Caput I

With due regard for can. 76, § 1, an individual administrative act, be it a decree, a precept or a rescript, can be issued by one who possesses executive power within the limits of that person's competency.

§ 1.

An administrative act is to be understood in accord with the proper meaning of the words and the common usage of speech. In a doubtful situation administrative acts are subject to a broad interpretation except for the following administrative acts which are subject to a strict interpretation: those dealing with lawsuits, those threatening or inflicting penalties, those which restrict the rights of a person, those which injure the acquired rights of others, or those which benefit private individuals and are contrary to law.

§ 2.

An administrative act must not be extended to cases other than those actually expressed in it.

An administrative act which deals with the external forum is to be set forth in writing; likewise, if the administrative act is issued in commissorial form (forma commissoria), its act of execution is to be in writing.

Even in the case of a rescript given at the initiative of its issuer (motu proprio), an administrative act lacks effect insofar as it injures the acquired right of another or is contrary to a law or an approved custom, unless (nisi) the competent authority expressly adds to it a derogating clause.

Conditions attached to an administrative act are considered to affect its validity only when they are expressed by the particles if (si), unless (nisi), or provided that (dummodo).

The executor of an administrative act who executes it before receiving the letter and verifying its authenticity and accuracy functions invalidly, unless (nisi) previous notice of the letter had been given to the executor by the authority who issued the act.

The executor of an administrative act whose competency is limited to executing it cannot refuse to execute it unless (nisi) it is manifestly apparent that the act is null, that it cannot be upheld due to another serious cause, or that the conditions attached to the administrative act itself have not been fulfilled. Nevertheless, if the execution of the administrative act appears inopportune due to circumstances of person or place, the executor should delay its execution; in all these cases the executor should immediately inform the authority who issued the act.

The executor of an administrative act must proceed in accord with the norm of the mandate; the execution is invalid unless (nisi) the essential conditions attached in the letter have been fulfilled and unless the executor has substantially observed the procedural formalities.

The executor of an administrative act can with prudent judgment substitute another as executor unless (nisi) such substitution has been forbidden or the executor has been chosen for personal qualifications, or the person of the substitute has been predetermined; however, in these cases the executor may entrust preparatory acts to another.

Unless (nisi) the executor was chosen on account of personal qualifications, ad administrative act can also be implemented by the executor's successor in office.

If in some way the executor erred in the execution of an administrative act, the executor may implement the same act again.

Unless (nisi) it is expressly provided otherwise in law, an administrative act does not cease with the termination of the authority of the one issuing it.

The revocation of an administrative act by means of another administrative act of a competent authority takes effect only from the moment at which the latter act has legitimately been made known to the person for whom it has been given.

An individual decree is an administrative act issued by a competent executive authority in which a decision is given or a provision is made in a particular case in accord with the norms of law; such decisions or provisions of their nature do not presuppose that a petition has been made by someone.

An individual precept is a decree directly and legitimately enjoining a determined person or persons to do or to omit something, especially concerning the urging of the observance of a law.

Before issuing an individual decree an authority should seek out the necessary information and proofs, and also hear those whose rights can be injured, insofar as this is possible.

A decree should be issued in writing, giving, in the case of a decision, the reasons which prompted it, at least in a summary fashion.

An individual decree has force only in respect to the matters it decides and only on behalf of the persons for whom it was given; it obliges these persons everywhere, unless (nisi) it is otherwise evident.

If decrees are contrary to one another, a special decree prevails over a general decree in those matters which are specifically expressed; if they are equally special or general, the later decree modifies the prior one to the extent that the later is contrary to the prior.

§ 1.

An individual decree whose application is entrusted to an executor takes effect from the moment of its execution; otherwise, from the moment it is made known to the person through the authority of its issuer.

§ 2.

For an individual decree to be enforced it must be communicated by means of a legitimate document in accord with the norm of law.

With due regard for the prescription of cann. 37 and 51, when a most serious reason prevents the handing over of the written text of a decree, the decree is considered to have been communicated if it is read before a notary or two witnesses to the person for whom it is destined and all present sign an instrument stating this was done.

A decree is considered to have been communicated when the person for whom it was destined was properly summoned to receive or hear it, even if the person without a just cause did not appear or refused to sign it.

§ 1.

As often as the law requires a decree to be issued or if an interested party legitimately presents either a petition or a recourse to obtain a decree, the competent authority should provide for the matter within three months from the receipt of the petition or recourse unless (nisi) another time period is prescribed by law.

§ 2.

When this period of time has passed, if the decree has not yet been given, the response is presumed to be negative regarding the presentation of a further recourse.

§ 3.

A presumed negative response does not exempt the competent authority from the obligation of issuing the decree and even making reparation for damages possibly incurred in accord with the norm of can. 128.

§ 1.

An individual decree ceases to have force through its legitimate revocation by competent authority and also through the cessation of the law for whose execution it has been given.

§ 2.

An individual precept which has not been imposed through a legitimate document ceases with the termination of the authority of the one issuing it.

§ 1.

A rescript is an administrative act issued in writing by competent executive authority by which through its very nature a privilege, dispensation, or other favor is granted in response to someone's request.

§ 2.

The prescriptions established for rescripts also apply to the verbal granting of a permission or of favors, unless (nisi) it is otherwise evident.

Any rescript whatsoever can be requested by all who are not expressly forbidden to do so.

Unless (nisi) it is otherwise evident, a rescript can be requested on behalf of another person, even without that person's consent, and it takes effect before the person's acceptance, with due regard for contrary clauses.

A rescript for which no executor is given takes effect from the moment when the letter is issued; other rescripts take effect from the moment of execution.

§ 1.

Subreption, or the concealment of the truth, invalidates a rescript if those things which must be expressed in the request for validity according to the law, style, and canonical practice were not expressed; this does not apply to a rescript of favor which was given motu proprio.

§ 2.

Obreption, or statements of falsehood, likewise invalidates a rescript if not even one proposed motivating reason is true.

§ 3.

For rescripts which have no executor the motivating reason must be true at the time when the rescript is issued; for other rescripts, at the time of execution.

