ARTICLE 10

In this article the question is: Whether there are any infused virtues in man.

It would seem that there are not.

             OBJECTIONS:

1. In the Physics we read: "Each thing is perfect when it attains the virtue (strength) proper to it." But the proper virtue of each thing is its natural perfection. Therefore, a man's connatural virtue suffices for his perfection, and this virtue can be caused by natural principles. Hence man's perfection does not require that he have any infused virtue.

             2. It might be objected that man must be made perfect by virtue not only with regard to a connatural end but also to a supernatural end, namely, the happiness of eternal life, to which man is ordered by infused virtues.--On the contrary, nature does not fall short in necessaries. But what a man needs to reach his final end is necessary for him. Therefore, he can acquire it by his natural powers, and so does not need infused virtue for it.

             3. The seed germinates by the power received from its germinator. Otherwise, since an animal seed is imperfect, it could not by its own action attain the perfection of the species. But the seeds of the virtues are planted in us by God, as we read in a Gloss (on Heb. 1:3: "who, being the brightness of His Glory."): "God has sown in every soul the beginnings of understanding and of reason." Hence these seeds act by the power of God. Now since acquired virtue is caused from seeds of this kind, it would seem that acquired virtue could bring us to the enjoyment of God, in which the happiness of eternal life consists.

             4. Further, virtue orders man to the happiness of eternal life, inasmuch as virtue is a meritorious act. Now the act of an acquired virtue can be meritorious of eternal life if it be informed by grace. Therefore, it is not necessary for eternal life to have infused virtues.

             5. Further, the principle or root of merit is charity. Hence if it were necessary to have infused virtues to merit eternal life, it would seem that for this charity alone would suffice. And so it is not imperative to have any other infused virtues.

             6. Further, moral virtues are necessary in order that the lower powers be subjected to reason. But these powers are sufficiently subjected to reason by the acquired virtues. Therefore, it is not necessary that there be any infused moral virtues for the purpose of ordering reason to this specific end or any other; rather it is enough that man's reason be directed to his supernatural end. Now this is adequately accomplished by faith. Therefore, we need have no other infused virtues.

             7. Further, what is done by Divine power is not specifically different from what is wrought by the working of nature. For example, the health which a man recovers by a miracle is of the same nature as that which nature procures. Therefore, if there is any infused virtue, which would be in us from God; besides virtue acquired by our own acts, e.g. should there be acquired temperance and infused temperance, they would not on this account differ. Now two forms identical in species cannot exist simultaneously in the same subject. Therefore, it is impossible that one who has acquired temperance should have an infused temperance.

             8. Further, the nature of a virtue is known from its acts. But acts of infused and of acquired temperance are specifically the same. Therefore, so are the virtues themselves. Proof of the minor: Whatever things agree both in matter and in form are of one species. But acts of infused and of acquired temperance are concerned with the same matter both are concerned with the pleasures of touch. They agree also in form, for both consist in a mean. Therefore, the acts of infused temperance and the acts of acquired temperance are identical in species.

             9. But it might be objected that they differ in species from the fact that they are ordered to different ends, and in morals species are determined by the end.--On the contrary, things can be specifically different according to that which determines the nature of a thing. Now in morals, species are not determined from the ultimate end but by the proximate end. Otherwise, all virtues would be of one species, since all are ordered to happiness as to their ultimate end. Therefore, things cannot be said to agree or to differ in species from their ordination to the ultimate end. And so infused temperance is not specifically different from acquired temperance from the fact that the former orders man to a higher type of beatitude.

