Caput I

§ 1.

Whenever the ordinary receives information which at least seems to be true of an offense, he shall cautiously inquire personally or through another suitable person about the facts and circumstances and about imputability unless (nisi) this investigation appears to be entirely superfluous.

§ 2.

Care must be taken lest anyone's good name be endangered by this investigation.

§ 3.

The one who conducts the investigation has the same powers and obligations as an auditor in the process; this person cannot act as a judge in the matter, if a judicial process is set in motion later.

§ 1.

When sufficient evidence appears to have been collected, the ordinary shall decide:

(1) whether the process for inflicting or declaring a penalty can be set in motion;

(2) whether this is expedient in light of can. 1341;

(3) whether a judicial process must be used or unless (nisi) the law forbids it whether he must proceed by a decree without a trial.

§ 2.

The ordinary is to revoke or change the decree mentioned in § 1 whenever it appears to him from new evidence that a different decision is called for.

§ 3.

In issuing the decrees mentioned in § § 1 and 2, the ordinary is to hear two or more judges or other experts in the law, if he prudently sees fit to do so.

§ 4.

In order to avoid useless trials, before he makes a decision in accord with § 1, the ordinary is to consider whether it is expedient that either he or the investigator equitably solve the question of damages with the consent of the parties.

The acts of the investigation, the decrees of the ordinary by which the investigation was opened and closed, and all that preceded it are to be kept in the secret archive of the curia if they are not necessary for the penal process.

If the ordinary decides that he is to proceed by a decree without a trial:

(1) he is to inform the accused about the accusation and the proofs, giving the person the opportunity of self-defense unless (nisi) the accused neglects to be in court after having been duly summoned;

(2) he is to consider carefully the proofs and arguments with two assessors;

(3) if the offense is certainly proved and the criminal action has not been terminated, he is to issue the decree in accord with cann. 1342-1350, explaining the reasons in law and in fact, at least briefly.

§ 1.

If the ordinary decrees that a judicial penal process is to be begun, he is to give the acts of the investigation to the promoter of justice who is to present a libellus of accusation to the judge in accord with the norms of cann. 1502 and 1504.

§ 2.

The promoter of justice constituted as such by the higher court acts as the petitioner before that tribunal.

To preclude scandals, to protect the freedom of witnesses and to safeguard the course of justice, having heard the promoter of justice and having cited the accused, the ordinary at any stage of the process can remove the accused from the sacred ministry or from any ecclesiastical office or function, can impose or prohibit residence in a given place or territory, or even prohibit public participation in the Most Holy Eucharist; all these measures must be revoked once the reason for them ceases; they also end by the law itself when the penal process ceases.

§ 1.

When citing the accused, the judge must invite the accused to appoint an advocate in accord with the norm of can. 1481, § 1, within a period of time set by the judge.

§ 2.

But if the accused does not provide for this the judge is to name an advocate before the joinder of issues (contestatio litis) who will remain in this function as long as the accused has not personally appointed an advocate.

§ 1.

In any grade of the trial, renunciation of the instance can be made by the promoter of justice either at the order of or with the consent of the ordinary in light of whose deliberation the process was set in motion.

§ 2.

For validity, the renunciation must be accepted by the accused unless (nisi) such a one is declared to be absent from the trial.

In the discussion of the case, whether it be done in writing or orally, the accused always has the right to write or speak last either personally or through an advocate or procurator.

In any grade of stage of the penal trial, if it becomes clearly proven that the offense was not perpetrated by the accused, the judge must declare this in a sentence and absolve the accused, even if it is also proven that the criminal action is terminated.

§ 1.

The accused can propose an appeal even though dismissed in a sentence solely because the penalty was facultative or because the judge used the power mentioned in cann. 1344 and 1345.

§ 2.

The promoter of justice can appeal whenever it appears that the reparation of scandal or the restitution of justice has not been provided sufficiently.

§ 1.

With due regard for the prescriptions of the canons of this title, unless (nisi) the nature of the matter is opposed, the canons on trials in general and on ordinary contentious trials must be applied in the penal trial, observing the special norms for cases which refer to the public good.

§ 2.

The accused is not bound to confess the offense and cannot be constrained to take an oath.

§ 1.

In accord with the norm of can. 1596, an injured party can exercise in the penal trial itself a contentious action for the repairing of damages sustained due to the offense.

§ 2.

The intervention of an injured party, mentioned in § 1, is not admitted afterwards if it was not made in the first grade of the penal trial.

§ 3.

The appeal in a case for damages is made in accord with cann. 1628-1640 even if an appeal in the penal trial cannot be made; but if both appeals are proposed, though by different parties, there is to be a single appellate trial with due regard for the prescription of can. 1730.

§ 1.

To avoid excessive delays in a penal trial, the judge can postpone a trial for damages until he has rendered a definitive sentence in the penal trial.

§ 2.

The judge who does this must take cognizance of damages after rendering the sentence in a penal trial even if the penal trial is still pending due to a proposed challenge or if the accused has been acquitted for a reason which does not take away the obligation of repairing damage.

Even if the sentence rendered in the penal trial has become a res iudicata, in no way does it establish the right of the injured party unless (nisi) this party has intervened in accord with can. 1729.