With due regard for the authority of the Sacred Penitentiary in the internal forum, a favor which has been denied by one dicastery of the Roman Curia cannot be validly granted by another dicastery or by another competent authority below the Roman Pontiff without the consent of the dicastery before which the matter was initiated.

§ 1.

With due regard for the prescriptions of § § 2 and 3, no one should petition for a favor from another ordinary which has been denied by one's own ordinary unless (nisi) mention of the denial has been made. Even after such mention has been made, the second ordinary should not grant the favor unless (nisi) he has obtained the reasons for the denial from the prior ordinary.

§ 2.

A favor which has been denied by a vicar general or by an episcopal vicar cannot be granted validly by another vicar of the same bishop even if the reasons for the denial have been obtained from the vicar who denied it.

§ 3.

A favor which has been denied by a vicar general or by an episcopal vicar and later procured from the diocesan bishop without mentioning this denial is invalid. But a favor which has been denied by the diocesan bishop cannot be procured validly from his vicar general or episcopal vicar without the consent of the bishop, even if mention of the denial has been made.

A rescript does not become invalid due to an error in the name of the person to whom it is given or from whom it is issued or an error in the name of the place where the person is staying or the matter being treated provided (dummodo) that there is no doubt concerning the identity of the person or the matter in question in the judgment of the ordinary.

§ 1.

If it happens that two contradictory rescripts are procured concerning one and the same thing the special rescript prevails over the general one in those matters which are specifically expressed.

§ 2.

If they are equally special or general in character, the first one issued prevails over the one issued later, unless (nisi) express mention of the prior one is made in the second one or unless (nisi) the person who had procured the prior rescript had not used it out of deceit or notable negligence.

§ 3.

When there is doubt about whether a rescript is valid or not, recourse should be had to the one issuing it.

A rescript of the Apostolic See in which no executor is given must be presented to the ordinary of the person who obtained it only when such action is ordered by the rescript itself, or when it deals with public affairs, or when it is necessary to prove that the attached conditions have been satisfied.

When no definite time is set for its presentation, a rescript can be presented to its executor at any time whatsoever, provided fraud and deceit are absent.

If the granting of a rescript is entrusted to an executor, the favor can be granted or denied in accord with the executor's prudent judgment and conscience.

No one is bound to use a rescript granted for one's own advantage alone, unless (nisi) one is otherwise bound to do so by a canonical obligation.

Rescripts granted by the Apostolic See which have expired can be extended once by a diocesan bishop for a just reason, but not beyond three months.

No rescripts are revoked by a contrary law unless (nisi) it is provided otherwise in the law itself.

Although a person can use in the internal forum a favor granted only orally, the person is bound to prove it for the external forum whenever this is legitimately requested.

If a rescript contains a privilege or a dispensation, the prescriptions of the following canons are likewise to be observed.

§ 1.

A privilege or a favor granted to certain persons, whether physical or juridical, by means of a special act can be granted by the legislator as well as by an executive authority to whom the legislator has granted this power.

§ 2.

Centenary or immemorial possession induces a presumption that a privilege has been granted.

A privilege is to be interpreted in accord with the norm of can. 36, § 1, but that interpretation is always to be used so that the beneficiaries of a privilege actually obtain some favor.

§ 1.

A privilege is presumed to be perpetual unless (nisi) the contrary is proved.

§ 2.

A personal privilege, namely one which follows the person, ceases with the person's death.

§ 3.

A real privilege ceases with the complete destruction of the thing or place; but a local privilege revives if the place is restored within fifty years.

A privilege ceases through its revocation by competent authority in accord with the norm of can. 47, with due regard for the prescription of can. 81.

§ 1.

No privilege ceases through renunciation unless (nisi) the renunciation has been accepted by the competent authority.

§ 2.

Any physical person can renounce a privilege granted on behalf of that person alone.

§ 3.

Individual persons cannot renounce a privilege which has been granted to some juridic person or has been granted by reason of the dignity of a place or thing; nor is a juridic person competent to renounce a privilege granted to it if its renunciation prejudices the Church or others.

A privilege is not terminated with the termination of the authority of the one issuing it unless (nisi) it has been granted with the provision ad beneplacitum nostrum or some equivalent terminology.

A privilege which is not a burden on others does not cease through nonusage or contrary usage; but if it is to the disadvantage of others, it is lost through legitimate prescription.

§ 1.

A privilege ceases through the lapse of the period of time or after the completion of the number of cases for which it was granted, with due regard for the provision of can 142,

§ 2.

§ 2. A privilege also ceases if in the course of time circumstances change to such a degree that the privilege becomes harmful or its use illicit in the judgment of the competent authority.

Whoever abuses the power given by privilege deserves to be deprived of it; therefore, the ordinary, after having admonished the grantee in vain, may deprive the one who seriously abuses it of a privilege which he himself had granted; if, however, the privilege was granted by the Apostolic See, the ordinary is bound to notify the Apostolic See.

A dispensation, or the relaxation of a merely ecclesiastical law in a particular case, can be granted by those who enjoy executive power, within the limits of their competence, as well as by those to whom the power of dispensing has been given explicitly or implicitly either by the law itself or by lawful delegation.

Laws, to the extent that they define that which essentially constitutes juridical institutes or acts, are not subject to dispensation.

§ 1.

As often as he judges that a dispensation will contribute to the spiritual good of the faithful, the diocesan bishop can dispense from both universal and particular disciplinary laws established for his territory or for his subjects by the supreme authority of the Church. He cannot dispense, however, from procedural or penal laws or from those laws whose dispensation is especially reserved to the Apostolic See or to another authority.

§ 2.

If recourse to the Holy See is difficult and, at the same time, there is danger of grave harm in delay, any ordinary can dispense from the abovementioned disciplinary laws, even if the dispensation is reserved to the Holy See, provided (dummodo) that the matter concerns a dispensation which the Holy See is wont to grant under the same circumstances with due regard for the prescriptions of can. 291.

The local ordinary can dispense from diocesan laws and, as often as he judges that a dispensation will contribute to the good of the faithful, from laws passed by a plenary or provincial council or by the conference of bishops.

The pastor (parochus) and other presbyters or deacons cannot dispense from a universal or particular law unless (nisi) this power has been expressly granted to them.