             10. Further, no moral habit takes its species from its being moved by another habit. For one moral habit may happen to be moved or imperated by habits which are specifically diverse; as the habit of intemperance is moved by that of avarice, when one commits adultery in order to steal; and by that of cruelty, when one commits adultery in order to murder someone. On the other hand, habits specifically diverse may be imperated by one and the same habit; for example, when one man commits adultery in order to steal, while another commits murder in order to steal. But temperance or fortitude or any of the other moral virtues have no act ordered to the happiness of eternal life, save insofar as it be imperated by the virtue which has the ultimate end for its object. Therefore, they do not take their species from this, or, in other words, an infused moral virtue does not differ in species from an acquired virtue by the fact that it is ordered to eternal life as to its end.

             11. Further, the subject of infused virtue is the mind: thus Augustine says, in Contra Julianum, that virtue is a good quality of the mind which God works in us without us. But the moral virtues do not have the mind as their subject: for temperance and fortitude are in the irrational parts, as the Philosopher says, in the Ethics. Therefore, the moral virtues are not infused.

             12. Further, contraries are of the same ratio. But vice, which is the contrary of virtue, is not infused, but is brought about by our acts. Neither, therefore, are the virtues infused, but rather they are caused solely by our acts.

             13. Further, before the acquisition of virtue man is in potency to virtue. But potency and act are of the same genus: every genus is divided by potency and act, as is clear from the Physics. Therefore, since the potency to virtue is not infused, it would seem that virtue is not infused either.

             14. Further, if the virtues are infused, they must be infused together. Now when grace is infused into a man who has been in the state of sin, the habits of the moral virtues are not at that time infused into him; for even after contrition he suffers the onslaughts of the passions. But this is not the condition of a virtuous, but perhaps of a continent man: a continent man differs from a temperate man in this, that the former suffers but is not overcome, whereas the latter does not suffer, as we read in the Ethics. Therefore, it would seem that the virtues are not in us from the infusion of grace.

             15. Further, the Philosopher says, in the Ethics, that we may consider it as a sign of the formation of a habit when delight accompanies an operation. But one does not perform with pleasure acts of the moral virtues immediately after contrition. Therefore, he has not as yet a virtuous habit; and consequently, the moral virtues are not caused in us from the infusion of grace.

             16. Further, we hold that from many bad acts a vicious habit is formed in a man. Yet it is manifest that a man's sins are forgiven and grace is infused from one act of contrition. But an acquired habit is not destroyed by one, single act, just as it is not formed by one only. Therefore, if the moral virtues are infused together with grace, it must follow that the habit of a (infused) moral virtue could exist along with the habit of an opposed vice: which is impossible.

             17. Further, virtue is both engendered and destroyed from the same cause, as it says in the Ethics. Therefore, if virtue is not caused in us by our own acts, it would seem to follow that neither is it corrupted because of our acts. From this it would also follow that a man does not lose virtue by sinning mortally: which is false.

             18. Further custom (Lat.: mos, moris) and habit would seem to have the same meaning. Therefore moral (moralis) and habitual virtue are the same. But habitual virtue is so called from habit, because it is caused by frequent or habitual good acts. Therefore, all moral virtue is caused by acts, and not by the infusion of grace.

             19. Further, if certain virtues are infused, their acts will of necessity be more efficacious than those of a man who has no virtue. But from our acts, even before we have any virtue, virtuous habits are caused in us. Therefore, habits will also be formed from acts of infused virtues, if there be any such virtues. But we know, from the Ethics, that as acts are, so are the habits which they cause. Therefore, habits caused by acts of infused virtues are of the same nature as the infused virtues themselves. It must then follow that two forms identical in species are in the same subject, which is impossible. Therefore, it would seem impossible that there be any infused virtues in us.

             ON THE CONTRARY:

1. Luke 24:49: "But stay you in the city till you be endued with power from on high."

             2. Further, in Wisd. 8:7, it is written of Divine wisdom that "she teaches temperance and prudence, etc." Now the spirit teaches virtue by causing it. Therefore, it would seem that there are moral virtues infused into us by God.

             3. The acts of all the virtues should be meritorious, in that by them we are able to attain beatitude. But there can be no merit save from grace. Therefore, it would seem that virtues are caused in us from the infusion of grace.

