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Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima
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§ 865. After proving that touch must exist in all animals, the Philosopher now sets out to show that no animate body can be made up of one simple element: of fire, for instance, or air,--as certain Platonists thought when they imagined animals made of air. He argues this from the fact that the other senses all presuppose touch and that therefore, as he has said already, no animal can be without this sense. Every body that is both animate and sensitive must be such as is able to sense by touching. Now all the elements, except earth, can be organs of, or the medium for, the other senses: air and water for instance are adapted to sensation at a distance, which takes place through something other than the sensitive body itself, namely the medium. But touch involves no medium, it occurs by direct contact with its object. That is why it is so named: it is 'contact' par excellence, whereas the other senses perceive by a sort of contact, indeed, with their objects, but through a medium, not immediately. Only touch perceives of and by itself, and with no medium.
§ 866. From which it is clear that the animal body must be, of and by itself, capable of touching. This necessity is not found in the case of sight or hearing; for these senses work through an extrinsic medium. That is why the animal body cannot be made of any one single element,--not of earth alone, for earth in any case is not sensitive; nor of any of those other elements presupposed by the other senses.
§ 867. The reason is that the organ of touch must be balanced midway between the various tangible qualities; otherwise it could not receive their impressions. For as we have seen already, touch is in potency to these qualities. And this is true with respect to all tangible qualities, not to those of earth alone. Now simple bodies cannot be thus balanced half-way; they have one or other of opposed qualities to an extreme degree. Hence no simple body, nor any body approximating to simplicity, can touch. This is why we do not feel with such parts of our bodies as bones and hair, and so on, in which the element of earth so predominates that there is no balance of tangible qualities such as the sense of touch requires.
§ 868. It is for the same reason that plants lack sensitivity. They contain too much earth for touch, and without touch no other sense can exist. No simple body, then, can be animated by the sensitive soul.
§ 869. Then, at 'It is then evident', as a conclusion from what has been said, he shows how all the senses are related to animals; first the sense of touch; then, at 'As we have said, the animal', the other senses. First, then, he observes that, touch being necessary for all animals, they would die if deprived of it alone. It is indeed convertible with animality: only the animal has touch, and all animals have it.
§ 870. And he goes on to say that, while excess in the object of the other senses can destroy these senses one by one (as excessive brightness is blinding, and excessive noise deafening) yet, because the animal can survive the loss of these senses, such excess in their objects only indirectly endangers its life--inasmuch, that is, as destructive tangible objects are brought into play, as when blasts and blows accompany noise, as in thunderstorms for instance. So also, if things seen endanger life it is not precisely as seen, but as somehow infecting the air with some poison or other. So also smells might affect the air. Similarly, a savour might harm an animal, not precisely as a savour, but as accompanied by some tangible quality in excess, for example heat or cold.
§ 871. On the other hand, tangible qualities can directly endanger an animal's life. For as any excess in the sense-object may injure the corresponding sense, an excess in the object of touch may destroy this sense; and it is on this sense that the animal's life depends. It survives just so long as it can touch. Only this sense is strictly necessary to animal life; hence its destruction involves the death of the whole animal.
§ 872. Then at 'As we have said, the animal', he relates the other senses to the animal as a whole; they pertain, he says, to its greater perfection; they are not sheer necessities. Thus animals that live in air or water have sight in order that they may see things at a distance through air or water,--or indeed through any transparent medium, including the heavenly bodies. Similarly, animals have the sense of touch that they may find pleasure, or its contrary, in their food; and thus, taking pleasure in eating, may desire to eat, and so to look for the food they need.
§ 873. Notice that here Aristotle places taste among the senses which are not strictly necessary, whereas he had previously said that it was necessary for animals; but then he was considering taste as a kind of touch--the touch of nourishment--whereas now he is considering it as a discrimination between the savours which make nourishment agreeable or disagreeable, and thus the more readily taken or rejected. And the same applies to the sense of smell; its function is to draw the animal to its food from a distance,--though indeed in man, as Aristotle explains in the De Sensu et Sensato, smell has a different nature and utility.
§ 874. The purpose, too, of hearing is to provide communication between animals. It is necessary that animals transmit their experiences to one another; for they help one another to live; as is especially evident in the gregarious animals whose young are reared by the parent. Hence, too, the tongue is necessary that one animal may communicate, by sound, its feelings to another.
Let this suffice for the present concerning the soul.
FINIS
Notes
Footnotes
de Anima, 402a 4; Nic. Eth., 1094a 1.
Summa Theol., I., 1, 8 ad 2.
Cf. P. Rousselot, S.J., The Intellectualism of St. Thomas (London, 1935), pp. 11 and 151 n. 9; J. Collins, The Thomistic Philosophy of the Angels (Washington, D.C., 1947), pp. 38 ff.
Marcel de Corte, La Doctrine de l'Intelligence chez Aristote (Paris, 1934).
Cf. M. Grabmann, Guglielmo di Moerbeke, O.P., Il Traduttore delle Opere di Aristotele (Rome, 1946).
E. Gilson, La Philosophie au Moyen Age (2nd edn., Paris, 1944), p. 736.
P. Mandonnet, O.P., Des Ecrits Authentiques de S. Thomas d' Aquin (Fribourg, 1910), pp. 18 ff.
M. de Corte, Themistius et S. Thomas d' Aquin (Paris, 1932).
loc. cit.
F. Pelster, S.J., Die Uebersetzungen der aristotelischen Metaphysik in den Werken des hl. Thomas von Aquin (Gregorianum XVII, 1936).
For the background of this condemnation see P. Mandonnet, O.P., Siger de Brabant et l'Averroisme Latin au XIIIe Siècle (Louvain, 1911), and F. van Steenberghen, Siger de Brabant d'après ses Oeuvres Inédites, II, pp. 704 ff. (Louvain, 1942).
Aristotle, de Anima (Cambridge, 1907).
3rd edn. (Paris, 1948). Gloses sur Aristote, pp. 331 ff.