§ 1.

A dispensation from an ecclesiastical law may not be granted without a just and reasonable cause and without taking into consideration the circumstances of the case and the gravity of the law from which the dispensation is to be given; otherwise the dispensation is illicit and, unless (nisi) it is given by the legislator himself or his superior, it is also invalid.

§ 2.

When there is a doubt about the sufficiency of the cause, a dispensation is granted validly and licitly.

One who possesses the power of dispensing can exercise it even though he is outside his own territory, for his subjects, though they are absent from his territory, and also, unless (nisi) the contrary is expressly established, for travelers (peregrini) actually present in his territory, as well as on his own behalf.

A strict interpretation must be given not only to a dispensation according to can. 36, § 1, but also to the very power of dispensing granted for a particular case.

A dispensation which has successive applications ceases in the same ways as a privilege and also because of the certain and complete cessation of the motivating cause.

§ 1.

Statutes in the proper sense are ordinances which are established in aggregates of persons or of things according to the norm of law and by which their purpose, constitution, government and operation are defined.

§ 2.

The statutes of an aggregate of persons bind only its legitimate members; the statutes of an aggregate of things bind only those who govern it.

§ 3.

Those prescriptions of statutes which were issued and promulgated in virtue of legislative power are governed by the prescriptions of the canons on laws.

§ 1.

Rules of order (ordines) are rules or norms to be observed in assemblies of persons, whether the assemblies were convoked by ecclesiastical authority or called together freely by the Christian faithful or are other kinds of celebrations. These rules define the constitution, government and procedures of the assembly.

§ 2.

In assemblies or celebrations the rules of order oblige all those who participate.

By baptism one is incorporated into the Church of Christ and is constituted a person in it with duties and rights which are proper to Christians, in keeping with their condition, to the extent that they are in ecclesiastical communion and unless (nisi) a legitimately issued sanction stands in the way.

§ 1.

A person who has completed the eighteenth year of age is an adult; below this age, a person is a minor.

§ 2.

Before the completion of the seventh year a minor is called an infant and is held to be incompetent (non sui compos); with the completion of the seventh year one is presumed to have the use of reason.

§ 1.

An adult person enjoys the full use of his or her rights.

§ 2.

A minor person remains subject to the authority of parents or guardians in the exercise of his or her rights, with the exception of those areas in which minors by divine law or canon law are exempt from their power; with reference to the designation of guardians and their authority, the prescriptions of the civil law are to be followed unless (nisi) canon law determines otherwise or unless the diocesan bishop in certain cases for a just cause has decided to provide otherwise through the designation of some other guardian.

Whoever habitually lacks the use of reason is held to be incompetent (non sui compos) and is equated with infants.

A person is called a resident (incola) in the place where one has a domicile; a temporary resident (advena) in the place where one has a quasi-domicile; a traveler (peregrinus) when outside the place of domicile or quasi-domicile which is still retained; and a transient (vagus) if one has neither domicile nor quasi- domicile anywhere.

§ 1.

The place of origin of a child, even of a neophyte, is that in which the parents had a domicile, or in its absence a quasi-domicile, at the time the child was born or, if the parents did not have the same domicile or quasi-domicile, that of the mother.

§ 2.

In the case of a child of transients (vagi), the place of origin is the place of birth; in the case of an abandoned child, it is the place in which the child was found.

§ 1.

Domicile is acquired by residence within the territory of a certain parish or at least of a diocese, which either is joined with the intention of remaining there permanently unless (nisi) called away, or has been protracted for five complete years.

§ 2.

Quasi- domicile is acquired by residence within the territory of a certain parish or at least of a diocese which either is joined with the intention of remaining there at least three months, unless (nisi) called away, or has in fact been protracted for three months.

§ 3.

A domicile or quasi-domicile within the territory of a parish is called parochial; in the territory of a diocese, even though not in a particular parish, it is called diocesan.

Members of religious institutes and societies of apostolic life acquire a domicile in the place of the house to which they are attached; they acquire a quasi-domicile in the house where they are living according to the norm of can. 102, § 2.

Spouses may have a common domicile or quasi-domicile; either can have a proper domicile or quasi-domicile by reason of a legitimate separation or some other just cause.

§ 1.

A minor necessarily keeps the domicile or quasi-domicile of the one to whose power he or she is subject. After passing beyond infancy one can also acquire a quasi-domicile of one's own; and one who has been legally emancipated according to the norm of civil law can also acquire a domicile of his or her own.

§ 2.

Whoever has been legally placed under the guardianship or care of another, for some reason other than minority, has the domicile or quasi-domicile of the guardian or curator.

Domicile and quasi-domicile are lost by departure from the place with the intention of not returning, with due regard for the prescription of can. 105.

§ 1.

Each person acquires a proper pastor (parochus) and ordinary through both domicile and quasi-domicile.

§ 2.

The proper pastor (parochus) or ordinary of a transient (vagus) is the pastor (parochus) or ordinary of the place in which the transient is actually staying.

§ 3.

The proper pastor (parochus) of one who has only a diocesan domicile or quasi-domicile is the pastor (parochus) of the place in which such a person is actually staying.

§ 1.

Consanguinity is calculated through lines and degrees.

§ 2.

In the direct line, there are as many degrees as there are generations or persons, not counting the common ancestor.

§ 3.

In the collateral line, there are as many degrees as there are persons in both lines together, not counting the common ancestor.

§ 1.

Affinity arises from a valid marriage, even if not consummated, and exists between a man and the blood relatives of the woman and between the woman and blood relatives of the man.

§ 2.

It is so calculated that those who are blood relatives of the man are related in the same line and degree by affinity to the woman, and vice versa.

Children who have been adopted according to the norm of civil law are considered as being the children of the person or persons who have adopted them.

§ 1.

A child of parents who belong to the Latin Church is ascribed to it by reception of baptism, or, if one or the other parent does not belong to the Latin Church and both parents agree in choosing that the child be baptized in the Latin Church, the child is ascribed to it by reception of baptism; but, if the agreement is lacking, the child is ascribed to the Ritual Church to which the father belongs.

§ 2.

