LECTURE 5

THERE IS NO ALTERATION IN THE FOURTH SPECIES OF QUALITY (FORM AND FIGURE) NOR IN THE FIRST SPECIES OF QUALITY (HABIT AND DISPOSITION) IN REGARD TO THE BODY

             913. Since in the preceding argument the Philosopher has assumed that every alteration occurs with respect to sensible things, he intends here to prove this.

             First he states his intention. Secondly, where he says, 'Of the other things . . .' (Appendix A, 698), he proves the proposition.

             He says, therefore, first that from the following it must be realized that all things which are altered are altered with respect to sensible qualities, and consequently only those things are capable of being altered which per se are affected by qualities of this kind.

             914. Next where he says, 'Of the other things . . .' (Appendix A, 698), he proves the proposition by arguing from the major.

             First he states the major. Secondly, where he says, 'That from which the form . . .' (Appendix A, 699), he proves a certain thing which he has assumed.

             He says, therefore, first that over and above sensible qualities, alteration especially seems to occur in the fourth species of quality, which is quality with respect to quantity, namely form and figure, and in the first species of quality, which contains habit and disposition. For it seems that there is alteration in these cases because qualities of this kind are removed with respect to something new or are acquired with respect to something new. And it does not seem that this can occur without a mutation. But alteration is mutation in respect to quality, as was shown above.

             But in the above mentioned qualities of the first and fourth species, alteration does not occur primarily and principally, but secondarily. For qualities of this kind are consequent upon certain alterations of the primary qualities. For example, it is clear that when a material subject becomes dense or rarefied, there follows a mutation with respect to figure, and similarly when it becomes warm or grows cold, there follows a mutation with respect to sickness and health, which pertains to the first species of quality. Rarity and density, and warmth and cold, are sensible qualities, thus it is clear that there is no alteration primarily and per se in the first and fourth species of quality. Rather the removal and reception of qualities of this kind are consequent upon an alteration which occurs with respect to sensible qualities.

             From this it is also clear why he makes no mention of the second species of quality, which is natural power or lack of power. For it is clear that natural power or the lack of it is received or removed only through a natural change of alteration. Therefore, he omits this as if it were obvious.

             915. Next where he says, 'That from which the form . . .' (Appendix A, 699), he proves what he has assumed.

             First he proves that there is no alteration in the fourth species of quality. Secondly, where he says, 'Nor is there alteration . . .' (Appendix A, 701), he proves that there is no alteration in the first species of quality.

             Concerning the first point he gives two arguments. The first is taken from a mode of speaking. It must be realized that form and figure differ from each other in that figure signifies the termination of quantity. For a figure is that which is contained by a terminus or termini. And a form is said to be that which gives specific being to an artifact. For the forms of artifacts are accidents.

             He says, therefore, that that which becomes the form of a statue we do not call 'form', that is, the matter of the statue is not predicated of the statue principally and directly. The same is true of the figure of a pyramid or a bed. Rather in such cases the matter is predicated denominatively, for we say a triangle is 'of bronze' or 'waxen' or 'wooden'. And the same is true of other things. But in things which are altered we predicate the passion of the subject, for we say that bronze is damp or strong or warm. And conversely we say that the damp or the warm is bronze, equally predicating the matter of the passion, and vice versa. We also say that man is white, and the white is man. Since, therefore, in forms and figures the matter is not predicated equally with figure, such that the one is predicated of the other principally and directly, but matter is predicated of figure and form only denominatively, while in things which are altered the subject and the passion are predicated equally of each other, it follows that in forms and figures there is no alteration. Rather this occurs only in sensible qualities.

             916. He gives the second argument where he says, 'Further there is another . . .' (Appendix A, 700). This argument is taken from a property of the thing.

             It is ridiculous to say that a man or a house or any other thing is altered because it receives the end of its own perfection. For example, if a house is completed because it is covered, or because it is faced with brick, or because it is roofed, it is ridiculous to say that the house is altered when it is roofed or faced with brick. For it is clear that there is no alteration of things which come to be insofar as they come to be. Rather each thing is completed and comes to be insofar as it receives its proper form and figure. Therefore, there is no alteration in the reception of form and figure.

             917. To understand these arguments one must realize that among all qualities figures are especially consequent upon and reveal the species of things. This is particularly clear with respect to plants and animals, in which no more certain judgment of the diversity of species can be had than the judgment of the diversity of their figures. This is so because, just as quantity is more closely related to substance than the other accidents, likewise figure, which is a quality of quantity, is most closely related to the form of the substance. Hence, just as some say that dimensions are the substance of things, others say that figures are substantial forms. And because of this an image, which is an expressed representation of a thing, is noticed by its figure more than by its colour or something else. And since art is the imitator of nature, and since an artifact is an image of a natural thing, the forms of artifacts are figures or something very similar.

             And, therefore, because of the similarity of such forms and figures to substantial forms, the Philosopher says that with respect to the reception of form and figure there is no alteration but perfection. This is also true because the matter of such things is predicated only denominatively, as is also true of natural substances. For we do not say that man is earth but that man is 'earthen'.

             918. Next where he says, 'Nor is there alteration . . .' (Appendix A, 701), he shows that there is no alteration in the first species of quality.

             He shows this first in regard to the habits and dispositions of the body. Secondly, where he says, 'Nor is there alteration . . .' (Appendix A, 702), he shows this in regard to the habits and dispositions of the soul.

             Concerning the first point he gives the following argument. Even corporeal habits, which belong to the first species of quality, are virtues and vices. For universally virtue is that which makes the one who has it good, and its operation results in good. Hence, that is called a virtue of the body in respect to which the body is well constituted and acting well, for example, health. And the contrary is true of vice, for example, sickness. Moreover, every virtue and vice is predicated in relation to something. He explains this with examples. Health, which is a virtue of the body, is a certain proportion of hot and cold things. This proportion arises from the proper proportion of the 'things which are within', i.e., the humours, from which the body is composed, to each other and to the 'container', i.e., the whole body. For that harmony of the humours which is health for a lion is not health for a man, but his death, because human nature cannot endure it.

             However the Commentator says that 'container' means the containing air. But the first interpretation is better. For the health of an animal is not determined in relation to the air. Rather, conversely, the disposition of air is called healthy in relation to the animal.

             Likewise, beauty and barrenness are predicated in relation to something. (Barrenness is understood as a disposition by which one is led to motion and action.) Such things are certain dispositions of that which is complete in its own nature in comparison to an 'optimum', that is, to an end, which is operation. For it was said that dispositions of this kind are called virtues because they make the one who has them good and their operation produces good. Therefore, such dispositions are predicated in relation to a proper operation, which is the 'optimum' of the thing.

             It is not necessary to say that 'optimum' means something extrinsic, as that which is most beautiful or most healthy, as the Commentator says. For a relation to an extrinsic, optimum disposition pertains to beauty and health, but a relation to good operation belongs to them per se.

             And lest anyone should understand 'perfect' as meaning 'already having attained an end', he says that 'perfect' here means that which is disposed to health according to nature. Nor is it to be understood here that such habits and dispositions in themselves are relations. For then they would not be in the genus of quality but in the genus of relation. Rather their nature [ratio] depends on some relation.

             Therefore, since such habits are in relation to something, and since in relation there is neither motion nor generation nor alteration, as was proven in Book V, it is clear that in such habits there is no alteration primarily and per se. Rather their transmutation follows from some prior transmutation of hot and cold, or some such things, just as relations also begin to be as the result of some motion.