Part I: Trials in General

§ 1.

The object of a trial is:

1° to prosecute or to vindicate rights of physical or juridic persons, or to declare juridic facts;

2° to impose or declare the penalty for offenses.

§ 2.

However, controversies which have arisen from an act of administrative power can be brought only before the superior or an administrative tribunal.

By proper and exclusive right the Church adjudicates:

(1) cases concerning spiritual matters or connected with the spiritual;

(2) the violation of ecclesiastical laws and all those cases in which there is a question of sin in respect to the determination of culpability and the imposition of ecclesiastical penalties.

With due regard for the norms established for the tribunals of the Apostolic See, all the tribunals of the Church are regulated by the following canons.

§ 1.

The causes of the canonization of the servants of God are regulated by special pontifical law.

§ 2.

The prescriptions of this Code, however, are applicable to the aforementioned causes whenever the pontifical law refers to the universal law or when it is a question of norms which affect those causes from the very nature of the matter.

The First See is judged by no one.

§ 1.

It is the right of the Roman Pontiff himself alone to judge in cases mentioned in can. 1401:

(1) those who hold the highest civil office in a state;

(2) cardinals;

(3) legates of the Apostolic See and, in penal cases, bishops;

(4) other cases which he has called to his own judgment.

§ 2.

A judge cannot review an act or instrument explicitly (in forma specifica) confirmed by the Roman Pontiff without (nisi) his prior mandate.

§ 3.

Judgment of the following is reserved to the Roman Rota:

(1) bishops in contentious cases, with due regard for the prescription of can. 1419, § 2;

(2) an abbot primate or an abbot superior of a monastic congregation and the supreme moderator of religious institutes of pontifical right;

(3) dioceses or other ecclesiastical persons, whether physical or juridic, which do not have a superior below the Roman Pontiff.

§ 1.

Acts and decisions made in violation of the prescription of can. 1404 are considered invalid.

§ 2.

The incompetence of other judges is absolute in the cases mentioned in can. 1405.

§ 1.

No one can be brought into a court of first instance unless (nisi) before an ecclesiastical judge who is competent in virtue of one of the titles determined in cann. 1408-1414.

§ 2.

The incompetence of a judge who possesses none of these titles is termed relative.

§ 3.

The petitioner follows the forum of the respondent; but if the respondent has a number of fora, the choice of one among them is granted to the petitioner.

Anyone can be brought into court before the tribunal of one's own domicile or quasi-domicile.

§ 1.

A transient has the forum of the place of actual residence.

§ 2.

A person whose domicile, quasi-domicile or place of residence is not known can be brought into court in the forum of the petitioner provided no other legitimate forum is available.

By reason of the location of a disputed item, a party can be brought into court before the tribunal of the place where the litigated thing is located whenever the action is directed against the thing or whenever it is a question of damages.

§ 1.

By reason of a contract a party can be brought into court before the tribunal of the place in which the contract was entered or must be fulfilled, unless (nisi) the parties agree to choose another tribunal.

§ 2.

If the case revolves around obligations which arise from another title, the party can be brought into court before the tribunal of the place in which the obligation either originated or is to be fulfilled.

In penal cases the accused, even if absent, can be cited before the tribunal of the place where the offense was perpetrated.

A party can be brought into court:

(1) in cases which concern administration before the tribunal of the place where the administration was conducted;

(2) in cases which concern inheritances or pious legacies before the tribunal of the last domicile, quasi- domicile or place of residence of the person whose inheritance or pious legacy is the object of the action, in accord with the norm of cann. 1408-1409 unless (nisi) it is a question of the mere execution of the legacy, which is to be examined according to the ordinary norms of competence.

Unless (nisi) a prescription of the law blocks this, by reason of connection cases which are interrelated are to be tried by one and the same tribunal and in the same procedure.

By reason of prevention, if two or several tribunals are equally competent, the tribunal which has first legitimately cited the respondent has the right to judge the case.

Conflicts of competence between tribunals subject to the same appellate tribunal are resolved by that tribunal; if the tribunals are not subject to the same appellate tribunal, conflicts of competence are resolved by the Apostolic Signatura.

§ 1.

In virtue of the primacy of the Roman Pontiff, anyone of the faithful is free to bring to or introduce before the Holy See a case either contentious or penal in any grade of judgment and at any stage of litigation.

