Title

The judge cannot adjudicate any case unless (nisi) the party concerned or the promoter of justice has presented a petition in accord with the norm of the canons.

A person who wishes to bring another to court must present a libellus to a competent judge, which explains the object of the controversy and requests the services of the judge.

§ 1.

The judge may accept an oral petition if either the petitioner is impeded from presenting a libellus or the case can be easily investigated and is of lesser importance.

§ 2.

But in either situation the judge is to require the notary to put the act into writing, which is to be read to and approved by the petitioner; this then takes the place of and has all the legal effects of a libellus written by the petitioner.

A libellus which introduces a suit must:

(1) express before which judge the case is being introduced, what is being petitioned and by whom the petition is being made;

(2) indicate the basis for the petitioner's right and at least in general the facts and proofs which will be used to prove what has been alleged;

(3) be signed by the petitioner or procurator, adding the day, month and year, as well as the address of the petitioner or procurator or the place where they say they reside for the purpose of receiving the acts;

(4) indicate the domicile or quasi-domicile of the respondent.

§ 1.

After the single judge or the president of a collegiate tribunal has recognized both that the matter is within his competence and that the petitioner does not lack legitimate personal standing in court, he must accept or reject the libellus as soon as possible through a decree.

§ 2.

A libellus can be rejected only:

(1) if the judge or the tribunal is incompetent;

(2) if it is undoubtedly clear that the petitioner lacks legitimate personal standing in court;

(3) if the prescriptions of can. 1504, nn. 1-3 have not been observed;

(4) if from the libellus itself it is certainly obvious that it lacks any basis whatsoever and that it is impossible that any such basis would appear through a process.

§ 3.

If the libellus has been rejected due to defects which can be corrected, the petitioner can properly draw up a new libellus and again present it to the same judge.

§ 4.

A party is always free within ten available days (tempus utile) to lodge a reasoned recourse against the rejection of the libellus before the appellate tribunal or the college if it had been rejected by its president; the question of the rejection is to be resolved as quickly as possible.

If within a month from the presentation of the libellus the judge has not issued a decree by which he accepts or rejects the libellus in accord with the norm of can. 1505, the interested party can insist that the judge fulfill his duty; but if the judge, nevertheless, remains silent for ten days after the petitioner's insistence, the petition is considered as having been accepted.

§ 1.

In the decree which accepts the libellus of the petitioner the judge or president must either call into court or cite the other parties for the joinder of issues (contestatio litis), determining whether they must respond in writing or present themselves personally before the judge in order to join the issues. But if from the written responses the judge perceives that it is necessary to call the parties together for a session, that can be determined in a new decree.

§ 2.

If the libellus is considered as having been accepted in virtue of the norm of can. 1506, the decree of citation must be made in court within twenty days from the party's insistence on action as mentioned in that canon.

§ 3.

But if the litigating parties de facto present themselves before the judge in order to proceed with the case, there is no need for a citation; the notary, however, is to note in the acts that the parties were present for the trial.

§ 1.

The decree of citation to the trial must be forwarded immediately to the respondent and at the same time to others who are to appear.

§ 2.

The introductory libellus is to be joined to the citation unless (nisi) for serious reasons the judge determines that the libellus is not to be made known to the respondent before the latter makes a deposition during the trial.

§ 3.

If the suit is filed against a person who does not have the free exercise of personal rights or the free administration of the controverted items, the citation is to be made known to the guardian, curator or special procurator, as the case may be, or to the person who is bound to enter the trial in the respondent's name according to the norm of law.

§ 1.

Notification of citations, decrees, sentences and other judicial acts are to be made in accordance with the norms determined in particular law through the public postal services or through another method which is the safest.

§ 2.

The fact and method of notification must be clear in the acts.

A respondent who refuses to accept the document of citation or who prevents its arrival is considered as having been legitimately cited.

If the citation has not been legitimately communicated, the acts of the process are null, with due regard for the prescription of can. 1507, § 3.

Once the citation has been legitimately communicated or the parties have appeared before the judge to pursue the case:

(1) the issue ceases to be res integra;

(2) the case become proper to that judge or tribunal before whom the action was begun and is competent in other respects;

(3) the jurisdiction of a delegated judge is firmly established so that it does not expire when the right of the one delegating ceases;

(4) prescription is interrupted unless otherwise provided;

(5) the litigation begins to be pending and therefore the principle become operative: while a suit is pending, nothing new is to be introduced (lite pendente, nihil innovetur).

§ 1.

The joinder of issues (contestatio litis) occurs when the terms of the controversy based on the petitions and responses of the parties are specified by the decree of the judge.

§ 2.

The petitions and responses of the parties, besides those in the libellus introducing the suit, can be expressed either in response to the citation or in a declaration made orally before the judge, in more difficult cases, however, the parties are to be called together by the judge to specify the question or questions to be answered in the sentence.

§ 3.

The decree of the judge is to be made known to the parties; unless (nisi) they have already reached an agreement, they can within ten days make recourse to that judge that it be changed; however, the issue is to be resolved as quickly as possible by a decree of that judge.

Once the terms of the controversy have been determined, they cannot validly be changed except (nisi) for a serious reason through a new decree at the request of one party and after hearing the other parties and considering their reasons.

Once the joinder of issues (contestatio litis) has occurred, the possessor of another's property ceases to be in good faith; if therefore, the possessor is sentenced to make restitution, the profits made from the day of the joinder of issues (contestatio litis) must also be returned and any damages compensated.

Once the joinder of issues (contestatio litis) has occurred, the judge is to furnish the parties suitable time to present and complete proofs.

