Part I

The Church has an innate and proper right to coerce offending members of the Christian faithful by means of penal sanction.

§ 1.

The following penal sanctions exist in the Church:

(1) medicinal penalties or censures enumerated in cann. 1331-1333;

(2) expiatory penalties enumerated in can. 1336.

§ 2.

The law can establish other expiatory penalties which deprive a believer of some spiritual or temporal good and are consistent with the supernatural end of the Church.

§ 3.

Penal remedies and penances are likewise employed; the former especially in order to prevent offenses, the latter rather to substitute for or to increase a penalty.

§ 1.

If a law is changed after an offense has been committed the law which is more favorable to the accused is to be applied.

§ 2.

But if the second law abolishes the first law or at least its penalty, the penalty immediately ceases.

Ordinarily a penalty is to be inflicted by a sentence (ferendae sententiae) so that it does not bind the guilty party until (nisi) after it has been imposed; however, a penalty is incurred automatically by the very commission of the offense (latae sententiae) if the law or precept expressly determines this.

§ 1.

Those who have legislative power can also issue penal laws, within the existing limits of their competence by reason of territory or persons, they can by means of their own laws safeguard with an appropriate penalty any divine law or an ecclesiastical law made by a higher authority.

§ 2.

The law itself can determine a penalty or its determination can be left to the prudent assessment of a judge.

§ 3.

Particular law can also add other penalties to the penalties established in universal law for some offense, but this is not to be done except (nisi) for the most serious necessity. If the universal law threatens a penalty which is indeterminate or facultative, however, particular law can establish in its place a determinate or obligatory penalty.

Diocesan bishops are to see to it that penal laws if they are to be enacted are uniform in the same city or region to the extent that this is possible.

Penalties should be established to the extent to which they are truly necessary to provide more suitably for ecclesiastical discipline. Dismissal from the clerical state, however, cannot be established by particular law.

A legislator is not to threaten automatic penalties (latae sententiae) unless (nisi) perhaps against certain particularly treacherous offenses which either can result in more serious scandal or cannot be effectively punished by means of inflicted penalties (ferendae sententiae); a legislator is not to establish censures, especially excommunication, except (nisi) with the greatest moderation and only for more serious offenses.

§ 1.

To the extent that one can impose precepts in the external forum by virtue of the power of governance, to that same extent one can also threaten determinate penalties through a precept with the exception of perpetual expiatory penalties.

§ 2.

A penal precept is not to be issued without (nisi) a mature consideration of the matter and without observing what is stated in cann. 1317 and 1318 concerning particular laws.

Religious can be coerced by penalties by the local ordinary in all matters in which they are subject to him.

§ 1.

No one is punished unless (nisi) the external violation of a law or a precept committed by the person is seriously imputable to that person by reason of malice or culpability.

§ 2.

A person who has deliberately violated a law or a precept is bound by the penalty stated in the law or that precept; unless (nisi) a law or a precept provides otherwise, a person who has violated that law or that precept through a lack of necessary diligence is not punished.

§ 3.

Unless (nisi) it is otherwise evident, imputability is presumed whenever an external violation has occurred.

Persons who habitually lack the use of reason are considered incapable of an offense even if they have violated a law or a precept while appearing to be sane.

The following are not subject to penalties when they have violated a law or precept:

(1) a person who has not yet completed the sixteenth year of age;

(2) a person who without any fault was unaware of violating a law or precept; however, inadvertence and error are equivalent to ignorance;

(3) a person who acted out of physical force or in virtue of a mere accident which could neither be foreseen nor prevented when foreseen;

(4) a person who acted out of grave fear, even if only relatively grave, or out of necessity or out of serious inconvenience unless (nisi) the act is intrinsically evil or verges on harm to souls;

(5) a person who for the sake of legitimate self- defense or defense of another acted against an unjust aggressor with due moderation;

(6) a person who lacked the use of reason with due regard for the prescriptions of cann. 1324, § 1, n. 2 and 1325;

(7) a person who without any fault felt that the circumstances in nn. 4 or 5 were verified.

§ 1.

