ARTICLE 8

(33) "Speaking of moral virtues, Aristotle says: 'The virtues come to be in us neither by nature nor in despite of nature, but we are furnished by nature with a capacity for receiving them, and are perfected in them through custom (or habit)' (Nich. Ethics II, 1). This capacity includes both the faculties of the soul and the bodily dispositions. We say of a certain man that he is naturally mild or naturally abstemious, or of another that he is naturally choleric or naturally intemperate. Or again, we say that so-and-so is a natural linguist or a born musician. Such statements mean that a man has a natural predisposition to art or virtue which will make one line of action easier to him than another line, or easier to him than to another man. It is possible that this predisposition may be reducible in each case to the physical structure of the body. But is that bodily disposition to be taken as a principle of action. If so, the resulting habits of virtue, of vice, of learning and so on, will in no sense be under the control of the man in question; there is no place for his reason or his will. Granting such a hypothesis, we should have to conclude that a man's character and attainments must necessarily develop entirely and only upon lines dictated by corporal infirmities or excellences over which he has no control. If he has a physical tendency which inclines him to excessive consumption of alcoholic liquor, he will necessarily become a confirmed drunkard. Or if he has physical predispositions which lend themselves to musical ability, he will necessarily become an accomplished musician. Such a position is, of course, utterly untenable and preposterous. It is true that these conditions, in so far as they are purely corporeal, cannot be directly controlled by the will; it is equally true that the passions, incited and aided by these conditions, may conceivably prove strong enough on occasion to overwhelm reason. But in spite of this it is certain that a man can control his passions and can act in accordance with or diametrically opposite to his bodily predisposition. If a man follows the corporeal or purely sensitive bent of his nature, he does so of his own choice, and he is himself responsible for the actions thus performed and for the habits which are thus generated in the faculties immediately productive of those actions. Again, habitual action in a specified direction will produce a corresponding modification of the bodily organ or member concerned. But that aptitude and prompt obedience in the bodily member, though undoubtedly an important concomitant, is not the habit nor even necessarily conjoined to the habit."--Carpenter, op. cit. p. 115-16.

             It is important to remember that true human habits are formed only by one who knows what they are and voluntarily chooses to acquire them (we are speaking of natural habits; supernatural habits "God works in us without us"). Thus Aristotle's commentators have defined habit as "that which a man may use when he so wishes." The promptness, facility, and stability of operation which ensue upon the formation of perfect habit in no way diminish its voluntary character. (cf. I-II, q. 49, a. 3) Hence language such as "second nature," and, more especially, "the automatism of a machine," employed in description of the characteristic properties of habitual operation, is to be referred to the mode of action. The action itself, if it be truly human and springing from a distinctively human habit, is always elicited by reason and will. Otherwise human habit is indistinguishable from the natural traits of brute animals, such as the mildness of the lamb and the fierceness of the lion, or from innate racial and national hereditary characteristics.

             (34) "Since God remains equally the same in His action on all creatures, the diversity of gifts received from Him must be attributed to the diverse conditions of the recipients. Now the diversity of the recipients follows from their being more or less disposed and prepared to receive. Just as we observe in regard to natural forms, that by accidental dispositions, such as heat and cold and the like, matter is rendered more or less disposed to receiving a form; so also, in the perfections of the soul, the soul is rendered more or less apt at attaining its own perfection. However, the operations of the soul are related differently to infused and to acquired perfections. For acquired perfections are in the nature of the soul itself, in a potency which is not purely material (passive) but active as well, as a thing exists in its seminal causes. Thus every acquired science evidently exists in the knowledge of first principles, which are naturally known, as in the active principles from which the science may be deduced. Likewise the moral virtues pre-exist in the very rectitude and order of reason, as in a kind of seminal principle. Hence in VII Ethics, c. 5, the Philosopher says that there are certain natural virtues, which are like seeds of the moral virtues. And so the operations of the soul stand in relation to acquired perfections, not merely as dispositions but as active principles.

             "But infused perfections are in the nature of the soul itself as in a potency which is material (i.e., purely passive) and in no way active, since they elevate the soul above all its natural activity. Hence the soul's operations are related to infused perfections only as dispositions. It must be noted, also, that the measure by which charity is given is the capacity of the soul itself, which is simultaneously from nature and from the disposition which results from acts which the soul has attempted. Because nature is more and better disposed according to this very striving, it happens that one who has better natural dispositions, but who struggles but little, will receive less of infused perfections; while one whose natural gifts are inferior, if he makes a greater effort, will sometimes receive more."--In I Sent. d 17, q. 1, a. 2.