The prosecution of a suit begins with the citation; it ends not only with the pronouncement of a definitive sentence but also through the other methods defined by law.

If the litigating party dies, or changes status, or ceases from the office on behalf of which the suit was initiated:

(1) if the case is not concluded, its prosecution is suspended until the heir of the deceased, the successor or an interested party resumes the suit;

(2) if the case is concluded, the judge must proceed to the final acts after having cited the procurator if present or otherwise the heir or the successor of the deceased.

§ 1.

If a guardian, curator or procurator who is necessary in accord with the norms of can. 1481, § § 1 and 3, ceases from office, the prosecution of the suit is suspended in the interim.

§ 2.

However, the judge is to appoint another guardian or curator as soon as possible; the judge can appoint a procurator for the suit if the party has neglected to do so within the brief time period stated by the judge.

Barring some impediment, if no procedural act is proposed by the parties for six months, the prosecution of the suit is abated. Particular law can state other time limits for abatement.

Abatement takes effect by the law itself against all persons, including minors and those equivalent to minors, and it must also be declared ex officio with due regard for the right of petitioning for indemnity against tutors, guardians, administrators or procurators who have not proved that they were not at fault.

Abatement extinguishes the acts of the process, but not the acts of the case, which in fact may be operative in another instance provided (dummodo) that the case involves the same persons and the same issue; as regards outsiders the acts of the case have no other value than that of documents.

When a trial is abated, each of the litigants is to bear the expenses which he or she has incurred.

§ 1.

A petitioner can renounce the instance at any stage or grade of trial; both petitioner and respondent can likewise renounce either all or some of the acts of the process.

§ 2.

In order for them to renounce an instance, the guardians and administrators of juridic persons need to consult with or obtain the consent of those whose involvement is required to place acts which go beyond the limits of ordinary administration.

§ 3.

In order for a renunciation to be valid it is to be made in writing and also signed by the party or by the party's procurator with a special mandate to do so; it must be communicated to the other party, accepted, or at least not attacked, by that party, and admitted by the judge.

A renunciation admitted by the judge has the same effects concerning the renounced acts as an abatement of an instance and it obliges the renouncing party to pay the expenses for the renounced acts.

§ 1.

The burden of proof (onus probandi) rests upon the person who makes the allegations.

§ 2.

The following do not need proof:

(1) matters which are presumed by the law itself;

(2) facts alleged by one of the contending parties and admitted by the other unless (nisi) proof is nonetheless demanded by the law or by the judge.

§ 1.

Proofs of any type whatever which seem useful for deciding the case and which are licit can be adduced.

§ 2.

If a party insists that a proof rejected by the judge be admitted, the judge is to determine the matter most expeditiously.

If a party or a witness refuses to appear before the judge to testify, it is permitted to hear the person through a lay person assigned by the judge or to seek the person's declaration before a notary public or in any other legitimate manner.

Except (nisi) for a serious cause, the judge is not to proceed to gather proofs before the joinder of issues (contestatio litis).

The judge can always interrogate the parties so as to reveal the truth (ad veritatem eruendam) more effectively; in fact the judge must do so at the request of a party or to prove a fact which is to be established beyond doubt for the sake of the public interest.

§ 1.

A party legitimately interrogated must answer and tell the whole truth.

§ 2.

But if a party has refused to answer, it is for the judge to evaluate what can be drawn from that refusal concerning the proof of the facts.

Unless (nisi) a serious cause persuades otherwise, the judge is to administer an oath to the parties to tell the truth or at least to confirm the truth of their testimony in cases where the public good is at stake; the judge, in accord with prudential judgment, can do the same in other cases.

The parties, the promoter of justice and the defender of the bond can present to the judge items on which a party is to be interrogated.

To the extent it is possible the regulations of cann. 1548, § 2, n. 1, 1552 and 1558-1565 on witnesses are to be observed in the interrogation of the parties.

A judicial confession is a written or oral assertion against oneself made by any party regarding the matter under trial and made before a competent judge, whether spontaneously or upon interrogation by the judge.

§ 1.

If it is a question of some private matter and the public good is not at stake the judicial confession of one party relieves the other parties from the burden of proof.

§ 2.

In cases which concern the public good, however, a judicial confession and the declarations of the parties which are not confessions can have a probative force to be evaluated by the judge along with the other circumstances of the case; but complete probative force cannot be attributed to them unless (nisi) other elements are present which thoroughly corroborate them.

Having weighed all the circumstances, it is for the judge to evaluate the worth of an extra-judicial confession which has been introduced into the trial.

A confession or any other declaration of a party lacks all probative force if it is proved that it was made through an error of fact or it was extorted by force or grave fear.

In every type of trial, proof by means of both public and private documents is admitted.

§ 1.

Public ecclesiastical documents are those which official persons have drawn up in the exercise of their function in the Church, after having observed the formalities prescribed by law.

§ 2.

Public civil documents are those which are considered to be such in law in accord with the laws of the individual place.

§ 3.

Other documents are private ones.

Unless (nisi) contrary and evident arguments show otherwise, public documents are to be trusted concerning everything which is directly and principally affirmed in them.

A private document whether acknowledged by a party or recognized by the judge has the same probative force against its author or signer and those deriving a case from them as does an extra-judicial confession; against outsiders it has the same force as the declarations of the parties which are not confessions, in accord with the norm of can. 1536, § 2.

If the documents are shown to have been erased, corrected, interpolated, or affected by another such defect, it is for the judge to assess whether such documents have value and how much.