One who violates a law or precept is not exempt from a penalty but the penalty set by law or precept must be tempered or a penance substituted in its place if the offense was committed:

(1) by a person with only the imperfect use of reason;

(2) by a person who lacked the use of reason due to drunkenness or another similar mental disturbance which was culpable;

(3) in the serious heat of passion which did not precede and impede all deliberation of mind and consent of will as long as (dummodo) the passion itself had not been voluntarily stirred up or fostered;

(4) by a minor who has completed the age of sixteen years;

(5) by a person who was forced through grave fear, even if only relatively grave, or through necessity or serious inconvenience, if the offense was intrinsically evil or verged on harm to souls;

(6) by a person who for the sake of legitimate self-defense or defense of another acted against an unjust aggressor but without due moderation;

(7) against one gravely and unjustly provoking it;

(8) by one who erroneously yet culpably thought one of the circumstances in can. 1323, nn. 4 and 5 was verified;

(9) by one who without any fault was unaware that a penalty was attached to the law or precept;

(10) by one who acted without full imputability provided (dummodo) there was grave imputability.

§ 2.

A judge can act in the same manner if any other circumstance exists which would lessen the seriousness of the offense.

§ 3.

An accused is not bound by an automatic penalty (latae sententiae) in the presence of any of the circumstances enumerated in § 1.

Crass, supine or affected ignorance can never be considered in applying the prescriptions of cann. 1323 and 1324; the same is true for drunkenness and other mental disturbances if they are deliberately induced to commit or excuse the offense; this is also true for passion which is deliberately aroused or fostered.

§ 1.

A judge can punish more severely than a law or a precept has stated:

(1) a person who after condemnation or after a declaration of a penalty still commits an offense so as to be prudently presumed to be in continuing bad will in light of the circumstances;

(2) a person who has been given some dignified position or who has abused authority or office in order to commit the offense;

(3) an accused who although a penalty has been established against a culpable offense, foresaw what was to happen yet nonetheless did not take the precautions which any diligent person would have employed to avoid it.

§ 2.

If the penalty established is an automatic one (latae sententiae), another penalty or a penance can be added in those cases mentioned in § 1.

Particular law can determine other exempting, mitigating or aggravating circumstances besides the cases in cann. 1323-1326 either by general norm or for individual offenses. Furthermore, circumstances can be determined in a precept which exempt or mitigate or increase the penalty determined in a precept.

§ 1.

A person who has done or omitted something in order to commit an offense but, unwittingly, has not completed it, is not bound by the penalty stated for a completed delict unless (nisi) the law or precept provides otherwise.

§ 2.

But if such acts or omissions are of their nature conducive to the execution of an offense, their author can be subjected to a penance or a penal remedy unless (nisi) the author spontaneously ceased from the execution of the offense which had been begun. If, however, scandal or some serious injury or danger has occurred, the author can be punished with a just penalty even if he or she had ceased spontaneously; but it is to be lighter than that which is established for a completed offense.

§ 1.

If the penalties established against the principal author are inflicted ones (ferendae sententiae), then those who collaborate to commit an offense through a common conspiracy but who are not expressly named in a law or a precept are subject to the same penalties or to other penalties of the same or lesser severity.

§ 2.

Accomplices who are not named in a law or in a precept incur an automatic penalty (latae sententiae) attached to an offense if it would not have been committed without their efforts and the penalty is of such a nature that it can punish them; otherwise, they can be punished by inflicted penalties (ferendae sententiae).

An offense which consists of some declaration or of some other manifestation of will, doctrine or knowledge is not to be considered completed if no one perceives such a declaration or manifestation.

§ 1.

An excommunicated person is forbidden:

(1) to have any ministerial participation in celebrating the Eucharistic Sacrifice or in any other ceremonies whatsoever of public worship;

(2) to celebrate the sacraments and sacramentals and to receive the sacraments;

(3) to discharge any ecclesiastical offices, ministries or functions whatsoever, or to place acts of governance.

§ 2.

