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Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles
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That the Truths which we confess concerning God fall under two Modes or Categories
That there is no lightmindedness in assenting to Truths of Faith, although they are above Reason
That the Truth of reason is not contrary to the Truth of Christian Faith
Of the Relation of Human Reason to the first Truth of Faith*
The Order and Mode of Procedure in this Work
Rejection of the aforesaid Opinion, and Solution of the aforesaid Reasons
Reasons in Proof of the Existence of God
That in order to a Knowledge of God we must use the Method of Negative Differentiation*
That in God there is no Passive Potentiality
That in God there is no Composition
That in God Existence and Essence is the same*
That in God there is no Accident
That the Existence of God cannot he characterised by the addition of any Substantial Differentia*
That God is Universal Perfection
How Likeness to God may be found in Creatures
What Names can be predicated of God
That nothing is predicated of God and other beings synonymously*
That the things that are said God and Creatures are said analogously
That the several Names predicated of God are not synonymous
That the Propositions which our Understanding forms of God are not void of meaning
That in God there can be no Evil
That God is the Good of all Good
That in God the Understanding is His very Essence
That God understands by nothing else than by His own Essence
That God perfectly understands Himself
That God primarily and essentially knows Himself alone
That God knows other things besides Himself
That God has a particular Knowledge of all things
Some Discussion of the Question how there is in the Divine Understanding a Multitude of Objects
How there is in God a Multitude of Objects of Understanding
That the Divine Essence, being One, is the proper Likeness and Type of all things Intelligible*
That God understands all things at once and together
That there is no Habitual Knowledge in God
That the Knowledge of God is not a Reasoned Knowledge
That God does not understand by Combination and Separation of Ideas
That the Truth to be found in Propositions is not excluded from God
That the Truth of God is the First and Sovereign Truth
The Arguments of those who wish to withdraw from God the Knowledge of Individual Things*
A list of things to be said concerning the Divine Knowledge
That God Knows Individual Things
That God knows things which are not*
That God knows Individual Contingent Events*
That God knows the Motions of the Will
That God knows infinite things*
That God knows Base and Mean Things*
That the Will of God is His Essence
That the Object of the Will of God in the First Place is God Himself
That God in willing Himself wills also other things besides Himself*
That with one and the same Act of the Will God wills Himself and all other Beings
That the Divine Will reaches to the good of Individual Existences
That God wills things even that as yet are not
That God of necessity wills His own Being and His own Goodness
That God does not of necessity love other things than Himself
Arguments against the aforesaid Doctrine and Solutions of the same
That God wills anything else than Himself with an Hypothetical Necessity*
That the Will of God is not of things in themselves Impossible
That the Divine Will does not take away Contingency from things
That Reason can be assigned for the Divine Will*
That nothing can be a Cause to the Divine Will
That there is a Free Will in God
That there are no Passions in God
That there is in God Delight and Joy
In what sense Virtues can be posited in God
That in God there are the Virtues which regulate Action
That the Contemplative (Intellectual) Virtues are in God
That the Life of God is everlasting
Connexion of what follows with what has gone before.
That the Philosopher and the Theologian view Creatures from Different Standpoints
Order of Matters to be Treated
That it belongs to God to be to other Beings the Principle of Existence
That there is in God Active Power
That God's Power is His Substance
That God's Power is His Action
In what manner Power is said to be in God
That something is predicated of God in relation to Creatures
That the Relations, predicated of God in regard to Creatures, are not really in God*
How the aforesaid Relations are predicated of God
That God is to all things the Cause of their being
That God has brought things into being out of nothing
That Creation is not a Movement nor a Change
Solution of Arguments against Creation*
That Creation is not Successive
That it belongs to God alone to create
That God's Action in Creation is not of Physical Necessity, but of Free Choice of Will
In what sense some things are said to be Impossible to the Almighty
That the Divine Understanding is not limited to certain fixed Effects
That God has not brought things into being in discharge of any Debt of Justice
How Absolute Necessity may have place in Creation
That it is not necessary for Creatures to have existed from Eternity*
Reasons alleged for the Eternity of the World on the part of God, with Answers to the same
Reasons alleged for the Eternity of the World on the part Creatures, with answers to the same
Arguments wherewith some try to show that the World is not Eternal, and Solutions of the same
That the Variety of Creatures does not arise from any Contrariety of Prime Agents*
That the Variety of Creatures has not arisen from Variety of Merits and Demerits
The Real Prime Cause of the Variety of Creatures.