Documents do not have probative force in a trial unless (nisi) they are originals or presented in authentic copy and are deposited with the chancery of the tribunal so that they may be examined by the judge and the opposing party.

The judge can order that a document which is common to both parties be exhibited in the process.

§ 1.

Even if documents are common, no one is obliged to exhibit those which cannot be communicated without risk of harm in accordance with the norm of can. 1548, § 2, n. 2, or without risk of violating the obligation to observe secrecy.

§ 2.

Nonetheless, if some excerpt, at least, of a document can be transcribed and can be presented in copy form without the above-mentioned hazards the judge can decree that it be produced.

Proof by means of witnesses is admitted in every kind of case under the supervision of the judge.

§ 1.

When the judge legitimately interrogates witnesses they must tell the truth.

§ 2.

With due regard for the prescription of can. 1550, § 2, n. 2, the following are exempted from the obligation to answer:

(1) clerics in regard to whatever was made known to them in connection with their sacred ministry; civil officials, doctors, midwives, advocates, notaries and others who are bound to professional secrecy, even by reason of advice rendered, as regards matters subject to this secrecy;

(2) persons who fear that infamy, dangerous vexations or other serious evils will happen to themselves, or their spouse, or persons related to them by consanguinity or affinity, as a result of their testimony.

All persons can be witnesses unless (nisi) they are expressly excluded by law, either completely or partially.

§ 1.

Minors below the fourteenth year of age and those who are feebleminded are not allowed to give testimony; however, they may be heard by reason of a decree of the judge which declares such a hearing expedient.

§ 2.

The following are considered incapable:

(1) those who are parties in the case, or who represent the parties in the trial; the judge and assistants, the advocate and others who are assisting or have assisted the parties in the same case;

(2) priests as regards everything which has become known to them by reason of sacramental confession, even if the penitent requests their manifestation; moreover, whatever has been heard by anyone or in any way on the occasion of confession cannot be accepted as even an indication of the truth.

The party who has introduced a witness can forego the examination of the witness; but the opposing party can demand that the witness be examined notwithstanding that action.

§ 1.

When proof by means of witnesses is demanded, their names and domicile are to be made known to the tribunal.

§ 2.

The items of discussion upon which interrogation of the witnesses is sought are to be presented within the time limit set by the judge; otherwise the petition is to be considered as abandoned.

It is the judge's responsibility to curb an excessive number of witnesses.

Before witnesses are examined, their names are to be made known to the parties; however, if in the prudent assessment of the judge, that cannot be done without serious difficulty, it is to be done at least before the publication of the testimony.

With due regard for the prescription of can. 1550, a party can request that a witness be excluded if a just cause for exclusion is demonstrated before the interrogation of the witness.

The citation of a witness is done by a decree of the judge made known to the witness according to law.

A witness who has been duly cited is to appear or inform the judge of the reason for the absence.

§ 1.

Witnesses must be examined at the tribunal unless (nisi) it appears otherwise appropriate to the judge.

§ 2.

Cardinals, patriarchs, bishops and those who, by the law of their state, enjoy a similar right, are to be heard in a place which they themselves select.

§ 3.

The judge is to decide where those are to be heard for whom it is impossible or difficult to come to the tribunal because of distance, illness or other impediment with due regard for the prescriptions of cann. 1418 and 1469, § 2.

The parties may not assist at the examination of witnesses unless (nisi) the judge believes that they must be admitted, especially when the matter concerns the private good. On the other hand, their advocates or their procurators may assist unless (nisi) the judge believes that the process must be carried on in secret because of the circumstances of things or persons.

§ 1.

Each of the witnesses must be examined individually.

§ 2.

If the witnesses disagree among themselves or with a party in a serious matter the judge can bring them together or have them come to an agreement with one another, precluding disputes and scandal insofar as it is possible.

The examination of a witness is conducted by the judge, a delegate or an auditor, who is to be assisted by a notary; as a result, if the parties, or the promoter of justice, or the defender of the bond, or the advocates who are present at the examination have further questions to be put to the witness, they are to propose these questions not to the witness but to the judge or the person taking the judge's place who is to ask them, unless (nisi) particular law provides otherwise.

§ 1.

The judge is to call to the attention of the witness the serious obligation to tell the whole truth and only the truth.

§ 2.

The judge is to administer the oath to the witness in accord with can. 1532; but the witness who refuses to take it is to be heard without the oath.

The judge, first of all, is to establish the identity of the witness; the judge should seek out what is the relationship of the witness with the parties, and, when addressing specific questions to the witness regarding the case, the judge is also to inquire about the sources of the witness' knowledge and the precise time the witness learned what is asserted.

The questions are to be brief, accommodated to the intelligence of the person being interrogated, not comprising several points at the same time, not captious, nor crafty, nor suggestive of the answer, free from every kind of offense and pertinent to the case being tried.

§ 1.

The questions must not be communicated to the witnesses ahead of time.

§ 2.

However, if the matters which are to be testified to are so removed from memory that unless (nisi) they are recalled earlier they cannot be affirmed with certainty, the judge may advise the witness of some matters if it is thought that this can be done without danger.

Witnesses are to give testimony orally; they are not to read from written memoranda, unless (nisi) there is question of calculation and accounts; in such a case they may consult the notes which they brought with them.

§ 1.

The answer is to be put in writing at once by the notary who must report the exact words of the testimony given, at least as regards those points which touch directly upon the matter of the trial.

§ 2.

Use of a tape recorder is allowed provided (dummodo) that, afterwards, the answers are transcribed and are signed by those making the depositions, if possible.

