ARTICLE 1

In this article the question is: Whether virtues are habits.

It would seem that they are not, but rather that they are acts.

             OBJECTIONS:

1. Augustine says, in his book of Retractations, that virtue is the good use of free will. But the use of free will is an act. Therefore virtue is an act.

             2. Further, a reward is not due anyone, save because of an act. But everyone who possesses virtue deserves a reward; for whoever dies with charity in his soul will attain beatitude. Therefore virtue is merit. But merit is an act. Therefore virtue is an act.

             3. Further, the more something in us resembles God, so much the better is it. But we are made to resemble God especially in so far as we are in act, because He is Pure Act. Act, then, is what is best in us. Now virtues are the best things we possess, as Augustine says in his book De Libero Arbitrio. Therefore, virtues are acts.

             4. Further, the perfections of this life correspond to the perfections of Heaven. But the perfection of Heaven is an act, according to the Philosopher. Therefore, the perfection of this life, namely virtue, is also an act.

             5. Further, contraries are found in the same genus, wherein they mutually exclude each other. But a sinful act destroys virtue by reason of its opposition to the latter. Therefore, virtue is in the genus of act.

             6. Further, the Philosopher says, in De Caelo, that virtue is the limit of power: but the limit of potency is act. Therefore, virtue is an act.

             7. Further, the rational part is nobler and more perfect than the sensitive part. But the sensitive powers have their own operations, with no habit or quality acting as a mean. Neither, therefore, should habits be assigned to the intellective power, by means of which this power might perform a perfect operation.

             8. Further, the Philosopher says, in the Physics, that virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best. But the best of anything is act. Now a disposition is in the same genus as that to which it disposes. Therefore, virtue is an act.

             9. Further, Augustine says, in his book De Moribus Ecclesiae, that virtue is the order of love. But order, as he himself says in De Civitate Dei, is the disposing of equal and unequal elements, assigning to each its own place. Therefore, virtue is a disposition, and not a habit.

             10. Further, a habit is a quality difficult to change (qualitas de difficili mobilis). But virtue is easily lost, since a single act of mortal sin will erase it. Therefore, virtue is not a habit.

             11. Further, if we do need certain habits such as virtue may be, we need them either for natural acts or for meritorious, supernatural acts. Now we do not need such habits for natural operations: for if any nature, even sensitive and senseless, can perform its own operation without a habit, a fortiori a rational being can do so. Neither do we need such habits for meritorious acts, because God works these in us: Phil. 2/13: "Who worketh in us (Douay: in you) both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will." Therefore, virtues are in no way habits.

             12. Further, every agent acting according to its nature or form always acts conformably to the exigencies of that nature; as what is hot always acts by heating. If, then, there is in the mind an habitual form called a virtue, the one possessing it will necessarily act in conformity with it. But this is false: for if it were true, anyone who had virtue would be confirmed in it. Therefore, virtues are not habits.

             13. Further, habits reside in powers in order to give them ease in operation. But for acts of virtue we do not need anything to give us this facility, as it seems. The reason is that such acts consist chiefly in election and volition: and nothing is easier than what is established in the will. Therefore, virtues are not habits.

             14. Further, no effect can be nobler than its cause. But if virtue is a habit, it will be a cause of act, which is nobler than habit. Therefore, it would seem that virtue is not a habit.

             15. Further, mean and extremes pertain to the same genus. But moral virtue is a mean between two passions; and passions are in the class of acts. Therefore, virtues are not habits.

             ON THE CONTRARY,

             1. Virtue, according to Augustine, is a good quality of the mind. Now it can be in no species of quality other than the first, which is habit. Therefore virtue is a habit.

             2. Further, the Philosopher says, in the Ethics, that virtue is a habit of choosing found in the soul.

             3. Further, virtues remain in us while we are asleep, for they are lost only through mortal sin. Now while we are sleeping we are not performing virtuous acts, since we do not enjoy the use of our free will. Therefore, virtues are not acts.