Anyone to be baptized who has completed the fourteenth year of age can freely choose to be baptized in the Latin Church or in another Ritual Church sui iuris, and in this case the person belongs to that Church which is chosen.

§ 1.

After the reception of baptism, the following are enrolled in another Ritual Church sui iuris:

(1) one who has obtained permission from the Apostolic See;

(2) a spouse who declares at the time of marriage or during marriage that he or she is transferring to the Ritual Church sui iuris of the other spouse; but when the marriage has ended, that person can freely return to the Latin Church;

(3) children of those in nn. 1 and 2 under fourteen complete years of age; and similarly children of a Catholic party in a mixed marriage who legitimately transferred to another Ritual Church. But, when such persons reach fourteen complete years of age, they may return to the Latin Church.

§ 2.

The custom, however prolonged, of receiving the sacraments according to the rite of another Ritual Church sui iuris, does not carry with it enrollment in that Church.

§ 1.

The Catholic Church and the Apostolic See have the nature of a moral person by divine law itself.

§ 2.

Besides physical persons, there are also in the Church juridic persons, that is, subjects in canon law of obligations and rights which correspond to their nature.

§ 1.

Juridic persons are constituted either by prescription of law or by special concession of the competent authority given through a decree; they are aggregates of persons or of things ordered towards a purpose congruent with the mission of the Church and which transcends the purpose of the individuals that make them up.

§ 2.

The purposes spoken of in § 1 are understood as those which pertain to works of piety, of the apostolate or of charity, whether spiritual or temporal.

§ 3.

The competent ecclesiastical authority is not to confer juridic personality except (nisi) upon those aggregates of persons or things which pursue a truly useful purpose and, all things considered, have resources which are foreseen to be sufficient to achieve their designated end.

§ 1.

Juridic persons within the Church are aggregates either of persons or of things.

§ 2.

An aggregate of persons which cannot be constituted unless (nonnisi) it consists of at least three persons, is collegial if its members determine its action through participation in making its decisions, whether by equal right or not, according to the norm of law and its own statutes; otherwise it is noncollegial.

§ 3.

An aggregate of things or an autonomous foundation consists of goods or things, whether spiritual or material, and is directed by one or several physical persons or a college according to the norm of law and its statutes.

§ 1.

Public juridic persons are aggregates of persons or things which are so constituted by the competent ecclesiastical authority that, within the limits set for them in the name of the Church, they fulfill a proper function entrusted to them in view of the common good, in accord with the prescripts of law; other juridic persons are private.

§ 2.

Public juridic persons are given this personality either through the law itself or by a special decree of the competent authority granting it; private juridic persons are given this personality only through a special decree of the competent authority expressly granting this personality.

No aggregate of persons or things, intending to obtain juridic personality, can achieve it unless (nisi) its statutes have been approved by the competent authority.

They alone represent a public juridic person and act in its name who are acknowledged to have this competence either by universal or particular law or by its own statutes; they represent a private juridic person who have been given this competency by statute.

With regard to collegial acts, unless (nisi) provision is made otherwise by law or statutes:

(1) if it is a question of elections, that action has the force of law which, when a majority of those who must be convoked are present, receives the approval of an absolute majority of those who are present; after two indecisive ballots, the choice is between the two candidates who have obtained the greater number of the votes, or, if there are several (with the same numbers), upon the two who are senior in age; after a third ballot, if the tie remains, the one who is the senior in age is considered elected;

(2) if it is a question of other matters, that action will have the force of law which, when a majority of those who must be convoked are present, receives the approval of an absolute majority of those who are present; if after two ballots it is a tie vote, the presiding officer can break the tie by his or her vote;

(3) what touches all as individuals must be approved by all.

§ 1.

A juridic person is of its nature perpetual; nevertheless it is extinguished if it is legitimately suppressed by a competent authority or has ceased activity for a hundred years; a private juridic person is furthermore extinguished if the association is dissolved according to the norm of its statutes, or if, in the judgment of the competent authority, the foundation itself has ceased to exist according to the norm of its statutes.

§ 2.

If even one member of a collegial juridic person survives, and the aggregate of persons has not ceased to exist according to its statutes, the exercise of all of the rights of the aggregate devolves upon that one member.

If aggregates, whether of persons or of things, which are public juridic persons, are so joined that out of all of them one aggregate is constituted, itself enjoying juridic personality, this new juridic person obtains the goods and patrimonial rights proper to the prior ones, and it also takes upon itself the obligations with which they have been burdened; however, the intention of the founders and donors and acquired rights must be respected, particularly as regards the allocation of goods and the fulfillment of obligations.

If an aggregate which has public juridic personality is so to be divided so that a part of it is united to another public juridic person, or that a distinct public juridic persons is established from the separated part, it is the obligation of the ecclesiastical authority which is competent to make the division, having observed before all else the intention of founders and donors, acquired rights, and approved statutes, to see to it personally or through an executor:

(1) that things held in common which are capable of division, both goods and patrimonial rights as well as the debts and other obligations, are divided among the juridic persons concerned with due proportion based on equity and justice, taking into account all the circumstances and the needs of each;

(2) that the use and usufruct of those common goods which are not susceptible to division accrue to each juridic person, and that the obligations proper to them fall upon each, to be determined in like manner with proper regard for due proportion based on equity and justice.

Upon the extinction of a public juridic person, the allocation of its goods, patrimonial rights and obligations, is ruled by law and by statutes; if these give no indication, they go to the juridic person immediately superior, with due regard for the will of the founders or donors and for acquired rights; upon the extinction of a private juridic person the allocation of its goods and obligations is regulated by its own statutes.

§ 1.

For the validity of a juridic act it is required that it be placed by a person capable of placing it, and that it include those elements which essentially constitute it as well as the formalities and requisites imposed by law for the validity of the act.

§ 2.

A juridic act correctly placed with respect to its external elements is presumed to be valid.

§ 1.

An act placed because of extrinsic force brought to bear upon a person, which the person was not in any way able to resist, is considered not to have been placed.

§ 2.

An act placed because of grave fear, which has been unjustly afflicted, or because of fraud is valid unless (nisi) the law makes some other provision; but such an act can be rescinded by the decision of a judge, either at the instance of an injured party, or that party's successors in law, or ex officio.