That Subsistent Intelligences are Voluntary Agents
That Subsistent Intelligences have Free Will
That Subsistent Intelligence is not Corporeal
That in Created Subsistent Intelligences there is a Difference between Existence and Essence
That in Created Subsistent Intelligences there is Actuality and Potentiality
That Subsistent Intelligences are Imperishable
Plato's Theory of the Union of the Intellectual Soul with the Body*
That Vegetative, Sentient, and Intelligent are not in man Three Souls
That the Potential Intellect of Man is not a Spirit subsisting apart from Matter*
That the aforesaid Tenet is contrary to the Mind of Aristotle
Against the Opinion of Alexander concerning the Potential Intellect*
That the Soul is not a Harmony*
Against those who suppose Intellect and Sense to be the same
Against those who maintain that the Potential Intellect is the Phantasy*
How a Subsistent Intelligence may be the Form of a Body
That the Potential Intellect is not One and the Same in all Men
Confutation of the Arguments which seem to prove the Unity of the Potential Intellect
That the Active Intellect is not a separately Subsisting Intelligence, But a Faculty of the Soul
That the Human Soul does not Perish with the Body
That the Souls of Dumb Animals are not Immortal
That the Soul is not of the substance of God
That the Human Soul is not transmitted by Generation*
That the Human Soul is brought into Being by a Creative Act of God
Arguments against the Truth of the Conclusion last drawn, with their Solution
That there are Subsistent Intelligences not united with Bodies*
That Intelligences subsisting apart are not more than one in the same Species*
That an Intelligence subsisting apart and a Soul are not of one Species
That Intelligences subsisting apart do not gather their Knowledge from Objects of Sense
That the Mind of an Intelligence subsisting apart is ever in the act of understanding
How one separately subsisting Intelligence knows another
That Intelligences subsisting apart know Individual Things
Preface to the Book that Follows
That every Agent acts to some End
That every Agent acts to some Good
That Evil in things is beside the Intention of the Agent
Arguments against the Truth of the Conclusion last drawn, with Solutions of the Same
That Evil is not a Nature or Essence*
Arguments against the aforsesaid Conclusion, with Answers to the same
That the Cause of Evil is good
That Evil is founded in some Good
That Evil does not entirely swallow up Good
That Evil is an Accidental Cause
That there is not any Sovereign Evil, acting as the Principle of All Evils
That the End in View of everything is some Good
That all Things are ordained to one End, which is God
How God is the End of all Things
That all Things aim at Likeness to God
How Things copy the Divine Goodness
That Things aim at Likeness to God in being Causes of other Things
That all Things seek good, even Things devoid of Consciousness
That the End of every Subsistent Intelligence is to understand God
That Happiness does not consist in any Act of the Will*
That the Happiness of Man does not consist in Bodily Pleasures
That Happiness does not consist in Honours nor in Human Glory
That Man's Happiness does not consist in Riches
That Happiness does not consist in Worldly Power
That Happiness does not consist in the Goods of the Body
That the Final Happiness Man does not consist in Acts of the Moral Virtues
That the Final Happiness of Man consists in the Contemplation of God
That Happiness does not consist in the Knowledge of God which is to be had by Demonstration
That Happiness does not consist in the Knowledge of God by Faith
[That we cannot find happiness in this life by sharing an angel's natural knowledge of God]*
That the Soul in this life does not understand itself by itself
That we cannot in this life see God as He essentially is*
That the Final Happiness of Man is not in this Life*
How God is seen as He essentially is
That no Created Substance can of its natural power arrive to see God as He essentially is
That a Created Intelligence needs some influx of Divine Light to see God in His Essence
Arguments against the aforesaid statements, and their Solutions
That the Created Intelligence does not comprehend the Divine Substance
That no Created Intelligence in seeing God sees all things that can be seen in Him
That every Intelligence of every grade can be partaker of the vision of God
That one may see God more perfectly than another
How they who see the Divine Substance see all things
That they who see God see all things in Him at once
That by the Sight of God one is Partaker of Life Everlasting
That they who see God will see Him for ever
How in that Final Happiness every Desire of Man is fulfilled
That God governs things by His Providence
That God preserves things in being
That nothing gives Being except in as much as it acts in the Power of God
That God is the Cause of Activity in all Active Agents
That God is everywhere and in all things
Of the Opinion of those who withdraw from Natural Things their Proper Actions