The notary is to make mention in the acts whether the oath was taken, omitted, or refused, also of the presence of the parties and of other persons, the questions added ex officio and, in general, everything noteworthy which may have occurred while the witnesses were being examined.

§ 1.

At the conclusion of the examination what the notary has put in writing from the deposition must be read to the witness or the witness must be given an opportunity to listen to the tape recording of the deposition with the option of adding to, suppressing, correcting or changing it.

§ 2.

Finally the acts must be signed by the witness, the judge and the notary.

Although witnesses have already been examined, they can be recalled for another examination at the request of a party or ex officio but before the acts or the testimony have been published; this is true if the judge believes such a reexamination necessary or useful, provided (dummodo), however, that there is no danger of collusion or corruption.

In accord with an equitable assessment of the judge, witnesses must be compensated both for the expenses they have incurred and for the income they have lost by rendering testimony.

In evaluating testimony, after having obtained testimonial letters if need be, the judge should consider:

(1) the condition and good reputation of the person;

(2) whether the witness testifies in virtue of personal knowledge, especially what has been seen and heard personally, or whether the testimony is the witness' opinion, or a rumor or hearsay from others;

(3) whether the witness is reliable and firmly consistent or rather inconsistent, uncertain or vacillating;

(4) whether the witness has supporting witnesses or whether there is support from other sources of proof.

The deposition of a single witness cannot constitute full proof unless (nisi) a witness acting in an official capacity makes a deposition regarding duties performed ex officio or unless circumstances of things and persons suggest otherwise.

The services of experts must be used whenever their examination and opinion, based on the laws of art or science, are required in order to establish some fact or to clarify the true nature of something by reason of a prescription of the law or a judge.

It is the responsibility of the judge either to name experts after listening to the parties and the names they propose, or to make use of reports, if warranted, already drawn up by other experts.

Experts can be excluded or rejected for the same reasons that witnesses can be.

§ 1.

After paying attention to those points which may have been brought forward by the litigants, the judge is to specify by a decree the individual points on which the expert's services must focus.

§ 2.

The acts of the case and other documents and aids which the expert may need in order to function properly and faithfully must be turned over to the expert.

§ 3.

After listening to the expert, the judge should fix the time within which the examination is to be carried out and the report presented.

§ 1.

Each of the experts should draw up a report distinct from the others unless (nisi) the judge orders that one report be made and signed by the experts individually; if this latter is done, differences of opinion, if any, are to be carefully noted.

§ 2.

The experts must indicate clearly by what documents or other apt means they have been informed about the identity of persons, things or places, by what path and method they proceeded in discharging the function given to them and on what grounds, for the most part, their conclusions are based.

§ 3.

An expert can be summoned by the judge to supply further explanations which may seem necessary.

§ 1.

The judge is to weigh attentively not only the conclusions of the experts, even when they are concordant, but also the other circumstances of the case.

§ 2.

In giving the reasons for the decision, the judge must express what considerations prompted him or her to admit or reject the conclusions of the experts.

Both the expenses and the stipends which must be paid to the experts are to be determined justly and equitably by the judge with due regard for particular law.

§ 1.

The parties may designate private experts who must be approved by the judge.

§ 2.

If the judge admits them, they may inspect the acts of the case if necessary and be present at the discharging of the court experts' function; moreover they can always present their own report.

If in order to settle a case the judge considers it opportune to have access to a given place or to inspect something, this should be specified in a decree which describes in summary fashion those elements which must be exhibited at the access, after hearing the parties.

When the recognizance has been completed, a report of it is to be drawn up.

A presumption is a probably conjecture about an uncertain matter; one is a presumption of law, which is established by the law itself; another is human, which is formulated by a judge.

A person who has a favorable legal presumption is freed from the burden of proof which then devolves upon the other party.

The judge is not to formulate presumptions which are not determined by law unless (nisi) they arise from a certain and determined fact which is directly connected with the subject matter of the controversy.

An incidental case is had whenever after the trial has begun by the citation, a question is proposed which is so pertinent to the case that it very often must be resolved before the principal question, although it is not expressly contained in the libellus introducing the suit.

An incidental case is proposed in writing or orally before the judge who is competent to settle the principal case with an indication of the connection between it and the principal case.

§ 1.

The judge, having received the petition and heard the parties, is to decide very promptly whether the proposed incidental question seems to have a basis and a connection with the principal issue, or whether it must be rejected from the outset; and, if it is admitted, whether it is of such seriousness that it must be resolved by an interlocutory sentence or by a decree.

§ 2.

On the other hand, if the judge decides that the incidental question is not to be resolves before the definitive sentence, the judge is to decree that it will be considered when the principal case is settled.

§ 1.

If the incidental question must be resolved by sentence, the norms of the oral contentious process are to be observed, unless (nisi) the judge decides otherwise given the seriousness of the matter.

§ 2.

But if it must be resolved by decree, the tribunal may turn the matter over to the auditor or to the presiding officer.

Before the principal case is closed, if there is just cause, the judge or the tribunal can revoke or reform the decree or the interlocutory sentence either at the request of a party or ex officio after hearing the parties.

§ 1.

If the respondent, after having been cited, has neither appeared nor offered a suitable excuse for being absent, nor responded in accord with can. 1507, § 1, the judge is to declare the respondent absent from the trial and is to decree that the case should proceed to the definitive sentence and its execution, while observing all the formalities which are to be observed.

§ 2.

Before issuing the decree mentioned in § 1, the judge must have proof that the citation drawn up by law reached the respondent within available time even by issuing a new citation if necessary.