             I reply that virtue, from its very name, denotes the perfection of a power (potentiae complementum); hence it is also called a force (vis), whereby a thing is enabled to perform its proper operation or movement, with all its strength. For virtue, according to its nominal definition, indicates a power's perfection; whence the Philosopher says, in De Caelo, that virtue is the limit of a thing's power. Since a power is ordained to act, the perfection or completion of a power consists in its performing a perfect operation. Now since the end of an agent is its operation, for, according to the Philosopher, in De Caelo, everything exists for its proper operation as for its proximate end, each thing is good insofar as it is perfectly ordered to its end. Thus it is that virtue makes its possessor and his action (opus) good, as it says in the Ethics. In this respect it is also evident that virtue is a disposition of what is perfect for what is best in it, as we read in the Physics

             All of this is applicable to the virtue or power of anything whatsoever. For the strength (virtus) of a horse is what makes it good and its action good also; likewise the virtue of a stone, of a man, or of any other thing.

             However, the complexion of powers varies according to the diverse kinds of powers. One type of power is active only; another is only acted on or moved; still another is both active and acted on.

             A power which is only active does not need to receive anything in order to be the principle of an action; hence the force (virtus) of such a power is nothing other than the power itself. Of this type are the Divine Power, the agent intellect, and natural powers. The virtues of these powers are not habits, but the powers themselves, complete in themselves.

             Powers are purely acted upon or passive which do not act unless moved by another; nor does it rest with them to act or not to act, but they must act on the impetus of the force which moves them. Such are the sensitive powers considered in themselves. Wherefore, in the Ethics it says that the senses are not principles of act. These powers are actualized by something added to them. Nor does this added force remain in them as a form in its subject, but only as a passion, an example of which is the visual species impressed on the pupil of the eye. Hence, neither are the "virtues" of these powers habits, but rather the powers themselves, when they are actually receiving the impressions of their active objects.

             Those powers are both active and acted on which are moved by their active objects so that they are not determined by these objects to one thing; but it is in them to act, or not, as being in some way possessed of reason. These powers are brought to complete actualization by something superadded to them, which does not inhere in them as a mere passion, but as a form residing and remaining in a subject. However, this occurs in such a manner that the power is not bound by them of necessity to one thing; for if such were the case, the power would not be master of its own act. The virtues of these powers are not the powers themselves, nor are they passions, as in the sense powers; neither are they qualities which operate of necessity, as are the qualities of natural things. Rather they are habits, by which a man can act when he wills, as the Commentator says in De Anima. And Augustine remarks, in his book De Bono Coniugali, that a habit is that by which one acts at the opportune moment.

             Thus it is clear that virtues are habits. It is further evident how habits differ from the second and third species of quality, and from the fourth, for figure in itself bespeaks no order to act.

             From this it can also be seen that we need virtuous habits for three reasons:

             First, that there may be uniformity in our acts. For those things which depend solely on human actions are easily varied, unless they are firmly fixed by some habitual inclination.

             Secondly that a perfect operation be readily performed. For unless the rational powers in some way are inclined by a habit to one definite object, it will always be necessary, whenever it is time to act, to begin an inquiry concerning the manner in which to act. This is evident in one who lacks the habit of science and yet wishes to consider a speculative question; and in one who wants to act virtuously, although he lacks the habit of virtue. Hence, the Philosopher says, in the Ethics, that things done suddenly are done from habit.

             Thirdly, that a perfect operation be performed with pleasure. This is effected by a habit which, inasmuch as it becomes a second nature, renders natural the acts proper to it, so that it is delightful to perform them. For what is conveniently accomplished is pleasurable. Hence, in the Ethics, the Philosopher observes that taking delight in an action is a sign of a habit.

             REPLY TO OBJECTIONS:

1. Virtue, like power, may be taken in two ways. First, materially: thus we say that what we are capable of is in our power. And in this sense Augustine says that the good use of free will is a virtue. Secondly, essentially: in this sense neither power nor virtue is an act.

             2. To merit has two meanings. The first is proper, and is nothing other than performing some act for which a man may justly acquire a reward for himself. By a second, improper signification, any condition which in any way makes a man worthy is called merit: as when we say that the race of Priam merits empire, as being worthy to rule.