If the excommunication has been imposed or declared, the guilty party:

(1) wishing to act against the prescriptions of § 1, n. 1, is to be prevented from doing so or the liturgical action is to stop unless (nisi) a serious cause intervenes;

(2) invalidly places acts of governance which are only illicit in accord with the norms of § 1, n. 3;

(3) is forbidden to enjoy privileges formerly granted;

(4) cannot validly acquire a dignity, office or other function in the Church;

(5) cannot appropriate the revenues from any dignity, office, function or pension in the Church.

An interdicted person is bound by the prohibitions of can. 1331, § 1 nn. 1 and 2; if, however, the interdict has been imposed or declared, the prescription of can. 1331, § 2, n. 1, is to be observed.

§ 1.

A suspension, which can affect clerics alone, forbids:

(1) either all or some acts of the power of orders;

(2) either all or some acts of the power of governance;

(3) the exercise of either all or some rights or functions which are attached to an office.

§ 2.

It can be stated in a law or a precept that a suspended cleric cannot validly place acts of governance after a condemnatory or declaratory sentence.

§ 3.

A prohibition never affects:

(1) the offices or the power of governance which are not subject to the power of the superior who establishes the penalty;

(2) the right to a dwelling place which the accused may have by reason of his office;

(3) the right to administer goods which may pertain to the office of the suspended cleric himself if the penalty is an automatic one (latae sententiae).

§ 4.

A suspension forbidding one to collect revenues, stipends, pensions or any other such thing carries with it an obligation to make restitution for anything illegitimately collected even in good faith.

§ 1.

Within the limits stated in the preceding canon, the extent of the suspension is defined by the law or precept itself or by the sentence or decree by which it is imposed.

§ 2.

A law but not a precept can establish an automatic suspension (latae sententiae) without any further determination or limitation; such a penalty has all the effects enumerated in can. 1333, § 1.

If a censure prohibits the celebration of the sacraments or sacramentals or the placing of an act of governance, the prohibition is suspended whenever it is necessary to take care of the faithful who are in danger of death; and if an automatic censure (latae sententiae) is not a declared one, the prohibition is also suspended whenever a member of the faithful requests a sacrament, a sacramental or act of governance; this request can be made for any just cause whatsoever.

§ 1.

Besides other penalties which the law may establish, the following are expiatory penalties which can punish an offender in perpetuity, for a prescribed time or for an indeterminate time:

(1) a prohibition or an order concerning living in a certain place or territory;

(2) deprivation of power, office, function, right, privilege, faculty, favor, title or insignia, even merely honorary;

(3) a prohibition against exercising those things mentioned in n. 2 or a prohibition against exercising them in a certain place or outside a certain place, which prohibitions are never under pain of nullity;

(4) a penal transfer to another office;

(5) dismissal from the clerical state.

§ 2.

The only expiatory penalties which can be automatic (latae sententiae) are those enumerated in § 1, n. 3.

§ 1.

A prohibition against living in a certain place or territory can affect either clerics or religious; an order to live in a certain place or territory, however, can affect secular clerics and religious within the limits of their constitutions.

§ 2.

An order to live in a certain place or territory requires the consent of the ordinary of that place unless (nisi) it is a question of a house of penance or correction set aside also for clerics from outside that diocese.

§ 1.

The deprivations and prohibitions enumerated in can. 1336, § 1, nn. 2 and 3, never affect the powers, offices, functions, rights, privileges, faculties, favors, titles or insignia which are not subject to the power of the superior who establishes the penalty.

§ 2.

There is no such penalty as deprivation of the power of orders, but only the prohibition against exercising it or some acts of orders; there is likewise no such penalty as a deprivation of academic degrees.

§ 3.

Prohibitions listed in can. 1336, § 1, n. 3, are to be regulated by the norm given in can. 1335 concerning censures.

§ 1.

An ordinary can admonish personally or through another person one who is in the proximate occasion of committing an offense or upon whom, after an investigation has been made, there has fallen a serious suspicion of having committed an offense.

§ 2.

An ordinary can likewise rebuke a person from whose behavior there arises scandal or serious disturbance of order in a manner accommodated to the special conditions of the person and the deed.

§ 3.

Proof of admonishment and of rebuke must always be retained, at least by some document which is preserved in the secret archive of the curia.

§ 1.

