ARTICLE 7

In this article the question is: Whether there is virtue in the speculative intellect.

It would seem that there is not.

             OBJECTIONS:

1. Every virtue is ordered to action: It is virtue which renders an action good. But the speculative intellect is not ordained to action: for it says nothing about imitating or avoiding, as is clear from the De Anima. Therefore, there can be no virtue in the speculative intellect.

             2. Further, virtue is that which makes the one who has it good, as it is stated in the Ethics. But habits of the speculative intellect do not make one who has them good; a man is not said to be good because he has science. Therefore, the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues.

             3. Further, the speculative intellect is especially perfected by the habit of science. Now science is not a virtue, as is evident from the fact that it is distinguished from the virtues. Thus in the first species of quality there are habit and disposition; and habit is further divided into habits of science and of virtue. Therefore, there is no virtue in the speculative intellect.

             4. Further, every virtue is ordered to happiness, which is the crown of virtue. But the speculative intellect is not ordered to anything: the speculative sciences are not sought for their utility but for their own sake, as it says in the Metaphysics. Therefore, there can be no virtue in the speculative intellect.

             5. Further, a virtuous act is meritorious. But mere knowledge does not suffice for merit; indeed: "To him who knoweth to do good and doth it not, to him it is sin," as we read in Jas. 4:17. Therefore, there is no virtue in the speculative intellect.

             ON THE CONTRARY:

1. Faith is in the speculative intellect, since its object is the First Truth. But faith is a virtue. Therefore, the speculative intellect can be the subject of virtue.

             2. Further, truth and goodness are equally noble, for they include each other: Truth is a kind of good, and goodness is something true; and both are common to all being. Therefore, if there can be virtue in the will, the object of which is the good, it follows that there can be virtue in the speculative intellect, the object of which is truth.

             I reply: In every subject virtue bespeaks a relation to goodness: for, as the Philosopher remarks, in the Ethics, the virtue of each thing is that which makes the one who has it good and renders his operation good. Thus the strength (virtus) of a horse is that which makes it a good horse, makes it run well and carry a rider well--which is the work (operation) of a horse. Hence a habit will partake of the nature of a virtue from its being ordered to good.

             Now this can happen in two ways: first, formally; secondly, materially. Formally, when a habit is ordered to good under the very ratio of good; materially, when it is ordered to good, but not as such.

             Good under its proper formality is the subject of the appetitive part only; for the good is that which all desire. Consequently, those habits which either reside in or depend upon the appetitive part are formally ordained to the good. For this reason, they possess the nature of virtue in a most eminent sense. Those habits which neither inhere in nor depend on the appetitive part can, indeed, be materially ordered to the good, but not formally, under the aspect of goodness. Hence they can be called virtues to a certain extent, although not in as proper a sense as the other type of habit (moral virtue).

             It must be observed that both the speculative and the practical intellect can be perfected by a habit in two ways. In one way, absolutely and in itself, as it precedes volition, moving the will to act; in another way, as it follows upon volition, eliciting its act at the command of the will. This is possible because, as has been said, these two powers, intellect and will, mutually accompany each other.

             Those habits which are in the practical or the speculative intellect in the first way can in some sense be called virtues, although not with the perfection of true virtue. In this manner, in the speculative intellect there are understanding, science, and wisdom, and in the practical intellect there is art. For a man is said to have understanding or science when his intellect has been perfected to know the truth, which is the intellect's good. Although this truth can be something willed, as when a man wills to know the truth, nevertheless, it is not in this respect that the aforesaid habits are brought to perfection. For it does not follow from the fact that a man has science that he be moved to will the consideration of the truth, but only that he be capable of doing so. Hence the consideration itself of truth is not science insofar as it is the object of volition, but according as it tends directly to its object. The like may be said of art with respect to the practical intellect: art does not perfect a man so that he wills to produce good works according to the canons of art; but solely so that he knows how and is capable of doing so.

