LUCII CAECILII FIRMIANI LACTANTII DE OPIFICIO DEI, VEL FORMATIONE HOMINIS, LIBER, AD DEMETRIANUM AUDITOREM SUUM.

 0009A CAPUT PRIMUM. Prooemium et adhortatio ad Demetrianum.

 CAPUT II. De generatione belluarum et hominis.

 CAPUT III. De conditione pecudum et hominis.

 CAPUT IV. De imbecillitate hominis.

 CAPUT V. De figuris animalium et membris.

 CAPUT VI. De Epicuri errore et de membris eorumque usu.

 CAPUT VII. De omnibus corporis partibus.

 0033B CAPUT VIII. De hominis partibus, oculis et auribus.

 CAPUT IX. De sensibus eorumque vi.

 CAPUT X. De exterioribus hominis membris, eorumque usu.

 0048A CAPUT XI. De intestinis in homine, eorumque usu.

 0053A CAPUT XII. De utero, et conceptione, atque sexibus.

 CAPUT XIII. De Membris inferioribus.

 CAPUT XIV. De intestinorum quorumdam ignota ratione.

 CAPUT XV. De Voce.

 0064A CAPUT XVI. De mente, et ejus sede.

 0068A CAPUT XVII. De Anima, deque ea sententia philosophorum.

 CAPUT XVIII. De anima et animo, eorumque affectionibus.

 0073A CAPUT XIX. De anima, eaque a Deo data.

 CAPUT XX. De seipso, et veritate.

Chap. XVIII.—Of the Soul and the Mind, and Their Affections.

There follows another, and in itself an inexplicable inquiry: Whether the soul and the mind are the same, or there be one faculty by which we live, and another by which we perceive and have discernment.121    [See cap. 16, p. 296, note 1, supra; also vol. ii. p. 102, note 2, this series.]   There are not wanting arguments on either side. For they who say that they are one faculty make use of this argument, that we cannot live without perception, nor perceive without life, and therefore that that which is incapable of separation cannot be different; but that whatever it is, it has the office of living and the method of perception. On which account two122    Lucretius is undoubtedly one of the poets here referred to; some think that Virgil, others that Horace, is the second.   Epicurean poets speak of the mind and the soul indifferently. But they who say that they are different argue in this way: That the mind is one thing, and the soul another, may be understood from this, that the mind may be extinguished while the soul is uninjured, which is accustomed to happen in the case of the insane; also, that the soul is put to rest123    Sopiatur.   by death, the mind by sleep, and indeed in such a manner that it is not only ignorant of what is taking place,124    Quid fiat. Others read “quid faciat.”   or where it is, but it is even deceived by the contemplation of false objects. And how this takes place cannot accurately be perceived; why it takes place can be perceived. For we can by no means rest unless the mind is kept occupied by the similitudes125    Imaginibus.   of visions. But the mind lies hid, oppressed with sleep, as fire buried126    Sopitus.   by ashes drawn over it; but if you stir it a little it again blazes, and, as it were, wakes up.127    Evigilat.   Therefore it is called away by images,128    Simulacris.   until the limbs, bedewed with sleep, are invigorated; for the body while the perception is awake, although it lies motionless, yet is not at rest, because the perception burns in it, and vibrates as a flame, and keeps all the limbs bound to itself.  