Cf. D.J. B. Hawkins, A Sketch of Medieval Philosophy (London, 1946), p. 51.
Cf. E. Gilson, loc. cit., p. 366.
S. Thomae Aquinatis Opuscula Omnia, I, ed. P. Mandonnet, O.P. (Paris, 1927).
Oxford transl. of the Works of Aristotle, Vol. III.
L'Intelligence etc., p. 25.
'{Aporiai kai Auseis}, I, XIa, 22, 23-26, 20. Cited by G. Rodier, Aristote, Traité de l'Ame, II (Paris, 1901).
Cf. G. Rodier, loc. cit., notes on 402b 5, 414b 20.
Cf. P. Louis, Les Métaphores de Platon (Paris, 1945), pp. 53 ff.
S. Alexander, Space, Time and Deity (Gifford Lectures, London, 1920), I, pp. 82-3.
Our thanks are due to the translator, Fr. K. Foster, O.P., for bringing these passages to our attention.
Translation by Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Burns, Oates & Washbourne, Ltd.).
For detailed exegesis of the whole of this passage see de Corte, L'Intelligence etc., pp. 64-91.
'shared in common' is unsupported by most Greek manuscripts.
Obliquum, {to kampylon} (402b 19); curvum in Commentary.
Correcting quod rectis of Pirotta's text to quot rectis, {posais orthais}.
De Partibus Animalium, I, c.5; 645b 1-10.
Anima: henceforth rendered 'soul'.
402a 7.
402a 10.
402a 4.
De Partibus Animal., I, c.5; 644b 20ss.
402a 1.
historia, {historia}.
402a 4-5.
E.N., I, 13, 1102a 5ss.
402a 5.
402a 10.
. . . substantiam animae.
. . . accidentia seu proprias passiones.
402a 22.
circa substantiam . . . et circa quod quid est.
essentiam rei.
species specialissima.
This should be placed in § 11.
402b 8.
402b 9.
402b 16.
'Two' is lacking in Pirotta; see note 2, p. 43.
'. . . people have the same feelings as a person in fright', 403a 23-4 (E. Wallace's rendering). The translation given here of M. agrees with St. Thomas's commentary. M.: in passionibus fiunt, his inquam quibus timens; St. Thomas: fiunt in aliquibus passiones similes, etc. The subject implied by fiunt ({ginontai}) is really 'men' in general, not 'passions'. It is not impossible that M. knew this. Incidentally, St. Thomas's quotations of his text here depart slightly from the (Pirotta) text of M. He says adhuc fit magis manifestum where M. has adhuc autem magis hoc manifestum; and sunt rationes in materia where M. says rationes in materia sunt.
'bricks', 403b 6.
'Physical' renders naturalis. 'Definition' is implicit here, corresponding to 'idea' (ratio); cf. St. Thomas, § 27.
403a 2 ff.
403a 27.
403a 5.
403a 10.
§ 765-86.
§ 770, 772, 791, 854.
403a 10.
403a 16.
403a 23.
403a 27.
403a 29.
403a 29.
403b 3-16.
403b 16.
The quotation marks are in Pirotta, but this is not a direct quotation.
Decisiones: in Greek, {xysmata}, 'filings'.
quarum omne semen, {hon ten . . . panspermian}: 'the seed aggregate of which', 404a 4.
'Even when there is a perfect calm.' 'Soul' is not in the Greek; the phrase refers to the atmosphere (404a 20), and this is how St. Thomas understands it.
'Otherminded' means 'dazed'; Iliad, xxiii, 698; but the phrase does not apply to Hector.
'but elsewhere he says that this is the soul', 404b 2. See Introduction, pp. 31-2.
Lectio 6, § 68.
§ 33, 403b 28.
403b 20.
Lectio 4, § 43, 404b 7.
§ 52. 404b 27.
403b 31.
Or 'souls'.
404a 16.
De Civ. Dei, VIII, 2 (P.L., vol. XLI, col. 226).
§ 32-3.
404a 20.
404a 25.
404a 27.
404b 1.
404b 5.
See Introduction, pp. 31-2.
404b 5.
404b 7.
Or 'destructive', {aidelos}.
404b 8.
404b 11.
404b 11.
404b 16.
35A ss.
404b 18.
intellectus agents; cf. Bk. III, lectio 10, § 728ss.
sensibilia.
404b 21.
§ 48-50.
intellectum, scientiam, opinionem, sensum.
Reading, with Pirotta (in footnote), in ea, not in una.
404b 27.
'There is a consequent diversity in what they say of the soul', 405a 2.
'from which other things are constituted', 405a 26.
{zein}, to boil, {zen}, to live; {psyche}, soul, {psychros}, cold, 405b 26, 27.
404b 30-405a 5.
405a 5.
405b 10.
405a 5.
405a 5-20.
405a 21.
405b 1.
§ 34.
405a 13.
§ 38.
405a 19.
405a 21.
§ 43.
405a 25.
405a 29.
405b 1.
405a 20; cf. § 58.
405b 5.
405b 8.
405b 10.
§§ 43; 59.
405b 19-20.
405b 23.
cf. De Respir., cc. 21-2; 478a 10ss,
de mediis, {peri ton metaxy}. St. Thomas seems to understand 'elements', § 80.
Not in the Greek.
sc. quod sit subtilissimum.
Lectio 12, § 178s; 409b 19.
Lectio 14, § 199s; 411a 26.
Lectio 11, § 168s; 408b 32.
Lectio 10, § 146s; 408a 34.
Lectio 7, § 87s; 406b 15.
§ 75 infra; 406a 12.
Phys., VIII, 5; 257a 315.
The context requires the parenthesis, which is lacking in Pirotta.
405b 31.
loc. cit.
406a 12.
Literally, '3 cubits'.
406a 22.
i.e. against its nature.
Reading quod, not Pirotta's suggestion quoad.
406a 27.
ibid., 30.
motus est actus imperfecti.
operatio . . . est actus perfecti.
406b 6.
406b 11.
cf. § 61.
Paraphrasing the Timaeus, 35A ff.