A penance, which can be imposed in the external forum, is some work of religion, piety or charity to be performed.

§ 2.

A public penance is never to be imposed for an occult transgression.

§ 3.

An ordinary can prudently attach penances to the penal remedy of admonishment or of rebuke.

Only after he has ascertained that scandal cannot sufficiently be repaired, that justice cannot sufficiently be restored and that the accused cannot sufficiently be reformed by fraternal correction, rebuke and other ways of pastoral care is the ordinary then to provide for a judicial or administrative procedure to impose or to declare penalties.

§ 1.

As often as just causes preclude a judicial process a penalty can be imposed or declared by an extra-judicial decree; penal remedies and penances, however, can be applied by a decree in any case whatsoever.

§ 2.

Perpetual penalties cannot be imposed or declared by a decree; neither can penalties be so applied when the law or the precept which established them forbids their application by a decree.

§ 3.

What is said in a law or precept concerning a judge's imposing or declaring a penalty in a trial is to be applied to a superior who would impose or declare a penalty by means of an extra-judicial decree, unless (nisi) the contrary is evident or unless it is a question of prescriptions which deal only with procedural matters.

If a law or a precept gives the judge the power to apply or not to apply a penalty, the judge can also temper the penalty or impose a penance in its place in accord with his own conscience and prudence.

Although a law may employ preceptive words, the judge in accord with his own conscience and prudence can:

(1) postpone to a more opportune time the infliction of a penalty if it is foreseen that greater evils will occur from an overly prompt punishment of the accused;

(2) refrain from imposing a penalty, or impose a lighter penalty, or employ a penance if the accused has reformed and scandal has been repaired, or if the accused has been or, it is foreseen, will be sufficiently punished by civil authority;

(3) suspend the obligation to observe an expiatory penalty if it was the person's first offense after having led a praiseworthy life and if the need to repair scandal is not pressing; in such a situation, however, if the accused should again commit an offense within the time period set by the judge, the person is to pay the penalty required for both offenses unless (nisi), in the interim, time had run out for initiating a penal action for the first offense.

As often as the offender had only an imperfect use of reason or committed the offense from fear or necessity or in the heat of passion or in drunkenness or another similar mental disturbance, the judge can also abstain from inflicting any penalty if he judges that reform can be better provided for otherwise.

Whenever the accused has committed several offenses, it is left to the prudent determination of the judge to moderate the penalties within equitable limits if the cumulative burden of the inflicted (ferendae sententiae) penalties appears excessive.

§ 1.

A censure cannot be imposed validly unless the accused has been warned at least once in advance that he or she should withdraw from contumacy and be given a suitable time for repentance.

§ 2.

The guilty party is to be said to have withdrawn from contumacy when he or she has truly repented the offense and furthermore has made suitable reparation for damages and scandal or at least has seriously promised to do so.

When the accused is acquitted of the charge or when no penalty is otherwise imposed on the accused, the ordinary can provide for the public good and for the person's own good by means of appropriate admonitions and other ways of pastoral care or even through penal remedies, if circumstances warrant it.

If the penalty is indeterminate and the law does not provide otherwise, the judge is not to impose heavier penalties, especially censures, unless (nisi) the seriousness of the case clearly demands it; he cannot, however, impose perpetual penalties.

§ 1.

Unless (nisi) it is a question of dismissal from the clerical state, when penalties are imposed upon a cleric provision must always be made that he does not lack those things which are necessary for his decent support.

§ 2.

In the best manner possible the ordinary is to see to the care of a person dismissed from the clerical state who is truly in need due to the penalty.

Unless (nisi) express provision is made otherwise, a penalty binds the guilty party everywhere, even when the authority of the one who established or imposed the penalty has lapsed.

§ 1.

If a penalty prohibits the reception of the sacraments or sacramentals, the prohibition is suspended as long as the guilty party is in danger of death.

§ 2.

The obligation to observe an automatic penalty (latae sententiae) which has not been declared and which is not notorious in the place where the offender is living is totally or partially suspended to the extent that the person cannot observe it without danger of serious scandal or infamy.

