LECTIO THREE

             § 31. So much by way of Introduction. The Philosopher has stated his aim in general and the difficulty of the undertaking; which he now proceeds to carry out in the order already indicated. The whole treatise divides into two parts. In the first the soul's nature is discussed as other philosophers have regarded it; but in the second as it is in reality. The latter section begins at Book II. The first part itself has two parts. The former simply relates the opinions of other philosophers; the second, beginning at 'The first thing to be considered', examines them. The former part itself divides into two parts, in the first of which Aristotle distinguishes between the starting points of the other philosophers, while in the second, starting at 'For some say, he shows how they severally came to hold their different opinions.

             § 32. First of all then he says that one ought to start by gathering together everything that would seem to belong to the soul by nature. As to this, we should note that when we find things differing both by clear and understandable differences and by differences that are still obscure, we must assuredly take the former as a means to arrive at knowledge of the latter. This was the method used by the philosophers in their study of the soul. Living things differ from non-living in having 'souls'; but because the nature of the soul was not evident and could not be investigated except by way of certain more obvious notes which differentiate animate from inanimate things, the philosophers first took these more evident characteristics and tried, through them, to come to knowledge of the soul's nature. These evident notes are two: sensation and movement. Animate things seem to be characterised chiefly by movement, in that they move themselves, and by having sense-awareness or perception. So the ancients thought that if they could discover the principle of these two factors they would know the soul; hence their efforts to discern the cause of movement and sensation. They all agreed in identifying the soul with the cause of movement and sense-perception. But just at this point also their differences began; for some tried to arrive at the soul by way of movement, and others by way of sense-perception.

             § 33. Hence at 'For some say' he states these differences: taking those of his predecessors first who started their enquiry from movement; and then, at 'All who have considered', those who started from knowledge; and thirdly, at 'But since the soul', those who started from both.

             With regard to the first group we should note that it had one principle in common, namely, that if living things are moving things, the soul must be both moving and moved. They assumed this because they thought that one thing could only move another if it were itself already moved; that is, only what is moved moves. So if living things are moved by the soul, then clearly the soul itself, and pre-eminently, must be moved. It was this that led the early students of Nature to class the soul among things that are moved. But about this also different opinions arose.

             § 34. When therefore he says, 'Hence Democritus', Aristotle states first of all the view of Democritus, one of the early philosophers, who, thinking that the soul by nature was in a state of maximum movement, which state seems natural to fire, maintained that the soul 'was a kind of fire or heat'. Such was his view. For he did not admit the existence of anything in Nature except what is sense-perceptible and corporeal; and the first principles, he said, of all things are indivisible bodies, infinite in number, which he called atoms. These atoms, he said, are all the same by nature, differing from each other only in shape, position and arrangement (though here only the difference of shape is alluded to, as being the only necessary one. This consists in some being round, some square, some pyramids, and so on). He also maintained that the atoms were mobile and never ceased moving, and that the world had come into being through their fortuitous coming together. And to illustrate the mobility of these bodies he took the example of the particles that move in the air even when no wind blows, as we can see when a sunbeam shines through a doorway. Since the atoms, being indivisible, are much smaller than such particles, they must obviously be extremely mobile. And because the spherical is, of all shapes, the one best suited for movement--having no angles to impede it,--and since the soul, as the cause of movement in living things, was thought to have maximum mobility, Democritus concluded that among these infinitely numerous bodies the spherical ones were the soul.

             § 35. Leucippus, a companion of Democritus, held the same opinion. And Democritus thought the following was a sign of its truth. He maintained that 'coterminous with', or essential to, life is respiration (a short-sighted view since not all living things breathe), and that respiration is necessary because the body is full of small ever-moving spherical particles (the cause, as he thought, of all movement in animal bodies) and that the surrounding air compresses what it 'envelops', i.e. our bodies, and 'expels', i.e. thrusts out of them, those particles which are so shaped as to impart movement to animals, being never at rest themselves. Lest, therefore, our bodies should decay with the loss of all these particles, he said that respiration is necessary whereby fresh particles may be brought in, and those already within prevented from leaving by those that inhaling brings in. And he said that animals can live as long as they can do this, i.e. as long as they can breathe. The point of the argument is that if breathing is called the cause of life because it keeps the spherical particles inside the animal body, and also introduces fresh ones lest the body should decay through loss of particles by movement, then it is clearly implied that the particles are the soul itself. They are indeed the same particles that Democritus said were fiery by nature and the cause of heat.

             § 36. Next, at 'The teaching of the Pythagoreans . . .' Aristotle mentions a view of certain Pythagoreans which resembles that of Democritus; for their statement and his seem to mean the same, although the Pythagoreans themselves do not all agree. Some of them, agreeing with Democritus, said that motes in the air, i.e. indivisible, infinitely numerous particles, were the soul. Others, however, of the same school, said that the soul was rather the force that moved those particles. Of this opinion was a certain Archelaus, the master of Socrates, as Augustine remarks in the De Civitate Dei.

             The reason why the soul has been thus identified with these particles has been already given -namely, that as the soul was regarded as being especially mobile, and as those particles seem to be always moving (even when the air is calm) they identified the one with the other.