§ 1.

If the respondent is present in court later or responds before the settlement of the case, the respondent can adduce conclusions and proofs, with due regard for the prescription of can. 1600; however the judge is to take care that the trial is not intentionally prolonged through rather long and unnecessary delays.

§ 2.

Even if the respondent has not appeared or responded before the settlement of the case, the respondent can use challenges against the sentence; if the respondent proves that there was a legitimate impediment for being detained which without personal fault was unable to be made know earlier, the respondent can use a complaint of nullity.

If the petitioner has not appeared on the day and at the hour set for the joinder of issues (contestatio litis) and has not offered a suitable excuse:

(1) the judge is to cite the petitioner again;

(2) a petitioner who does not obey the new citation is presumed to have renounced the suit in accord with cann. 1524-1525;

(3) but if the petitioner later wishes to intervene in the process, can. 1593 is to be observed.

§ 1.

A party who is absent from the trial, whether the petitioner or the respondent, and who has not given proof of a just impediment, is obliged both to pay the expenses of the lawsuit which were incurred because of the absence and also to provide indemnity to the other party, if necessary.

§ 2.

If both the petitioner and the respondent were absent from the trial, they are jointly obliged to pay the expenses of the lawsuit.

§ 1.

An interested party can be admitted to intervene in a case at any stage of the suit, either as a party defending one's own right or as an accessory to help a given litigant.

§ 2.

However, in order to be admitted, such an interested party before the conclusion of the case must present to the judge a libellus briefly demonstrating the right to intervene.

§ 3.

The person who intervenes in a case must be admitted at that stage which the case has reached with a brief and peremptory period of time assigned to present proofs if the case has reached the probatory stage.

After hearing the parties, the judge must summon to the trial a third party whose intervention seems necessary.

§ 1.

After the proofs have been collected the judge by a decree must, under pain of nullity, permit the parties and their advocates to inspect at the tribunal office the acts which are not yet known to them; a copy of the acts can also be given to advocates upon request; however, in cases concerned with the public good, in order to avoid very serious dangers, the judge can decree that a given act is not to be shown to anyone, with due concern, however, that the right of defense always remains intact.

§ 2.

In order to complete the proofs the parties may propose additional proofs to the judge; when these have been collected there is an occasion for repeating the decree mentioned in § 1 if the judge thinks it necessary.

§ 1.

When everything pertinent to the production of proofs has been completed, it is time for the conclusion of the case.

§ 2.

The conclusion takes place whenever the parties declare that they have nothing more to add or the time set by the judge for proposing proofs has expired, or the judge declares that the case is sufficiently instructed.

§ 3.

The judge is to issue a decree that the conclusion of the case has been completed, in whatever manner it took place.

§ 1.

After the conclusion of the case, the judge can still call the same or other witnesses, or arrange for other proofs which had not been previously asked for, only:

(1) in cases in which it is a question solely of the private good of the parties and if all the parties give consent;

(2) in other cases, after hearing the parties and provided that there exists a serious reason and all danger of fraud or subornation is removed;

(3) in all cases, whenever it is likely that the future sentence may turn out to be unjust because of the reasons listed in can. 1645, § 1, nn. 1-3, if (nisi) new proof is not admitted. § 2. However, the judge can order or allow that a document be exhibited which, perhaps, could not have been exhibited earlier, through no fault of the interested party.

§ 3.

The new proofs are to be published with due regard for can. 1598, § 1.

After the conclusion of the case, the judge is to determine an appropriate period of time for the presentation of defense briefs or observations.

§ 1.

The defense briefs and observations are to be in writing unless (nisi) the judge with the consent of the parties decides that an oral debate before the tribunal is sufficient.

§ 2.

If the defense briefs together with the principal documents are to be printed, the prior authorization of the judge is required but with the obligation of secrecy if it exists.

§ 3.

The regulations of the tribunal are to be observed as regard the length of the defense briefs, the number of copies and other additional matters of this kind.

§ 1.

After the defense briefs and observations have been communicated to each one, both parties are permitted to present rejoinders within a short period of time set by the judge.

§ 2.

This right is granted to the parties only once unless (nisi) it seems to the judge that it must be granted a second time for a serious reason; however, in that case, the grant made to one party is considered made also the other party.

§ 3.

The promoter of justice and the defender of the bond have the right to reply again to the rejoinders of the parties.

§ 1.

It is absolutely forbidden that information given to the judge by the parties or the advocates or other persons remain outside the acts of the case.

§ 2.

If the discussion of the case has been done in writing, the judge can determine that moderate oral debate take place before the tribunal to elucidate certain questions.

A notary is to be present at the oral debate mentioned in cann. 1602, § 1 and 1604, § 2, so that, if the judge orders it or if a party requests it and the judge consents, the notary can immediately record in writing the points discussed and the conclusions.

If the parties neglect to prepare a defense brief within the time available to them, or if they entrust themselves to the knowledge and the conscience of the judge, the judge can pronounce sentence at once after requesting the observations of the promoter of justice and of the defender of the bond when they are involved in the trial, if the issue is plainly and fully known from the acts and proofs.

After the case has been tried in a judicial manner, if it is the principal case, it is settled by the judge by a definitive sentence; if it is an incidental case, it is settled by an interlocutory sentence, with due regard for the prescription of can. 1589, § 1.

§ 1.

For the pronouncement of any kind of sentence, there must be in the mind of the judge moral certitude regarding the matter to be settled by the sentence.

§ 2.

The judge must derive this certitude from the acts and the proofs.

