LECTURE 8 (196 b 10-197 a 7)

AFTER MAKING CERTAIN DIVISIONS AMONG EFFECTS AND CAUSES, HE CONCLUDES TO A DEFINITION OF FORTUNE

             207. Having set forth the opinions of others about fortune and chance, the Philosopher here determines the truth.

             This section is divided into three parts. First he shows what fortune is. Secondly, where he says, 'They differ . . .' (197 a 36), he shows how fortune and chance differ. Thirdly, where he says, 'Both belong to . . .' (198 a 2), he points out the genus of cause to which chance and fortune are reduced.

             The first part is divided into two parts. First he shows what fortune is. Secondly, where he says, 'It is necessary . . .' (197 a 8), from the definition of fortune he explains the meaning [ratio] of those things which are said about fortune.

             Concerning the first part he makes three points. First he sets forth certain divisions needed for the investigation of the definition of fortune. Secondly, where he says, 'To resume then . . .' (196 b 29), he shows under which members of these divisions fortune is contained. Thirdly, where he says, 'It is clear . . .' (197 a 5), he concludes to the definition of fortune.

             Now since fortune is posited as a kind of cause, and since it is necessary, in order to understand a cause, to know that of which it is the cause, he first sets forth a division on the part of that of which fortune is the cause. Secondly, where he says, 'Things of this kind . . .' (196 b 23), he sets forth a division on the part of the cause itself.

             208. With reference to the first point he sets forth three divisions.

             The first of these is that certain things always come to be, e.g., the rising of the sun; and certain things come to be frequently, e.g., man is born having eyes. But neither of these is said to be by fortune.

             But certain other things occur in fewer instances, as when a man is born with six fingers or without eyes. And everyone says that things of this sort come to be by fortune. Hence, it is clear that fortune is something, since to be by fortune and to be in fewer instances are convertible. And he brings this up in opposition to the first opinion which denied fortune.

             209. However, it seems that this division of the Philosopher is insufficient, for there are some happenings which are indeterminate. Therefore Avicenna said that in those things which are indeterminate a thing happens to be by fortune, as for example those things which are occasional. And it is no objection that it is not said that it is by fortune that Socrates sits, since this is indeterminate. For although this is indeterminate with respect to the moving potency, it is not indeterminate with respect to the appetitive potency which tends determinately to one thing. And if something should happen outside of this, it would be said to be fortuitous.

             Now just as the moving potency, which is indeterminate, does not move to act unless it is determined to one thing by the appetitive potency, so also nothing which is indeterminate moves to act unless it is determined to one thing by something. For that which is indeterminate is, as it were, being in potency. However, potency is not a principle of action, but only act is such. Hence from that which is indeterminate nothing follows unless it is determined to one thing by something, either always or frequently. And because of this, he omitted things which are indeterminate from his discussion of things which come to be.

             210. It must also be noted that some define the necessary as that which is never impeded and the contingent as that which occurs frequently but may be impeded in a few instances.

             But this is unreasonable. For that is called necessary which has in its nature that which cannot not be, whereas the contingent, as happening frequently, has in its nature that which can not be. But to have or not have some impediment is itself contingent. For nature does not prepare an impediment for that which cannot not be, since this would be superfluous.

             211. He gives the second division where he says, 'But secondly . . .' (196 b 17). He says that some things come to be for the sake of an end, and other things do not.

             This division, however, raises a difficulty, because every agent acts for an end; it acts either by nature or by intellect.

             But we must note that he is saying that those things which come to be for themselves do not come to be for the sake of something, insofar as they have in themselves a pleasure or perfection because of which they are pleasing in themselves.

             Or else he is speaking of those things which do not occur for the sake of a deliberate end, for example, stroking the beard or some other such thing which takes place at times without deliberation solely from the movement of the imagination. Hence they have an imagined end, but not a deliberated end.

             212. He gives the third division where he says, 'Again, some of the former . . .' (196 b 18). He says that of the things which come to be for the sake of an end, some happen in accordance with will and others do not. Both of these are found among those things which come to be for the sake of something. For not only those things which come to be by will, but also those things which come to be by nature, come to be for the sake of something.