An act placed because of ignorance or error concerning an element which constitutes its substance or which amounts to a condition sine qua non is invalid; otherwise it is valid, unless (nisi) the law makes some other provision. However, an act placed out of ignorance or error can be the occasion for a recissory action in accord with the norm of law.

§ 1.

When the law determines that in order to place certain acts a superior requires the consent or counsel of a college or group of persons, the college or group must be convoked according to the norm of can. 166, unless (nisi) particular or proper law provides otherwise when counsel only is to be sought; however, for such acts to be valid it is required that the consent of an absolute majority of those present be obtained or that the counsel of all who are present be sought.

§ 2.

When the law determines that a superior in order to place certain acts requires the consent or the counsel of certain persons as individuals:

(1) if consent is required, the action of the superior is invalid if the superior does not seek the consent of those persons or acts contrary to the opinion of the persons or person;

(2) if counsel is required, the action of the superior is invalid if the superior does not listen to those persons; although in no way obliged to accede to their recommendation, even if it be unanimous, nevertheless the superior should not act contrary to it, especially when there is a consensus, unless (nisi) there be a reason which, in the superior's judgment, is overriding.

§ 3.

All whose consent or counsel is required are obliged to offer their opinion sincerely and, if the seriousness of the matter requires it, to observe secrecy sedulously, and this obligation can be insisted upon by the superior.

Anyone who unlawfully inflicts damage upon someone by a juridic act, or indeed by any other act placed with malice or culpability is obliged to compensate for the damage inflicted.

§ 1.

In accord with the prescriptions of law, those who have received sacred orders are capable of the power of governance, which exists in the Church by divine institution and is also called the power of jurisdiction.

§ 2.

Lay members of the Christian faithful can cooperate in the exercise of this power in accord with the norm of law.

The power of governance is normally exercised in the external forum , but sometimes it is exercised in the internal forum only, but in such a way that the effects which its exercise normally has in the external forum are not acknowledged in this forum except (nisi) as is established by law in certain instances.

§ 1.

The ordinary power of governance is that which is joined to a certain office by the law itself; delegated power is that which is granted to a person, but not by means of an office.

§ 2.

The ordinary power of governance can be either proper or vicarious.

§ 3.

The burden of proving delegation rests with the person who claims to have been delegated.

§ 1.

Habitual faculties are governed by the prescriptions for delegated power.

§ 2.

However, unless (nisi) otherwise expressly provided in the grant of faculties or unless an ordinary was chosen for his personal qualifications, a habitual faculty granted to an ordinary is not withdrawn when that ordinary's authority ceases, even though he has started to execute the faculty, but it transfers to any ordinary who succeeds him in governance.

§ 1.

A delegate who exceeds the limits of the mandate with respect to matters or to persons acts invalidly.

§ 2.

A delegate who acts in delegated matters in a manner other than that determined in the mandate is not considered to have exceeded the limits of the mandate unless (nisi) the manner of acting was prescribed for validity by the one delegating.

§ 1.

By the title of ordinary in the law are understood, in addition to the Roman Pontiff, diocesan bishops and others who, even if only on an interim basis, have been placed over a particular church or over a community which is equivalent to it according to the norm of can. 368, as well as those who possess ordinary general executive power in said churches and communities, namely vicars general and episcopal vicars; and likewise for their own members the major superior of clerical religious institutes of pontifical right and of clerical societies of apostolic life of pontifical right, who possess at least ordinary executive power.

§ 2.

By the title of local ordinary are understood all those mentioned in § 1, except superiors of religious institutes and societies of apostolic life.

§ 3.

Whatever things in the canons in the realm of executive power which are attributed by name to the diocesan bishop are understood to pertain only to the diocesan bishop and to others equivalent to him in can. 381, § 2, excluding the vicar general and the episcopal vicar unless (nisi) they have received a special mandate.

§ 1.

The power of governance is distinguished as legislative, executive and judicial.

§ 2.

Legislative power is to be exercised in the manner prescribed by law, and that legislative power in the Church possessed by a legislator below the highest authority cannot be validly delegated, unless (nisi) otherwise explicitly provided for in the law; a law which is contrary to a higher law cannot be validly enacted by a lower level legislator.

§ 3.

Judicial power, which is possessed by judges or judicial colleges, is to be exercised in the manner prescribed by law and cannot be delegated, except (nisi) to carry out acts which are preparatory to a decree or a decision.

§ 4.

In regard to the exercise of executive power, the prescriptions of the following canons are to be observed.

A person can exercise executive power over his subjects, even though he himself is outside his own territory and even when they are outside his territory, unless (nisi) the contrary is certain from the nature of the case or from the prescription of the law; he can also exercise this power over travellers actually present in his territory, provided it is a matter of granting favors or of enforcing either universal laws or particular laws by which they are bound according to the norm of can. 13, § 2, n. 2.

§ 1.

Ordinary executive power can be delegated both for a single act and for all cases, unless (nisi) the law expressly provides otherwise.

§ 2.

Executive power delegated by the Apostolic See can be subdelegated, whether for a single act or for all cases, unless (nisi) the delegation was granted in view of the special qualifications of the delegate or unless subdelegation was expressly prohibited.

§ 3.

If executive power delegated by another authority having ordinary power was delegated for all cases, it can be subdelegated only for individual cases; if, however, it was delegated for a single act or for determined acts it cannot be subdelegated except (nisi) by the expressed grant of the one delegating.

§ 4.

No subdelegated power can be again subdelegated, unless (nisi) this has been expressly granted by the one delegating.

Ordinary executive power as well as power delegated for all cases is to be broadly interpreted; any other is to be strictly interpreted; however, a person who has received delegated power is understood to have also been granted whatever is necessary to exercise that power.

§ 1.

Unless (nisi) other provision is made in the law, the fact that a person approaches a competent authority, even one which is higher, does not suspend the executive power of another competent authority, whether this be ordinary or delegated.

§ 2.

Nevertheless, a lower authority should not become involved in cases which have been submitted to a higher authority, except (nisi) for a grave and urgent reason, in which case the lower authority should immediately notify the higher concerning the matter.