How the Same Effect is from God and from a Natural Agent
That the Divine Providence is not wholly inconsistent with the presence of Evil in Creation
That Divine Providence is not inconsistent with an element of Contingency in Creation*
That Divine Providence is not inconsistent with Freedom of the Will
That Divine Providence is not inconsistent with Fortune and Chance*
That the Providence of God is exercised over Individual and Contingent Things
That the Providence of God watches immediately over all Individual Things
That the arrangements of Divine Providence are carried into execution by means of Secondary Causes
That Intelligent Creatures are the Medium through which other Creatures are governed by God
Of the Subordination of Men one to another
That other Subsistent Intelligences cannot be direct Causes of our Elections and Volitions*
That the Motion of the Will is caused by God, and not merely by the Power of the Will
That Human Choices and Volitions are subject to Divine Providence
How Human Things are reduced to Higher Causes*
In what sense one is said to be Fortunate, and how Man is aided by Higher Causes*
Of Fate, whether there be such a thing, and if so, what it is
Of the Certainty of Divine Providence*
That the Immutability of Divine Providence does not bar the Utility of Prayer
That God does not hear all Prayers
How the Arrangements of Providence follow a Plan
God can work beyond the Order laid down for Creatures, and produce Effects without Proximate Causes
That the things which God does beyond the Order of Nature are not contrary to Nature*
How Separately Subsisting Spirits work certain Wonders, which yet are not true Miracles
That the Works of Magicians are not due solely to the Influence of the Heavenly Spheres*
Whence the performances of Magicians derive their Efficacy*
That the Subsistent Intelligence, whose aid is employed in Magic, is not Evil by Nature*
Arguments seeming to prove that Sin is impossible to Spirits, with Solutions of the same
That in Spirits there may be Sin, and how
That it was necessary for a Law to be given to Man by God
That the main purpose of the Divine Law is to subordinate Man to God
That the End of the Divine Law is the Love of God
That by the Divine Law we are directed to the Love of our Neighbour
That by Divine Law men are obliged to a Right Faith
That by certain Sensible Rites our mind is directed to God
That the Worship of Latria is to be paid to God alone
That the Divine Law directs man to a Rational Use of Corporeal and Sensible Things
That Marriage ought to be Indissoluble
That Marriage ought to be between one Man and one Woman
That Marriage ought not to take place between Kindred
That of no Food is the Use Sinful in itself
How the Law of God relates a man to his Neighbour
That the Divine Government of Men is after the manner of Paternal Government
Of the Counsels that are given in the Divine Law
Arguments against Voluntary Poverty, with Replies
Of various Modes of Living adopted by the Votaries of Voluntary Poverty
In what the Good of Poverty consists
Arguments against Perpetual Continence, with Replies
Against those who find fault with Vows
That neither all Good Works nor all Sins are Equal*
That a Man's Acts are punished or rewarded by God
Of the Difference and Order of Punishments
That not all Punishments nor all Rewards are Equal
Of the Punishment due to Mortal and Venial Sins respectively in regard to the Last End
That the Punishment whereby one is deprived of his Last End is Interminable*
That Sins are punished also by the experience of something Painful
That it is Lawful for judges to inflict Punishments
That Man stands in need of Divine Grace for the Gaining of Happiness
That the Divine Assistance does not compel a Man to Virtue
That Man cannot Merit beforehand the said Assistance
That the Grace which constitutes the State of Grace causes in us the Love of God
That Divine Grace causes in us Faith
That Divine Grace causes in us a Hope of future Blessedness
That Man needs the Assistance of Divine Grace to persevere in Good*
That he who falls from Grace by Sin may be recovered again by Grace
That Man cannot be delivered from Sin except by Grace
That a Man already in Mortal Sin cannot avoid more Mortal Sin without Grace*
That some Men God delivers from Sin, and some He leaves in Sin
That God is Cause of Sin to no Man
Of Predestination, Reprobation, and Divine Election
Of Generation, Paternity, and Sonship in God
The Opinion of Photinus touching the Son of God, and its Rejection*
Rejection of the Opinion of Sabellius concerning the Son of God*
Of the Opinion of Arius concerning the Son of God*
Explanation of the Texts which Arius used to allege for himself
How the Son of God is called the Wisdom of God
That the Holy Ghost is true God
That the Holy Ghost is a Subsistent Person
Of the Effects which the Scriptures attribute to the Holy Ghost in respect of the whole Creation
Of the Effects attributed to the Holy Ghost in the attraction of the Rational Creature to God
Replies to Arguments alleged against the Divinity of the Holy Ghost