             A reward may be due to merit, in one sense, because of an habitual quality which makes one worthy of reward: thus it is due to baptized infants. Again, it may be due to actual merit; in this sense it is due, not to habitual virtue (alone), but to a virtuous act. It is bestowed, nevertheless, in a way even on infants, by reason of actual merit, insofar as by the actual merit of Christ the sacrament has its efficacy, regenerating us unto life.

             3. Augustine says that virtues are a supreme good, not absolutely (simpliciter), but in a certain genus; just as fire is said to be the subtlest of bodies. Hence it does not follow that there is nothing in us better than the virtues; but the truth is that the latter are among those things which are supreme goods in their own genus.

             4. Just as in this life there is an habitual perfection, namely virtue, and an actual perfection, which is a virtuous act; so also in Heaven, happiness is actual perfection, proceeding from a consummated habit. Wherefore the Philosopher also says, in the Ethics, that happiness is an act of perfect virtue.

             5. A vicious act directly excludes a virtuous act, being its contrary; whereas it removes a virtuous habit accidentally, inasmuch as it cuts one off from the Cause of infused virtue, that is, from God. Hence Is. 59/2: "But your iniquities have divided between you and your God." For this reason, the acquired virtues are not destroyed by one vicious act alone.

             6. This definition of the Philosopher's can be understood in two ways. In one sense, materially, understanding virtue as that of which virtue is capable (id in quod virtus potest), which is the extreme limit of a power; just as the strength of a man who can carry a hundred pounds consists in the ability of carrying that number of pounds, and not in the ability of carrying a mere sixty pounds. In another sense, we can understand the definition in its essential meaning, in which virtue is said to be the limit of power because it designates the actualization of a power, whether or not that by which the power is actualized be other than the power itself.

             7. There is no similarity here between the sensitive and the rational powers, as has been said.

             8. A disposition for something is that by which one is moved to attain that thing. Now motion sometimes has its term in the same genus as itself; for instance, the movement of alteration is a quality; hence a disposition to this term will always be in the same genus as the term itself. On the other hand, sometimes it has a term of another genus, e.g. when the term of an alteration is a substantial form. Thus, a disposition is not always of the same genus as that for which it disposes: heat, for instance, is a disposition for the substantial form of fire.

             9. A disposition may be considered in three ways. First, as that by which matter is disposed to receive form, as heat is a disposition for the form of fire. Secondly, as that by which an agent is disposed to act, as swiftness is a disposition for running. Thirdly, the ordination of things to each other is said to be a disposition. This last is the sense in which disposition is used by Augustine. A disposition in the first sense is distinct from a habit; while virtue itself is a disposition of the second type.

             10. No thing is so stable that it may not of itself suddenly fail, should its causes fail to sustain it. Wherefore, it is no wonder if infused virtue is lost, should union with God be broken by mortal sin. Nor does this argue against the stability (immobilitati) of virtue itself, which stability is effective only as long as its Cause remains.

             11. We need a habit for both types of operation: for natural operations, for the three reasons stated above (in the Body of the Article); for meritorious acts, moreover, that our natural powers may be elevated by an infused habit to what is above their nature. Nor does this destroy the working of God in us; for He so acts in us that we also act. Hence we need a habit to act sufficiently well.

             12. Every form is received in its subject according to the nature of that subject. Now it is proper to a rational power to be capable of (choosing between) opposites, that is, to be master of its own act. Hence a rational power cannot be forced to act always in the same way, by the reception of an habitual form or habit; rather it can act or not act.

             13. That which consists merely in the act of choice is, at least to a certain extent, easy to perform; but that it be done in a proper manner, namely with dispatch, firmness, and enjoyment, is not easy. Consequently, for the latter we need virtuous habits.

             14. All movements of brutes or of men which begin anew proceed from some mover which in turn is moved, and depend on something already existing. And so habits do not of themselves elicit acts, but must be put into operation by an agent.

             15. Virtue is a mean between passions, not as a sort of intermediary passion, but as an act which constitutes the mean in the passions themselves.