§ 1.

When several persons have been delegated in solidum to transact the same business, the one who first undertakes to deal with it excludes the others from acting, unless (nisi) thereafter that person is impeded or does not wish to proceed further in treating the matter.

§ 2.

When several persons have been delegated to transact some business collegially, all must proceed according to the norm of can. 119, unless (nisi) in their mandate some other provision has been made.

§ 3.

Executive power delegated to several persons is presumed to have been delegated to them in solidum.

If several persons have been successively delegated, that person should transact the business whose mandate is prior to the others and has not later been revoked.

§ 1.

Delegated power ceases by fulfillment of the mandate, by the lapse of the time or by the completion of the number of cases for which it was granted, by cessation of the final cause of the delegation, by the revocation of the one delegating directly communicated to the delegate, as well as by the resignation of the delegate made known to and accepted by the one delegating; it does not cease, however, by the expiration of the authority of the one delegating, unless (nisi) this is clear from clauses appended to the grant.

§ 2.

An act of delegated power, however, which is exercised only for the internal forum and which is placed inadvertently after the lapse of the time of the grant, is valid.

§ 1.

Ordinary power ceases by the loss of the office to which it is connected.

§ 2.

Unless (nisi) the law provides otherwise, ordinary power is suspended in the event that a privation of or removal from office is legitimately appealed or recourse taken.

§ 1.

In factual or legal common error and also in positive and probable doubt about law or about fact, the Church supplies executive power of governance both for the external and for the internal forum.

§ 2.

This same norm applies to the faculties mentioned in cann. 882, 966 and 1111, § 1.

§ 1.

An ecclesiastical office is any function constituted in a stable manner by divine or ecclesiastical law to be exercised for a spiritual purpose.

§ 2.

The obligations and the rights proper to individual ecclesiastical offices are defined either in the law by which the office is constituted or in the decree of a competent authority by which it is at the same time constituted and conferred.

An ecclesiastical office cannot be validly acquired without canonical provision.

Provision of an ecclesiastical office occurs by the free conferral of a competent ecclesiastical authority, or by installation by the same authority if presentation preceded it, or by confirmation or admission granted by the same authority if election or postulation preceded it, or, finally, by simple election and acceptance by the one elected if the election does not require confirmation.

That authority which is competent to establish, modify and suppress offices is also competent to make provision for them unless (nisi) the law establishes otherwise.

§ 1.

In order to be promoted to an ecclesiastical office, a person must be in the communion of the Church as well as suitable, namely endowed with those qualities which are required for the office in question by universal or particular law or by the law of the foundation.

§ 2.

Provision of an ecclesiastical office made in favor of a person who lacks the required qualities is invalid only if the qualities are expressly required for the validity of the provision by universal or particular law or the law of the foundation; otherwise the provision is valid, but it can be rescinded by the decree of the competent authority or by the sentence of an administrative tribunal.

§ 3.

Simoniacal provision of an office is invalid by the law itself.

An office entailing the full care of souls, for whose fulfillment the exercise of the priestly order is required, cannot be validly conferred upon someone who has not yet received priestly ordination.

The provision of an office entailing the care of souls is not to be deferred without serious cause.

Two or more incompatible offices, that is, offices which cannot be fulfilled at the same time by the same person may not be conferred upon one person.

§ 1.

The provision of an office which is by law not vacant is by that very fact invalid, and a subsequent vacancy does not validate the provision.

§ 2.

But if it is a question of an office which by law is conferred for a determined period of time the provision can be made within six months before the expiration of this time, and it takes effect on the day of the vacancy of the office.

§ 3.

A promise of an office, no matter by whom it is made, has no juridic effect.

An office which is vacant by law but perhaps held by someone illegitimately can be conferred provided (dummodo) that it is duly declared that the possession is illegitimate and provided that this declaration is mentioned in the document of conferral.

A person who confers an office, while supplying for someone who is negligent or impeded, thereby acquires no power over the person upon whom the office was conferred, and the juridic situation of that person is determined just as though the provision had been made according to the ordinary norm of law.

The provision of any office whatsoever is to be made in writing.

Unless (nisi) otherwise explicitly determined by law, it is within the competence of the diocesan bishop to provide for ecclesiastical offices in his own particular church by free conferral.

§ 1.

Presentation for an ecclesiastical office must be made by the person who has the right of presentation to the authority whose right it is to install someone in the office in question, and furthermore this presentation must be made within three months from the receipt of notice of the vacancy of the office, unless (nisi) something else has been legitimately established.

§ 2.

If the right of presentation belongs to a certain college or group of persons, the person to be presented is to be designated according to the prescriptions of cann. 165-179.

No one may be presented who is unwilling; hence a person proposed for presentation who has been asked about his or her willingness can be presented unless (nisi) the person has declined it within eight days of available time.

§ 1.

A person who enjoys the right of presentation can present one or even several candidates either at one time or successively.

§ 2.

No one can present himself or herself; a college or group of persons, however, can present one of its own members.

§ 1.

Unless (nisi) otherwise determined by law, a person who has presented someone found to be unsuitable can present someone else only once more and within a month.

§ 2.

If the person presented declines or dies before the installation, the person having the right of presentation can again exercise such right within a month of the receipt of notice of the refusal or death.

A person who has not made a presentation within the available time according to the norm of cann. 158, § 1 and 161 or who has twice presented someone who has been found unsuitable loses the right of presentation for that instance; and the authority whose right it is to install is competent to provide freely for the vacant office, with the consent, however, of the candidate's own ordinary.

The authority which is competent according to law to install someone who has been presented is to install the person who has been legitimately presented, whom he or she found suitable and who accepted the office; but if several have been legitimately presented who are found to be suitable, the authority must install one of them.

Unless (nisi) the law has provided otherwise, the prescriptions of the following canons are to be observed in canonical elections.

Unless (nisi) the law or the legitimate statutes of a college or group provide otherwise, if a college or group of persons has the right of election to office the election is not be deferred beyond three months of available time from receipt of the notice of vacancy of the office; if this period of time has elapsed without action, the ecclesiastical authority having the right to confirm the election or provide for the office successively is to make provision freely for the vacant office.