§ 3.

However, the judge must evaluate the proofs conscientiously with due regard for the prescriptions of the law concerning the efficacy of certain proofs.

§ 4.

A judge who cannot arrive at this certitude is to pronounce that the right of the petitioner is not established, and is to dismiss the respondent as absolved, unless (nisi) there is a question of a case which enjoys the favor of the law, in which case the decision must be in favor of it.

§ 1.

If the tribunal is collegiate, the presiding judge of the college is to determine on what day and at what hour the judges are to convene for their deliberation; and the meeting is to be held at the tribunal unless (nisi) a special reason suggests otherwise.

§ 2.

On the day assigned for the meeting, the judges shall individually submit in writing their conclusions on the merits of the case and the reasons, both in law and in fact, for arriving at these conclusion, which are to be appended to the acts of the case and are to be kept secret.

§ 3.

After the invocation of the Divine Name, the conclusions of the individual judge are to be made known in the order of precedence, but beginning always with the ponens or the relator of the case, and there is to be a discussion under the leadership of the presiding judge, especially in order to decide what is to be determined in the dispositive part of the sentence.

§ 4.

In the discussion, however, each judge has the right to retract his or her original conclusions; on the other hand, a judge who does not wish to accede to the decision of the others, can demand that his or her conclusions be transmitted to the higher tribunal if there is an appeal.

§ 5.

But if the judges are unwilling or unable to arrive at a sentence in the first discussion, the decision can be deferred to another meeting but not beyond one week unless (nisi) the instruction of the case must be completed in accord with the norm of can. 1600.

§ 1.

If there is only one judge, he himself will write the sentence.

§ 2.

In a collegiate tribunal it is the duty of the ponens or relator to write the sentence, drawing the reasons from those which the individual judges brought out in the discussion, unless (nisi) it has been previously decided by the majority of the judges which reasons are to be preferred; then the sentence is to be submitted for the approval of the individual judges.

§ 3.

The sentence must be issued not beyond one month from the day on which the case was settled, unless (nisi), in a collegiate tribunal, the judges set a longer period of time for a serious reason.

A sentence must:

(1) settle the controversy discussed before the tribunal with an appropriate response given to each one of the questions;

(2) determine what obligations of the parties arise from the trial and how they must be fulfilled;

(3) set forth the reasons, that is, the motives both in law and in fact on which the dispositive section of the sentence is based;

(4) make a determination about the expenses of the suit.

§ 1.

After the invocation of the Divine Name, the sentence must express in sequence who is the judge or the tribunal; who is the petitioner, the respondent, the procurator, with the names and domiciles correctly indicated; the promoter of justice and the defender of the bond, if they took part in the trial.

§ 2.

Next, it must briefly report the facts together with the conclusions of the parties and the formulation of the doubts.

§ 3.

Following these points is the dispositive section of the sentence preceded by the reasons on which it is based.

§ 4.

It is to close with an indication of the day and place where it was rendered and with the signature of the judge or, if it is a collegiate tribunal, with the signatures of all the judges and the notary.

The regulations mentioned above concerning a definitive sentence are to be adapted to an interlocutory sentence.

The sentence is to be published as soon as possible with an indication of the ways in which it can be challenged; it has no force before publication even if the dispositive section has been made known to the parties with the permission of the judge.

The publication or announcement of the sentence can be made either by giving a copy of the sentence to the parties or their procurators or by sending a copy to them in accord with the norm of can. 1509.

§ 1.

If in the text of the sentence either an error in calculations has crept in, or a material error has occurred in transcribing the dispositive section, or reporting the facts or the petitions of the parties, or if the points required by can. 1612, § 4 were omitted, the sentence must be corrected or completed at the request of the parties or ex officio by the tribunal which issued the sentence; the parties, moreover, must always be heard and a decree appended at the bottom of the sentence.

§ 2.

If any party objects, the incidental question is to be settled by decree.

The other pronouncements of a judge, over and above the sentence, are decrees which, if they are not merely procedural, have not force unless (nisi) they express the reasons at least in a summary fashion, or refer to reasons expressed in some other act.

An interlocutory sentence or a decree has the force of a definitive sentence if it stops the trial, or if it puts and end to the trial or to some grade of the trial as regards at least some party in the case.

With due regard for cann. 1622 and 1623, nullities of acts which are established by positive law and which, although they were known to the party proposing the complaint, have not be denounced to the judge before the sentence, are sanated by the sentence itself if it is a case involving the good of private individuals.

A sentence is vitiated by irremediable nullity if:

(1) it was rendered by a judge who is absolutely incompetent;

(2) it was rendered by a person who lacks the power of judging in the tribunal in which the case was settled;

(3) the judge passed the sentence under duress from force or grave fear;

(4) the trial was instituted without the judicial petition mentioned in can. 1501, or was not instituted against some respondent;

(5) it was rendered between parties one of whom at least did not have standing in court;

(6) one person acted in the name of another without a legitimate mandate;

(7) the right of defense was denied to one or other party;

(8) it did not settle the controversy even partially.

The complaint of nullity mentioned in can. 1620 can always be proposed by way of exception in perpetuity and by way of action before the judge who pronounced the sentence within ten years from the date of publication of the sentence.

A sentence is vitiated by remediable nullity only, if:

(1) it was rendered by an illegitimate number of judges contrary to the prescription of can. 1425, § 1;

(2) it does not contain the motives, that is, the reasons for the decision;

(3) it lacks the signatures prescribed by law;

(4) it does not contain reference to the year, month, day and place in which it was pronounced;

(5) it is based on a judicial act which is null and whose nullity was not sanated according to the norm of can. 1619;

(6) it was rendered against a party who was legitimately absent as provided for in can. 1593, § 2.

