Chap. XV.—The Error of Seneca in Philosophy, and How the Speech of Philosophers is at Variance with Their Life.

Under the influence of the same error (for who could keep the right course when Cicero is in error?), Seneca said: “Philosophy is nothing else than the right method of living, or the science of living honourably, or the art of passing a good life. We shall not err in saying that philosophy is the law of living well and honourably. And he who spoke of it as a rule of life, gave to it that which was its due.” He evidently did not refer to the common name of philosophy; for, since this is diffused into many sects and systems, and has nothing certain—nothing, in short, respecting which all agree with one mind and one voice,—what can be so false as that philosophy should be called the rule of life, since the diversity of its precepts hinders the right way and causes confusion? or the law of living well, when its subjects are widely discordant? or the science of passing life, in which nothing else is effected by its repeated contradictions than general401    Than—that no one knows anything.   uncertainty? For I ask whether he thinks that the Academy is philosophy or not? I do not think that he will deny it. And if this is so, none of these things, therefore, is in agreement with philosophy; which renders all things uncertain, abrogates law, esteems art as nothing, subverts method, distorts rule, entirely takes away knowledge. Therefore all those things are false, because they are inconsistent with a system which is always uncertain, and up to this time explaining nothing. Therefore no system, or science, or law of living well, has been established, except in this the only true and heavenly wisdom, which had been unknown to philosophers. For that earthly wisdom, since it is false, becomes varied and manifold, and altogether opposed to itself. And as there is but one founder and ruler of the world, God, and as truth is one; so wisdom must be one and simple, because, if anything is true and good, it cannot be perfect unless it is the only one of its kind. But if philosophy were able to form the life, no others but philosophers would be good, and all those who had not learned it would be always bad. But since there are, and always have been, innumerable persons who are or have been good without any learning, but of philosophers there has seldom been one who has done anything praiseworthy in his life; who is there, I pray, who does not see that those men are not teachers of virtue, of which they themselves are destitute? For if any one should diligently inquire into their character, he will find that they are passionate, covetous, lustful, arrogant, wanton, and, concealing their vices under a show of wisdom, doing those things at home which they had censured in the schools.402    Sallust as a writer abounds in denunciations of vice. But see book ii. cap. 13, note 4, p. 62, supra.]    

Perhaps I speak falsely for the sake of bringing an accusation. Does not Tullius both acknowledge and complain of the same thing? “How few,” he says, “of philosophers are found of such a character, so constituted in soul and life, as reason demands! how few who think true instruction not a display of knowledge, but a law of life! how few who are obedient to themselves, and submit to their own decrees! We may see some of such levity and ostentation, that it would be better for them not to have learned at all; others eagerly desirous of money, others of glory; many the slaves of lusts, so that their speech wonderfully disagrees with their life.” Cornelius Nepos also writes to the same Cicero: “So far am I from thinking that philosophy is the teacher of life and the completer of happiness, that I consider that none have greater need of teachers of living than many who are engaged in the discussion of this subject. For I see that a great part of those who give most elaborate precepts in their school respect-modesty and self-restraint, live at the same time in the unrestrained desires of all lusts.” Seneca also, in his Exhortations, says: “Many of the philosophers are of this description, eloquent to their own condemnation: for if you should hear them arguing against avarice, against lust and ambition, you would think that they were making a public disclosure403    Indicium sui professos putes; others read judicium, “you would think that they were passing sentence on themselves.”   of their own character, so entirely do the censures which they utter in public flow back upon themselves; so that it is right to regard them in no other light than as physicians, whose advertisements404    Tituli, “titles.”   contain medicines, but their medicine chests poison. Some are not ashamed of their vices; but they invent defences for their baseness, so that they may appear even to sin with honour.” Seneca also says: “The wise man will even do things which he will not approve of, that he may find means of passing to the accomplishment of greater things; nor will he abandon good morals, but will adapt them to the occasion; and those things which others employ for glory or pleasure, he will employ for the sake of action.” Then he says shortly afterwards: “All things which the luxurious and the ignorant do, the wise man also will do, but not in the same manner, and with the same purpose. But it makes no difference with what intention you act, when the action itself is vicious; because acts are seen, the intention is not seen.”  