That the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son*
That there are only Three Persons in the Godhead, Father and Son and Holy Ghost
Of the Incarnation of the Word according to the Tradition of Holy Scripture
Of the Error of Photinus concerning the Incarnation
Of the Error of the Manicheans concerning the Incarnation
Of the Error of Arius and Apollinaris concerning the Soul of Christ
Of the Error of Theodore of Mopsuestia concerning the Union of the Word with Man
Of the Error of Macarius of Antioch, who posited one Operation only and one Will only in Christ*
The Doctrine of Catholic Faith concerning the Incarnation
Objections against the Faith of the Incarnation, with Replies
Some further Elucidation of the Incarnation
That Christ was born of virgin without prejudice to His true and natural Humanity
That Christ was conceived by the Holy Ghost
That Original Sin is transmitted from our First Parent to his Posterity
Arguments against Original Sin, with Replies
Of the Incarnation as part of the Fitness of Things
Points of Reply to Difficulties touching the Economy of the Incarnation
Of the Difference between the Sacraments of the Old and of the New Law
Of the Number of the Sacraments of the New Law
Of the Conversion of Bread into the Body of Christ
An Answer to Difficulties raised in respect of Place
The Difficulty of the Accidents remaining
What happens when the Sacramental Species pass away
Answer to the Difficulty raised in respect of the Breaking of the Host
Of the kind of Bread and Wine that ought to be used for the Consecration of this Sacrament
That it is possible for a man to sin after receiving Sacramental Grace*
That a man who sins after the Grace of the Sacraments may be converted to Grace*
Of the need of the Sacrament of Penance, and of the Parts thereof
Of the Sacrament of Extreme Unction
Of the Episcopal Dignity, and that therein one Bishop is Supreme
That Sacraments can be administered even by Wicked Ministers
That through Christ the Resurrection of our Bodies will take place
Some Points of Reply to Difficulties on the Resurrection
That Men shall rise again Immortal
That in the Resurrection there will be no use of Food or of the Sexes
That Risen Bodies shall be of the same Nature as before
That the Bodies of the Risen shall be otherwise organised than before
Of the Qualities of Glorified Bodies
Of Sex and Age in the Resurrection
Of the Quality of Risen Bodies in the Lost
That Souls enter upon Punishment or Reward immediately after their Separation from their Bodies
That the Souls of the Saints after Death have their Will immutably fixed on Good
That the Souls of the Wicked after Death have their Will immutably fixed on Evil
Of the General Cause of Immutability in all Souls after their Separation from the Body
LO, these things that have been said are but a part of his ways; and whereas we have heard scarce one little drop of his speech, who shall be able to look upon the thunder of his greatness? (Job xxvi, 14.) It is the nature of the human mind to gather its knowledge from sensible things; nor can it of itself arrive at the direct vision of the divine substance, as that substance is in itself raised above all sensible things and all other beings to boot, and beyond all proportion with them. But because the perfect good of man consists in his knowing God in such way as he can, there is given man a way of ascending to the knowledge of God, to the end that so noble a creature should not seem to exist altogether in vain, unable to attain the proper end of his existence. The way is this, that as all the perfections of creatures descend in order from God, who is the height of perfection, man should begin from the lower creatures, and ascend by degrees, and so advance to the knowledge of God. Of this descent of perfections from God there are two processes. One is on the part of the first origin of things: for the divine wisdom, to make things perfect, produced them in order, that the universe might consist of a complete round of creatures from highest to lowest. The other process belongs to the things themselves: for, as causes are nobler than effects, the first and highest products of causation, while falling short of the First Cause, which is God, nevertheless are superior to the effects which they themselves produce; and so on in order, until we come to the lowest of creatures.* And because in that 'roof and crown of all things' (summo rerum vertice), God, we find the most perfect unity; and everything is stronger and more excellent, the more thoroughly it is one; it follows that diversity and variety increase in things, the further they are removed from Him who is the first principle of all. Therefore the process of derivation of creatures from their first principle may be represented by a sort of pyramid, with unity at the apex, and the widest multiplicity at the base.* And thus in the diversity of things there is apparent a diversity of ways, beginning from one principle and terminating in different terms. By these ways then our understanding can ascend to God.