             The habits of the speculative or of the practical intellect have in a truer sense the nature of virtue, to the extent that the intellect follows the will. To this extent a man is not merely made capable of acting rightly, or given the knowledge of how to act rightly, but also willing to do so. This is illustrated, in different ways, in faith and in prudence.

             Faith perfects the speculative intellect according as the latter is commanded to embrace it by the will, as is clear from the act of faith itself. For a man does not assent to those things which are above human reason, save because he wills to do so, as Augustine says that a man cannot believe unless he is willing. Further, faith dwells in the speculative intellect when the latter is subject to the command of the will, just as there is temperance in the concupiscible appetite when the latter obeys the command of reason. Hence the will commands the intellect in believing, not only as to the placing of the act, but also as to the determining of its object. Thus the intellect assents to a determined article of belief at the command of the will, just as the concupiscible power tends, by temperance, to a mean determined by reason.

             Now prudence is in the intellect or practical reason as has been noted (in the preceding Art.): not in such a way that the object of prudence is determined by the will, but only the end thereof; the object it determines for itself. Presupposing the end, namely, the good, from the will, prudence seeks the means to attain and conserve this good.

             From what has been said, it is evident that habits exist in the intellect in a manner which is different from the way in which they exist in the will.

             Some habits depend in no wise on the will, save as regards their use--and this only accidentally, since this use of habits depends in one sense on the will and in another on the habits themselves. Examples of this type of habit are science, wisdom, and art. A man is not so perfected by these habits that he actually wills to use them well, but only that he is capable of so using them.

             On the other hand, there is an intellectual habit which depends on the will for its principle: for in things to be done the principle is the end. This habit is prudence.

             Another habit has its object determined by the will: and this habit is faith. Although all of these habits may in some way be called virtues, it is the habits of the second and last type which have the nature of virtue more perfectly and properly. However, it does not follow from this that they are nobler or more perfect habits.

             REPLY TO OBJECTIONS:

1. A habit of the speculative intellect is ordered to its own proper act, namely, to the consideration of truth, which it perfects. It is not ordered to any exterior act as an end, but has its end in its own proper act.

             On the contrary, the practical intellect is ordered to an exterior act as to its end: for the consideration of what must be done or made does not pertain to the practical intellect, save for the sake of actually doing or making.

             Thus a habit of the speculative intellect renders its act good in a nobler fashion than a habit of the practical intellect, since the former regards the end, while the latter looks to the mean. However, a habit of the practical intellect, from the fact that it orders one to good under the aspect of good, more properly has the nature of virtue, as it is presupposed to the will.

             2. A man is not said to be good absolutely because he may be good in some part, but because he is wholly good; and this he is when his will is good. For the will commands the acts of all of man's powers, since each act is the good for that particular power. Hence only he is said to be a good man absolutely, who has a good will.

             A man who is good in one of his powers, without having a good will, is said to be good as regards that power, e.g. because he has good vision or hearing, or sees or hears well.

             It is clear then that a man is not said to be absolutely good from the fact that he has science, but only to have a good mind or a good understanding. The like may be said of art and of other habits of this sort.

             3. Science is distinguished from moral virtue, and yet is itself an intellectual virtue; or it may be divided against virtue properly so-called: in which case it is not itself virtue, as was said above (in the body of the article).

             4. The speculative intellect is not ordered to anything outside itself; it is ordered to its own act as to its end. Now ultimate happiness, which is contemplation, consists in such an act. Hence acts of the speculative intellect are closer in likeness to beatitude than are the habits of the practical intellect. Yet the habits of the practical intellect are perhaps closer by way of preparation or merit.

             5. A man can merit by an act of science or a similar habit when the act is commanded by the will, without which there is no merit. Nevertheless, science does not perfect the intellect precisely for this purpose, as we have said (in the body of the Art.). For the possession of science does not make a man willing to use it well, but only capable of using it well. So it is that a bad will is not opposed to science or to art, as it is to prudence, faith, or temperance. Hence the Philosopher says, in the Ethics, that one who voluntarily sins in exterior acts is less prudent, although the contrary may be true in science and art. For a grammarian who unwittingly makes a grammatical error appears to have little knowledge of grammar.