             213. Now since those things which come to be either necessarily or frequently come to be from nature or from that which is proposed [by the intellect], it is clear that both in those things which always happen and in those things which happen frequently there are some things which come to be for an end. For both nature and that which is proposed [by the intellect] act for the sake of an end.

             And thus it is clear that these three divisions include each other. For those things which come to be from what is proposed [by the intellect] or from nature come to be for the sake of an end, and those things which come to be for the sake of an end come to be always or frequently.

             214. Next where he says, 'Things of this kind . . .' (196 b 23), he gives the division which is taken on the part of the cause.

             He says that when things of this sort (i.e., things which are from what is proposed [by the intellect] for the sake of something, and which are in few instances) come to be through a per accidens cause, we say that they are by fortune. For as certain aspects of beings are per se and others per accidens, the same is true of causes. Thus the per se cause of a house is the builder's art, while the per accidens cause is the white or the musical.

             But it must be noted that per accidens cause is taken in two ways: in one way on the part of the cause, and in another way on the part of the effect.

             On the part of the cause, that which is called a per accidens cause is joined to the per se cause. Thus if the white and the musical are called causes of a house, it is because they are accidentally joined to the builder.

             On the part of the effect, we sometimes refer to something which is accidentally joined to the effect, as when we say that a builder is the cause of strife because strife arises from the building of a house.

             In this sense fortune is said to be a per accidens cause when something is accidentally joined to the effect, for example, if the discovery of a treasure is accidentally joined to the digging of a grave. Thus the per se effect of a natural cause is what follows according to the exigencies of its form, so that the effect of the agent who acts through something proposed [by the intellect] is that which happens because of the intention of the agent. Hence whatever takes place in the effect outside this intention is per accidens.

             And I say that this is true if what is outside the intention follows in few cases. For what is always or frequently joined to the effect falls under the intention itself. For it is stupid to say that someone intends something but does not will that which is always or frequently joined to it.

             Moreover, he points out a difference between the per se cause and the per accidens cause. The per se cause is limited and determinate, whereas the per accidens cause is unlimited and indeterminate, because an infinity of things can happen to be united.

             215. Next where he says, 'To resume then . . .' (196 b 29), he points out those members of the above divisions under which fortune is contained, and what fortune is.

             He says first that fortune and chance, as was said above, pertain to those things which happen for the sake of something. However, the difference between fortune and chance will be determined later.

             But now it should be clear that each of them is contained among those things which act for the sake of an end. Thus if one knows that he will receive money in the forum, and if he goes there to take it away, [this does not happen by fortune], but if he did not go there for this purpose, it is per accidens that his arrival should have this effect. And thus it is clear that fortune is a per accidens cause of things which are for the sake of something.

             Further it is clear that fortune is a cause of things which occur in few instances. For carrying money away is said to be by fortune when he who takes money away comes to the house neither necessarily nor frequently.

             Moreover, fortune pertains to those things which come to be because of what is proposed [by the intellect]. For taking money away, which is said to be by fortune, is the end of some causes, but not in itself, as in those things which happen by nature. Rather it is the end of those things which come to be as proposed by the intellect. But if someone acting under such a proposal should go in order to take money away, or if he always or frequently takes money away when he comes, this would not be said to be by fortune, just as if anyone frequently or always soaks his feet when he goes to a muddy place, it would not be said that this is due to fortune, even though he did not intend it.

             216. Next where he says, 'It is clear . . .' (197 a 5), he concludes to a definition of fortune which is drawn from what was said above.

             He says that it is clear from the foregoing that fortune is a per accidens cause in those things which come to be in a few instances according to what is proposed for the sake of an end. And from this it is clear that fortune and intellect pertain to the same thing. For only those who have an intellect act by fortune, for there is no proposal or will without intellect. And although only those who have an intellect act by fortune, still the more something is subject to the intellect, the less is it subject to fortune.