The complaint of nullity in the cases mentioned in can. 1622 can be proposed within three months from the notification of publication of the sentence.

The judge who pronounced the sentence examines the complaint of nullity; but if the party fears that the judge who pronounced the sentence which is being challenged by the complaint of nullity, may be prejudiced and, as a result, regards him or her as suspect, the party can demand that another judge be substituted according to the norm of can. 1450.

A complaint of nullity can be proposed together with an appeal within the time determined for an appeal.

§ 1.

Not only the parties who feel themselves aggrieved can file a complaint of nullity but also the promoter of justice or the defender of the bond whenever they have the right to intervene.

§ 2.

A judge himself can ex officio retract or amend an invalid sentence which he has pronounced, within the time period for acting set by can. 1623 unless (nisi) meanwhile an appeal together with a complaint of nullity has been filed, or unless the nullity has been sanated during the course of the time mentioned in can. 1623.

Cases involving a complaint of nullity can be treated according to the norms for the oral contentious process.

The party who feels aggrieved by a given sentence and likewise the promoter of justice and the defender of the bond in cases in which their presence is required, have the right to appeal from a sentence to a higher judge, with due regard for the prescription of can. 1629.

There is no room for appeal:

(1) from a sentence of the Supreme Pontiff himself or of the Apostolic Signatura;

(2) from a sentence vitiated by nullity unless it is joined with a complaint of nullity according to the norm of can. 1625;

(3) from a sentence which has become res iudicata;

(4) from the decree of a judge or an interlocutory sentence which does not have the force of a definitive sentence, unless it is joined with an appeal from a definitive sentence;

(5) from a sentence or from a decree in a case in which the law provides for a settlement of the matter as quickly as possible.

§ 1.

An appeal must be filed before the judge who pronounced the sentence within the peremptory time limit of fifteen available days (tempus utile) from notification of the publication of the sentence.

§ 2.

If it is made orally, the notary is to put it in writing in the presence of the appellant.

If a question arises regarding the right of appeal, the appellate tribunal should examine it as quickly as possible according to the norms of the oral contentious process.

§ 1.

If in the appeal there is no indication of the tribunal to which it is directed, it is presumed to be made to the tribunal mentioned in cann. 1438 and 1439.

§ 2.

If the other party has recourse to another appellate tribunal, the tribunal of higher grade examines the case, with due regard for can. 1415.

An appeal must be prosecuted within a month of its being filed before the judge to whom it is directed, unless (nisi) the judge from whom appeal is made has set a longer period of time for the party to prosecute it.

§ 1.

In order to prosecute an appeal, it is required and suffices that the party call upon the services of the higher judge for the emendation of the challenged sentence, append a copy of this sentence, and indicate the reasons for the appeal.

§ 2.

If the party is unable to obtain a copy of the challenged sentence from the tribunal from which the appeal is being made with the available time, the time limits do not run out in the interval; and the impediment must be indicated to the appellate judge who is to bind the judge from whom the appeal is made with a precept to perform his duty as soon as possible.

§ 3.

Meanwhile the judge from whom the appeal is being made must transmit the acts to the appellate judge according to the norm of can. 1474.

If the deadline for appeal either before the judge from whom the appeal is being made or before the judge to whom the appeal is directed has passed without result, the appeal is considered abandoned.

§ 1.

The appellant can renounce the appeal with the effects mentioned in can. 1525.

§ 2.

If the appeal was proposed by the defender of the bond or the promoter of justice, it can be renounced by the defender of the bond or the promoter of justice of the appellate tribunal unless (nisi) the law provides otherwise.

§ 1.

An appeal lodged by the petitioner also benefits the respondent and vice versa.

§ 2.

If there are several respondents or petitioners, and if the sentence is challenged by only one or against only one of them, the challenge is considered made by all of them and against all of them whenever the matter sought is indivisible or it is a joint obligation.

§ 3.

If an appeal is filed by one party regarding one part of the sentence, the other party can place an incidental appeal regarding the other parts within a peremptory time period of fifteen days from the date of being notified of the principal appeal even though the deadline for an appeal has expired.

§ 4.

Unless (nisi) there is evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that an appeal is made against all parts of a sentence.

An appeal suspends the execution of a sentence.

§ 1.

With due regard for the prescription of can. 1683, a new basis for petitioning may not be admitted at the appellate level not even by way of helpful cumulation; consequently, the joinder of issues (contestatio litis) can focus only on whether the prior sentence is to be confirmed or revised, either totally or partially.

§ 2.

Moreover, new proofs are admitted only in accord with the norm of can. 1600.

At the appellate level the procedure is the same as in first instance insofar as it is applicable; however, immediately after the joinder of issues has taken place in accord with the norm of cann. 1513, § 1 and 1639, § 1, the case is to be discussed and the sentence rendered unless (nisi) perhaps the proofs must be completed.

With due regard for the prescription of can. 1643, a res iudicata results:

(1) if two concordant sentences have been issued between the same persons regarding the same petition and arising out of the same basis for petitioning;

(2) if an appeal against the sentence has not been filed within the available time;

(3) if, at the appellate level, the prosecution of the suit has been stopped or renounced;

(4) if a definitive sentence has been rendered from which no appeal is granted according to the norm of can. 1629.

§ 1.

A res iudicata enjoys the stability of law and cannot be directly challenged except in accord with the norm of can. 1645, § 1.