§ 2.

A recourse made to the Apostolic See, however, does not suspend the exercise of jurisdiction by a judge who has already begun to adjudicate the case except (praeter) in the case of an appeal; for this reason, the judge can pursue judgment up to the definitive sentence unless (nisi) the Apostolic See has informed the judge that it has called the case to itself.

Every tribunal has the right to call upon the assistance of another tribunal to instruct a case or to communicate acts.

§ 1.

The diocesan bishop is the judge of first instance in each diocese and for all cases not expressly excepted by law; he can exercise his judicial power personally or through others in accord with the following canons.

§ 2.

But if the action concerns the rights or the temporal goods of a juridic person represented by the bishop, the appellate tribunal judges in first instance.

§ 1.

Each diocesan bishop is bound to appoint a judicial vicar or officialis with ordinary power to judge, distinct from the vicar general unless the smallness of the diocese or the small number of cases suggests otherwise.

§ 2.

The judicial vicar constitutes one tribunal with the bishop but he cannot judge cases which the bishop reserves to himself.

§ 3.

The judicial vicar can be given assistants whose title is adjutant judicial vicars or vice-officiales.

§ 4.

Both the judicial vicar and the adjutant judicial vicars must be priests of unimpaired reputations, holding doctorates or at least licentiates in canon law and not less than thirty years of age.

§ 5.

When the see is vacant, they do not cease from their office and they cannot be removed by the diocesan administrator; when the new bishop arrives, however, they need confirmation.

§ 1.

The bishop is to appoint diocesan judges in the diocese who are clerics.

§ 2.

The conference of bishops can permit lay persons to be appointed judges; when it is necessary, one of them can be employed to form a collegiate tribunal.

§ 3.

The judges are to be of unimpaired reputation and possess doctorates, or at least licentiates, in canon law.

The judicial vicar, the adjutant judicial vicars and the other judges are to be appointed for a definite period of time with due regard for the prescription of can. 1420, § 5; they cannot be removed except (nisi) for legitimate and serious cause.

§ 1.

With the approval of the Apostolic See, several diocesan bishops may agree to establish for their dioceses a single tribunal of first instance in place of the diocesan tribunals mentioned in cann. 1419- 1421; in this case the group of bishops or a bishop designated by them has all the powers which a diocesan bishop has over his own tribunal.

§ 2.

The tribunals mentioned in § 1 can be established either for any case whatsoever or only for some types of cases.

In any trial a single judge can make us of two assessors, who are clerics or lay persons of upright life, to serve as his consultors.

§ 1.

Every contrary custom being reprobated, the following cases are reserved to a collegiate tribunal of three judges:

(1) contentious cases: (a) concerning the bond of sacred ordination; (b) concerning the bond of marriage with due regard for the prescriptions of cann. 1686 and 1688;

(2) penal cases: (a) concerning offenses which can entail the penalty of dismissal from the clerical state; (b) concerning the imposition or declaration of excommunication.

§ 2.

The bishop can entrust more difficult cases or cases of greater importance to the judgment of three or five judges.

§ 3.

Unless (nisi) the bishop has determined otherwise for individual cases, the judicial vicar is to assign the judges in order by turn to adjudicate the individual cases.

§ 4.

If it happens that a collegiate tribunal cannot be established for a trial of first instance, the conference of bishops can permit the bishop to entrust cases to a single clerical judge as long as the impossibility of establishing a college perdures; he is to be a cleric and is to employ an assessor and an auditor where possible.

§ 5.

The judicial vicar is not to appoint substitutes for judges once they are assigned unless (nisi) for a most serious reason, expressed in a decree.

§ 1.

A collegiate tribunal must proceed as a collegial body and pass its sentences by majority vote.

§ 2.

The judicial vicar or the adjutant judicial vicar must preside over a collegiate tribunal insofar as this is possible.

§ 1.

If there is a controversy between religious or houses of the same clerical religious institute of pontifical right, the judge of first instance is the provincial superior unless (nisi) the constitutions provide otherwise; if it is an autonomous monastery, it is the local abbot.

§ 2.

With due regard for the different prescriptions of the constitutions, if it is a contentious case between two provinces, the supreme moderator himself personally or through a delegate shall be the judge in first instance; if the contention is between two monasteries, it shall be the abbot superior of the monastic congregation.

§ 3.