The literal sense of Pirotta's text is doubtful here.
406b 15.
§ 91; and Lectio 8, §§ 107-31; 406b 25-30.
Lectio 9, § 132;407b 25-30.
§§ 34, 56.
406b 22.
406b 24.
406b 25.
Lectio 8, § 107; 407a 2.
406b 28.
406b 31; cf. § 99.
35A ff.
§§ 46-51.
Phys., III, c.4; 203a 10-15.
figura numeralis.
diapason.
Pirotta has diatesseron, i.e. 'a fourth'; the mistake is due, as manuscript evidence shows, to his having left out the phrase in brackets (Balliol MSS. 278, fol. 9vb; 311, fol. 6vb; 313, fol. 92va).
Altering quae sub diapason to quae est bis diapason.
De Musica, I, c.10 (P.L., vol. LXIII, col. 1176-7).
406b 31.
406b 31.
anima mundi.
3/2 and 4/3 are the arithmetic and harmonic means between 2 and 1; 2/1 and 3/2 are the same between 3 and 1.
406b 34.
St. Thomas reverses this argument, § 118.
407a 1.
cf. Bk. III, lectio 7, § 682, and lectio 9, § 722. Also Contra Gent. II, 78, under Deinde subjungit 'idem autem etc.'.
407a 10.
Phys., VI, C. 1; 231a 20-5.
407a 18.
407a 18.
Phys., VIII, c.8; 264b 8ss.
Anal. Post., I, c.3; 72b 5-73a 20.
407a 30.
super eamdem quantitatem: which might be rendered, 'over the same area'; the movement itself remaining the same, or continuous.
407a 32.
Phys., VII, c.3, 247b 10.
407a 34.
§§ 46-51; 92-8.
Pirotta: et reflexit in septimo. In a footnote: forte 'reflecti'.
per accidens.
407b 1.
407b 5.
§§ 118-21.
De Coelo, II, c.5. 287b 22ss.
407b 13.
407b 22.
ars textrina; M. has tectonica, 'carpentry'.
'and has rendered an account of itself in public discussions', St. Thomas seems to follow another version, see Introd., p. 32.
Oxford transl.: 'easily refutable' (i.e. that soul is a harmony as the composition, etc.); with which Hicks and Tricot substantially agree, but not Wallace. St. Thomas (§ 139) follows M. as rendered here.
A possible rendering of M., though not of the Greek. It is fixed for us by the Commentary, § 140.
'has not a soul', 408a 27.
407b 27.
Et dicit 'quantum ad id quod commune est'. But M. has simply in communi, {en koino}, which has a different sense, 407b 30. See Introd., p. 32.
407b 30.
407b 32.
§ 141; 408a 18.
407b 34.
408a 1.
Phys., IV, c.4; 211a 5ss.
408a 5.
The rendering is a little uncertain. It takes non enim per hoc possumus scire as referring back to the 'order' in the body.
408a 18.
408a 21.
408a 22.
408a 24.
408a 29.
§§ 75-86.
secundum accidens.
See Introd., p. 33.
'of the sort (needed).' 408b 21.
408a 34-408b 4.
408b 5.
Phys., III, cc.4-8.
De Coelo, 1, c.3; 269b 15-270a 10.
§ 163; 408b 18.
§§ 377; 684-5.
intelligere. A per se incorporeal act.
408b 9.
habitus.
§ 150.
408b 15.
cf. § 82.
408b 18.
quaedam substantia quae est in fieri et nondum completa. This curious phrase certainly adds to the plain meaning of the text. But see introd., p. 33.
intelligere.
considerare.
408b 25.
cf. § 147.
408b 27.
408b 29.
§ 671ss.
'But how can such a thing be a unit?' is a possible rendering of the Greek, 409a 19.
408b 32.
§ 177; 409b 11.
409a 1-30.
409a 30.
Phys., VIII, c.5; 257a 30ss.
409a 2.
409a 7.
e.g. worms.
409a 10.
§ 169.
409a 18.
id est, unitatis intellectae.
Pirotta has et sic erunt duo puncta animae in codem loco, but the context requires that we omit animae.
409a 29.
409a 30.
He seems to mean the theories of all the philosophers criticised in the preceding chapters.
cf. § 68.
§ 173.
cf. § 34ss.
409b 11.
Vulcanus, '{Hephaistos}.
'of every kind of soul or of the whole of any one soul', 410b 26.
obliquum for {to kampylon}.
409b 23-411a 7.
Lectio 13, § 192; 411a 7.
But perhaps ratio, 'formulable essence', means only the proportion already mentioned.
410a 13.
410a 23.
410a 27.
410b 2.
410b 4.
§§ 45; 133.
410b 7.
Adopting Pirotta's proposal to read ex elementis aut ex elementatis.
410b 10.
410b 16.
411a 2.
That the distinction here referred to between parts of 'soul' refers to mortal and immortal existence is St. Thomas's interpretation of this passage (§ 197). The above translation has been made with this in mind. See introd., p. 33.
411a 9.
411a 11.
411a 16.
411a 24.
411a 20.
'existet', i.e. immortalis est: cf. transl. of text, note, and Introd., p. 33.
411a 24.
'It is observed that plants . . .', 411b 19.
'and certain insects', ibid. St. Thomas follows M., § 208.
'the whole soul being divisible', 411b 27.
411a 26.
411b 5.
'Of matter' is inserted for clarity.--(Transl.)
411b 5.
411b 6.
411b 6-13.
411b 14.
411b 19.
411b 27.
cf Bk. III, cc. 12, 13; lectios 17 and 18.
412a 1-5.
412a 6.
The 'parts' begin to be examined at 414a 29: Lectio 5, § 279ss.
Lectio 1, § 212-Lectio 4, § 278; 412a 5-414a 25.
Lectio 5, § 279; 414a 29.
Lectio 1-Lectio 2, § 244; 412a 5-413a 10.
Lectio 3, § 245; 413a 10.
I, c.8; 75b 30. See Introd., p. 30.
412a 15-412b 9.