§ 2.

It settles an issue between the parties and gives rise to an action for execution and an exception of res iudicata which the judge can declare ex officio to prevent a new introduction of the same case.

Cases concerning the status of persons, especially those concerning the separation of spouses, never become a res iudicata.

§ 1.

If two concordant sentences have been pronounced in a case concerning the status of persons, it can be appealed at any time to an appellate tribunal if new and serious proofs or arguments are bought forward within the peremptory time period of thirty days from the proposed challenge. However, within a month from the presentation of the new proofs and arguments, the appellate tribunal must settle by decree whether a new presentation of the case must be admitted or not.

§ 2.

An appeal to a higher tribunal to obtain a new presentation of the case does not suspend the execution of the sentence, unless (nisi) either the law provides otherwise or the appellate tribunal orders its suspension, in accord with the norm of can. 1650, § 3.

§ 1.

Restitutio in integrum is granted against a sentence which has become a res iudicata provided (dummodo) that there is clear proof of its injustice.

§ 2.

However, clear proof of injustice is verified only if:

(1) the sentence is so based on proofs which are later discovered to be false so that without those proofs the dispositive section of the sentence would not be sustained;

(2) afterwards documents have been found which undoubtedly prove new facts which demand a contrary decision;

(3) the sentence was pronounced because of the fraud of one party which harmed the other;

(4) a prescription of the law which is not merely procedural has been evidently neglected;

(5) the sentence is contrary to a preceding sentence which has become a res iudicata.

§ 1.

Restitutio in integrum for the reasons mentioned in can. 1645, § 2, nn. 1-3, must be sought from the judge who issued the sentence, within three months to be computed from the date of one's becoming aware of the reasons.

§ 2.

Restitutio in integrum for the reasons mentioned in can. 1645, § 2, nn. 4 and 5 must be sought from the appellate tribunal within three months from notification of the publication of the sentence; but if, in the case mentioned in can. 1645, § 2, n. 5, notification of the preceding decision is had later, the time limit runs from this notification.

§ 3.

The time limits mentioned above do not expire as long as the injured person is a minor.

§ 1.

A petition of restitutio in integrum suspends the execution of a sentence if the execution has not yet begun.

§ 2.

If, however, from probably indications there is a suspicion that the petition has been made in order to delay the execution of the sentence, the judge can decree that the sentence be executed but with due caution being taken to indemnify the person seeking restitutio in integrum if it is granted.

If restitution in integrum is granted, the judge must pronounce on the merits of the case.

§ 1.

The bishop whose responsibility it is to supervise the tribunal, is to determine norms regarding:

(1) the parties to be liable for paying or compensating for judicial expenses;

(2) the honoraria for procurators, advocates, experts and interpreters and the indemnification of witnesses;

(3) the granting of gratuitous legal assistance or a diminution of expenses;

(4) the recovery of damages which are owed by the one who not only lost the case but also engaged in litigation rashly;

(5) the depositing of money or the guarantees to be made concerning the expenses to be paid and the damages to be recovered.

§ 2.

From a pronouncement relating to expenses, honoraria and recovery of damages, there is no separate appeal; but the party can have recourse within fifteen days to the same judge who can adjust the assessment.

§ 1.

A sentence which has become a res iudicata can be executed with due regard for the prescription of can. 1647.

§ 2.

The judge who rendered the sentence and also the appellate judge if an appeal has been filed, can ex officio or at the request of a party order a provisional execution of a sentence which has not yet become a res iudicata after having arranged, if the case warrants, for the rendering of appropriate guarantees if there is a question of provisions or payments for necessary sustenance or if some other just cause is pressing.

§ 3.

On the other hand if the sentence mentioned in § 2 is challenged and if the judge who must take cognizance of the challenge sees that it is probably well-founded and irreparable harm could arise from the execution of the sentence, the judge can suspend its execution or subject it to a safeguard.

There can be no execution of a sentence prior to an executory decree of the judge in which it is stated that the sentence must be executed; this decree is to be included in the text of the sentence or issued separately, according to the different types of cases.

If the execution of the sentence demands a prior rendering of accounts, it is an incidental question which must be decided by the judge who passed the sentence ordering the execution.

§ 1.

Unless (nisi) particular law determines otherwise, the bishop of the diocese in which the first instance sentence was rendered, must execute the sentence personally or through another.

§ 2.

If he refuses of neglects to do so, the execution belongs to the authority to which the appellate tribunal is subject in accord with the provision of can. 1439, § 3, at the request of an interested party or ex officio. § 3. Among religious the execution of a sentence belongs to the superior who passed the sentence to be executed or who delegated the judge.

§ 1.

Unless (nisi) something is left to the discretion of the executor in the text of the sentence, the executor must execute the sentence according to the obvious meaning of the words.

§ 2.

The executor may consider exceptions regarding the manner and force of the execution but not regarding the merits of the case; but if it has been discovered from other sources that the sentence is invalid or manifestly unjust according to the norm of cann. 1620, 1622 and 1645 the executor is to refrain from executing it, refer the matter to the tribunal which issued the sentence, and inform the parties.

§ 1.

As regards real actions, wherever a given thing has been adjudicated as belonging to the petitioner, it must be handed over to the petitioner as soon as there is a res iudicata.

§ 2.

However, as regards personal actions, when the respondent is condemned to furnish something mobile, to pay money, or to give or to do something else, the judge in the text of the sentence, or the executor with personal discretion and prudence is to set a time limit for fulfilling the obligation, which, however, is not to be less than fifteen days nor more than six months.