If the controversy arises between religious persons, physical or juridic, of different religious institutes or even of the same clerical or lay institute of diocesan right, or between a religious person and a secular cleric, or a lay person, or a non-religious juridic person, the diocesan tribunal judges in first instance.

§ 1.

A judge or the president of a collegiate tribunal can designate an auditor to carry out the instruction of a case, selecting one either from among the judges of the tribunal or from among the persons approved for this function by the bishop.

§ 2.

The bishop can approve for the function of auditor clerics or lay persons who are outstanding for their good character, prudence and learning.

§ 3.

The only task of the auditor is to collect the proofs according to the mandate of the judge and to present them to the judge; unless (nisi) the mandate of the judge states otherwise, the auditor can in the meantime decide which proofs are to be collected and how they are to be collected if such a question perhaps arises while the auditor is exercising his or her function.

The president of a collegiate tribunal must assign one of the collegiate judges as ponens or relator who reports on the case at the meeting of the judges and puts the sentence into writing; for a just cause the president may substitute another in place of the original relator.

A promoter of justice is to be appointed in a diocese for contentious cases in which the public good could be at stake and for penal cases; the promoter of justice is bound by office to provide for the public good.

§ 1.

In contentious cases it is the task of the diocesan bishop to judge whether or not the public good could be at stake unless (nisi) the intervention of the promoter of justice is prescribed by law or it is clearly necessary from the nature of the matter.

§ 2.

If the promoter of justice has intervened in a preceding instance, such intervention is presumed to be necessary in a further instance.

A defender of the bond is to be appointed in a diocese for cases concerning the nullity of sacred ordination or the nullity or dissolution of marriage; the defender of the bond is bound by office to propose and clarify everything which can be reasonably adduced against nullity or dissolution.

In cases which require the presence of the promoter of justice or the defender of the bond, the acts are invalid if the were not cited, unless (nisi), although not cited, they were actually present, or, at least before the sentence, could have fulfilled their office by inspecting the acts.

Unless (nisi) express provision is made to the contrary:

(1) as often as the law requires the judge to hear the parties or one or other of them, the promoter of justice and the defender of the bond are also to be heard if they are present in court;

(2) as often as the judge is required to decide something at the request of a party, the request of the promoter of justice or the defender of the bond has the same force when they are present in the court.

It is the task of the bishop to name the promoter of justice and the defender of the bond who are to be clerics or lay persons of unimpaired reputation who hold doctorates or licentiates in canon law and are proven in prudence and in zeal for justice.

§ 1.

The same person can hold the office of promoter of justice and of defender of the bond but not in the same case.

§ 2.

The promoter and defender can be appointed for all cases or for particular cases; they can, however, be removed by the bishop for a just cause.

§ 1.

A notary is to be present during each procedure so that the acts are considered null if they have not been signed by the notary.

§ 2.

Acts which notaries draw up warrant public trust.

With due regard for the prescription of can. 1444, § 1, n. 1:

(1) from the tribunal of a suffragan bishop appeal is made to the metropolitan tribunal but the prescription of can. 1439 is to be observed;

(2) in cases of first instance tried before the metropolitan, appeal is made to the tribunal which he has permanently designated with the approval of the Apostolic See;

(3) for cases tried before a provincial superior, the tribunal of second instance is before the supreme moderator; for cases tried before the local abbot, the tribunal of second instance is before the abbot superior of the monastic congregation.

§ 1.

If a single tribunal of first instance has been established for several dioceses in accord with the norm of can. 1423, the conference of bishops must establish a tribunal of second instance with the approval of the Apostolic See unless (nisi) these dioceses are all suffragans of the same archdiocese.

§ 2.

The conference of bishops can establish one or several tribunals of second instance with the approval of the Apostolic See even beyond the cases mentioned in § 1. 3. The conference of bishops or a bishop designated by it has all the powers over the tribunals of second instance mentioned in § § 1 and 2 which the diocesan bishop has over his own tribunal.

If competence by reason of grade in accord with cann. 1438 and 1439 is not observed, the incompetence of the judge is absolute.

A tribunal of second instance must be constituted in the same way as a tribunal of first instance; nevertheless if a single judge passed sentence in a first instance court in accord with can. 1425, § 4, the tribunal of second instance is to proceed in a collegial manner.