But the weakness of our understanding prevents us from knowing these ways perfectly. Our knowledge begins with sense; and sense is concerned with exterior accidents (phenomena), which are of themselves sensible, as colour, smell, and the like. With difficulty can our mind penetrate through such exterior phenomena to an inner knowledge of things, even where it perfectly grasps by sense their accidents.* Much less will it be able to attain to a comprehension of the natures of those objects of which we perceive only a few phenomena by sense;* and still less of those natures no accidents of which lie open to sense, but certain effects which they produce, inadequate to their power, enable us to recognise them.* But even though the very natures of things were known to us, still we should have but slight knowledge of their order, of their mutual relations, and direction by divine providence to their final end, since we cannot penetrate the plan of Providence.* The ways themselves then being so imperfectly known to us, how shall we travel by them to any perfect knowledge of the First Beginning of all things, which transcends all created ways and is out of all proportion with them? Even though we knew the said ways perfectly, we should still fall short of perfect knowledge of their origin and starting-point.*
Feeble and inadequate then being any knowledge to which man could arrive by these ways, God has revealed to men facts about Himself which surpass human understanding; in which revelation there is observed an order of gradual transition from imperfect to perfect. In man's present state, in which his understanding is tied to sense, his mind cannot possibly be elevated to any clear discernment of truths that surpass all proportions of sense: in that state the revelation is given him, not to be understood, but to be heard and believed.* Only when he is delivered from the thraldom of sensible things, will he be elevated to an intuition of revealed truth. Thus there is a threefold knowledge that man may have of divine things. The first is an ascent through creatures to the knowledge of God by the natural light of reason. The second is a descent of divine truth by revelation to us; truth exceeding human understanding; truth accepted, not as demonstrated to sight, but as orally delivered for belief. The third is an elevation of the human mind to a perfect insight into things revealed.
This triple knowledge is suggested by the text above quoted from Job. These things that have been said are but a part of his ways, applies to that knowledge whereby our understanding ascends by way of creatures to a knowledge of God. And because we know these ways but imperfectly, that is rightly put in, but a part, for we know in part (i Cor. xiii, 9). The next clause, and whereas we have heard scarce one little drop of his speech, refers to the second knowledge, whereby divine truths are revealed for our belief by means of oral declaration: for faith is hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ (Rom. x, 17). And because this imperfect knowledge is an effluent from that perfect knowledge whereby divine truth is seen in itself, -- a revelation from God by the ministry of angels, who see the face of the Father (Matt. xviii, 10),* he rightly terms it a drop, as it is written: In that day the mountains shall drop sweetness (Joel iii, 18). But because revelation does not take in all the mysteries which the angels and the rest of the blessed behold in the First Truth, there is a meaning in the qualification, one little drop: for it is said: Who shall magnify him as he is from the beginning? many things are hidden greater than these, for we see but a few of his works (Ecclus xliii, 35): I have many things to say to you, but ye cannot hear them now (John xvi, 2). These few points that are revealed to us are set forth under similitudes and obscurities of expression, so as to be accessible only to the studious, hence the expressive addition, scarce, marking the difficulty of the enquiry. The third clause, who shall be able to look upon the thunder of his greatness? points to the third knowledge, whereby the First Truth shall be known, not as believed, but as seen: for we shall see him as he is (1 John iii, 2). No little fragment of the divine mysteries will be perceived, but the Divine Majesty itself, and all the perfect array of good things: hence the Lord said to Moses: I will show thee all good (Exod. iii, 19). Rightly therefore we have in the text the words look upon his greatness. And this truth shall not be proposed to man under the covering of any veils, but quite plain: hence the Lord says to His disciples: The hour cometh, when I will no longer speak to you in proverbs, but will tell you openly of my Father (John xvi, 25): hence [the] word thunder in the text, indicative of this plain showing.
The words of the above text are adapted to our purpose: for whereas in the previous books we have spoken of divine things according as natural reason can arrive through creatures to the knowledge of them, -- but that imperfectly, according to the limitations of the author's capacity, so that we can say with Job: Lo, these things that have been said are but a part of his ways; it remains now to treat of truths divinely revealed for our belief, truths transcending human understanding. And the words of the text are a guide to our procedure in this matter. As we have scarce heard the truth in the statements of Holy Scripture, those being as it were one little drop coming down to us, and no man in this life can look upon the thunder of his greatness, our method will be as follows. Taking as first principles the statements of Holy Scripture, we will endeavour to penetrate their hidden meaning to the best of our ability, without presuming to claim perfect knowledge of the matter. Our proofs will rest on the authority of Holy Scripture, not on natural reason: still it will be our duty to show that our assertions are not contrary to natural reason, and thereby defend them against the assaults of unbelievers. And since natural reason ascends by creatures to the knowledge of God, while the knowledge of faith descends by divine revelation from God to us, and it is the same way up and down, we must proceed in these matters of supra-rational belief by the same way in which we proceeded in our rational enquiries concerning God. Thus we shall treat first of the supra-rational truths that are proposed for our belief concerning God Himself, as the confession of the Trinity [Chapp. I - XXVI: cf. I, Chap. IX: this answers to Book I]. Secondly, of the supra-rational works done by God, as the work of the Incarnation and its consequences [Chapp. XXVII - LXXVIII: answering to Book II]. Thirdly, of the supra-rational events expected at the end of human history, as the resurrection and glorification of bodies, the everlasting bliss of souls, and events therewith connected [Chapp. LXXIX - XCVII: answering to Book III].