Chapter V.—On Contempt for Pain, Poverty, and Other External Things.

Fit objects for admiration are the Stoics, who say that the soul is not affected by the body, either to vice by disease, or to virtue by health; but both these things, they say, are indifferent. And indeed Job, through exceeding continence, and excellence of faith, when from rich he became poor, from being held in honour dishonoured, from being comely unsightly, and sick from being healthy, is depicted as a good example, putting the Tempter to shame, blessing his Creator; bearing what came second, as the first, and most clearly teaching that it is possible for the gnostic to make an excellent use of all circumstances. And that ancient achievements are proposed as images for our correction, the apostle shows, when he says, “So that my bonds in Christ are become manifest in all the palace, and to all the rest; and several of the brethren in the Lord, waxing confident by my bonds, are much more bold to speak the word of God without fear,”883    Phil. i. 13, 14.—since martyrs’ testimonies are examples of conversion gloriously sanctified. “For what things the Scripture speaks were written for our instruction, that we, through patience and the consolation of the Scriptures, might have the hope of consolation.”884    Rom. xv. 4. When pain is present, the soul appears to decline from it, and to deem release from present pain a precious thing. At that moment it slackens from studies, when the other virtues also are neglected. And yet we do not say that it is virtue itself which suffers, for virtue is not affected by disease. But he who is partaker of both, of virtue and the disease, is afflicted by the pressure of the latter; and if he who has not yet attained the habit of self-command be not a high-souled man, he is distraught; and the inability to endure it is found equivalent to fleeing from it.

The same holds good also in the case of poverty. For it compels the soul to desist from necessary things, I mean contemplation and from pure sinlessness, forcing him, who has not wholly dedicated himself to God in love, to occupy himself about provisions; as, again, health and abundance of necessaries keep the soul free and unimpeded, and capable of making a good use of what is at hand. “For,” says the apostle, “such shall have trouble in the flesh. But I spare you. For I would have you without anxiety, in order to decorum and assiduity for the Lord, without distraction.”885    1 Cor. vii. 28, 32, 35.

These things, then, are to be abstained from, not for their own sakes, but for the sake of the body; and care for the body is exercised for the sake of the soul, to which it has reference. For on this account it is necessary for the man who lives as a gnostic to know what is suitable. Since the fact that pleasure is not a good thing is admitted from the fact that certain pleasures are evil, by this reason good appears evil, and evil good. And then, if we choose some pleasures and shun others, it is not every pleasure that is a good thing.

Similarly, also, the same rule holds with pains, some of which we endure, and others we shun. But choice and avoidance are exercised according to knowledge; so that it is not pleasure that is the good thing, but knowledge by which we shall choose a pleasure at a certain time, and of a certain kind. Now the martyr chooses the pleasure that exists in prospect through the present pain. If pain is conceived as existing in thirst, and pleasure in drinking, the pain that has preceded becomes the efficient cause of pleasure. But evil cannot be the efficient cause of good. Neither, then, is the one thing nor the other evil. Simonides accordingly (as also Aristotle) writes, “that to be in good health is the best thing, and the second best thing is to be handsome, and the third best thing is to be rich without cheating.”

And Theognis of Megara says:—

On the other hand, Antiphanes, the comic poet, says, “Plutus (Wealth), when it has taken hold of those who see better than others, makes them blind.” Now by the poets he is proclaimed as blind from his birth:—

Says the Chalcidian Euphorion:—

Wrote Euripides in Alexander:—

“It is not then the only coin that mortals have, that which is white silver or golden, but virtue too,” as Sophocles says.