             I reply: Besides the virtues acquired from our acts, as has been said, we must admit other virtues infused into us by God.

             The reason for this may be seen in the fact that virtue, as the Philosopher says, makes both its possessor and his action good. Therefore, virtue will be diversified according as good is diversified in man, for the good of man insofar as he is man is evidently other than his good as a citizen. Moreover, certain operations can be agreeable to man as man, which would not be appropriate to him insofar as he is a citizen. On this point the Philosopher remarks, in the Politics, that there is one virtue which makes a good man, and another which makes a good citizen.

             Now it must be observed that man's good is two-fold: one is proportionate to his nature, the other exceeds the powers of his nature.

             The point is that a passive subject must acquire perfections from an agent in various ways, according to the diversity of the agent's powers. Thus we see that the perfections and forms which are caused by the action of a natural agent do not exceed the natural capacity of the receiver; for the natural active power is proportionate to the natural passive power. But the perfections and forms which derive from a supernatural agent of infinite power, which is God, exceed the powers of the nature which receives these perfections. Thus the rational soul, which is immediately created by God, exceeds the capacity of its material receiver in such wise that corporeal matter cannot completely confine and enclose it; there remains to it some power and operation in which corporeal matter does not share. This does not happen in any of the forms which are all caused by natural agents.

             Just as man acquires his first perfection, namely, his soul, from God, so he also receives his ultimate perfection, which is perfect happiness, immediately from God, and therein he rests. This is evident, indeed, from the fact that man's desire can be satisfied in nothing outside of God alone. It has been given man by nature, that from effects he should be moved to a desire to seek after causes; nor does this desire cease until he beholds the First Cause, which is God.

             Hence it must be that, just as man's first perfection, which is his rational soul, exceeds the power of corporeal matter, so the ultimate perfection which man can attain, which is the blessedness of eternal life, exceeds the powers of the whole of human nature. And since each thing is ordered to reach its end by some operation, and since the means must be in some manner proportionate to the end, of necessity there must be in man certain perfections whereby he may be ordered to his supernatural end, and these perfections must surpass the power of man's natural principles. Now this cannot be, unless certain supernatural principles of operation be infused into man by God, over and above man's natural powers of action.

             The natural principles of man's operations are the soul and its faculties, namely, the intellect and the will, which are the principles of his actions precisely insofar as he is human. This could not be, unless the intellect were endowed with a knowledge of principles to serve as a guide in the knowledge of other things; or unless the will had a natural inclination to the good proportionate to its nature, as was said in the preceding Articles, 8 and 9.

             There is infused into man by God, to enable him to perform acts ordered to eternal life as their end: first, grace, which gives the soul a certain spiritual or Divine being; and then, faith, hope and charity. By faith the mind is enlightened concerning supernatural truths, which in their order stand as do principles naturally known in the order of natural actions. By hope and charity the will acquires an inclination to that supernatural good to which the human will, by its own natural operations, is not adequately ordered.

             Besides the natural principles which a man has, for his perfection in the order natural to him, a man needs virtuous habits, as was indicated above (in the preceding Art.). So also, besides the aforesaid supernatural principles, man is endowed by God with certain infused virtues which perfect him in the ordering of his actions to their end, which is eternal life.

             REPLY TO OBJECTIONS:

1. By his first perfection man is perfected in two ways: first, in his nutritive and sensitive part, wherein the perfection does not surpass the capacity of corporeal matter, and secondly, in his intellective part, which does exceed corporeal nature: and in this part man is absolutely perfect, whereas in the lower part he is only so to some extent. So also, with regard to his final perfection, man can be perfected in two ways: first, according to the capacity of his nature, and secondly, according to a supernatural perfection. In the second way a man is said to be absolutely perfect, but in the first way, only in some respect. Hence two types of virtue may be present in man: one which corresponds to natural perfection, and this is not perfect virtue; and another, which corresponds to man's ultimate perfection, and this is man's true and perfect virtue.