But when the mind is transferred from its application to the contemplation of images, then at length the whole body is resolved into rest. But the mind is transferred from dark thought, when, under the influence of darkness, it has begun to be alone with itself. While it is intent upon those things concerning which it is reflecting, sleep suddenly creeps on, and the thought itself imperceptibly turns aside to the nearest appearances:129    Species.   thus it begins also to see those things which it had placed before its eyes. Then it proceeds further, and finds diversions130    Avocamenta.   for itself, that it may not interrupt the most healthy repose of the body. For as the mind is diverted in the day by true sights, so that it does not sleep; so is it diverted in the night by false sights, so that it is not aroused. For if it perceives no images, it will follow of necessity either that it is awake, or that it is asleep in perpetual death. Therefore the system of dreaming has been given by God for the sake of sleeping; and, indeed, it has been given to all animals in common; but this especially to man, that when God gave this system on account of rest, He left to Himself the power of teaching man future events by means of the dream.131    Thus Joseph and Daniel were interpreters of dreams: and the prophet Joel (ii. 28) foretells this as a mark of the last days, “Your old men shall dream dreams, your young men shall see visions.”   For narratives often testify that there have been dreams which have had an immediate and a remarkable accomplishment,132    Quorum præsens et admirabilis fuerit eventus. [A sober view of the facts revealed in Scripture, and which, in the days of miracles, influenced so many of the noblest minds in the Church.]   and the answers of our prophets have been after the character of a dream.133    Ex parte somnii constiterunt. Some editions read, “ex parte somniis constituerunt.”   On which account they are not always true, nor always false, as Virgil testified,134    Æneid, vi. 894.   who supposed that there were two gates for the passage of dreams. But those which are false are seen for the sake of sleeping; those which are true are sent by God, that by this revelation we may learn impending goods or evils.  

CAPUT XVIII. De anima et animo, eorumque affectionibus.

Sequitur alia, et ipsa inextricabilis quaestio: idemne sit anima, et animus; an vero aliud sit illud, quo vivimus, aliud autem, quo sentimus et sapimus. Non desunt argumenta in utramque partem. Qui 0070B enim unum esse dicunt, hanc rationem sequuntur, quod neque vivi sine sensu possit, neque sentiri sine vita; ideoque non posse esse diversum id, quod non potest separari, sed quidquid est illud, et vivendi officium, et sentiendi habere rationem. Idcirco animum et animam indifferenter appellant duo Epicurei poetae. Qui autem dicunt esse diversa, 0071A sic argumentantur: ex eo posse intelligi, aliud esse mentem, aliud animam, quia incolumi anima mens possit extingui, quod accidere soleat insanis; item, quod anima morte sopiatur, animus somno, et quidem sic, ut non tantum, quid fiat, aut ubi sit, ignoret, sed etiam rerum falsarum contemplatione fallatur. Quod ipsum quomodo fiat, non potest pervideri; cur fiat, potest. Nam requiescere nullo pacto possumus, nisi mens visionum imaginibus occupata teneatur. Latet autem mens oppressa somno, tamquam ignis obducto cinere sopitus, quem si paululum commoveris, rursus ardescit, et quasi evigilat. Avocatur ergo simulacris, donec membra sopore irrigata vegetentur; corpus enim, vigilante sensu, licet jaceat immobile, tamen non est quietum, 0071B quia flagrat in eo sensus, et vibrat, ut flamma, et artus omnes ad se adstrictos tenet.

Sed postquam mens ad contemplandas imagines ab intentione traducta est, tunc demum corpus omne resolvitur in quietem. Traducitur autem mens cogitatione caeca, cum cogentibus tenebris secum tantummodo esse coeperit: dum intenta est in ea, de 0072A quibus cogitat, repente somnus obrepit, et in species proximas sensim ipsa cogitatio declinat: sic ea, quae sibi ante oculos posuerat, videre quoque incipit. Deinde procedit ulterius, et sibi avocamenta invenit, ne saluberrimam quietem corporis interrumpat. Nam ut mens per diem veris visionibus avocatur, ne obdormiat, ita falsis nocte, ne excitetur. Nam si nullas imagines cernat, aut vigilare illam necesse erit, aut perpetua morte sopiri. Dormiendi ergo causa tributa est a Deo ratio somniandi; et quidem in commune universis animantibus: sed illud homini praecipue, quod cum eam rationem Deus quietis causa daret, facultatem sibi reliquit docendi hominem futura per somnium. Nam et historiae saepe testantur extitisse somnia, quorum praesens et admirabilis 0072B fuerit eventus; et responsa vatum nostrorum ex parte somnii constiterunt. Quare neque semper vera sunt, neque semper falsa, Virgilio teste, qui duas portas voluit esse somniorum. Sed quae falsa sunt, dormiendi causa videntur; quae vera, immittuntur a Deo, ut imminens bonum aut malum hac revelatione discamus.