LECTURE 9 (197 a 8-35)

THE MEANING OF THE THINGS WHICH THE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS AND THE COMMON MAN SAY ABOUT FORTUNE

             217. Having given the definition of fortune, he establishes from this definition the meaning [ratio] of those things which are said about fortune.

             First he considers those things which the ancient philosophers said about fortune. Secondly, where he says, 'Thus to say . . .' (197 a 18), he considers those things which the common man says about fortune. He has given above three opinions concerning fortune and chance. And he disproved the second of these opinions as being altogether false, for this position held that fortune is the cause of the heavens and of all worldly things.

             Thus, having rejected the second opinion, he here shows that the third opinion, which holds that fortune is hidden to man, is true. Secondly, where he says, '. . . and why . . .' (197 a 10), he shows how the first opinion, which holds that nothing comes to be by fortune or chance, might be true.

             Since it was said above that per accidens causes are infinite, and since it was also said that fortune is a per accidens cause, he concludes from this that the causes of that which is by fortune are infinite. And since the infinite, insofar as it is infinite, is unknown, it follows that fortune is hidden to man.

             218. Next where he says, '. . . and why . . .' (197 a 10), he shows how the first opinion might be true. He says that in a way it is true to say that nothing comes to be by fortune. For all of those things which others say about fortune are in a certain respect true, because they have some meaning [ratio]. Since fortune is a per accidens cause, it follows that what is by fortune is something per accidens. But what is per accidens is not simply. Hence it follows that fortune is not the cause of anything simply.

             And he clarifies what he has said about each of these opinions through an example. He says that as the builder is the per se cause of a house and is the cause simply, whereas flute player is a per accidens cause of the house; in like manner the fact that someone should come to a place with no intention of taking money away is a per accidens cause of carrying it away. But this per accidens cause is infinite, because it is possible for a man to go to that place because of an infinity of other reasons, e.g., if he came to visit someone, or to pursue an enemy, or to escape from a pursuer, or to see a show of some sort. Now all these things and anything similar are causes of the taking of money which happens by chance.

             219. Next where he says, 'Thus to say . . .' (197 a 18), he explains the meaning [ratio] of those things which are commonly said about fortune.

             First he explains why it is said that that which is by fortune is without reason [ratio]. Secondly, where he says, 'Chance, or fortune . . .' (197 a 25), he explains why it is said that fortune is good or bad.

             Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he proves his position. Secondly he raises a certain difficulty where he says, 'Yet in some cases . . .' (197 a 21).

             220. He says, therefore, first that fortune is rightly said to be without reason [ratio]. For we can reason only about those things which happen always or in most instances. But fortune lies outside of both of these. And so since such causes, which occur in exceptional cases, are per accidens and infinite and without reason [ratio], it follows that causes by fortune are infinite and without reason [ratio]. For every per se cause produces its effect either always or in most cases.

             221. Next where he says, 'Yet in some cases . . .' (197 a 21), he raises a certain difficulty. He says that although it may be said that fortune is a per accidens cause, some will question this.

             The problem is whether everything which happens to be a per accidens cause ought to be called a cause of that which comes to be by fortune. Thus it is clear that the per se cause of health can be either nature or the art of the doctor. However, can all those things with which the coming to be of health happens to be connected, such as the wind, and the heat, and shaving of the head, be called causes per accidens? The question, therefore, is whether each of these is a cause per accidens.

             Now since we said above that fortune is most properly called a per accidens cause on the part of the effect, since a thing is said to be a cause of that which happens to the effect, it is clear that a fortuitous cause produces something in the fortuitous effect although it does not intend that, but rather something else connected with the effect. According to this wind or heat can be called fortuitous causes of health insofar as they produce some change in the body, upon which change health follows. But removing the hair or some other such thing does not produce anything clearly related to health.

             But among the per accidens causes, some are nearer [to the per se cause] and others are more remote. Those which are more remote seem less to be causes.

             222. Next where he says, 'Chance or fortune . . .' (197 a 25), he explains why fortune is said to be good or bad.

             First he explains why fortune is said to be good or bad simply. He says that fortune is said to be good when something good happens and bad when something bad happens.

             223. Secondly, where he says, 'The terms "good fortune" . . .' (197 a 26), he explains the meaning [ratio] of good fortune and misfortune.

             He says that we refer to good fortune and misfortune when [the fortuitous event] has some great good or great evil. For an event is called good fortune when some great good follows; it is called misfortune when some great evil follows.

             And since being deprived of a good is included in the notion [ratio] of evil, and being deprived of evil is included in the notion [ratio] of the good, then when one is a little removed from a great good, he is said to be unfortunate if he misses it. On the other hand, if one is close to a great evil and is freed from it, he is said to be fortunate. This is so because the intellect takes that which is only a little removed as if it were not removed at all, but already possessed.

             224. Thirdly where he says, 'Further, it is with reason . . .' (197 a 30), he explains why good fortune is uncertain. He says that this is so because good fortune is a kind of fortune. But fortune is uncertain because it pertains to things which are neither always nor frequent, as was said.

Hence it follows that good fortune is uncertain.

             225. Finally where he says, 'Both are then . . .' (197 a 33), he concludes as a sort of résumé that each, i.e., chance and fortune, is a cause per accidens, and that each pertains to things which do not happen simply, i.e., neither always nor frequently, and that each pertains to things which come to be for the sake of something, as is clear from what was said above.