p. 231, and same treatise sparsim ]    

What, then, shall we say, but that they are in error who either desire death as a good, or flee from life as an evil? unless they are most unjust, who do not weigh the fewer evils against the greater number of blessings. For when they pass all their lives in a variety of the choicest gratifications, if any bitterness has chanced to succeed to these, they desire to die; and they so regard it as to appear never to have fared well, if at any time they happen to fare ill. Therefore they condemn the whole of life, and consider it as nothing else than filled with evils. Hence arose that foolish sentiment, that this state which we imagine to be life is death, and that that which we fear as death is life; and so that the first good is not to be born, that the second is an early death. And that this sentiment may be of greater weight, it is attributed to Silenus.433    Silenus was the constant companion of Dionysus. He was regarded as an inspired prophet, who knew all the past and the most distant future, and as a sage who despised all the gifts of fortune.  Cicero in his Consolation says: “Not to be born is by far the best thing, and not to fall upon these rocks of life. But the next thing is, if you have been born, to die as soon as possible, and to flee from the violence of fortune as from a conflagration.” That he believed this most foolish expression appears from this, that he added something of his own for its embellishment. I ask, therefore, for whom he thinks it best not to be born, when there is no one at all who has any perception; for it is the perception which causes anything to be good or bad. In the next place, why did he regard the whole of life as nothing else than rocks, and a conflagration; as though it were either in our power not to be born, or life were given to us by fortune, and not by God, or as though the course of life appeared to bear any resemblance to a conflagration?  

The saying of Plato is not dissimilar, that he gave thanks to nature, first that he was born a human being rather than a dumb animal; in the next place, that he was a man rather than a woman; that he was a Greek rather than a barbarian;434    The Greeks included all nations, except themselves, under the general name of barbarians.   lastly, that he was an Athenian, and that he was born in the time of Socrates. It is impossible to say what great blindness and errors are produced by ignorance of the truth would altogether contend that nothing in the affairs of men was ever spoken more foolishly. As though, if he had been born a barbarian, or a woman, or, in fine, an ass, he would be the same Plato, and not that very being which had been produced. But he evidently believed Pythagoras, who, in order that he might prevent men from feeding on animals, said that souls passed from the bodies of men to the bodies of other animals; which is both foolish and impossible. It is foolish, because it was unnecessary to introduce souls that have long existed into new bodies, when the same Artificer who at one time had made the first, was always able to make fresh ones; it is impossible, because the soul endued with right reason can no more change the nature of its condition, than fire can rush downwards, or, like a river, pour its flame obliquely.435    In transversum, “crosswise or transversely.”   The wise man therefore imagined, that it might come to pass that the soul which was then in Plato might be shut up in some other animal, and might be endued with the sensibility of a man, so as to understand and grieve that it was burthened with an incongruous body. How much more rationally would he have acted, if he had said that he gave thanks because he was born with a good capacity, and capable of receiving instruction, and that he was possessed of those resources which enabled him to receive a liberal education! For what benefit was it that he was born at Athens? Have not many men of distinguished talent and learning lived in other cities, who were better individually than all the Athenians? How many thousands must we believe that there were, who, though born at Athens, and in the times of Socrates, were nevertheless unlearned and foolish? For it is not the walls or the place in which any one was born that can invest a man with wisdom. Of what avail was it to congratulate himself that he was born in the times of Socrates? Was Socrates able to supply talent to learners? It did not occur to Plato that Alcibiades also, and Critias, were constant hearers of the same Socrates, the one of whom was the most active enemy of his country, the other the most cruel of all tyrants.  

CAPUT XIX. Cicero et alii sapientissimi animarum immortalitatem, sed infideliter docent; et quod bona vel mala mors ex ante acta vita sit ponderanda.

At illi, qui de mortis bono disputant quia nihil 0410B veri sciunt, sic argumentantur: Si nihil est post mortem, non est malum mors; aufert enim sensum mali. Si autem supersunt animae, est etiam bonum, quia immortalitas sequitur. Quam sententiam Cicero de Legibus sic explicavit: «Gratulemurque nobis, quoniam mors aut meliorem, quam qui est in vita, aut certe non deteriorem allatura est statum. Nam sine corpore animo vigente, divina vita est; sensu carente, nihil profecto est mali.» Argute, ut sibi videbatur, quasi nihil esse aliud possit. Atqui utrumque hoc falsum est. Docent enim divinae Litterae, non extingui animas: sed aut pro justitia praemio affici, aut poena pro sceleribus sempiterna. Nec enim fas aut eum qui sceleratus in vita feliciter fuerit, effugere quod meretur; aut eum, qui ob justitiam miserrimus 0410C fuerit, sua mercede fraudari. Quod adeo verum est, 0411A ut idem Tullius in Consolatione non easdem sedes 0411A incolere justos atque impios praedicaverit. Nec enim omnibus, inquit, iidem illi sapientes arbitrati sunt, eumdem cursum in coelum patere: nam vitiis et sceleribus contaminatos deprimi in tenebras, atque in coeno jacere docuerunt; castos autem animos, puros, integros, incorruptos, bonis etiam studiis atque artibus expolitos, levi quodam et facili lapsu ad deos, id est, ad naturam sui similem pervolare. Quae sententia superiori illi argumento repugnat. Illud enim sic assumptum est, tamquam necesse sit, omnem hominem natum immortalitate donari. Quod igitur erit discrimen virtutis, ac sceleris, si nihil interest, utrumne Aristides sit aliquis, an Phalaris? utrum Cato, an Catilina? Sed hanc repugnantiam rerum 0411B sententiarumque non cernit, nisi qui tenet veritatem. Si quis igitur nos roget, utrumne bonum sit mors, an malum? respondebimus, qualitatem ejus ex vitae ratione pendere. Nam sicut vita ipsa bonum est, si cum virtute vivatur, malum, si cum scelere: sic et mors ex praeteritis vitae actibus ponderanda est. Ita fit, ut si vita in Dei religione transacta sit, mors malum non sit; quia translatio est ad immortalitatem. Sin autem, malum sit necesse est; quoniam ad aeterna (ut dixi) supplicia transmittit.