             § 37. Then, at 'All who say . . .' he summarises the views of a number of philosophers, saying that all who have defined the soul in terms of movement and called it that which moves itself, 'tend in the same direction', i.e. the same as those mentioned already. All these, it seems, agreed in thinking that the soul's first and chief characteristic was movement; all things being moved by soul, and soul by itself. The reason for this was, as has been noted, that they all thought that only what was itself in motion could move other things. Since the soul moves other things, they thought the soul especially and principally was in motion.

             § 38. In the third place, at 'Anaxagoras likewise', he states the view of Anaxagoras. He first shows how this philosopher agrees with those already mentioned, saying that he, and anyone else who held that Intellect moved all things, really agreed with them that the source of all movement was a soul. Anaxagoras, however, differed in this that he denied that every mover was itself in motion, and maintained the existence of a pure and transcendent Intellect which, motionless itself, moved all other things; and that the soul was of this nature too. (This view led some into the error of divinising the soul.) Thus Anaxagoras agreed with the other philosophers in calling the soul a principle of movement, but disagreed with them in saying that it was not itself moved (for they said the contrary). And he also differed from Democritus in what he understood by intellect.

             § 39. When Aristotle therefore says 'He (i.e. Democritus) asserts,' he states this last difference, first stating Democritus' opinion that intellect and soul were 'absolutely', i.e. everywhere and in all respects, the same. Democritus said this because he held that only sense-perceptible things existed in the real world, and that no cognitive faculty existed in the soul except sensitivity. From this he inferred that no definite truth about things was attainable, that nothing could be definitely known with certainty: truth being simply what appears to be true; and what one man thought about anything being never any nearer the truth than what another man thought about the same thing at the same time. In consequence he maintained that contradictories were both true at the same time; and this because, as we have said, he took intellect to be, not the faculty for knowing truth and understanding intelligible objects, but a mere sense-faculty. Only the sensible, he thought, could be known, since only the sensible existed. And because the latter is continually changing there could be no certain truth about anything. Never attaining to an understanding of the intellect as the supreme faculty 'concerned with truth', i.e. which bears on true being, and admitting only the faculties of sense, he completely 'identifies soul and intellect'. The intellect changed, he said, as the whole man changed. Hence his approval of Homer's phrase 'Hector lies other-minded', i.e. Hector's mind was altered by Hector's condition; for he thought one thing as conqueror, another as conquered.

             § 40. Next, at 'Anaxagoras is less definite', he shows how Anaxagoras differed from Democritus, first stating the former's opinion and then, at 'It does not seem', criticising it. First then he observes that Anaxagoras spoke with less certainty and less conclusively about the soul. He often said that intelligence was the cause of right actions, whilst elsewhere he also identifies intelligence with the soul; for it is agreed that a soul is found in all animals, the lower as well as the higher, the smaller as well as the larger; and Anaxagoras said that intelligence was in all of them. Clearly then he identifies soul and intelligence.

             § 41. Secondly, at 'It does not seem', he shows the inconsistency of Anaxagoras' use of the term intellect. For sometimes Anaxagoras distinguishes between soul and intellect, but sometimes also he identifies them. These are contradictory statements which cannot both be true; as Aristotle proceeds to show. Right action, he says, admittedly derives from intellect perfected by prudence. If then the intellect that causes right action is the same thing as the soul, it follows that intellect perfected by prudence is the same as the soul. But this is false; because, while all animals have souls, not all--not even all men--are prudent. Therefore the soul is something else.

             § 42. Lastly, at 'All those therefore . . .' he states that all who have regarded animate beings from the standpoint of movement, i.e. as self-movers, thought that the chief mover in them was the soul, as the above-mentioned opinions show.

404b 8-404b 29

PREVIOUS THEORIES.

EMPEDOCLES, PLATO, SOUL AS SELF-MOVING NUMBER

             ALL WHO HAVE CONSIDERED IT AS KNOWING AND perceiving realities identify the soul with the [elemental] principles,--some making several principles, others one.§§ 43-4

             Empedocles, for instance, says that it is composed of all elements, and that each of these is a soul, saying,

 'As by earth we know earth, by ether divine ether, By water water, by fire, it is clear, fire mysterious and hidden; Love by love, hate by sad hate.'§ 45

             In the same way Plato in the Timaeus constitutes the soul from the elements. For like [he says] is known by like; and things are made up of elements.§§ 46-7

             In the lectures 'On Philosophy' he likewise lays it down that the animate itself is compounded of the idea of the One, together with the primary Length and Depth and Breadth; other things existing in the same manner.§§ 48-50

             Again, rather differently, that intellect is the One, knowledge the Two (for [this proceeds] as one to one), and the number of the Plane belongs to opinion, and that of the Solid to sensation. For he said that numbers are the specific forms and principles of beings, and are themselves constituted from elements. Some things are discerned by understanding, some by science, some by opinion, some by sensation. But these same numbers are the specific forms of things.§ 51

             But since the soul seems to be both a moving and a knowing principle, some have made it out to be a combination of these two, stating that it is a self-moving number.§ 52