The Roman Pontiff is the supreme judge for the entire Catholic world; he tries cases either personally or through the ordinary tribunals of the Apostolic See or through judges delegated by himself.

The ordinary tribunal established by the Roman Pontiff to receive appeals is the Roman Rota.

§ 1.

The Roman Rota tries:

(1) in second instance, cases which have been adjudicated by the ordinary tribunals of first instance and brought before the Holy See by means of legitimate appeal;

(2) in third and further instance, cases already tried by the Roman Rota itself or by any other tribunals whatsoever, unless (nisi) the case is considered res iudicata.

§ 2.

This tribunal tries in first instance the cases mentioned in can. 1405, § 3, and other cases which the Roman Pontiff has summoned to his own tribunal and has entrusted to the Roman Rota of his own accord or at the request of the parties; unless (nisi) other provisions are made in the rescript of commission, the Rota tries these cases in second and further instance as well.

§ 1.

The Supreme Tribunal of the Apostolic Signatura adjudicates:

(1) complaints of nullity, petitions for restitution in integrum, and other recourses against rotal sentences;

(2) recourses in cases involving the status of persons which the Roman Rota refuses to admit to a new examination;

(3) exceptions of suspicion and other cases against the auditors of the Roman Rota because of acts in the exercise of their function;

(4) conflicts of competence mentioned in can. 1416.

§ 2.

This same tribunal deals with contentions legitimately referred to it which arise from an act of ecclesiastical administrative power, with other administrative controversies which are referred to it by the Roman Pontiff or by the dicasteries of the Roman Curia, and with a conflict of competence among these dicasteries.

§ 3.

Furthermore it is the task of this Supreme Tribunal:

(1) to exercise its vigilance over the correct administration of justice and to discipline advocates or procurators, if necessary;

(2) to extend the competence of tribunals;

(3) to promote and approve the erection of the tribunals mentioned in cann. 1423 and 1439.

§ 1.

With due regard for justice, all the Christian faithful especially bishops are to strive earnestly to avoid lawsuits among the people of God as much as possible and to resolve them peacefully as soon as possible.

§ 2.

At the very start or even at any point during the litigation, whenever some hope of a happy outcome is perceived, the judge is not to neglect to encourage and assist the parties to collaborate in working out an equitable solution to the controversy as well as indicating suitable ways of reaching such a solution, perhaps even employing the services of reputable persons for mediation.

§ 3.

If the litigation concerns the private good of the parties, the judge should find out whether it can profitably be resolved through a negotiated settlement or through arbitration in accord with the norms of cann. 1713-1716.

A person who has taken part in a case as a judge, promoter of justice, defender of the bond, procurator, advocate, witness or expert cannot afterwards in another instance validly resolve the same case as a judge or act as an assessor in another instance.

§ 1.

A judge is not to undertake the adjudication of a case in which the judge may have some interest due to consanguinity or affinity in any degree of the direct line and up to the fourth degree of the collateral line, due to functioning as a guardian or trustee, due to close friendship, due to great animosity, or due to a desire to make some profit or avoid some loss.

§ 2.

In the same circumstances the promoter of justice, the defender of the bond, the assessor, and the auditor must disqualify themselves from their office.

§ 1.

If, in the cases mentioned in can. 1448, the judge does not withdraw, the party can lodge an objection against the judge.

§ 2.

The judicial vicar deals with the issue of such an objection; if the judicial vicar is the one objected against, the bishop who is in charge of the tribunal deals with the issue.

§ 3.

If the bishop himself is the judge and an objection is lodged against him, he is to disqualify himself from judging.

§ 4.

If the objection is lodged against the promoter of justice, the defender of the bond or other officers of the tribunal, the president of the collegiate tribunal or the single judge deals with this exception.

If the objection is accepted, the persons must be changed, but the grade of the court does not change.

§ 1.

The issue of an objection is to be solved without delay after having heard the parties, the promoter of justice or defender of the bond if they are present and an objection has not been lodged against them.

§ 2.

The acts posited by a judge prior to an objection are valid; but those acts posited after the objection has been moved must be rescinded if the party petitions within ten days from the acceptance of the objection.

§ 1.

In a matter which concerns private individuals only, a judge can proceed only at the request of a party; once a case has been legitimately introduced, however, a judge can and must proceed, even ex officio, in penal cases and in other cases which involve the public good of the Church or the salvation of souls.