§ 1.

The presiding officer of the college or group shall convoke all the members of the college or group; and the notice of convocation, when it must be communicated to each member personally, is valid if it is directed to the place of domicile or quasi-domicile or actual residence.

§ 2.

If one of those to be convoked is overlooked and is therefore absent, the election is valid; however, upon the instance of such a one and after proof of the oversight and absence, the election, even if it has been confirmed, must be rescinded by the competent authority, provided (dummodo) that it has been juridically established that recourse was made within at least three days of receipt of the notice of the election.

§ 3.

But if more than one-third of the electors were overlooked, the election is invalid by the law itself, unless (nisi) all those overlooked were in fact present.

§ 1.

Once the convocation has been legitimately made, those present on the day and in the place designated in the convocation have the right to vote; the faculty of voting by mail or by proxy is excluded, unless (nisi) the statutes legitimately provide otherwise.

§ 2.

If one of the electors is present in the house in which the election takes place but cannot be present for the election because of ill health, his or her written ballot is to be obtained by the tellers.

Even if a person has the right to vote in his or her own name by more than one title, such a person can cast only one ballot.

In order that the election be valid, no one can be permitted to vote who is not a member of the college or group.

An election whose freedom was in fact impaired in any way whatever is invalid by the law itself.

§ 1.

Those persons are ineligible to vote:

(1) who are incapable of placing a human act;

(2) who lack active voice;

(3) who have been excommunicated either by a judicial sentence or by a decree in virtue of which the penalty has been inflicted or declared;

(4) who have notoriously defected from the communion of the Church.

§ 2.

If one of the above has been admitted, the vote is null but the election is valid, unless (nisi) it is clear that by subtracting the vote the person elected did not receive the required number of votes.

§ 1.

For a vote to be valid it must be:

(1) free; therefore, a vote is invalid if one has been coerced directly or indirectly by grave fear or by fraud to vote for a certain person or different persons disjunctively;

(2) secret, certain, absolute, determinate.

§ 2.

Conditions appended to a vote prior to the election are to be considered as not having been appended.

§ 1.

Before the election begins at least two tellers are to be designated from the membership of the college or group.

§ 2.

The tellers are to gather the ballots, determine in the presence of the presiding officer that the number of ballots is the same as the number of electors, read the ballots themselves and announce clearly how many votes each person received.

§ 3.

If the number of ballots exceeds the number of electors the vote is invalid.

§ 4.

The secretary is to record accurately all the acts of the election and carefully preserve them in the file of the college, after signing them along with at least the presiding officer and the tellers.

§ 1.

Unless (nisi) the law or the statutes provide otherwise, an election can also be effected by compromise, provided (dummodo) that the electors unanimously and in writing consent to transfer to a qualified individual or to several qualified individuals, from within the membership or from outside it, the right to elect for that instance; such person or persons elect in the name of all in virtue of the faculty they have received.

§ 2.

In the case of a college or group composed only of clerics, the persons commissioned must themselves be ordained; otherwise the election is invalid.

§ 3.

The persons commissioned must observe the prescriptions of law concerning elections and, for the validity of the election, they must fulfill whatever conditions have been attached to the compromise agreement which are not contrary to law; conditions contrary to the law, however, are to be considered as not having been attached.

The compromise is terminated and the right to elect reverts to the electors authorizing the compromise:

(1) by revocation by the college or group, before the persons commissioned have begun to act;

(2) if a condition attached to the compromise agreement has not been fulfilled;

(3) if the election has been completed but is invalid.

Unless (nisi) the law or the statutes provide otherwise, the person who has received the required number of votes according to the norm of can. 119, n. 1, is to be considered elected, and this is to be announced by the presiding officer of the college or the group.

§ 1.

The election is to be communicated forthwith to the person elected, who must, within eight days of available time after having been notified, inform the college or the presiding officer of the group whether or not he or she accepts the election; otherwise the election has no effect.

§ 2.

A person elected who does not accept loses any right deriving from the election and does not regain any such right by a subsequent acceptance; such a person however, can be elected again; the college or group must proceed to a new election within a month of notification of the nonacceptance.

The person elected who has accepted the election immediately acquires the office in full right if the election does not require confirmation; otherwise the person acquires only the right to the office.

§ 1.

If the election requires confirmation the person elected must personally or through someone else request confirmation by the competent authority within eight days of available time from the day of acceptance of the election; otherwise the person elected is deprived of any right unless (nisi) it is proved that the person has been constrained from petitioning confirmation by a just impediment.

§ 2.

The competent authority cannot deny confirmation if the person elected is qualified according to the norm of can. 149, § 1, and the election was conducted in accord with the law.

§ 3.

The confirmation must be given in writing.

§ 4.

Before being informed of confirmation the person may not become involved in the administration of the office, whether this be in matters spiritual or temporal, and any acts placed by such a person are invalid.

§ 5.

Once notified of confirmation the person elected acquires the office in full right, unless (nisi) the law provides otherwise.

§ 1.

If a canonical impediment, which can be and usually is dispensed, prevents the election of the person whom the electors believe to be more qualified and whom they prefer, they can vote to postulate such a person from the competent authority, unless (nisi) something else is provided by the law.

§ 2.

Those commissioned to elect in virtue of a compromise cannot postulate anyone unless (nisi) this was expressed in their document of compromise.

§ 1.

At least two thirds of the votes are required for postulation to have any effect.

§ 2.

A vote for postulation must be expressed by the words, "I postulate," or the equivalent; the formula "I elect or I postulate" or the equivalent, is valid for an election if an impediment does not exist, otherwise for a postulation.

§ 1.

A postulation must be sent within eight days of available time by the presiding officer to the competent authority to whom confirmation of the election belongs, who is authorized to grant the dispensation from the impediment, or, lacking the faculty to do so, to request the dispensation from a higher authority; if confirmation is not required, the postulation must be sent to the competent authority so that the dispensation may be granted.

§ 2.

If the postulation has not been sent within the prescribed time, it is by that very fact invalid and the college or group is deprived for that instance of the right to elect or postulate, unless (nisi) it is demonstrated that the presiding officer had been constrained from forwarding the postulation by a just impediment, or had failed to send it at the opportune time out of fraud or negligence.