Lectio 2, § 235; 412b 10.
412a 15.
VII, c.1; cf. VI, c.1; 1025b 30ss.
412a 5-11.
412a 11.
412a 5.
412a 7.
hoc aliquid.
412a 10.
412a 11.
412a 13.
412a 13.
Perhaps XII, c.7; 1072b 1ss.
412a 15.
412a 15-412b 4.
412b 4.
412b 6.
412a 29.
412a 15.
412a 22.
i.e. composed of Matter and Form, cf. § 215.
412a 20. See Introd., pp. 28-31.
412a 21.
facit esse actu simpliciter.
VII, c. 10; 1035b 15ss.
412a 22.
§ 216.
IX, c.8; 1049b 5ss.
'. . . in the history of the individual' (Oxford transl., 412a 26).
412a 29.
i.e. in the body.
412a 29.
corticis vel fructiferi.
412b 4.
412b 6.
VIII, c.6; 1045b 15.
413a 2.
412b 25.
412b 17.
412b 10.
412b 11. St. Thomas reads simply huic corpori, but Moerbeke hujusmodi corporis.
i.e. not artificial ones.
§ 218.
412b 13.
412b 15.
Parenthesis added.--(Transl.)
Phys., II, c.1, 192b 10ss.
412b 17.
412b 25.
413a 2.
§ 239.
413a 9.
Tetragonismus, which St. Thomas takes to mean 'square', not 'squaring'; and comments accordingly, §§ 248-51. See Introd., pp. 33-4. Pirotta places the question-mark after 'square', but the Commentary supposes that it comes after 'oblong'.
The second 'and rest' is not in the Greek, nor presupposed by the Commentary, § 255.
This sentence is not in the Greek, 413b 4.
413a 20.
413a 13. cf. Introd., pp. 24-31.
demonstratio propter quid.
Phys., I, 1; 184a 15.
§ 233.
hoc est quod quia.
orthogonia.
rhomboydes.
413a 16.
Tetragonismus. St. Thomas understands 'square', not 'squaring' or 'quadrature' as the Greek requires. See Introd., pp. 33-4.
413a 20.
Lectio 4, § 271; 414a 4.
413a 20-5.
413a 25.
Lectio 4, § 262; 413b 13.
§ 201.
413a 25.
413b 2.
413b 9.
413a 25.
natura.
413a 31.
413b 2.
413b 4.
413b 9.
§§ 847-74.
'in insects cut in two', 413b 20: cf. supra, Bk. I, 1. 14, § 208.
'fittingly' is not in the Greek, 414a 26.
413b 13.
413b 15.
413b 32.
413b 29.
413b 15.
§§ 632; 659; 666; 792.
§§ 644; 839.
i.e., in the higher animals.
413b 24.
413b 29.
413b 32.
§ 262.
§§ 288-94.
414a 4.
414a 19.
§ 233.
414a 4.
414a 12.
§ 255.
§§ 258; 261.
414a 13.
414a 14.
§ 221.
414a 19.
'They are nourished' is not in the Greek, which may be rendered, 'touch is of these, and of other sense objects only indirectly', 414b 9.
Lectio 7, § 309; 415a 22.
Lectio 6, § 299; 414b 32.
§ 295; 414b 20.
§ 288; 414a 32.
414a 29.
§§ 255; 260.
Bk. III, lectio 13, §§ 787; 788.
§§ 253-60.
§§ 270; 279.
VIII, c.3; 1043b 30-1044a 10.
414b 1-6.
414b 6.
§§ 637-54.
414b 20.
414b 28.
This parenthesis is doubtful, 415a 8.
414b 34.
Bk. III, lectionis 17 and 18; §§ 847-74.
§ 285.
§ 18.
§ 265.
§§ 644; 839.
Such seems to be St. Thomas's meaning; it differs from the Greek (415a 12) and also, apparently, from M.
415a 14.
415a 16.
E.N., I, c-7; 1097a 15ss.
§§ 724-6.
Bk. III, lectio 17, §§ 847-64.
Bk. II, lectio 10, §350ss.
Bk. III, lectio 7, § 671.
Bk. III, lectio 14, § 795. 'Since the soul is defined . . .
§ 795ss.
Bk. II, lectio 9, § 333ss.
§§ 309-10; 415a 22.
§ 311; 415a 26.
415a 26.
415b 8.
§ 288.
415b 1.
415b 5.
415 b 8.
415b 28. Lectio 8, § 324ss.
415b 10.
415b 12.
415b 14.
ratio ({logos}).
415b 15.
Phys., II, c.8; 198b 15ss.
§ 316.
415b 20.
M. omits 'head', which is in the Greek and is presupposed by St. Thomas.
§ 329.
415b 28.
416a 1.
416a 6.
Pirotta prints non enim, which does not connect with the previous sentence. The sense seems to require non autem.
416a 9.
416a 14.
§§ 341-2.
Activo esse, 'to be active', is in Pirotta's text, but St. Thomas, § 343, reads, as in Aristotle, 'To be augmentative', 416b 11.
'The primary soul would be generative etc.', 416b 24. Aristotle is giving a definition, which is obscured in the Latin by the omission of 'would be'.
St. Thomas reads (§ 348) 'moving', as here. The better reading of the Greek is 'moved', 416b 27.
§ 340; 416b 9.
§ 345; 416b 17.
416a 19.
416a 21.
416a 29.
416a 29.
416b 2.
416b 9.
416b 11.
416b 15.
416b 11.
§ 340.
416b 15.
416b 17.
416b 23.
§ 323.
416b 20.
416b 23.
Meteor., IV, c.3, 380a 11ss.
416b 25.
Not extant.
This clause is not in the Greek, 417a 7.
Or perhaps 'the sense-object', {aistheton} rather than {aisthanesthai}, which M. renders as sentire.
Bk. III, lectio 1, §§ 565-7.
Bk. II, lectio 13, § 383.
416b 32.
417a 1.
De Generatione et Corruptione, I, c.7.
417a 1.
417a 9.
Lectio 11, § 358; 417a 21.
