QUINTI SEPTIMII FLORENTIS TERTULLIANI DE RESURRECTIONE CARNIS.

 CAPUT PRIMUM.

 CAPUT II.

 CAPUT III.

 CAPUT IV.

 CAPUT V.

 CAPUT VI.

 CAPUT VII.

 CAPUT VIII.

 CAPUT IX.

 CAPUT X.

 CAPUT XI.

 CAPUT XII.

 CAPUT XIII.

 CAPUT XIV.

 CAPUT XV.

 CAPUT XVI.

 CAPUT XVII.

 CAPUT XVIII.

 CAPUT XIX.

 CAPUT XX.

 CAPUT XXI.

 CAPUT XXII.

 CAPUT XXIII.

 CAPUT XXIV.

 CAPUT XXV.

 CAPUT XXVI.

 CAPUT XXVII.

 CAPUT XXVIII.

 CAPUT XXIX.

 CAPUT XXX.

 CAPUT XXXI.

 CAPUT XXXII.

 CAPUT XXXIII.

 CAPUT XXXIV.

 CAPUT XXXV.

 CAPUT XXXVI.

 CAPUT XXXVII.

 CAPUT XXXVIII.

 CAPUT XXXIX.

 CAPUT XL.

 CAPUT XLI.

 CAPUT XLII.

 CAPUT XLIII.

 CAPUT XLIV.

 CAPUT XLV.

 CAPUT XLVI.

 CAPUT XLVII.

 CAPUT XLVIII.

 CAPUT XLIX.

 CAPUT L.

 CAPUT LI.

 CAPUT LII.

 CAPUT LIII.

 CAPUT LIV.

 CAPUT LV.

 CAPUT LVI.

 CAPUT LVII.

 CAPUT LVIII.

 CAPUT LIX.

 CAPUT LX.

 CAPUT LXI.

 CAPUT LXII.

 CAPUT LXIII.

Chapter XIV.—A Sufficient Cause for the Resurrection of the Flesh Occurs in the Future Judgment of Man. It Will Take Cognisance of the Works of the Body No Less Than of the Soul.

Such, then, being the outlines of the divine energies which God has displayed as much in the parables of nature as in His spoken word, let us now approach His very edicts and decrees, since this is the division which we mainly adopt in our subject-matter.  We began with the dignity of the flesh, whether it were of such a nature that when once destroyed it was capable of being restored. Then we pursued an inquiry touching the power of God, whether it was sufficiently great to be habitually able to confer this restoration on a thing which had been destroyed. Now, if we have proved these two points, I should like you to inquire into the (question of) cause, whether it be one of sufficient weight to claim the resurrection of the flesh as necessary and as conformable in every way to reason; because there underlies this demurrer: the flesh may be quite capable of being restored, and the Deity be perfectly able to effect the restoration, but a cause for such recovery must needs pre-exist. Admit then a sufficient one, you who learn of a God who is both supremely good as well as just85    He refers to Marcion.—supremely good from His own (character), just in consequence of ours. For if man had never sinned, he would simply and solely have known God in His superlative goodness, from the attribute of His nature. But now he experiences Him to be a just God also, from the necessity of a cause; still, however, retaining under this very circumstance His excellent goodness, at the same time that He is also just. For, by both succouring the good and punishing the evil, He displays His justice, and at the same time makes both processes contribute proofs of His goodness, whilst on the one hand He deals vengeance, and on the other dispenses reward. But with Marcion86    He here refers his reader to what he has written against Marcion, especially in his books i. and ii. you will have the opportunity of more fully learning whether this be the whole character of God. Meanwhile, so perfect is our (God), that He is rightly Judge, because He is the Lord; rightly the Lord, because the Creator; rightly the Creator, because He is God. Whence it happens that that heretic, whose name I know not, holds that He properly is not a Judge, since He is not Lord; properly not Lord, since He is not the Creator.  And so I am at a loss to know how He is God, who is neither the Creator, which God is; nor the Lord, which the Creator is. Inasmuch, then, as it is most suitable for the great Being who is God, and Lord, and Creator to summon man to a judgment on this very question, whether he has taken care or not to acknowledge and honour his Lord and Creator, this is just such a judgment as the resurrection shall achieve. The entire cause, then, or rather necessity of the resurrection, will be this, namely, that arrangement of the final judgment which shall be most suitable to God.  Now, in effecting this arrangement, you must consider whether the divine censure superintends a judicial examination of the two natures of man—both his soul and his flesh. For that which is a suitable object to be judged, is also a competent one to be raised. Our position is, that the judgment of God must be believed first of all to be plenary, and then absolute, so as to be final, and therefore irrevocable; to be also righteous, not bearing less heavily on any particular part; to be moreover worthy of God, being complete and definite, in keeping with His great patience. Thus it follows that the fulness and perfection of the judgment consists simply in representing the interests of the entire human being. Now, since the entire man consists of the union of the two natures, he must therefore appear in both, as it is right that he should be judged in his entirety; nor, of course, did he pass through life except in his entire state.  As therefore he lived, so also must he be judged, because he has to be judged concerning the way in which he lived.  For life is the cause of judgment, and it must undergo investigation in as many natures as it possessed when it discharged its vital functions.

