Chapter XXXVII.—Ironical Dilemmas Respecting Matter, and Sundry Moral Qualities Fancifully Attributed to It.

I see now that you are coming back again to that reason, which has been in the habit of declaring to you nothing in the way of certainty. For just as you introduce to our notice Matter as being neither corporeal nor incorporeal, so you allege of it that it is neither good nor evil; and you say, whilst arguing further on it in the same strain: “If it were good, seeing that it had ever been so, it would not require the arrangement of itself by God;400    Compositionem Dei. if it were naturally evil, it would not have admitted of a change401    Non accepisset translationem. for the better, nor would God have ever applied to such a nature any attempt at arrangement of it, for His labour would have been in vain.” Such are your words, which it would have been well if you had remembered in other passages also, so as to have avoided any contradiction of them. As, however, we have already treated to some extent of this ambiguity of good and evil touching Matter, I will now reply to the only proposition and argument of yours which we have before us. I shall not stop to repeat my opinion, that it was your bounden duty to have said for certain that Matter was either good or bad, or in some third condition; but (I must observe) that you have not here even kept to the statement which you chose to make before. Indeed, you retract what you declared—that Matter is neither good nor evil; because you imply that it is evil when you say, “If it were good, it would not require to be set in order by God;” so again, when you add, “If it were naturally evil, it would not admit of any change for the better,” you seem to intimate402    Subostendis. that it is good. And so you attribute to it a close relation403    Affinem. to good and evil, although you declared it neither good nor evil. With a view, however, to refute the argument whereby you thought you were going to clinch your proposition, I here contend: If Matter had always been good, why should it not have still wanted a change for the better? Does that which is good never desire, never wish, never feel able to advance, so as to change its good for a better? And in like manner, if Matter had been by nature evil, why might it not have been changed by God as the more powerful Being, as able to convert the nature of stones into children of Abraham?404    Matt. iii. 9. Surely by such means you not only compare the Lord with Matter, but you even put Him below405    Subicis. it, since you affirm that406    This is the force of the subjunctive verb. the nature of Matter could not possibly be brought under control by Him, and trained to something better. But although you are here disinclined to allow that Matter is by nature evil, yet in another passage you will deny having made such an admission.407    Te confessum.

CAPUT XXXVII.

Nunc enim video te ad aliam rursus rationem reverti, quae tibi nihil certi renuntiare consuevit. Nam sicut nec corporalem nec incorporalem infers materiam, ita nec bonam nec malam allegas : et proinde superargumentans : «Si enim, 0231B inquis, esset bona quae semper hoc fuerat, non desideraret compositionem Dei: si esset natura mala, non accepisset translationem in melius: nec quicquam compositionis suae applicuisset illi Deus tali natura: in vacuum enim laborasset.» Verba haec tua sunt: quorum te et alibi meminisse oportuerat, ne quid his contrarium inferres. Sed quoniam de mali et boni ambiguitate super materiam in praeteritis aliquid tractavimus , nunc ad praesentem et solam propositionem et argumentationem tuam respondebo. Nec dicam, et hic te certum aliquid debuisse pronuntiasse aut bonam, aut malam , aut tertium aliquid: sed de his quod tibi libuit pronuntiasse, custodisse. Rescindis enim quod pronuntiasti nec bonam nec malam: quia cum 0231C dicis: Si esset bona, non desideraret componi a Deo, malam portendis: et cum apponis: Si esset mala natura, non admitteret in melius translationem, bonam subostendis : atque ita et boni et mali affinem constituisti , quam nec bonam nec malam pronuntiasti. Ut autem argumentationem, qua putasti te propositionem tuam confirmaturum, retundam, oppono etiam illud: Si bona fuisset materia semper, quare non desiderasset in melius reformari? 0232A Quod bonum, non desiderat, aut non optat, aut non capit profectum? ut fiat de bono melius. Aeque, si mala natura fuisset, quare non potuerit a Deo converti, ut a potentiore, ut ab eo qui lapidum quoque naturam convertere valeat in filios Abrahae (Matth., IV)? Nempe ergo non tantum comparas Deum materiae, sed et subjicis, a quo natura materiae devinci et edomari in melius non potuisset. Sed et quam hic non vis natura malam, alibi te confessum negabis.