             (35) "That is said to be natural to a thing which is agreeable to it according to its form, whereby the thing is constituted of such a nature, as fire naturally tends upward. The form which makes man to be man is his reason or intellect. Hence man naturally tends to what is agreeable to him according to reason and intellect. Now the good of any virtue is proper to man according to his reason: for this goodness arises from a certain commensuration of an act with its circumstances and end, and this commensuration is brought about by reason. Therefore, certain inclinations to or aptitudes for virtue pre-exist itself, and are called natural virtues, as we read in VI Ethics, c. 9. And by these a man tends naturally to good. But a natural movement proceeds from a form according to the condition of the form. Now the will and reason are of such a nature that they are not determined to one, so as to be unable to turn to another. Consequently, although it is natural for a man to will good, still, he can will evil, not in so far as it is evil, but in so far as it is judged to be good.--In II Sent. d. 39, q. 2, a. 1.

             It is clear, then, that natural inclinations do not destroy man's freedom; and further, that these inclinations, by their very indeterminateness--generality would be better--demand further perfection. This demand is satisfied by acquired virtue (there is no question here of infused virtue, since the latter is not demanded by nature, nor does man have any natural inclinations to it).

             (36) Maintaining the correct distinction between the inchoative or "seminal" stages of virtue and its consummate, stable, perfect state, Aristotle is able to show, in one part of his Ethics, how virtue is in us by nature, and, in another part, how it is not in us in this manner. St. Thomas comments on both of these passages:

             "That there is such a thing as natural virtue, which is presupposed to moral, is patent from the fact that singular traits of virtues or of vices are seen to exist naturally in certain men; for some men seem, immediately from birth, to be just or temperate or courageous on account of a natural disposition which inclines them to acts of these virtues. This same natural disposition can be perceived in three parts of the soul.

             "First, on the part of the reason, since the first principles of human actions are naturally inserted, for example, that harm is to be done to no one, and similar principles. Secondly, on the part of the will, which is naturally moved of itself by a good understood, as by its proper object. Thirdly, on the part of the sensitive appetite, wherein, from a natural complexion, some men are disposed to anger, some to the concupiscences, or to other passions, either to a greater or a lesser degree, or moderately, in which moral virtue consists. But the first two dispositions (in reason and in will) are common to all men.

             "Hence according to this the Philosopher says that some men are naturally brave or just: and yet in those who are naturally such, something which is eminently good is required, in order that the aforesaid virtues reside in us in a more perfect manner. These same natural habits or inclinations do exist in children and in beasts, as the lion is naturally brave and greathearted; but nevertheless, natural habits such as these can be harmful, unless the discretion of reason be present."--In VI Ethics, lect. II.

             Having agreed that virtue is caused in us by repeated operation, Aristotle proceeds to show that it is impossible for virtue to be in us from nature. Commenting on the Philosopher, St. Thomas writes:

             "He proves from what he has said above that moral virtue is not in us from nature, for two reasons. The first reason is this: In things which are from nature, there is no variation, because of their set ("accustomed") condition. He illustrates this statement by an example: Since a stone is naturally borne earthward, no matter how often it may be thrown in the air, it will in no way become accustomed to being tossed upwards in this manner. The reason for this is that in their natural actions things are either active only or are both active and passive. If the former, the principle of action in them undergoes no mutation; and while the cause remains the same, the inclination to the same effect always remains. But if these things so act that they also suffer (action), unless the passion be such that it removes the principle of action, the natural inclination which is in them is not taken away. If, however, it be a passion such as removes the principle of action in them, then the nature will also be changed, and what was natural to them before will no longer be so. Therefore, by the fact that a thing acts naturally, it undergoes no immutation by reason of its action. Similarly, even if it be moved against its nature, unless it happens that the motion be such as to corrupt the nature. But if the natural principle of action remains, the action will remain always the same. Thus it is that in acts which are according to nature, and in those which are contrary to nature, habituation (consuetudo) exercises no influence.

             "The reason is that moral virtue pertains to the appetite, which operates according as it is moved by an apprehended good. And so, as often as it must operate, it must at the same time, and just as often, be moved by its object. From this there arises a certain inclination, after the manner of a nature, just as many drops of falling water will hollow out a rock. Thus it is evident that the moral virtues are not in us by nature, nor are they in us contrary to nature. Rather there is in us a natural aptitude to receive them, inasmuch as the appetitive power in us is ordered by nature to obey reason. However, they are made perfect in us by repeated acts (per assuetudinem), for from performing acts according to reason a number of times, a form is impressed by the power of reason on the appetitive part, which impression is nothing other than moral virtue.

             ". . . The second reason is this. Of all those things which are in us from nature, the potency is in us before the act. This is apparent in the senses. For we do not acquire the sense of sight or of hearing by having seen or heard a number of times. On the contrary, from the fact that we have these senses, we begin to use them; we do not have them from the fact that we have used them. But we possess the acquired virtues by acting according to virtue, as is the case also in the manual arts, wherein men learn by doing those things which, after they have learnt, they will have to do. Thus men become builders by building and harpists by playing the harp. And similarly, by performing just or temperate or courageous acts, men become just, or temperate, or brave. Consequently, these virtues are not in us from nature."--In II Ethics, lect. 1.