417a 1.
417a 9.
417a 14.
Phys., III, c.1; 201a 10ss.
417a 17.
§ 351.
i.e., once his potency to know has been actualised. This is the first of the three cases mentioned above.
'from formerly etc.' is not in the Greek, 417b 1; nor referred to by St. Thomas, § 364.
Lectio 12, §§ 373-4.
417a 22.
417a 30.
417a 21.
417a 30.
417b 1.
417b 1.
417b 5.
417b 5.
417b 12.
§§ 365-6.
417b 9.
§ 362.
Altering Pirotta's punctuation to agree with the Greek and the Commentary.
417b 19.
417b 29.
417b 19.
§§ 622-36; 671-99; 765-78.
VII, c.11; 1036a 25ss.
417b 29.
§§ 373-4.
'sight' and 'hearing' are not in the Greek, the subject of 'errs not' being 'each sense'; 418a 15.
'sense' is not in the Greek, 418a 23.
Lectio 24, §§ 551ss.
sensibilia propria.
Lectio 14, § 399.
§ 384; 418a 11.
per accidens.
per se.
sensibilia illa quae communiter sentiuntur ab omnibus quae sentiunt, i.e. the sensibilia communia (cf. § 385).
418a 11.
sensibilia communia; cf. § 383 (fin.).
418a 17.
418a 20.
sentitur per accidens.
sentitur per se.
per se sensibilia.
proprie per se sensibilia.
sensus communis.
§§ 575-8; 601-14.
§§ 395-6.
As heat is.
§§ 183; 350-1.
Parenthesis inserted.--(Transl.)
vis cogitativa.
vis aestimativa.
'Hence it (colour) is not visible without light', 418b 1.
Or perhaps rather: 'where this transp. is potential, there is darkness', 418b 10.
'. . . nor any emanation from a body (for then it would still be a sort of body) but the presence of fire or something of that kind in the transparent', 418b 15-17. St. Thomas agrees with M., § 406.
Lectio 16, § 439ss.
Lectio 19, § 479ss.
Lectio 21, § 501ss.
Lectio 22, § 517ss.
Lectio 15, § 431ss.
418a 26.
418a 29.
Lectio 15, § 429; 419a 1.
§ 404; 418b 4.
418a 29-418b 2.
Per se; or secundum se (§ 400).
est quaedam passio.
418b 4.
418b 9.
418b 27, § 427.
§ 422.
418b 9.
418b 13.
418b 20.
418b 13-17.
418b 17.
418b 18.
X, c.4; 1055a 30ss.
418b 20.
caelum.
immutatio naturalis.
et soli disciplinabiles.
qualitas primi corporis alterantis, quod non habet contrarium.
lumen.
radius.
splendor.
Pirotta's correction of et item lumen to et tantum lumen is not acceptable in view of the context.
§§ 400-3; 418a 30.
'such as what is "dark"', 418b 29.
419a 1.
§ 399.
419a 7.
419a 25.
419a 15.
419a 7ss.
419a 11.
419a 15.
419a 23.
§§ 429-30.
419a 25.
§§ 526-8; 542.
419a 32.
§§ 491-500.
This rendering is governed by the Commentary (§ 450). But in the Greek what 'makes the shadow etc.' is the reflection from water, etc.
Lectio 18, §§ 466ss.
Lectio 17, 461ss.
ibid., § 459.
ibid., § 451.
De Sensu et Sens, cc.3-5.
De Gen. et Corr., II, c.2; 329b 5ss.
Meteor., I, c.3; 340b 5ss.: and II, cc.8-12; 385a 1ss.
§ 447; 419b 25.
442; 419b 9.
§§ 417-18.
419b 9.
419b 13.
ibid.
419b 18.
§ 451.
419b 18.
. . . percutere acervum lapidum antequam dissolvatur . . . 'a heap or whirl of sand' (Oxford trans.).
419b 25.
ibid.
§§ 445-6.
419b 27.
The parenthesis may be omitted, 420a 7.
'But what is struck must be smooth, so that the air rebound and vibrate in a single mass', 420a 25.
§ 453; 420a 4.
frangibilis. Moerbeke has fragilis.
420a 4.
420a 7.
420a 11.
420a 7.
§ 442.
420a 11.
laborat.
The text is evidently corrupt here, but the meaning is clear.
§ 455.
Hist. Animal., IV, c.8; 533b 1ss.
420a 15.
420a 19.
§§ 443-4.
420a 29.
420a 26.
420a 29.
The Latin terms are acutum and grave.
420a 30.
420a 32.
The term is still tarditas, 'slowness'; as used in the case of sounds caused by one movement.
De Musica, I, c.3 (P.L., vol. LXIII, col. 1173; cf. ibid., cols. 1175-6).
420b 1.
'movement of air', 420b 11.
'than other animals', 421b 25. But St. Thomas follows M. (§ 474).
Not in the Greek, 421a 5.
§ 476; 420b 27.
420b 12-13.
420b 9.
420b 5.
§§ 470-1.
§ 476.
Categ., c.6; 4b 31ss.
420b 9.
Hist. Animal., I, c.6; 490b 5-15.
§ 443.
420b 12-13.
420b 16.
420b 23.
420b 16.
De Respir., c.21-2; 478a 10ss.
420b 23.
quantum ad generationem, et quantum ad causalitatem motus.
i.e. the lungs.
§§ 470-1.
420b 27.
420b 29.
420b 29.
421a 1.
§§ 474-5.
§§ 466-9.
421a 1.
Lectio 20, § 491; 421b 9.
§ 490; 421b 2.
421a 16.
Hist. Animal., I, c.16; 494b 25.
421a 16.
421a 26.
421a 26.
§§ 480-2.
421b 3.
St. Thomas (§ 496) is not sure whether 'all' refers to other senses or other animals. The whole of this parenthesis is difficult, and alternative readings have been proposed. 421b 17.
422a 6.
421b 13.
i.e., for St. Thomas animals that live in air, or perhaps animals generally, Aristotle is referring to aquatic animals.
i.e. by evaporation.