Quid ergo dicemus, nisi errare illos, qui aut mortem appetunt, tamquam bonum, aut vitam fugiunt, 0411C tamquam malum? nisi quod sunt iniquissimi, qui 0412A pauciora mala non pensant bonis pluribus. Nam cum omnem vitam per exquisitas et varias traducant voluptates, mori cupiunt, si quid forte his amaritudinis supervenit; et sic habent, tamquam illis nunquam fuerit bene, si aliquando fuerit male. Damnant igitur vitam omnem, plenamque nihil aliud, quam malis opinantur. Hinc nata est inepta illa sententia, hanc esse mortem, quam nos vitam putemus; illam vitam, quam nos pro morte timeamus: ita primum bonum esse, non nasci, secundum citius mori. Quae, ut majoris sit auctoritatis, Sileno attribuitur. Cicero, in Consolatione: «Non nasci, inquit, longe optimum, nec in hos scopulos incidere vitae; Proximum autem, si natus sis, quamprimum mori, tanquam ex incendio effugere violentiam fortunae.» Credidisse 0412B illum vanissimo dicto exinde apparet, quod adjecit aliquid de suo, ut ornaret. Quaero igitur, cui esse optimum putet non nasci, cum sit nullus omnino, qui sentiat: nam ut bonum sit aliquid, aut malum, sensus efficit. Deinde, cur omnem vitam nihil aliud esse, quam scopulos, et incendium putaverit; quasi aut in nostra fuerit potestate, ne nasceremur, aut vitam nobis fortuna tribuat, non Deus, aut vivendi ratio quidquam simile incendio habere videatur.

Non dissimile Platonis illud est. quod aiebat, se gratias agere naturae: primum, quod homo natus 0412C esset potius, quam mutum animal; deinde, quod 0413A mas 0413A potius, quam foemina; quod Graecus, quam Barbarus; postremo, quod Atheniensis, et quod temporibus Socratis. Dici non potest, quantam mentibus caecitatem, quantosque pariat errores ignoratio veritatis. Ego plane contenderim, numquam quidquam dictum esse in rebus humanis delirius. Quasi vero si aut Barbarus, aut mulier, aut asinus denique natus esset, idem ipse Plato esset, ac non ipsum illud, quod natum fuisset. Sed videlicet Pyhagorae credidit, qui ut vetaret homines animalibus vesci, dixit, animas de corporibus in aliorum animalium corpora commeare: quod et vanum et impossibile est. Vanum, quia necesse non fuit veteres animas in nova corpora inducere, cum idem artifex, qui primas aliquando fecerat, potuerit semper novas facere. Impossibile, quia 0413B rectae rationis anima tam immutare naturam status sui non potest, quam ignis aut deorsum niti, aut in transversum, fluminis modo, flammam suam fundere. Existimavit igitur homo sapiens, potuisse fieri, ut anima, quae tunc erat in Platone, in aliquod mutum animal includeretur, essetque humano sensu praedita, ut intelligeret ac doleret incongruenti se corpore oneratam. Quanto sanius faceret, si gratias agere se diceret, quod ingeniosus, quod docilis natus esset, quod in iis opibus, ut liberaliter erudiretur. Nam quod Athenis natus est, quid in eo beneficii 0414A fuit? An non plurimi extiterunt in aliis civitatibus excellenti ingenio atque doctrina viri, qui meliores singuli, quam omnes Athenienses fuerunt? Quanta hominum millia fuisse credamus, qui et Athenis nati, et temporibus Socratis, indocti tamen, ac stulti fuerunt? Non enim aut parietes, aut locus in quo quisque est effusus ex utero conciliat homini sapientiam. Quid vero attinuit Socratis se temporibus natum gratulari? Num Socrates ingenia discentibus potuit commodare? Non venit in mentem Platoni Alcibiadem quoque et Critiam ejusdem Socratis assiduos auditores fuisse; quorum alter hostis patriae acerrimus fuit, alter crudelissimus omnium tyrannorum.