             2. Nature provides for man in necessaries according to his (natural) powers; hence with respect to those things which do not exceed the capacities of nature, man has from nature, not only receptive (i.e. passive), but also active principles. But as regards those things which exceed nature, man has from nature only the aptitude for receiving them.

             3. The seed of a man acts with the full power of the man himself. But the seeds of the virtues naturally planted in the human soul do not act with the full power of God. Hence it does not follow that they can do whatever God can do.

             4. Since there is no merit without charity, the act of an acquired virtue cannot be meritorious without charity. Now the other virtues are infused together with charity; hence an act of acquired virtue cannot be meritorious save by means of the (corresponding) infused virtue. For a virtue ordered to an inferior end produces no act ordered to a superior end, save by means of superior virtue; as the fortitude which is man's as an individual does not order its act to the common good save by means of that fortitude which is a virtue of man in his capacity as a citizen.

             5. When an action proceeds from many agents mutually ordered to one another, its perfection and goodness can be hindered by an impediment from one of the agents, even if the other agents are perfect. Thus, no matter how skilled an artisan may be, he will not produce a perfect work if his instrument is defective.

             Now in the operations of man, which must be made good by virtue, we must consider that the action of a superior power does not depend on an inferior power, but that the latter depends on the former. Therefore, that the acts of the lower powers, namely, the irascible and concupiscible appetites, may be perfect, not only must the intellect be ordered to the ultimate end by faith and the will by charity, but the inferior powers themselves, irascible and concupiscible, must also have their own proper operations made good and ordered to the ultimate end.

             Thus the sixth objection is also answered.

             7. Of every form which nature produces, God can also produce specifically the same form, by Himself and without the action of any natural agent. In this respect, the health which is miraculously bestowed by God is of the same species as that health which nature procures. But it does not follow that every form which God is able to produce, nature can also produce. Consequently, infused virtue, which is immediately from God, need not be of the same nature as acquired virtue.

             8. Infused and acquired temperance both agree in their matter or object, for both are concerned with the pleasures of touch; but they do not agree in the nature or form of their acts. For although both seek a mean, nevertheless, infused temperance seeks a mean under another formality than does acquired temperance. Infused temperance seeks the mean which accords with the precepts of Divine law and which is ordered to the ultimate end; whereas acquired temperance takes its mean according to inferior reasons, as ordered to the good of the present life.

             9. The ultimate end does not determine the nature of things in morals, save insofar as in the proximate end there is a due ordination towards the ultimate end; for means must be proportionate to the end. The good of counsel also requires that one seek the end with the appropriate means, as is clear from the Topics of Aristotle.

             10. The act of one habit, as it is imperated by another habit, takes its moral character, formally speaking, from the end to which the act is ordered. Hence, when a man commits fornication in order to steal, although the act may be materially one of intemperance, yet formally it is an act of avarice. But although an act of intemperance may in a certain sense receive its nature from its being imperated by avarice; nevertheless, it does not follow from this that intemperance itself takes its nature from the fact that an act is imperated by avarice.

             Therefore, when acts of temperance or of fortitude are imperated by charity, which orders them to the ultimate end; the very acts take their species formally from charity, for formally they are acts of charity. However, this does not mean that (the habits of) temperance or fortitude are so constituted. Infused temperance and fortitude do not differ specifically from acquired temperance and fortitude from the fact that their acts are imperated by charity, but because their acts consist in a mean which orders them to the ultimate end, which is the object of charity.

             11. Infused temperance is in the concupiscible's appetite. Now the irascible and concupiscible powers are said to belong to reason or to be reasonable insofar as they participate to some extent in reason, by obeying it. By the same token, they are called 'mind' when they obey mind; so that what Augustine says (loc. cit. in obj. 11) is true, namely, that virtue is a good quality of the mind.