§ 3.

The one postulated acquires no right from the postulation; the competent authority is not obliged to admit it.

§ 4.

The electors cannot revoke a postulation already sent to a competent authority unless (nisi) this authority consents to it.

§ 1.

If the postulation has not been admitted by the competent authority the right of electing reverts to the college or group.

§ 2.

But if the postulation has been admitted, this is to be made known to the one postulated, who is obliged to respond according to the norm of can. 177, § 1. § 3. The person who accepts the postulation which has been admitted immediately acquires the office in full right.

§ 1.

Ecclesiastical office is lost by the lapse of a predetermined time, by reaching the age determined by the law, by resignation, by transfer, by removal and by privation.

§ 2.

An ecclesiastical office is not lost by the expiration in any way of the authority of the one who conferred it, unless (nisi) the law provides otherwise.

§ 3.

The loss of an office once it has taken effect, is to be made known as soon as possible to all who enjoy any right with respect to the provision of the office.

The title of emeritus can be conferred upon the person who loses an office by reason of age or by a resignation which has been accepted.

Loss of office by lapse of the determined time or by reaching a certain age takes effect only from the moment when it has been communicated in writing by the competent authority.

Any person of sound mind can resign an ecclesiastical office for a just cause.

A resignation submitted out of grave fear, which has been unjustly afflicted, or because of fraud, substantial error or simony is invalid by the law itself.

§ 1.

To be valid a resignation, whether it requires acceptance or not, must be submitted to the authority who is responsible for the provision of the office, and this is to be done in writing or orally in the presence of two witnesses.

§ 2.

The authority is not to accept a resignation which is not based on a just and proportionate cause.

§ 3.

A resignation which requires acceptance lacks all effect if it is not accepted within three months; one which does not require acceptance takes effect when it has been communicated by the one resigning in accord with the norm of law.

§ 4.

A resignation can be withdrawn by the one resigning as long as it has not yet become effective; once it has become effective it cannot be withdrawn, but a person who has resigned can obtain the office by some other title.

§ 1.

Transfer can be effected only by one who has the right of providing for the office which is being lost as well as for the office which is being conferred.

§ 2.

If a transfer is to be made when the officeholder is unwilling, a grave cause is required and the procedure prescribed by law is to be observed, with due regard for the right to bring forward arguments against the transfer.

§ 3.

To take effect a transfer must be communicated in writing.

§ 1.

In the event of a transfer, the prior office becomes vacant through canonical possession of the other office unless (nisi) the law provides otherwise or something else has been prescribed by the competent authority.

§ 2.

The person transferred continues to receive the compensation assigned to the prior office until taking canonical possession of the other office.

A person is removed from office either by a decree legitimately issued by a competent authority, with due regard for the rights which may have been acquired by contract, or by the law itself according to the norm of can. 194.

§ 1.

A person cannot be removed from an office conferred for an indefinite period of time except (nisi) for grave reasons and according to the procedure determined by law.

§ 2.

The same holds for the removal of someone from an office conferred for a specified period of time before the term has expired, with due regard for the prescription of can. 624, § 3.

§ 3.

When, in accord with the prescriptions of law, an office has been conferred on someone at the prudent discretion of a competent authority, that person can be removed from office for a cause which is, in the judgment of the same authority, considered just.

§ 4.

In order to be effective the decree of removal must be communicated in writing.

§ 1.

One is removed from an ecclesiastical office by the law itself:

(1) who has lost the clerical state;

(2) who has publicly defected from the Catholic faith or from the communion of the Church;

(3) a cleric who has attempted marriage even if only civilly.

§ 2.

The removal from office referred to in nn. 2 and 3 can be enforced only if is established by the declaration of a competent authority.

If a person is removed from an office which is the source of financial support, not by the law itself, but by a decree of the competent authority, this same authority is to take care such support is seen to for a suitable time unless (nisi) it is provided otherwise.

§ 1.

Privation of office, namely removal as a penalty for an offense can be effected only according to the norm of law.

§ 2.

Privation takes effect in accord with the prescriptions of the canons on penal law.

The Church accepts prescription as it exists in the civil legislation of the respective nations, as a means of acquiring or losing a subjective right and of freeing oneself from obligations, the exceptions which are determined in the canons of this Code remaining intact.

No prescription has any effect which is not grounded in good faith, not only at the beginning but through the entire course of the time required for prescription with due regard for the prescription of can. 1362.

Not subject to prescription are:

(1) rights and obligations which are of the divine natural or positive law;

(2) rights which can be acquired only from an apostolic privilege;

(3) rights and obligations which directly affect the spiritual life of the Christian faithful;

(4) the certain and unchallenged boundaries of ecclesiastical territories;

(5) Mass stipends and obligations;

(6) the provision of an ecclesiastical office which requires the exercise of a sacred order, according to the norm of law;

(7) the right of visitation and the obligation of obedience if it should result that the Christian faithful can be visited by no ecclesiastical authority and are no longer subject to any ecclesiastical authority.

Time is computed according to the norms of the following canons unless (nisi) otherwise expressly provided by law.

§ 1.

Continuous time is understood as that which is subject to no interruption.

§ 2.

Available time is understood as that which a person has to exercise or pursue a right but which does not run if the person is unaware or unable to act.

§ 1.

In the law, a day is understood as a period of time consisting of 24 continuous hours, and it begins at midnight, unless (nisi) otherwise expressly provided; a week is a period of 7 days; a month is a period of 30 days and a year one of 365 days, unless (nisi) the month and the year are said to be taken as they appear in the calendar.

§ 2.

If the time is continuous, a month and a year are always to be taken as they appear in the calendar.

§ 1.

The day from which the computation is to be made is not counted in the total, unless (nisi) the beginning of the reckoning coincides with the beginning of the day or unless the law expressly provides otherwise.

§ 2.

Unless (nisi) the contrary is determined the final day is counted in the total, in such a way that, if the total consists of one or more months or years, of one or more weeks, the terminus is reached at the end of the last day of the same number or, if the months lacks a dayof the same number, at the end of the last day of the month.