421b 13.
421b 21.
421b 26.
421b 21.
421b 26.
422a 6.
'for instance, what is salty', 422a 18. Aristotle gives {to halmyron} as an example of a 'tasteable' easily dissolved. M. renders it as saliva, which alters the sense. St. Thomas follows M.
'answering to the footless (animal) and stoneless (fruit)', 422a 29.
§ 514; 422b 10.
§ 509; 422a 20.
§ 512; 422a 34.
422a 12.
422a 18.
§§ 525-8.
§ 290.
E.N., III, c.10; 1118a 15ss.
422a 12.
This phrase Pirotta puts in quotation marks, but it does not appear in his text of Moerbeke.
422a 18.
422a 20.
§ 490.
Probably E.N., III, c.10; 1118a 25ss.
422a 34.
422b 5.
422b 5.
plenam humiditate . . . scilicet cholera, quae est amara.
422b 10.
De Sensu et Sens, c.4.
i.e. in animals without flesh.
Lectio 23, § 545; 423b 17.
422b 23.
De Sensu et Sens, c.2; 438b 30-439a 3.
422b 23.
422b 27.
422b 33.
422b 27.
422b 33.
X, 4; 1055a 5-20.
§§ 529; 546.
422b 34.
423a 6.
connaturalis homini.
423a 6.
423a 17.
The Greek has 'these not being dry', 423a 26. St. Thomas (§ 531) follows M.
'is not perceived', 423b 25.
'is perceived', ibid.
The Latin renders clumsily a Greek idiom which simply means 'as with air', 424a 14.
§ 541; 423b 1.
§ 527.
Meteor., I, c.2.
§§ 547-8.
De Gen. et Corr., I, c.4; cf. II, c.7.
Meteor., IV, c.1; 379a 15.
423b 1.
423b 12.
423b 6.
§ 526.
i.e., immediately.
423b 12.
De Sensu et Sens., c.1; 436b 20-1.
423b 17.
423b 27.
424a 10.
423b 27.
De Gen. et Corr., II, cc.2 and 3.
§§ 482-3.
424a 10.
cc. 1ss.
Or 'whatever odour causes, it causes smelling'. St. Thomas notes both senses, § 559.
If Aristotle is here putting an objection to his own view, St. Thomas misses this nuance (§ 561). He takes this objection to be simply Aristotle's statement of one aspect of the matter as he saw it.
424a 28.
424b 2.
424a 24.
i.e. the same as the agent in respect of its materiality as well as of its form.
esse naturale.
Oxford transl.: 'it (the sense) is indifferent what in each case the substance is', 424a 23-4.
vel secundum rationem, i.e. sec. formam.
424a 24.
§§ 234-41.
424a 28.
ratio, cf. § 555.
i.e. of some stringed instrument.
424b 2.
424b 6.
424b 9.
424b 12.
Si . . . corpora insensibilia non paterentur, etc.
424b 14.
foetet.
feret.
species: presumably the odour.
Presumably, in this case, the air.
424b 16.
'through both', 425a 2. Our rendering of this difficult paragraph is of course governed by the Commentary.
i.e. of this world.
'no s. will be lacking', 425a 13. St. Thomas adds 'to us' (§ 574), as do Hicks and Tricot in their versions.
negatione continui et proprii. If M. really wrote propriis he would agree with the Greek {kai tois idiois}; but the Commentary (§ 578) hardly supports this reading.
The Greek adds 'for example, movement', 425a 21.
Bile==cholera, which M. puts for {chole}. He puts rubicunda for {xanthe}.
§§ 399-563.
Lectio 4, § 615; 427a 16.
Lectio 7, § 671; 429a 10.
Lectio 2, § 584; 425b 11.
§ 575; 425a 14.
§§ 546-8.
425a 2-3.
§ 453.
quaedam animalia . . . scilicet perfecta; cf § 255.
425a 10.
425a 14.
425a 17.
But see § 387, where per accidens, rendered here by 'indirectly', is rendered as 'incidentally'.
Phys., III, c.6.
425a 22.
cf. § 395.
non est nisi per accidens: incidental from the point of view of the senses brought into play.
425b 4.
De Gen. Anim., V, c.1; 778a 30-778b 19.
This sentence is not in the Greek.
aut auditus, aut auditio est: 'hearing as completed or in process' (Wallace's transl.). St. Thomas takes auditio to be hearing as in act.
Correcting dicuntur (Pirotta) to ducuntur.
'heated or chilled', 426b 6.
Lectio 3, § 599s.; 426b 8.
425b 11.
425b 13.
425b 15.
425b 17.
§ 427.
425b 20.
425b 22.
duplex esse: unum naturale in re . . . aliud spirituale in sensu.
§§ 551-4.
aliquo modo sentiunt animalia: or perhaps '. . .animals in their various ways are sentient'.
426a 2.
Phys., III, c.3; 202a 10ss.
Which is not the case when, as he says, the mover is 'active'.
§§ 590-1.
sonatio.
auditio.
426a 15.
§§ 590-3.
426a 20.
426a 27.
Pirotta has subjecti sens. The Greek and St. Thomas (§ 600) have 'object'.
'Is not this impossible?' 427a 6.
'takes the boundary-point ({to peras}) as two', 427a 13.
426b 12.
426b 12.
426b 29.
426b 17.
426b 23-4.
426b 29.
427a 2.
427a 5.
427a 10.
§ 602.
427a 14.
M. translates {metis} as voluntas, 'will', better rendered as 'craft', 'skill', or 'practical reason'.
St. Thomas takes et in aliis to mean 'in other animals'. The above rendering agrees with the Greek, 427a 24.
Od., XVIII, 136: quoted more fully here than in the Greek, as St. Thomas points out (§ 620).
427b 14; § 632.
427b 1.
427a 26.
427a 21.
427a 16.
427a 21.
§ 684.
427a 26.
427a 29ss.
§ 39; cf. §§ 595-6.
IV, c.5, 1010b 1ss.