An appeal or recourse from judicial sentences or from decrees which impose or declare any penalty whatsoever has a suspensive effect.

§ 1.

Besides the persons enumerated in cann. 1355-1356, all who can dispense from a law which includes a penalty and all who can exempt one from a precept which threatens a penalty can also remit that penalty.

§ 2.

Furthermore, a law or a precept which establishes a penalty can also give the power of remission to other persons.

§ 3.

If the Apostolic See reserves to itself or to another the remission of a penalty, such a reservation is to be interpreted strictly.

§ 1.

Unless (dummodo) it is reserved to the Apostolic See, the following can remit an imposed or declared penalty established by law:

(1) the ordinary who set in motion the trial in order to impose or declare the penalty or who imposed or declared it by decree personally or through another;

(2) the ordinary of the place where the offender lives, after consulting with the ordinary mentioned in n. 1, unless (nisi) this is impossible due to extraordinary circumstances.

§ 2.

Unless it is reserved to the Apostolic See an ordinary can remit an automatic (latae sententiae) penalty established by law but not declared for his own subjects and those who are living in his territory or who committed an offense there; any bishop, however, can also do this in the act of sacramental confession.

§ 1.

The following can remit an inflicted (ferendae sententiae) or automatic (latae sententiae) penalty established by a precept not issued by the Holy See:

(1) the ordinary of the place where the offender lives;

(2) if the penalty has been imposed or declared, the ordinary who set in motion the trial in order to impose or declare the penalty or who imposed or declared it by decree personally or through another.

§ 2.

Before such a remission occurs, the author of the precept is to be consulted unless (nisi) this is impossible due to extraordinary circumstances.

§ 1.

With due regard for the prescriptions of cann. 508 and 976, any confessor can remit in the internal sacramental forum an automatic (latae sententiae) censure of excommunication or interdict which has not been declared if it would be hard on the penitent to remain in a state of serious sin during the time necessary for the competent superior to provide.

§ 2.

In granting a remission, the confessor is to impose on the penitent the burden of having recourse within a month to a superior or a priest endowed with faculties and obeying his mandates under pain of reincidence of the penalty; in the meantime he should impose an appropriate penance and the reparation of any scandal or damage to the extent that it is imperative; recourse can also be made by the confessor without mentioning any names.

§ 3.

After they have recovered, those absolved in accord with can. 976 from an imposed or declared censure or one reserved to the Holy See are bound by the same obligation of recourse.

§ 1.

A remission of a censure cannot be granted unless an offender has withdrawn from contumacy in accord with the norm of can 1347, § 2; remission cannot be denied, however, to a person who withdraws from contumacy.

§ 2.

A person who remits a censure can act in accord with the norm of can. 1348 or even impose a penance.

If a person is bound by many penalties, the remission has force only for those penalties expressly mentioned in the remission; a general remission, however, takes away all penalties with the exception of those about which the guilty party kept silent in the petition in bad faith.

If the remission of a penalty was extorted through grave fear, it is invalid.

§ 1.

A remission can be granted even to a person who is not present or even under a condition.

§ 2.

A remission in the external forum is to be given in writing unless (nisi) a serious cause persuades otherwise.

§ 3.

Care should be taken that a petition for remission or the remission itself not be made public, except (nisi) to the extent that it would be advantageous to protect the reputation of the guilty party or necessary to repair scandal.

§ 1.

A criminal action is extinguished by prescription in three years unless (nisi) it is a question of:

(1) offenses reserved to the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith;

(2) an action due to offenses mentioned in cann. 1394, 1395, 1397 and 1398, which have a prescription of five years;

(3) offenses which are not punished in common law if particular law has stated another term of prescription.

§ 2.

Prescription starts on the day the offense was committed or on the day when it ceased if the offense is continuous or habitual.

§ 1.

An action to execute a penalty is extinguished by prescription if the guilty party has not been notified of the judge's executive decree mentioned in can. 1651 within the time limits indicated in can. 1362 which are to be computed from the day on which the condemnatory sentence became a finally judged matter (res iudicata).

§ 2.

All other things being observed that are to be observed, the same holds true if the penalty was imposed through an extra-judicial decree.