Aristippus, the master of the Cyrenaics, had a criminal intimacy with Lais, the celebrated courtesan; and that grave teacher of philosophy defended this fault by saying, that there was a great difference between him and the other lovers of Lais, because he himself possessed Lais, whereas others were possessed by Lais. O illustrious wisdom, to be imitated by good men! Would you, in truth, entrust your children to this man for education, that they might learn to possess a harlot? He said that there was some difference between himself and the dissolute, that they wasted their property, whereas he lived in indulgence without any cost. And in this the harlot was plainly the wiser, who had the philosopher as her creature, that all the youth, corrupted by the example and authority of the teacher, might flock together to her without any shame. What difference therefore did it make, with what intention the philosopher betook himself to that most notorious harlot, when the people and his rivals saw him more depraved than all the abandoned? Nor was it enough to live in this manner, but he began also to teach lusts; and he transferred his habits from the brothel to the school, contending that bodily pleasure was the chief good. Which pernicious and shameful doctrine has its origin not in the heart of the philosopher, but in the bosom of the harlot.  

For why should I speak of the Cynics, who practised licentiousness in public? What wonder if they derived their name and title from dogs,405    Augustine in many places expresses his opinion that the Cynics were so called from their immodesty. Others suppose that the name was given to them on account of their snarling propensity.   since they also imitated their life? Therefore there is no instruction of virtue in this sect, since even those who enjoin more honourable things either themselves do not practice what they advise; or if they do (which rarely happens), it is not the system which leads them to that which is right, but nature which often impels even the unlearned to praise.  

CAPUT XV. Senecae error in philosophia: et quomodo philosophorum oratio cum eorum vita pugnet.

Eodem ductus errore Seneca (quis enim veram viam teneret, errante Cicerone? «Philosophia, inquit, 0390C nihil aliud est quam recta ratio vivendi, vel 0391A honeste vivendi scientia, vel ars rectae vitae agendae. 0391A Non errabimus, si dixerimus philosophiam esse legem bene honesteque vivendi. Et qui dixerit illam regulam vitae, suum illi reddidit.» Hic plane non respexit ad commune philosophiae nomen, quae cum sit in plures sectas disciplinasque diffusa, nihilque habeat certi, nihil denique, de quo universi una mente ac voce consentiant, quid potest esse tam falsum, quam regulam vitae philosophiam nominari, in qua diversitas praeceptorum rectum iter impediat, et turbet? aut legem bene vivendi, cujus capita longe dissonant? aut scientiam vitae agendae, in qua nihil aliud efficitur, contraria saepe dicendo, quam ut nemo quidquam sciat? Quaero enim, utrumne academiam philosophiam putet esse, an non? Negaturum non arbitror: 0391B quod si est, nihil ergo illorum cadit in philosophiam, quae omnia reddit incerta, legem abrogat, artem nullam putat, rationem subvertit, regulam depravat, scientiam funditus tollit. Falsa igitur illa omnia, quia in rem semper incertam et adhuc nihil explicantem cadere non possunt. Nulla itaque ratio, vel scientia, vel lex bene vivendi, nisi in hac unica, et vera, et coelesti sapientia constituta est, quae philosophis fuerat ignota. Nam illa terrena, quoniam falsa est, fit varia, et multiplex, sibique tota contraria est. Et sicut unus est hujus mundi constitutor et rector Deus, una veritas: ita unam esse ac simplicem sapientiam 0391C necesse est, quia quidquid est verum, ac 0392A bonum, id perfectum esse non potest, nisi fuerit sin gulare. Quod si philosophia vitam posset instruere, nulli alii nisi philosophi essent boni, et qui eam non didicissent, essent omnes semper mali. Cum vero innumerabiles existant, et semper exstiterint, qui sint, aut fuerint sine ulla doctrina boni, ex philosophis autem perraro fuerit, qui aliquid in vita fecerit laude dignum, quis est tandem, qui non videat, eos homines virtutis, qua ipsi egent, non esse doctores? Nam si quis in mores eorum diligenter inquirat, inveniet iracundos, cupidos, libidinosos, arrogantes, protervos, et sub obtentu sapientiae sua vitia celantes, domi facientes ea quae in scholis arguissent.

