LECTURE 5 (202 a 22-b 29)

WHETHER ACTION AND PASSION ARE THE SAME MOTION

             308. After the Philosopher has shown that motion is the act of the mobile object and of the mover, he now raises a difficulty concerning what has been said.

             First he raises the difficulty, and secondly, he answers it, where he says, 'One may reply . . .' (202 b 5).

             Concerning the first part he makes two points. First, he sets forth certain things which pertain to the difficulty. Secondly, where he says, 'Since, then, they are both . . .' (202 a 25), he states the difficulty.

             309. He says, therefore, first that what has been said raises a difficulty which is dialectical, i.e., logical. For there are probable arguments on both sides.

             As an introduction to this difficulty he states that some acts pertain to the active, and some acts pertain to the passive. Thus it was said above that there is an act which pertains to both the mover and the moved. Now the act of the active is called action, while the act of the passive is called passion. And he proves this. For that which is the work and end of each thing is its act and perfection. Hence, since the work and end of an agent is action, and since the work and end of a patient is passion, as is obvious in itself, it follows, as was said, that action is the act of the agent and passion is the act of the patient.

             310. Next where he says, 'Since then they are both . . .' (202 a 25), he states the difficulty.

             It is clear that both action and passion are motion, for each is the same as motion.

             Therefore, action and passion are either the same motion or they are different motions.

             If they are different, it is necessary that each of them be in some subject. Therefore, either both of them are in the patient and that which is moved, or else one of them is in the agent, i.e., the action, and the other is in the patient, i.e., the passion. If, moreover, one were to say conversely that that which is in the agent is the passion and that which is in the patient is the action, it is obvious that one speaks equivocally. For that which is a passion will be called an action, and vice versa. However, Aristotle seems to omit a fourth member, i.e., that both would be in the agent. He leaves this out because it has been shown that motion is in the mobile object. Hence, this alternative, that neither would be in the patient but both in the agent, is excluded.

             311. Therefore, of the two alternatives which he treats, he deals first with the second one, where he says, 'Now in alternative . . .' (202 a 28). If one were to say that action is in the agent and passion is in the patient, then since action is a certain motion, as was said, it follows that motion is in the mover. Now the same reasoning [ratio] must apply to both the mover and the moved, i.e., whichever of these has motion is moved. Or one might say that mover and moved have the same nature [ratio] as patient and agent. Thus whatever has motion is moved. Hence it follows either that every mover would be moved, or that something would have motion and would not be moved. Each of these seems to be inconsistent.

             312. Next where he says, 'If on the other hand . . .' (202 a 31), he discusses the other alternative. He says that if one were to say that both action and passion, although they are two motions, are in the patient and the moved, and that teaching which is on the part of the teacher and learning which is on the part of the learner are in the learner, then two absurdities follow.

             The first of these arises because he has said that action is the act of the agent. If, therefore, action is not in the agent but in the patient, it would follow that the proper act of each thing is not in that whose act it is.

             After this the other absurdity would follow, namely, that some one and the same thing would be moved by two motions. For action and passion are assumed here to be two motions. Now whatever has motion is moved in respect to that motion. If, therefore, action and passion are in the mobile object, it follows that the mobile object would be moved by two motions. And this would be the same as if there were two alterations of one subject which would be terminated in one species. Thus, one subject would be moved by two whitenings, which is impossible. However, it is not absurd for the same subject to be moved simultaneously by two alterations terminating in different species, e.g., whitening and heating. However, it is obvious that action and passion terminate in the same species, for what the agent does and what the patient undergoes are the same.

             313. Next where he says, '. . . the actualization will be one' (202 a 37), he examines the other alternative.

             One might say that action and passion are not two motions but one. From this he brings out four inconsistencies.

             The first is that the acts of things diverse according to species would be the same. For it was said that action is the act of the agent and passion is the act of the patient, which acts are diverse according to species. If, therefore, action and passion are the same motion, it follows that the acts of things diverse in species are the same.

             The second inconsistency is that, if action and passion are one motion, then action is the same as passion. Thus teaching which is on the part of the teacher is the same as learning which belongs to the learner.

             The third inconsistency is that to act is the same as to be acted upon, and to teach is the same as to learn.

             And the fourth which follows from this is that every teacher learns, and every agent is acted upon.

             314. Next where he says, 'One may reply . . .' (202 b 5), he answers the problem presented above.

             It is clear from what was determined above that action and passion are not two motions, but are one and the same motion. For insofar as motion is from the agent it is called action, and insofar as it is in the patient it is called passion.

             315. Hence, the inconsistencies which were developed in the first part, in which it was assumed that action and passion are two motions, do not need to be answered. However, one of these difficulties must be answered even if it is supposed that action and passion are one motion. For since action is the act of the agent, as was said above, then if action and passion are one motion, it follows that the act of the agent is in some way in the patient, and thus the act of one thing will be in another. Now four inconsistencies followed from the other part, and thus five inconsistencies remain to be answered.