§ 2.

Furthermore, a judge can supply for the negligence of parties in furnishing proofs or in placing exceptions as often as it is judged necessary in order to avoid a seriously unjust sentence, with due regard for the prescriptions of can. 1600.

Judges and tribunals are to see to it that, with due regard for justice, all cases are concluded as soon as possible so that in a tribunal of first instance they are not prolonged beyond a year and in a tribunal of second instance beyond six months.

All persons who constitute a tribunal or assist it must take an oath that they will fulfill their function properly and faithfully.

§ 1.

Judges and tribunal personnel are always bound to secrecy of office in a penal case; they are also thus bound in a contentious case if the parties may be harmed by the revelation of some procedural act.

§ 2.

They are also always bound to observe secrecy concerning the discussion among the judges in a collegiate tribunal before passing the sentence and concerning the various votes and opinions offered during the discussion with due regard for the prescription of can. 1609, § 4.

§ 3.

Moreover, as often as the nature of a case or the proofs is such that the reputation of others is endangered by divulging the acts or proofs, or an opportunity for discord is provided or scandal or some other similar disadvantage might arise, the judge can bind the witnesses, the experts, the parties and their advocates or proxies by oath to observe secrecy.

The judge and all tribunal officers are forbidden to accept any gifts whatsoever on the occasion of their functioning in a trial.

§ 1.

Judges who refuse to try a case when they are certainly and obviously competent, who declare themselves competent without any legal basis and hear and decide cases, who violate the law of secrecy or who inflict some damage on litigants out of malice or serious negligence can be punished by the competent authority with fitting penalties, including deprivation of office.

§ 2.

Officers and personnel of the tribunal are subject to the same sanctions if they do not fulfill their function as above; the judge can also punish all of them.

Cases are to be tried in the order in which they are presented and put on the docket unless (nisi) some of them demand speedier treatment than others, which fact is to be determined in a special decree which states the reasons.

§ 1.

Defects which can render a sentence invalid can be introduced as an exception during any stage or grade of a trial; a judge can likewise declare them ex officio.

§ 2.

Besides the cases mentioned in § 1, dilatory exceptions, especially those which concern the persons and the manner of the trial, are to be proposed before the joinder of issues (contestatio litis), unless (nisi) they first emerged only after it; and they are to be settled as soon as possible.

§ 1.

If an exception is proposed against the competence of the judge, the same judge must deal with the matter.

§ 2.

In the case of an exception of relative incompetence, if the judge finds for competence, the decision does not admit of appeal; however, a complaint of nullity and restitutio in integrum are not forbidden.

§ 3.

But if the judge finds for incompetence, the person who feels injured can appeal to the appellate tribunal within fifteen available days (dies utiles).

Judges who become aware of their absolute incompetence during any stage of a case must declare that incompetence.

§ 1.

The exceptions that the matter has become res iudicata and that an agreement has been already reached (transactio) as well as other peremptory exceptions which are called litis finitae must be proposed and adjudicated before the joinder of issues (contestatio litis); a person who proposes them later is not to be rejected but is liable for the court costs unless (nisi) there is proof that presentation was not maliciously delayed.

§ 2.

Other peremptory exceptions are to be lodged during the joinder of issues (contestatio litis) and are to be treated at their proper time in accord with the regulations which deal with incidental questions.

§ 1.

Counter-claim actions cannot be lodged validly except within thirty days from the joinder of issues (contestatio litis).

§ 2.

However, they are to be adjudicated at the same time as the original action, that is, on the same grade with it unless it is necessary to try them separately or the judge deems it more appropriate to try them separately.

Questions concerning a deposit for judicial expenses or the granting of gratuitous legal assistance which has been requested from the beginning and other such questions are to be dealt with before the joinder of issues (contestatio litis) as a general rule.

§ 1.

Fatalia legis or the time limits set by law for extinguishing the right to act cannot be extended nor validly shortened unless (nisi) the parties request it.

§ 2.

Before they have lapsed, however, judicial time limits can be extended by the judge for a just cause after hearing the parties or if they request it; such time limits, however, may never validly be shortened unless (nisi) the parties agree.

§ 3.

But the judge is to see to it that the litigation is not overly prolonged by such extensions.

When the law does not establish time limits for positing of procedural acts, the judge must define them taking into consideration the nature of each act.