Fortasse mentior accusandi gratia. Nonne id ipsum Tullius et fatetur, et queritur? «Quotus quisque, inquit, 0392B philosophorum invenitur, qui sit ita moratus, ita animo et vita constitutus, ut ratio postulat? qui disciplinam veram, non ostentationem scientiae, sed legem vitae putet? qui obtemperet ipse sibi, et decretis pareat suis? Videre licet alios tanta levitate et jactatione, ut his fuerit non didicisse melius: alios pecuniae cupidos, alios gloriae; multos libidinum servos, ut cum eorum vita mirabiliter pugnet oratio.» Nepos quoque Cornelius ad eumdem Ciceronem ita scribit: «Tantum abest, ut ego magistram esse putem vitae philosophiam, beataeque vitae perfectricem, ut nullis magis existimem opus esse magistris vivendi, 0392C quam plerisque, qui in ea disputanda versantur. 0393A Video enim magnam partem eorum, qui in schola de pudore et continentia praecipiant argutissime, eosdem in omnium libidinum cupiditatibus vivere. Item Seneca in Exhortationibus: 0393A «Plerique, inquit, philosophorum tales sunt, diserti in convitium suum, quos si audias in avaritiam, in libidinem, in ambitionem perorantes, indicium sui professos putes, adeo redundant ad ipsos maledicta in publicum missa; quos non aliter intueri decet, quam medicos, quorum tituli remedia habent, pyxides venena. Quosdam vero nec pudor vitiorum tenet: sed patrocinia turpitudini suae fingunt, ut etiam honeste peccare videantur. Faciet sapiens, inquit idem Seneca, etiam quae non probabit, ut etiam ad majora transitum inveniat: nec relinquet bonos mores, sed tempori 0393B aptabit; et quibus alii utuntur in gloriam, aut voluptatem, utetur agendae rei causa.» Deinde paulo post: «Omnia quae luxuriosi faciunt, quaeque imperiti, faciet et sapiens, sed non eodem modo, eodemque proposito. Atqui nihil interest quo animo facias, quod fecisse vitiosum est: quia facta cernuntur, animus non videtur.»

Aristippo Cyrenaicorum magistro cum Laide nobili scorto fuit consuetudo, quod flagitium gravis ille philosophiae doctor sic defendebat, ut diceret, multum inter se et caeteros Laidis amatores interesse, 0394A quod ipse haberet Laidem, alii vero a Laide haberentur. O praeclara et imitanda bonis sapientia! Huic vero liberos in disciplinam dares, ut discerent habere meretricem? Aliquid inter se ac perditos interesse dicebat; scilicet quod illi bona sua perderent, ipse gratis luxuriaretur. In quo plane sapientior meretrix fuit, quae philosophum habuit pro lenone, ut ad se omnis juventus, doctoris exemplo et auctoritate corrupta, sine ullo pudore concurreret. Quid ergo interfuit, quo animo philosophus ad meretricem famosissimam commearet, cum eum populus et rivales sui viderent omnibus perditis nequiorem? Nec satis fuit ita vivere: sed docere etiam libidines coepit, ac mores suos de lupanari ad scholam transtulit, disserens voluptatem corporis esse summum bonum. 0394B Quae doctrina execrabilis et pudenda, non in corde philosophi, sed in sinu meretricis est nata.

Nam quid ego de Cynicis loquar? quibus in propatulo coire cum conjugibus mos fuit. Quid mirum, si a canibus, quorum vitam imitantur, etiam vocabulum nomenque traxerunt? Nullum igitur in hac disciplina magisterium virtutis est, cum etiam illi, qui honestiora praecipiunt, aut non faciant ipsi quae suadent, aut si faciunt (quod raro accidit) non disciplina eos ad rectum, sed natura perducat, quae saepius etiam indoctos impellit ad laudem.