CAPUT XIV.

0812A

Talia interim divinarum virium liniamenta non minus parabolis operato Deo, quam locuto, veniamus et ad ipsa edicta atque decreta ejus, quo cum maxime divisionem istam materiae ordinamus. Exorsi enim sumus ab auctoritate carnis, an ea sit cui dilapsae salus competat: dehinc, prosecuti de potentia Dei, an tanta sit quae salutem conferre dilapsae rei soleat: nunc, si probavimus utrumque, velim etiam de causa requiras an sit aliqua tam digna, quae resurrectionem carnis necessariam, et rationi certe omnimodo debitam vindicet, quia subest dicere, etsi caro capax restitui, etsi divinitas idonea restituendi, sed caussa restitutionis praeesse debebit. Accipe igitur et caussam, qui apud Deum discis, tam optimum, 0812B quam et justum; de suo optimum, de nostro justum. Nisi enim homo deliquisset, optimum solummodo Deum nosset, ex naturae proprietate; at nunc etiam justum eum patitur, ex caussae necessitate; tamen et hoc ipso optimum, dum et justum. Et bono enim juvando, et malo puniendo, justitiam exhibens, utramque sententiam bono praestat: hinc vindicans istud, inde remunerans illud. Sed cum Marcione plenius disces, an hoc sit Dei totum. Interim talis est noster; merito judex, quia Dominus; merito Dominus, quia auctor; merito auctor, quia Deus. Hinc et ille nescio quis haereticorum, merito non judex, non enim Deus ; merito non Dominus, non enim auctor: nescio jam si Deus , qui nec auctor, quod Deus, nec Dominus, quod auctor . Igitur si 0812C Deo et Domino et auctori congruentissimum est, judicium in hominem destinare, de hoc ipso an Dominum et auctorem suum agnoscere et observare 0813A curarit , an non utique judicium resurrectio expunget. Haec erit tota caussa, imo necessitas resurrectionis ; congruentissima scilicet Deo destinatio judicii: de cujus dispositione dispicias, an utrique substantiae humanae dijudicandae censura divina praesideat, tam animae quam et carni. Quod enim congruet judicari, hoc competet etiam resuscitari. Dicimus plenum primo perfectumque credendum judicium Dei, ut ultimum jam atque exinde perpetuum: ut sic quoque justum, dum non in aliquo minus: ut sic quoque Deo dignum, dum pro tanta ejus patientia, plenum atque perfectum: itaque plenitudinem perfectionemque judicii, non nisi de totius hominis repraesentatione constare. Totum porro hominem ex utriusque substantiae 0813B concretione parere ; idcircoque in utraque exhibendum, quem totum oporteat judicari: qui nisi totus, utique non vixerit. Qualis ergo vixerit, talem judicari, quia de eo quod vixerit, habeat judicari. Vita est enim causa judicii; per tot substantias dispungenda, per quot et functa est.