             316. He says, therefore, first that it is not inconsistent for the act of one thing to be in another. For teaching is the act of the teacher, tending, nevertheless, from him to someone else continuously and without interruption. Hence the same act is his, i.e., the agent's, as 'from whom', and is also in the patient as received in him. However, it would be inconsistent if the act of one thing were in another in the way in which it is the act of the former.

             317. Next where he says, 'There is nothing . . .' (202 b 8), he answers another inconsistency, namely, that two things would have the same act.

             He says that there is nothing to prevent two things from having one act in the sense that the act is not one and the same according to reason [ratio] but is one in things. As was said above, there is the same interval from two to one from one to two, and from that which is in potency to that which is acting and conversely. For the same act in things is the act of two according to different intelligibilities [ratio]. It is the act of the agent insofar as it is 'from it' and of the patient insofar as it is 'in it'.

             318. He replies to the other three inconsistencies, one of which is deduced from the other, in reverse order.

             He replies first to what was brought out last as more inconsistent. Thus this third point answers the fifth inconsistency.

             He says that it is not necessary that the teacher learn, or that the agent be acted upon, even though to act and to be acted upon are the same. This is true as long as we say that these latter are not the same in the sense of things whose natures [ratio] are the same (e.g. raiment and dress). Rather they are the same in the sense of things which are the same in subject and different in respect to reason [ratio], such as the road from Thebes to Athens and the road from Athens to Thebes, as was said before. For it is not necessary for all things which are the same to be the same in every way. Rather they are the same only in subject or in things or according to reason [ratio]. And so, even granting that to act and to be acted upon are the same, then since they are not the same according to reason [ratio], as was said, it does not follow that to be acted upon belongs to everything which acts.

             319. Next where he says, 'But indeed it . . .' (202 b 15), he replies to the fourth inconsistency. He says that, even if teaching and the learning of the learner are the same, it does not follow that to teach and to learn would be the same. For teaching and learning are said in the abstract, whereas to teach and to learn are said in the concrete. Hence they [teaching and learning] are applied to ends or to termini insofar as the diverse intelligibilities [ratio] of action and passion are taken. Thus although we say that there is the same interval of distance between certain things when they are considered abstractly, if we were to apply [what we say] to the termini of the interval, as when we say this place is distant from that, and that from this, then it is not one and the same.

             320. Next where he says, 'To generalize . . .' (202 b 19), he replies to the third inconsistency. He denies the inference by which it was concluded that if action and passion are one motion, then action and passion are the same.

             And he says that finally it must be said that it does not follow that action and passion are the same, or that teaching and learning are the same. Rather the motion in which both of these are is the same. And this motion according to one intelligibility [ratio] is action, and according to another is passion. For as far as intelligibility [ratio] is concerned, being the act of this as 'in this' is different than being the act of this as 'from this'. But motion is called action because it is the act of the agent as 'from this', while it is called passion because it is the act of the patient as 'in this'.

             And thus it is clear that, although the motion is the same for the mover and the moved because of the fact that it abstracts from both intelligibilities [ratio], nevertheless, action and passion differ because of the fact that they include in their signification these different intelligibilities [ratio].

             From this it is apparent that since motion abstracts from the intelligibility [ratio] of action and passion, it is contained neither in the predicament of action nor in the predicament of passion, as some have said.

             321. But with reference to this a twofold difficulty remains.

             First, if action and passion are one motion and differ only according to reason [ratio], as was said, it seems that there should not be these two predicaments, since the predicaments are the genera of things.

             Furthermore, if motion is either action or passion, motion will not be found in substance, in quality, in quantity and in 'where', as was said above. Rather motion will be found only in action and passion.

             322. For the clarification of these points it must be noted that being is not divided univocally into the ten predicaments as genera are divided into species. Rather it is divided according to the diverse modes of existing. But modes of existing are proportional to the modes of predicating. For when we predicate something of another, we say this is that. Hence the ten genera of being are called the ten predicaments.

             Now every predication is made in one of three ways.

             One way is when that which pertains to the essence is predicated of some subject, as when I say Socrates is a man, or man is animal. The predicament of substance is taken in this way.

             Another mode is that in which that which is not of the essence of a thing, but which inheres in it, is predicated of a thing. This is found either on the part of the matter of the subject, and thus is the predicament of quantity (for quantity properly follows upon matter--thus Plato also held the great to be on the part of matter), or else it follows upon the form, and thus is the predicament of quality (hence also qualities are founded upon quantity as colour is in a surface, and figure is in lines or in surfaces), or else it is found in respect to another, and thus is the predicament of relation (for when I say a man is a father, nothing absolute is predicated of man, but a relation which is in him to something extrinsic).

             The third mode of predication is had when something extrinsic is predicated of a thing by means of some denomination. For extrinsic accidents are also predicated of substances, nevertheless we do not say that man is whiteness, but that man is white. However, to be denominated by something extrinsic is found in a common way in all things, and in a special way in those things which pertain only to man.