If the tribunal is closed on the day scheduled for a judicial act the time limit is extended to the first day following which is not a holiday.

To the extend that it is possible, each tribunal is to be in a permanent place which is open during specified hours.

§ 1.

Judges who have been forcibly expelled from their own territory or have been impeded in the exercise of jurisdiction there can exercise jurisdiction and render a sentence outside that territory; however, the diocesan bishop should be informed of this fact by the judge.

§ 2.

Besides the case mentioned in § 1, for a just cause and after hearing the parties, judges can travel outside their own territory in order to acquire proofs with the permission of the diocesan bishop of the place they enter and at a site designated by the bishop.

§ 1.

Unless (nisi) particular law provides otherwise, while cases are being tried before a tribunal only those persons are to be present in court whom the law or the judge decides are necessary to expedite the process.

§ 2.

With appropriate penalties a judge can demand compliance on the part of all who assist at the trial and who are seriously lacking in the respect and obedience owed the tribunal; the judge can also suspend advocates and procurators from exercising their function before ecclesiastical tribunals.

If a person to be interrogated speaks a language which is not known by the judge or the parties, a sworn interpreter designated by the judge is to be employed. Their statements, however, are to be put into writing in the original language and a translation is to be added. An interpreter is also to be employed if a deaf or mute person must be interrogated unless (nisi) the judge perhaps prefers that the person respond to questions in writing.

§ 1.

Judicial acts, both the acts of the case, that is, those acts which concern the merits of the question, and the acts of the process, that is, those which pertain to the formal procedure, must be put into writing.

§ 2.

The individual pages of the acts are to be numbered and authenticated with a seal.

Whenever the signature of the parties or witnesses is required for judicial acts and a party or a witness cannot or will not sign, this is to be noted in the acts; both the judge and the notary are to attest that the act has been read to the party or witness verbatim and that the party or witness either could not or would not sign.

§ 1.

In case of appeal, a copy of the acts authenticated by the attestation of a notary is to be sent to a higher tribunal.

§ 2.

If the acts as drawn up are in a language unknown to the higher tribunal, they are to be translated into a language known to that tribunal, with due precautions being taken that it be a faithful translation.

§ 1.

At the completion of the trial documents which belong to private individuals must be returned but a copy of them is to be retained.

§ 2.

Notaries and the chancellor are forbidden to furnish a copy of judicial acts and of documents which have been acquired for the process without a mandate from the judge.

Anyone, whether baptized or not, can act in a trial; however, the respondent who has been legitimately cited must answer.

Although a petitioner or respondent has appointed a procurator or an advocate, they themselves are nevertheless bound to be present in person at the trial when the law or the judge prescribes it.

§ 1.

Minors and those who lack the use of reason can stand trial only through their parents or guardians or curators, with due regard for the prescription of § 3.

§ 2.

If the judge decides that the rights of minors are in conflict with the rights of the parents, guardians or curators, or that the latter cannot satisfactorily safeguard the rights of the former, then they are to be represented in the trial by a guardian or curator appointed by the judge.

§ 3.

But in spiritual cases and in cases connected with spiritual matters, if minors have attained the use of reason, they can act and respond without the consent of parents or guardian; if they have completed their fourteenth year of age, they can do so on their own; if not, through a curator appointed by the judge.

§ 4.

Those deprived of the administration of their goods and those who are of diminished mental capacity can stand trial personally only to answer for their own offenses or at the prescription of the judge; in all other cases they must act and respond through their curators.

Whenever a guardian or curator appointed by civil authority is present, this person can be admitted by an ecclesiastical judge after having heard the diocesan bishop of the person to whom the guardian or curator has been given, if this can be done; but if a guardian or curator is not present or does not appear admissible, the judge shall designate a guardian or curator for the case.

§ 1.

Juridic persons stand trial through their legitimate representatives.

§ 2.

In a case where the representative is lacking or is negligent, the ordinary himself can stand trial personally or through another in the name of juridic persons which are subject to his power.

§ 1.

A party can freely appoint a personal advocate and a procurator; however, except for the cases stated in § § 2 and 3, the party can petition and respond personally unless (nisi) the judge has decided that the services of a procurator or an advocate are necessary.

§ 2.

The accused in a penal trial must always have an advocate either appointed by the accused or given by the judge.

§ 3.