Θαυμάζειν δὲ ἄξιον καὶ τῶν Στωϊκῶν οἵτινές φασι μηδὲν τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος διατίθεσθαι μήτε πρὸς κακίαν ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου μήτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὑπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας· ἀλλ' ἀμφότερα ταῦτα λέγουσιν ἀδιάφορα εἶναι. καίτοι καὶ Ἰὼβ ἐγκρατείας ὑπερβολῇ καὶ πίστεως ὑπεροχῇ πένης μὲν ἐκ πλουσίου, ἄτιμος δὲ ἐξ ἐνδόξου, αἰσχρὸς δὲ ἐκ καλοῦ καὶ νοσερὸς ἐξ ὑγιεινοῦ γενόμενος ἡμῖν γέ ἐστι παράδειγμα ἀγαθὸν ἀναγεγραμμένος, δυσωπῶν τὸν πειράσαντα, εὐλογῶν τὸν πλάσαντα, φέρων οὕτω τὰ δεύτερα ὡς καὶ τὰ πρότερα, διδάσκων εὖ μάλα τοῖς περιστατικοῖς ἅπασιν οἷόν τε εἶναι καλῶς χρῆσθαι τὸν γνωστικόν. καὶ ὅτι γε εἰκόνες τὰ παλαιὰ κατορθώματα εἰς τὰ ἡμεδαπὰ ἐπανορθώματα ἔκκεινται, ἐμφαίνων ὁ ἀπόστολος ὥστε τοὺς δεσμούς μου φησὶ φανεροὺς ἐν Χριστῷ γενέσθαι ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ πραιτωρίῳ καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς πᾶσι, καὶ τοὺς πλείονας τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἐν κυρίῳ πεποιθότας τοῖς δεσμοῖς μου περισσοτέρως τολμᾶν ἀφόβως τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ λαλεῖν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ μαρτύρια ἐπιστροφῆς ἐστι παραδείγματα ἐνδόξως ἡγιασμένα. ὅσα γὰρ ἐγράφη, λέγει, εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν διδασκαλίαν ἐγράφη, ἵνα διὰ τῆς ὑπομονῆς καὶ τῆς παρακλήσεως τῶν γραφῶν τὴν ἐλπίδα ἔχωμεν τῆς παρακλήσεως. Ἔοικε δέ πως παρούσης ἀλγηδόνος ἡ ψυχὴ νεύειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς καὶ τίμιον ἡγεῖσθαι τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν τῆς παρούσης ὀδύνης. ἀμέλει κατ' ἐκεῖνο καιροῦ καὶ μαθημάτων ῥᾳθυμεῖ, ὁπηνίκα καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀπημέληνται ἀρεταί. καὶ οὐ δήπου τὴν ἀρετὴν αὐτὴν πάσχειν φαμέν (οὐδὲ γὰρ νοσεῖ ἡ ἀρετή), ὁ δὲ ἀμφοῖν μετεσχηκώς, ἀρετῆς καὶ νόσου, ὑπὸ τοῦ κατεπείγοντος θλίβεται· κἂν μὴ καταμεγαλοφρονῶν τύχῃ, ὁ μηδέπω τὴν ἕξιν τῆς ἐγκρατείας περιποιησάμενος ἐξίσταται, ἴσον τε εὑρίσκεται τῷ φεύγειν τὸ μὴ ὑπομεῖναι. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ πενίας, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὕτη τῶν ἀναγκαίων, τῆς θεωρίας λέγω καὶ τῆς καθαρᾶς ἀναμαρτησίας, ἀπασχολεῖν βιάζεται τὴν ψυχήν, περὶ τοὺς πορισμοὺς διατρίβειν ἀναγκάζουσα τὸν μὴ ὅλον ἑαυτὸν δι' ἀγάπης ἀνατεθεικότα τῷ θεῷ, ὥσπερ ἔμπαλιν ἥ τε ὑγίεια καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἀφθονία ἐλευθέραν καὶ ἀνεμπόδιστον φυλάσσει τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν εὖ χρῆσθαι τοῖς παροῦσι γινώσκουσαν· θλῖψιν, γάρ φησιν ὁ ἀπόστολος, τῇ σαρκὶ ἕξουσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἐγὼ δὲ ὑμῶν φείδομαι. θέλω γὰρ ὑμᾶς ἀμερίμνους εἶναι πρὸς τὸ εὔσχημον καὶ εὐπάρεδρον τῷ κυρίῳ ἀπερισπάστως. τούτων οὖν ἀνθεκτέον οὐ δι' αὐτά, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἡ δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιμέλεια διὰ τὴν ψυχὴν γίνεται, ἐφ' ἣν ἡ ἀναφορά. ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ μαθεῖν ἀνάγκη τὸν γνωστικῶς πολιτευόμενον τὰ προσήκοντα, ἐπεὶ τό γε μὴ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγα θὸν ὡμολόγηται ἐκ τοῦ κακὰς εἶναί τινας ἡδονάς. τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ἀναφαίνεται τὸ ἀγαθὸν κακὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν ἀγαθόν. ἔπειτα δὲ εἴ τινας μὲν αἱρούμεθα τῶν ἡδονῶν, τινὰς δὲ φεύγομεν, οὐ πᾶσα ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλγηδόνων ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὧν τὰς μὲν ὑπομένομεν, τὰς δὲ φεύγομεν, ἡ δὲ αἵρεσις καὶ φυγὴ κατ' ἐπιστήμην γίνεται· ὥστε τὴν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐ τὴν ἡδονήν, δι' ἣν ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ τὴν ποιὰν ἡδονὴν αἱρησόμεθα. αὐτίκα ὁ μάρτυς ἡδονὴν τὴν δι' ἐλπίδος διὰ τῆς παρούσης ἀλγηδόνος αἱρεῖται. εἰ δὲ κατὰ μὲν δίψαν ἡ ἀλγηδὼν νοεῖται, κατὰ τὴν πόσιν δὲ ἡ ἡδονή, ποιητικὴ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἡ ἀλγηδὼν ἡ προϋπάρξασα γίνεται· ἀγαθοῦ δὲ ποιητικὸν τὸ κακὸν οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, οὐθέτερον οὖν κακόν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Σιμωνίδης, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης, ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστον ἀνδρί, γράφει, δεύτερον δὲ φυὰν καλὸν γενέσθαι, τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως. καὶ ὁ Μεγαρεὺς Θέογνις· χρὴ πενίην φεύγοντα καὶ εἰς βαθυκήτεα πόντον ῥιπτεῖν καὶ πετρέων, Κύρνε, κατ' ἠλιβάτων. ἔμπαλιν δὲ Ἀντιφάνης ὁ κωμικὸς ὁ πλοῦτος φησί, πλέον θάτερον· βλέποντας παραλαβὼν τυφλοὺς ποιεῖ. αὐτίκα πρὸς τῶν ποιητῶν τυφλὸς ἐκ γενετῆς κηρύττεται· καί οἱ γείνατο κοῦρον, ὃς οὐκ ἠλέκτορα εἶδεν, φησὶν ὁ Χαλκιδεὺς Εὐφορίων. κακὸν οὖν ἦν τι παίδευμα εἰς εὐανδρίαν ὁ πλοῦτος ἀνθρώποισιν αἵ τ' ἄγαν τρυφαί, ἐν τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ὁ Εὐριπίδης πεποίηκεν. εἴρηταί γε· ἡ πενία σοφίαν ἔλαχε διὰ τὸ συγγενές. ἁ φιλοχρηματία δὲ οὐ Σπάρταν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσαν πόλιν ἕλοι ἄν. οὔκουν μόνον τοῦτο νόμισμα λευκὸς ἄργυρος ἢ χρυσός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ βροτοῖς, ὥς φησιν ὁ Σοφοκλῆς.