427b 5.
427b 6.
427b 8.
427b 14.
Lectio 5, § 637.
§§ 655-9.
phantasia; cf. § 668.
427b 16.
427b 21.
427b 24.
E.N., VI, cc. 3-11.
'Again, sense is always present, imagination not', 428a 8. St. Thomas follows M.
'when their eyes are shut', 428a 16.
'can be false', 428a 18.
This is an argument added to those referred to in the preceding section by propter haec, 'on these grounds'.
'an opinion of good and a sensation of white', 428a 30.
428a 1.
Lectio 6, § 655.
§ 641; 428a 5.
428a 24.
§§ 630-1.
intellectus, opinio, scientia.
Bk. I, lectio 4, § 51.
428a 5ss.
i.e. exterior senses.
428a 7-8.
428a 9.
§§ 838-9.
i.e. exteriorly.
428a 11.
428a 12.
428a 15.
428a 17.
428a 19.
§§ 643-4.
428a 22.
428a 24.
428a 27.
Because, since this would connote the direct object also, there would be two 'objects' involved in the one 'image'--which is impossible.
428b 2.
Perhaps, rather, 'differs according as it (the movement) arises from one or other of the sensations etc.' St. Thomas follows M. (§ 664), 428b 25.
428b 18.
428b 11.
428b 12.
428b 12-14.
428b 14.
428b 18.
428b 25.
quando motus phantasiae est simul cum motu sensus.
428b 30.
429a 2.
§§ 417-18.
cf. §§ 403-12.
420a 4.
Lectio 13, § 787; 431b 20.
Lectio 12, § 765; 431a 4.
Lectio 11, § 746; 430a 28.
Lectio 10, § 728; 430a 10.
Lectio 10, § 740; 430a 20.
intellectus possibilis.
Lectio 8, § 705; 429b 10.
Lectio 9, § 720; 429b 22.
Lectio 8, § 700; 429b 5.
§ 675; 429a 12-13.
§ 629.
sapere et intelligere.
429a 12-13.
429a 18.
429a 29.
§§ 350-1; 393-4.
429a 18.
intellectus possibilis.
429a 24.
§ 45.
§§ 352-5.
429a 23.
429a 24.
Reading, with Pirotta's footnote, sine, not sive.
429a 27.
locus specierum.
429a 29.
§ 676.
. . . est separatus.
sicut una de substantiis separatis.
§§ 355-7; 382.
Perhaps in the De Unitate Intellectus contra Averroistas. In any case there was the Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 59ss, composed 1258-64. See Introd., pp. 17-18.
'once it has become . . . as a "man of science",--meaning by this phrase one who is actually so', 429b 5. St. Thomas follows M. (as punctuated in Pirotta) in relating 'is said to be' to the intellect, not to 'the man of science', § 700.
Pirotta's text runs '(in quibusdam enim idem est esse carni et carnem esse)' etc. Probably the bracket is misplaced: it should be closed after idem est; and esse carni etc. should be attached to the next sentence. One would then read, 'but not in all (for in certain things there is identity [of thing and its form]); the mind then distinguishes flesh and being flesh, either by some other faculty, or etc.' St. Thomas reads as in Pirotta's text, § 710.
429b 10.
§§ 677-83.
429b 5.
primus actus.
429b 10.
VII, c.6; 1031a 15ss.
non sunt aliud a rebus nisi per accidens.
magnitudo.
See note 2, p. 411.
naturam sensitivam (Pirotta); apparently meaning sensibilem.
429b 14.
§§ 601-4.
429b 16.
429b 17.
proprium objectum.
scientia rationalis, i.e. logic.
intellectus possibilis.
'The receptivity ({to paschein}) involving a common element', i.e. common to agent and patient. But St. Thomas understands the phrase secundum aliquid commune in the sense of the translation given above. The allusion is to Bk. II, lectio 11, §§ 365-6.
'Speculative knowledge and its object are the same.' St. Thomas understands M.'s sic scibile as 'knowable in act', § 724.
The modern translators--Hicks, Tricot, Smith--put this sentence in brackets and take it that Aristotle is proposing, for later consideration, the question why the intellect is not always actually understanding. St. Thomas, however, takes it as a question why anything intelligible is not also itself possessed of an intellect (§ 727). The sentence has been rendered here to suit this interpretation.
'mind can only become such as are freed from their matter', 430a 7.
According to the Greek, apparently, this 'intelligible', {to noeton}, is the mind itself. The translation given above is fixed by the Commentary.
§ 722; 429b 29.
De Gen. et Corr., I, c.7; 323b 1ss.
429b 26.
cf. § 704.
§§ 365-6.
430a 2.
430a 5.
§§ 590-3.
§§ 707-19.
IX, c.9; 1051a 30.
materia prima.
intellectus possibilis.
430a 5.
A much-disputed passage. A safe rendering of the Greek is: 'This alone is immortal and perpetual. We have however no memory of it because it is impassible, whereas the passive intellect (or, the mind that can be affected) is perishable; and without it nothing thinks'--taking 'it' to refer to the agent intellect. The Latin translation, however, followed by St. Thomas, takes this 'it' to mean the 'passive intellect' and inserts anima, 'the soul', as subject of 'thinks'. Hence St. Thomas takes the whole section to refer to the state of the intellect after death: it 'does not remember', etc., once the passive intellect has perished; the latter is only 'called' intellect and is really a pars animae corporalis. See Introd., pp. 34-7.
intellectus agens.
§ 732; 430a 17.
intellectus possibilis.
sicut habitus quidam. The Oxford translation: 'a sort of positive state'. This term seems less misleading than the transliteration, 'habit'.
§ 400.
cf. § 716.
430a 17.
quod sit immixtus.
§ 728.
§§ 677-83.
§ 692.
§ 722.
430a 20. See Introd., pp. 34-7.
intellectus secundum actum. This is not the same as intellectus agens. It is intellect as actually understanding (ipsum intelligere, cf. § 741).
430a 22-3.
IX, c.8; 1049b 5-25.
non . . . inveniendo neque discendo.