             12. Man's vice consists in his going after lower things; but his virtue lies in this, that he be elevated to higher things. Hence vice cannot be infused (from above), but only virtue.

             13. When a passive subject is by nature constituted to receive various perfections from diversely ordered agents, the diversity and order of the passive powers in the patient will correspond to the diversity and order of the active powers in the agents, for an active power will correspond to each passive potency. For example, water or earth have some potency whereby they are naturally apt to be changed by fire and another potency whereby they are naturally apt to be changed by a heavenly body; and still another, whereby they are naturally apt to be moved or changed by God. Just as from water or from earth something can be made by the power of a heavenly body which cannot be made by the power of fire; so, from the same elements something can be formed by the power of a supernatural agent which no natural agent can produce. For this reason we say that in the whole of creation there is a certain obediential potency whereby every creature obeys God by receiving into itself whatsoever God wills.

             In a similar manner, there is in the soul something potential which is by nature constituted to be actualized by a natural agent. In this way the acquired virtues exist potentially in the soul. In another way, there is something potential in the soul which is not naturally ordered to be reduced to act except by Divine power; and in this way the infused virtues exist potentially in the soul.

             14. The passions which incline us towards evil are not completely suppressed by either acquired or infused virtue, unless it be in an extraordinary and miraculous manner. For the struggle of the flesh against the spirit always remains, even after moral virtue is had. Of this the Apostle speaks, in Gal. 5:17: "For the flesh lusteth against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh." However, these passions are subdued by both acquired and infused temperance, to the extent that a man is not violently disturbed by them.

             Acquired and infused virtues accomplish different effects in this subduing of the passions. Acquired virtue effects that the attacks of concupiscence be felt less. This effect results from the causality of acquired virtue; by the frequent acts whereby a man grows accustomed to virtue, he gradually grows unaccustomed to obey his passions and begins to resist them. From this there ensues that he senses their attacks the less. Infused virtue is of value in that, even though the passions be felt, still they in no way gain control. For infused virtue effects that a man in no way obey the concupiscences of sin; and while this virtue remains, it does this infallibly. Acquired virtue falls short in this respect, although in only a few instances, as other natural inclinations fail in only a minor part. Hence the Apostle declares, Rom. 7:5 and 6: "For when we were in the flesh, the passions of our sins, which were by the law, did work in our members to bring forth fruit and death. But now we are loosed from the law of death wherein we were detained; so that we should serve in newness of spirit, and not in the oldness of the letter."

             15. Because infused virtue does not at once always remove the stings of the passions, as acquired virtue does, for this reason it does not in the beginning operate with much delight. This does not destroy the nature of virtue, because at times it is sufficient for virtue that it work without sadness, nor is it required that it work with pleasure, because of the severe attacks which are experienced. Thus, in the Ethics, the Philosopher says that it is enough that the courageous man act without sadness.

             16. Although an acquired habit is not destroyed by a single (natural) act, nevertheless, by the power of grace an act of contrition has the effect of destroying a vicious habit which has been formed or acquired. Therefore, when the habit of intemperance is broken, it no longer remains as a habit in one who had it, along with the infused virtue of temperance, but it remains only as a form on its way to corruption, as a sort of disposition. Now a disposition does not exclude a contrary habit.

             17. Although infused virtue is not caused by our acts, still our acts can dispose for it; hence it is not impossible that it be destroyed by these same acts. Form is removed through the indisposition of matter, as the soul is separated from the body on account of the latter's indisposition.

             18. Moral virtue does not derive its name from custom (more) insofar as custom signifies a habit of the appetitive power, for on this count the infused virtues could be called moral, even though they are not formed by frequent acts.

             19. Acts of infused virtue do not cause any habit, but by them a pre-existing habit is strengthened. In fact, neither is a habit formed by each act of acquired virtue; otherwise, there would be an infinite number of habits.