Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima

 BOOK ONE

 CHAPTER I

 LECTIO ONE

 CHAPTER II

 LECTIO TWO

 LECTIO THREE

 LECTIO FOUR

 LECTIO FIVE

 CHAPTER III

 LECTIO SIX

 LECTIO SEVEN

 LECTIO EIGHT

 CHAPTER IV

 LECTIO NINE

 LECTIO TEN

 CHAPTER V

 LECTIO ELEVEN

 LECTIO TWELVE

 LECTIO THIRTEEN

 LECTIO FOURTEEN

 BOOK TWO

 CHAPTER I

 LECTIO ONE

 LECTIO TWO

 CHAPTER II

 LECTIO THREE

 LECTIO FOUR

 CHAPTER III

 LECTIO FIVE

 CHAPTER IV

 LECTIO SIX

 LECTIO SEVEN

 LECTIO EIGHT

 LECTIO NINE

 CHAPTER V

 LECTIO TEN

 LECTIO ELEVEN

 LECTIO TWELVE

 CHAPTER VI

 LECTIO THIRTEEN

 CHAPTER VII

 LECTIO FOURTEEN

 LECTIO FIFTEEN

 CHAPTER VIII

 LECTIO SIXTEEN

 LECTIO SEVENTEEN

 LECTIO EIGHTEEN

 CHAPTER IX

 LECTIO NINETEEN

 LECTIO TWENTY

 CHAPTER X

 LECTIO TWENTY-ONE

 CHAPTER XI

 LECTIO TWENTY-TWO

 LECTIO TWENTY-THREE

 CHAPTER XII

 LECTIO TWENTY-FOUR

 BOOK THREE

 CHAPTER I

 LECTIO ONE

 CHAPTER II

 LECTIO TWO

 LECTIO THREE

 CHAPTER III

 LECTIO FOUR

 LECTIO FIVE

 LECTIO SIX

 CHAPTER IV

 LECTIO SEVEN

 LECTIO EIGHT

 LECTIO NINE

 CHAPTER V

 LECTIO TEN

 CHAPTER VI

 CHAPTER VII

 LECTIO ELEVEN

 LECTIO TWELVE

 CHAPTER VIII

 LECTIO THIRTEEN

 CHAPTER IX

 LECTIO FOURTEEN

 CHAPTER X

 LECTIO FIFTEEN

 CHAPTER XI

 LECTIO SIXTEEN

 CHAPTER XII

 LECTIO SEVENTEEN

 CHAPTER XIII

 LECTIO EIGHTEEN

CHAPTER VI

SENSE OBJECTS IN GENERAL

             IN treating of each sense we must first discuss sense-objects. We speak of a sense-object in three ways: two [kinds of sense-objects] are perceptible essentially; one incidentally. Of the two former, one is proper to each sense, the other common to all.§ 383

             Now, I call that the proper object of each sense which does not fall within the ambit of another sense, and about which there can be no mistake,--as sight is of colour, and hearing of sound, and taste of savour; while touch has several different objects. Each particular sense can discern these proper objects without deception; thus sight errs not as to colour, nor hearing as to sound; though it might err about what is coloured, or where it is, or about what is giving forth a sound. This, then, is what is meant by the proper objects of particular senses.§§ 384-5

             Now the sense-objects in common are movement, rest, number, shape, dimension. Qualities of this kind are proper to no one sense, but are common to all; thus a movement is perceptible both by touch and by sight. These, then, are the essential objects of sensation.§ 386

             To be a sense-object 'incidentally' is said, for example, of a white object that is the son of Diares. This is perceived incidentally because whiteness happens to belong to what is perceived: but the sense is unaffected by that object as such. Of objects essentially sense-perceptible, the proper are properly such; and to these the essence of each sense is naturally adapted.§§ 387-98