             In the common way a thing is found to be denominated by something extrinsic either according to the intelligibility [ratio] of a cause or of a measure. For a thing is denominated as caused and measured by something extrinsic. Now although there are four genera of causes, two of them are parts of the essence, namely matter and form. Hence a predication which can be made in respect to these two pertains to the predicament of substance, e.g., if we say that man is rational and that man is corporeal. But the final cause does not cause anything outside of the agent, for the end has the nature [ratio] of a cause only insofar as it moves the agent. Hence there remains only the agent cause by which a thing can be denominated as by something extrinsic.

             Therefore, insofar as a thing is denominated by the agent cause, there is the predicament of passion. For to be acted upon is nothing other than to receive something from an agent. And conversely, insofar as the agent cause is denominated by the effect, there is the predicament of action. For action is an act from the agent to another, as was said above.

             Furthermore some measures are extrinsic and some are intrinsic.

             Thus the proper length and breadth and depth of each thing is intrinsic. Therefore, a thing is denominated by these as by something inhering intrinsically. Hence this pertains to the predicament of quantity.

             However time and place are extrinsic measures. Therefore, insofar as a thing is denominated by time, there is the predicament 'when', and insofar as it is denominated by place, there are predicaments 'where' and 'site', which adds to 'where' the order of parts in place.

             Now it was not necessary that this latter point be added in respect to time. For the order of parts in time is implied in the very meaning [ratio] of time. For time is the number of motion in respect to before and after. Therefore, a thing is said to be 'when' or 'where' by a denomination from time or place.

             However there is something special in men. For nature has adequately provided other animals with those things which pertain to the preservation of life, as horns for defence, and heavy and shaggy hides for clothing, and hoofs or something of this sort for walking without injury. And thus when such animals are said to be armed or clothed or shod, in a way they are not denominated by anything extrinsic but by some of their own parts. Hence in these cases this is referred to the predicament of substance, as, for example, if it were said that man is 'handed' or 'footed'.

             But things of this sort could not have been given to man by nature, both because they were not suitable for the delicacy of his make up and because of the diversity of the works which belong to man insofar as he has reason. Determinate instruments could not have been provided by nature for such works. But in the place of all of these things there is reason in man, by which he prepares for himself external things in the place of those things which are intrinsic in the other animals. Hence, when a man is said to be armed or clothed or shod, he is denominated by something extrinsic which has the nature [ratio] neither of a cause nor of a measure. Hence there is a special predicament, and it is called 'habit'.

             But it must be noted that this predicament is attributed to other animals also, not insofar as they are considered in their own nature, but insofar as they come under the use of man, as when we say that a horse is decorated or saddled or armed.

             323. Therefore, it is clear that, although motion is one, the predicaments which are taken in respect to motion are two insofar as the predicamental denominations are made from different exterior things. For the agent from which, as from something external, the predicament passion is taken by means of a denomination is one thing. And the patient by which the agent is denominated is another thing. And thus the answer to the first difficulty is clear.

             324. The second difficulty is easily answered. For the intelligibility [ratio] of motion is completed not only by that which pertains to motion in the nature of things, but also by that which reason [ratio] apprehends.

             For in the nature of things motion is nothing other than an imperfect act which is a certain incipience of perfect act in that which is moved. Thus in that which is being whitened, something of whiteness already has begun to be. But in order for the imperfect act to have the nature [ratio] of motion, it is further required that we understand it as a mean between two extremes. The preceding condition is compared to it as potency to act, and thus motion is called an act. The consequent condition is compared to it as perfect to imperfect or as act to potency. And because of this motion is called the act of that which exists in potency, as was said above.

             Hence, if an imperfect thing be taken as not tending toward something perfect, it is called a terminus of motion and will not be a motion in respect to which something is moved. For example, a thing begins to be whitened and the alteration is suddenly interrupted.

             With reference to that which pertains to motion in the nature of things, motion is placed by reduction in that genus which terminates the motion, as the imperfect is reduced to the perfect, as was said above. But with reference to that which reason [ratio] apprehends regarding motion, namely, that it is a mean between two termini, the intelligibility [ratio] of cause and effect is already implied. For a thing is not reduced from potency to act except by some agent cause. And in respect to this motion belongs to the predicament of action and passion. For these two predicaments are taken in respect to the intelligibility [ratio] of agent cause and effect, as was said above.

             325. Next where he says, 'What then motion is . . .' (202 b 24), he defines motion in particular. He says that he has already said what motion is in general and in particular. For from what was said about the definition of motion in general it is clear how motion should be defined in particular. If motion is the act of the mobile insofar as it is such, it follows that alteration is the act of the alterable insofar as it is such. And the same applies to other motions.

             He has raised the difficulty of whether motion is the act of the mover or the moved, and he has shown that motion is the act of the active as 'from this' and the act of the passive as 'in this'. Hence, in order to remove all difficulties, we might say somewhat more clearly that motion is the act of the potency of the active and of the passive.

             And thus we will also be able to say in a particular instance that building is the act of the builder and of the buildable insofar as it is such. And the same is true of healing and other motions.