In a contentious trial which involves minors or the public good except for marriage cases, the judge is to appoint ex officio a defender for a party who lacks one.

§ 1.

A person can appoint only a single procurator who cannot substitute another unless an expressed faculty has been granted the procurator to do this.

§ 2.

But if several procurators are appointed by the same party for some just cause, they are to be so designated that prevention is operative among them.

§ 3.

However, several advocates can be appointed to act together.

The procurator and the advocate must have at least attained majority and be of good reputation; furthermore, the advocate must be a Catholic unless (nisi) the diocesan bishop permits otherwise, must have a doctorate in canon law or be otherwise truly expert and must be approved by the same bishop.

§ 1.

Before a procurator and advocate undertake their function, they must present an authentic mandate to the tribunal.

§ 2.

To prevent the extinction of a right, however, the judge can admit a procurator without the presentation of the mandate provided that some suitable security is furnished if necessary; the procurator's acts, however, lack all force unless the mandate is correctly presented within the peremptory time limits set by the judge.

Without a special mandate the procurator cannot validly renounce an action, instance or judicial acts, make a settlement, strike a bargain, enter into arbitration and in general do those things for which the law requires a special mandate.

§ 1.

For the removal of a procurator or advocate to take effect, it is necessary that they be informed and that the judge and the opposing party be notified of the removal if the joinder of issues (contestatio litis) has already taken place.

§ 2.

After a definitive sentence has been issued, the procurator retains the right and duty to appeal unless the mandating party has renounced this.

For serious cause both the procurator and the advocate can be expelled from the tribunal by the judge by means of a decree either ex officio or at the request of a party.

§ 1.

Both the procurator and the advocate are forbidden to win the suit through bribery or to strike a bargain for excessive profit or for a claim upon a share of the litigated thing. If they do such things, the agreement is null and the judge can fine them. Furthermore, an advocate can be suspended from office and also stricken from the list of advocates by the bishop in charge of the tribunal if it happens again and again.

§ 2.

Advocates and procurators are liable to the same penalties if they withdraw cases from competent tribunals and submit them to other more favorable tribunals for adjudication in deceit of the law.

Advocates and procurators who have betrayed their office for the sake of gifts, promises or any other reason are to be suspended from the exercise of office and fined or punished with other suitable penalties.

Insofar as it is possible, permanent advocates are to be appointed in every tribunal and paid a stipend by that tribunal to exercise the function of advocate or procurator on behalf of parties who wish to choose them especially for marriage cases.

Every right whatsoever is safeguarded not only by an action but also by an exception unless something to the contrary is expressly stated.

§ 1.

Every action is terminated through prescription in accord with the norm of law or by another legitimate method except actions concerning the status of persons which are never terminated.

§ 2.

An exception is always available and is of its very nature perpetual, with due regard for the prescription of can. 1462.

A petitioner can bring a respondent to court by several actions at the same time provided they do not conflict among themselves, whether on the same or different matters, and if they do not exceed the competence of the tribunal approached.

§ 1.

A respondent can file a counter-claim action against the petitioner before the same judge in the same trial either due to a connection of a case with the principal action or to remove or to lessen the charge of the petitioner.

§ 2.

A counter-claim to the counter-claim is not admissible.

The counter-claim action is to be presented to the judge before whom the first action was filed even if he were delegated for only one case or were otherwise relatively incompetent.

§ 1.

A person who through at least probable arguments, has demonstrated a right to something retained by another and the threat of damage if (nisi) that thing is not placed in safekeeping, has the right to obtain its sequestration from the judge.

§ 2.

In similar circumstances a person can obtain an order retraining another from exercising a right.

§ 1.

Sequestration of the object is also admitted as security for credit provided (dummodo) the right of the creditor is sufficiently evident.

§ 2.

Sequestration can also be extended to the goods of the debtor which are discovered in the possession of others under any title and to the credit of the debtor.

Sequestration of a thing and an order to restrain the exercise of a right can in no way be decreed if the harm that is feared can otherwise be repaired and suitable security for its repair can be furnished.

The judge, in granting sequestration of a thing or an order restraining the exercise of a right, can impose on the person a prior obligation to compensate for damages if the right is not proven.

In regard to the nature and force of a possessory action the prescriptions of the civil law of the place where the thing, the possession of which is in question, is located, are to be observed.