Anal. Post., I, c.1; 71a 1ss.
430a 22-3.
§ 21.
§ 268.
XII, c.3; 1070a 20.
430a 23-4. See note 1, p. 426.
§§ 163-7.
E.N., I, c.13; 1102b 10ss.
§ 772.
'Where the heads, etc.', 430a 29.
'One cannot tell what the mind thought in each half' (i.e. of the time). With this M.'s version would seem to agree: . . . quod in utroque dimidio intelligat. However, St. Thomas takes the phrase in the sense of the translation given above, intelligatur sec. medium utriusque (§ 754).
A disputed passage both as to text and interpretation. The text of M. can yield our rendering; which suits the Commentary.
§§ 761-3.
VI, c.4; 1027b 20-25.
430b 6.
430b 26.
430b 6-14.
cf. §§ 107-31.
430b 14.
430b 20.
430b 22.
XII, c.7; 1072b 10-25.
430b 26.
intellectus qui est ipsius quid est secundum hoc quod aliquid erat esse . . . verus est semper.
quod quid est.
IX, c.10; 1051b 15-30.
§§ 740-1.
Perhaps 'to one subject', 431a 27. But St. Thomas: 'one intellect' (§ 776).
The Greek of this clause allows more than one rendering; ours is fixed by the Commentary, § 776.
'perceiving that the beacon is fire one knows by the common sense, on seeing the fire moving, that an enemy is approaching'. M. has mistranslated {ton phrykton}, the fire-brand or beacon, as fugibile, {ton phykton}, 431b 5.
'on future in relation to present matters', 431b 8.
'And so generally in practical matters.' This phrase ought to close the preceding paragraph. The rest of the sentence is translated to suit St. Thomas' reading of it (§ 779). Hence the comma after 'category', and the omission of any rendering of cum in in eodem genere est cum bono et malo.
431a 4.
431a 5.
Phys., V, c.5.
actus imperfecti.
actus perfecti.
operatio.
431a 8.
431a 14.
§§ 722; 738-9.
'judgement' renders dicere; 'apprehension', intelligere.
cf. §§ 746-51.
431a 14.
§ 781; 431b 12.
§ 779; 431b 10.
431a 17.
431a 14.
431a 17.
431b 2.
§§ 609-10.
431b 2.
§ 767.
431b 10.
See note 5, p. 444
431b 12.
431b 17.
431b 17.
§§ 688, 699.
M. has aliis when he should have alia. It is the other than primary concepts that are referred to.
431b 20.
431b 28.
species.
species.
432a 2.
432a 9.
§§ 284, 551.
432a 9.
quantum ad operationem communem intellectus.
432a 12.
432a 22.
Lectio 15, § 818; 433a 9.
§ 808; 432b 13.
432a 26.
432a 22.
E.N., I, c.13; 1102a 25ss.
432a 26.
§§ 199-210.
432a 31.
separatas subjecto.
432b 3-4.
cf. § 771.
Apparently a general reference to Hist. Animal., VI, c. 18.
Perhaps the text referred to is in Bk. II, chap. 5; 1105b 20.
432b 7.
432b 13.
432b 19.
432b 26.
433a 6.
432b 17.
432b 19.
432b 26.
433a 1.
433a 6.
E.N., VII, c.3; 1146b 20.
'in virtue etc.' is not in Pirotta's text of M., but seems to be supposed by St. Thomas (§ 824).
'The former the end, the latter the beginning', 433b 23.
Lectio 16, § 836; 433b 27.
§ 830; 433b 10.
§ 820; 433a 13.
§ 829; 433b 5.
433a 13.
433a 26.
433b 1.
IX, c.5; 1048a 5ss.
E.N., VII, c.6; 1149a 25ss.
433a 26.
bonum applicatum ad operationem . . .
433b 1.
E.N., VI, cc.3-5.
433b 5.
§ 817.
Reading alii as alios.
433b 10.
433b 13.
433b 21.
433b 13.
prout motus est actus perfecti.
De Motu Animalium, c.6; 706b 15ss.
433b 21.
The Greek is doubtful here; possibly three states are being contrasted: (1) irrational desire overcoming deliberation; (2) vice versa; (3) one irrational desire overcoming another. St. Thomas--and perhaps M.--combines (2) and (3), or rather absorbs (3) in (2). 'Continence', continentia, should be 'incontinence', {akrasia}: Aristotle's name for state (1). State (2) is {enkrateia}, which St. Thomas calls continentia (§ 843, and see footnote in loco).
St. Thomas takes this last clause as part of the sentence beginning 'Naturally'. But 'Naturally . . . motion' is a parenthesis. 'So that' should refer back to the sentence preceding the parenthesis.
433b 31.
§§ 818-19.
phantasia.
apparitio.
433b 31.
434a 5.
434a 12.
434a 16.
cf. §§ 657, 838.
434a 12.
Continentia is present when rational deliberation governs the sense-appetite, but with the latter still in revolt. It is therefore an imperfect state compared with the full virtue of temperantia (S.T., II-II, 155, 1). See note 1, p. 478.
434a 16.
§ 813.
'have grown', 434b 2.
434a 27.
§§ 262-846.
434a 27.
434a 31.
§§ 521-4.
§§ 284, 551, 792.
434a 31.
434b 9.
434b 2.
434b 2.
§§ 772; 791.
Presumably to § 854.
animo passiva.
434b 9.
Lectio 18, § 869; 435b 4.
434b 11.
§ 849; cf §§ 260, 266, 288, 300, 484, 602.
434b 11.
Lectio 18, § 865; 435a 11.
434b 24.
434b 18.
434b 18.
434b 24.
434b 30.
434b 30.
'that characterise earth' is lacking from Pirotta's M. St. Thomas supposes it, § 867.
435a 11.
§ 858, etc.
§§ 521-4, 849.
435b 4.
435b 19.
§§ 859, 865.
435b 19.
Altering qui videt (Pirotta) to qui vivit.
§ 861.
c.5; 444a 3-20.
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS