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Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles
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That the Truths which we confess concerning God fall under two Modes or Categories
That there is no lightmindedness in assenting to Truths of Faith, although they are above Reason
That the Truth of reason is not contrary to the Truth of Christian Faith
Of the Relation of Human Reason to the first Truth of Faith*
The Order and Mode of Procedure in this Work
Rejection of the aforesaid Opinion, and Solution of the aforesaid Reasons
Reasons in Proof of the Existence of God
That in order to a Knowledge of God we must use the Method of Negative Differentiation*
That in God there is no Passive Potentiality
That in God there is no Composition
That in God Existence and Essence is the same*
That in God there is no Accident
That the Existence of God cannot he characterised by the addition of any Substantial Differentia*
That God is Universal Perfection
How Likeness to God may be found in Creatures
What Names can be predicated of God
That nothing is predicated of God and other beings synonymously*
That the things that are said God and Creatures are said analogously
That the several Names predicated of God are not synonymous
That the Propositions which our Understanding forms of God are not void of meaning
That in God there can be no Evil
That God is the Good of all Good
That in God the Understanding is His very Essence
That God understands by nothing else than by His own Essence
That God perfectly understands Himself
That God primarily and essentially knows Himself alone
That God knows other things besides Himself
That God has a particular Knowledge of all things
Some Discussion of the Question how there is in the Divine Understanding a Multitude of Objects
How there is in God a Multitude of Objects of Understanding
That the Divine Essence, being One, is the proper Likeness and Type of all things Intelligible*
That God understands all things at once and together
That there is no Habitual Knowledge in God
That the Knowledge of God is not a Reasoned Knowledge
That God does not understand by Combination and Separation of Ideas
That the Truth to be found in Propositions is not excluded from God
That the Truth of God is the First and Sovereign Truth
The Arguments of those who wish to withdraw from God the Knowledge of Individual Things*
A list of things to be said concerning the Divine Knowledge
That God Knows Individual Things
That God knows things which are not*
That God knows Individual Contingent Events*
That God knows the Motions of the Will
That God knows infinite things*
That God knows Base and Mean Things*
That the Will of God is His Essence
That the Object of the Will of God in the First Place is God Himself
That God in willing Himself wills also other things besides Himself*
That with one and the same Act of the Will God wills Himself and all other Beings
That the Divine Will reaches to the good of Individual Existences
That God wills things even that as yet are not
That God of necessity wills His own Being and His own Goodness
That God does not of necessity love other things than Himself
Arguments against the aforesaid Doctrine and Solutions of the same
That God wills anything else than Himself with an Hypothetical Necessity*
That the Will of God is not of things in themselves Impossible
That the Divine Will does not take away Contingency from things
That Reason can be assigned for the Divine Will*
That nothing can be a Cause to the Divine Will
That there is a Free Will in God
That there are no Passions in God
That there is in God Delight and Joy
In what sense Virtues can be posited in God
That in God there are the Virtues which regulate Action
That the Contemplative (Intellectual) Virtues are in God
That the Life of God is everlasting
Connexion of what follows with what has gone before.
That the Philosopher and the Theologian view Creatures from Different Standpoints
Order of Matters to be Treated
That it belongs to God to be to other Beings the Principle of Existence
That there is in God Active Power
That God's Power is His Substance
That God's Power is His Action
In what manner Power is said to be in God
That something is predicated of God in relation to Creatures
That the Relations, predicated of God in regard to Creatures, are not really in God*
How the aforesaid Relations are predicated of God
That God is to all things the Cause of their being
That God has brought things into being out of nothing
That Creation is not a Movement nor a Change
Solution of Arguments against Creation*
That Creation is not Successive
That it belongs to God alone to create
That God's Action in Creation is not of Physical Necessity, but of Free Choice of Will
In what sense some things are said to be Impossible to the Almighty
That the Divine Understanding is not limited to certain fixed Effects
That God has not brought things into being in discharge of any Debt of Justice
How Absolute Necessity may have place in Creation
That it is not necessary for Creatures to have existed from Eternity*
Reasons alleged for the Eternity of the World on the part of God, with Answers to the same
Reasons alleged for the Eternity of the World on the part Creatures, with answers to the same
Arguments wherewith some try to show that the World is not Eternal, and Solutions of the same
That the Variety of Creatures does not arise from any Contrariety of Prime Agents*
That the Variety of Creatures has not arisen from Variety of Merits and Demerits
The Real Prime Cause of the Variety of Creatures.
That Subsistent Intelligences are Voluntary Agents
That Subsistent Intelligences have Free Will
That Subsistent Intelligence is not Corporeal
That in Created Subsistent Intelligences there is a Difference between Existence and Essence
That in Created Subsistent Intelligences there is Actuality and Potentiality
That Subsistent Intelligences are Imperishable
Plato's Theory of the Union of the Intellectual Soul with the Body*
That Vegetative, Sentient, and Intelligent are not in man Three Souls
That the Potential Intellect of Man is not a Spirit subsisting apart from Matter*
That the aforesaid Tenet is contrary to the Mind of Aristotle
Against the Opinion of Alexander concerning the Potential Intellect*
That the Soul is not a Harmony*
Against those who suppose Intellect and Sense to be the same
Against those who maintain that the Potential Intellect is the Phantasy*
How a Subsistent Intelligence may be the Form of a Body
That the Potential Intellect is not One and the Same in all Men
Confutation of the Arguments which seem to prove the Unity of the Potential Intellect
That the Active Intellect is not a separately Subsisting Intelligence, But a Faculty of the Soul
That the Human Soul does not Perish with the Body
That the Souls of Dumb Animals are not Immortal
That the Soul is not of the substance of God
That the Human Soul is not transmitted by Generation*
That the Human Soul is brought into Being by a Creative Act of God
Arguments against the Truth of the Conclusion last drawn, with their Solution
That there are Subsistent Intelligences not united with Bodies*
That Intelligences subsisting apart are not more than one in the same Species*
That an Intelligence subsisting apart and a Soul are not of one Species
That Intelligences subsisting apart do not gather their Knowledge from Objects of Sense
That the Mind of an Intelligence subsisting apart is ever in the act of understanding
How one separately subsisting Intelligence knows another
That Intelligences subsisting apart know Individual Things
Preface to the Book that Follows
That every Agent acts to some End
That every Agent acts to some Good
That Evil in things is beside the Intention of the Agent
Arguments against the Truth of the Conclusion last drawn, with Solutions of the Same
That Evil is not a Nature or Essence*
Arguments against the aforsesaid Conclusion, with Answers to the same
That the Cause of Evil is good
That Evil is founded in some Good
That Evil does not entirely swallow up Good
That Evil is an Accidental Cause
That there is not any Sovereign Evil, acting as the Principle of All Evils
That the End in View of everything is some Good
That all Things are ordained to one End, which is God
How God is the End of all Things
That all Things aim at Likeness to God
How Things copy the Divine Goodness
That Things aim at Likeness to God in being Causes of other Things
That all Things seek good, even Things devoid of Consciousness
That the End of every Subsistent Intelligence is to understand God
That Happiness does not consist in any Act of the Will*
That the Happiness of Man does not consist in Bodily Pleasures
That Happiness does not consist in Honours nor in Human Glory
That Man's Happiness does not consist in Riches
That Happiness does not consist in Worldly Power
That Happiness does not consist in the Goods of the Body
That the Final Happiness Man does not consist in Acts of the Moral Virtues
That the Final Happiness of Man consists in the Contemplation of God
That Happiness does not consist in the Knowledge of God which is to be had by Demonstration
That Happiness does not consist in the Knowledge of God by Faith
[That we cannot find happiness in this life by sharing an angel's natural knowledge of God]*
That the Soul in this life does not understand itself by itself
That we cannot in this life see God as He essentially is*
That the Final Happiness of Man is not in this Life*
How God is seen as He essentially is
That no Created Substance can of its natural power arrive to see God as He essentially is
That a Created Intelligence needs some influx of Divine Light to see God in His Essence
Arguments against the aforesaid statements, and their Solutions
That the Created Intelligence does not comprehend the Divine Substance
That no Created Intelligence in seeing God sees all things that can be seen in Him
That every Intelligence of every grade can be partaker of the vision of God
That one may see God more perfectly than another
How they who see the Divine Substance see all things
That they who see God see all things in Him at once
That by the Sight of God one is Partaker of Life Everlasting
That they who see God will see Him for ever
How in that Final Happiness every Desire of Man is fulfilled
That God governs things by His Providence
That God preserves things in being
That nothing gives Being except in as much as it acts in the Power of God
That God is the Cause of Activity in all Active Agents
That God is everywhere and in all things
Of the Opinion of those who withdraw from Natural Things their Proper Actions
How the Same Effect is from God and from a Natural Agent
That the Divine Providence is not wholly inconsistent with the presence of Evil in Creation
That Divine Providence is not inconsistent with an element of Contingency in Creation*
That Divine Providence is not inconsistent with Freedom of the Will
That Divine Providence is not inconsistent with Fortune and Chance*
That the Providence of God is exercised over Individual and Contingent Things
That the Providence of God watches immediately over all Individual Things
That the arrangements of Divine Providence are carried into execution by means of Secondary Causes
That Intelligent Creatures are the Medium through which other Creatures are governed by God
Of the Subordination of Men one to another
That other Subsistent Intelligences cannot be direct Causes of our Elections and Volitions*
That the Motion of the Will is caused by God, and not merely by the Power of the Will
That Human Choices and Volitions are subject to Divine Providence
How Human Things are reduced to Higher Causes*
In what sense one is said to be Fortunate, and how Man is aided by Higher Causes*
Of Fate, whether there be such a thing, and if so, what it is
Of the Certainty of Divine Providence*
That the Immutability of Divine Providence does not bar the Utility of Prayer
That God does not hear all Prayers
How the Arrangements of Providence follow a Plan
God can work beyond the Order laid down for Creatures, and produce Effects without Proximate Causes
That the things which God does beyond the Order of Nature are not contrary to Nature*
How Separately Subsisting Spirits work certain Wonders, which yet are not true Miracles
That the Works of Magicians are not due solely to the Influence of the Heavenly Spheres*
Whence the performances of Magicians derive their Efficacy*
That the Subsistent Intelligence, whose aid is employed in Magic, is not Evil by Nature*
Arguments seeming to prove that Sin is impossible to Spirits, with Solutions of the same
That in Spirits there may be Sin, and how
That it was necessary for a Law to be given to Man by God
That the main purpose of the Divine Law is to subordinate Man to God
That the End of the Divine Law is the Love of God
That by the Divine Law we are directed to the Love of our Neighbour
That by Divine Law men are obliged to a Right Faith
That by certain Sensible Rites our mind is directed to God
That the Worship of Latria is to be paid to God alone
That the Divine Law directs man to a Rational Use of Corporeal and Sensible Things
That Marriage ought to be Indissoluble
That Marriage ought to be between one Man and one Woman
That Marriage ought not to take place between Kindred
That of no Food is the Use Sinful in itself
How the Law of God relates a man to his Neighbour
That the Divine Government of Men is after the manner of Paternal Government
Of the Counsels that are given in the Divine Law
Arguments against Voluntary Poverty, with Replies
Of various Modes of Living adopted by the Votaries of Voluntary Poverty
In what the Good of Poverty consists
Arguments against Perpetual Continence, with Replies
Against those who find fault with Vows
That neither all Good Works nor all Sins are Equal*
That a Man's Acts are punished or rewarded by God
Of the Difference and Order of Punishments
That not all Punishments nor all Rewards are Equal
Of the Punishment due to Mortal and Venial Sins respectively in regard to the Last End
That the Punishment whereby one is deprived of his Last End is Interminable*
That Sins are punished also by the experience of something Painful
That it is Lawful for judges to inflict Punishments
That Man stands in need of Divine Grace for the Gaining of Happiness
That the Divine Assistance does not compel a Man to Virtue
That Man cannot Merit beforehand the said Assistance
That the Grace which constitutes the State of Grace causes in us the Love of God
That Divine Grace causes in us Faith
That Divine Grace causes in us a Hope of future Blessedness
That Man needs the Assistance of Divine Grace to persevere in Good*
That he who falls from Grace by Sin may be recovered again by Grace
That Man cannot be delivered from Sin except by Grace
That a Man already in Mortal Sin cannot avoid more Mortal Sin without Grace*
That some Men God delivers from Sin, and some He leaves in Sin
That God is Cause of Sin to no Man
Of Predestination, Reprobation, and Divine Election
Of Generation, Paternity, and Sonship in God
The Opinion of Photinus touching the Son of God, and its Rejection*
Rejection of the Opinion of Sabellius concerning the Son of God*
Of the Opinion of Arius concerning the Son of God*
Explanation of the Texts which Arius used to allege for himself
How the Son of God is called the Wisdom of God
That the Holy Ghost is true God
That the Holy Ghost is a Subsistent Person
Of the Effects which the Scriptures attribute to the Holy Ghost in respect of the whole Creation
Of the Effects attributed to the Holy Ghost in the attraction of the Rational Creature to God
Replies to Arguments alleged against the Divinity of the Holy Ghost
That the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son*
That there are only Three Persons in the Godhead, Father and Son and Holy Ghost
Of the Incarnation of the Word according to the Tradition of Holy Scripture
Of the Error of Photinus concerning the Incarnation
Of the Error of the Manicheans concerning the Incarnation
Of the Error of Arius and Apollinaris concerning the Soul of Christ
Of the Error of Theodore of Mopsuestia concerning the Union of the Word with Man
Of the Error of Macarius of Antioch, who posited one Operation only and one Will only in Christ*
The Doctrine of Catholic Faith concerning the Incarnation
Objections against the Faith of the Incarnation, with Replies
Some further Elucidation of the Incarnation
That Christ was born of virgin without prejudice to His true and natural Humanity
That Christ was conceived by the Holy Ghost
That Original Sin is transmitted from our First Parent to his Posterity
Arguments against Original Sin, with Replies
Of the Incarnation as part of the Fitness of Things
Points of Reply to Difficulties touching the Economy of the Incarnation
Of the Difference between the Sacraments of the Old and of the New Law
Of the Number of the Sacraments of the New Law
Of the Conversion of Bread into the Body of Christ
An Answer to Difficulties raised in respect of Place
The Difficulty of the Accidents remaining
What happens when the Sacramental Species pass away
Answer to the Difficulty raised in respect of the Breaking of the Host
Of the kind of Bread and Wine that ought to be used for the Consecration of this Sacrament
That it is possible for a man to sin after receiving Sacramental Grace*
That a man who sins after the Grace of the Sacraments may be converted to Grace*
Of the need of the Sacrament of Penance, and of the Parts thereof
Of the Sacrament of Extreme Unction
Of the Episcopal Dignity, and that therein one Bishop is Supreme
That Sacraments can be administered even by Wicked Ministers
That through Christ the Resurrection of our Bodies will take place
Some Points of Reply to Difficulties on the Resurrection
That Men shall rise again Immortal
That in the Resurrection there will be no use of Food or of the Sexes
That Risen Bodies shall be of the same Nature as before
That the Bodies of the Risen shall be otherwise organised than before
Of the Qualities of Glorified Bodies
Of Sex and Age in the Resurrection
Of the Quality of Risen Bodies in the Lost
That Souls enter upon Punishment or Reward immediately after their Separation from their Bodies
That the Souls of the Saints after Death have their Will immutably fixed on Good
That the Souls of the Wicked after Death have their Will immutably fixed on Evil
Of the General Cause of Immutability in all Souls after their Separation from the Body
A SUBSISTENT intelligence Cannot be united with a body by any manner of combination: for combined elements, when the combination is complete, do not remain actually, but virtually only: for if they remained actually, it would not be a combination, but a mere mechanical mixture.* But this combination and consequent cessation of actual existence cannot befall subsistent intelligences; for they are imperishable.
It is likewise evident that a subsistent intelligence cannot be united with a body by any manner of contact, properly so called. For contact is only of bodies: those things are in contact, the extremities of which are together,* as points, or lines, or circumferences, which are the extremities of bodies.
Still there is one mode of contact whereby a subsistent intelligence may be mingled with a body. For natural bodies in touching one another involve a change, and thus are united together, not only in their quantitative extremities, but also by likeness of one same quality or form, the one in pressing its form on the other. And though, if we regard only quantitative extremities, the contact must be mutual in all cases, yet, if we consider action and passion, there will be found some cases of touching without being touched, and some cases of being touched without touching. Any cases that may be found of contact without contact in quantitative extremities must still be ca]led instances of contact, inasmuch as they are instances of action: thus we say that he who saddens another 'touches' him.* According to this mode of touch it is possible for a subsistent intelligence to be united to a body by contact: for subsistent intelligences act upon bodies and move them, being more highly actualised than bodies are.*
This contact is not quantitative but virtual, and differs from bodily contact in three respects. First, because in this contact the indivisible can touch the divisible, which cannot happen in bodily contact: for only that which is indivisible can be touched by a point,* whereas a subsistent intelligence, indivisible though it be, can touch a divisible quantity by acting upon it. The point and the subsistent intelligence are not indivisible in the same way. The point is indivisible as a term of quantity, and has a definite situation in a continuous surface, beyond which it cannot be thrown:* whereas a subsistent intelligence is indivisible by being outside of the category of quantity altogether: hence no indivisible element of quantity is marked out for contact with it. Secondly, because quantitative contact is only with extremities, but virtual contact is with the whole subject touched: for the subject is touched inasmuch as it is acted upon and moved; but that is inasmuch as it is in potentiality; and potentiality extends to the whole, not merely to the extremities of the whole: hence the whole is touched. From this appears a third difference: because in quantitative touch, which is of extremities, the touching body must be outside of the touched, and cannot pervade it, but is stopped by it;* whereas the virtual contact, which is proper to subsistent intelligences, reaching to the inmost recesses of things, makes the touching substance be within the touched and pervade it without let or hindrance. Thus then a subsistent intelligence may be united with a body by virtual contact.*
Elements united by such contact are not absolutely one: they are one in action and in being acted upon, which does not involve absolute oneness of being. Such absolute oneness may be in three ways: in the way of indivisibility, in the way of continuity, and in the way of natural unity. Now out of a subsistent intelligence and a body there cannot be made an indivisible unity: it must be a compound of two things. Nor again a continuous unity, because the parts of a continuum are quantitative. It remains to be enquired whether out of a subsistent intelligence and a body there can result such a unity as means oneness of nature.* But out of two permanent elements there results no being one by nature except that which results of the union of substantial form with matter: for out of substance and accident there results no being one by nature, for the nature or essence of 'man' and 'whiteness' is not the same.* This question then remains to be studied, whether a subsistent intelligence can be the substantial form of any body. Looking at the matter argumentatively, it might seem that the thing is impossible.
Arg. 1. Of two actually existent substances no one being can be made: for the actuality of every being is that whereby it is distinguished from another being. But a subsistent intelligence is an actually existing substance: so likewise is a body. Apparently therefore no one being can be made of a subsistent intelligence and a body.
Arg. 2. Form and matter are contained under the same genus: for every genus is divided into actual and potential. But a subsistent intelligence and a body are of different genera.
Arg. 3. All that is in matter must be material. But if subsistent intelligence is the form of a body, the being of such intelligence must be in matter: for there is no being of the form beyond the being of the matter. It follows that a subsistent intelligence could not be immaterial, as supposed.
Arg. 4. It is impossible for anything having its being in a body to be apart from the body. But intelligence is shown to be apart from the body, as it is neither the body itself nor a bodily faculty.*
Arg. 5. Whatever has being in common with the body, must also have activity in common with the body: for the active power of a thing cannot be more exalted than its essence. But if a subsistent intelligence is the form of a body, one being must be common to it and the body: for out of form and matter there results absolute unity, which is unity in being. At that rate the activity of a subsistent intelligence, united as a form to the body, will be exerted in common with the body, and its faculty will be a bodily (or organic) faculty: positions which we regard as impossible.
(Chap. LXIX). It is not difficult to solve the objections alleged against the aforesaid union.
Reply 1. The first objection contains a false supposition: for body and soul are not two actually existing substances, but out of the two of them is made one substance actually existing: for a man's body is not the same in actuality when the soul is present as when it is absent: it is the soul that gives actual being.*
Reply 2. As for the second objection, that form and matter are contained under the same genus, it is not true in the sense that both are species of one genus, but inasmuch as both are elements of the same species. Thus then a subsistent intelligence and a body, which as separate existences would be species of different genera, in their union belong to one genus as elements of the same.
Reply 3. Nor need a subsistent intelligence be a material form, notwithstanding that its existence is in matter: for though in matter, it is not immersed in matter, or wholly comprised in matter.
Rep!y 4. Nor yet does the union of a subsistent intelligence with a body by its being that body's form stand in the way of intelligence being separable from body.* In a soul we have to observe as well its essence as also its power. In point of essence it gives being to such and such a body, while in point of power it executes its own proper acts. In any activity of the soul therefore which is completed by a bodily organ, the power of the soul which is the principle of that activity must bring to act that part of the body whereby its activity is completed, as sight brings the eye to act. But in any activity of the soul that we may suppose not to be completed by any bodily organ, the corresponding power will not bring anything in the body to act; and this is the sense in which the intellect is said to be 'separate,' -- not but that the substance of the soul, whereof intellect is a power, or the intellectual soul, brings the body to act, inasmuch as it is the form which gives being to such body.
Reply 5. Nor is it necessary, as was argued in the fifth place, that if the soul in its substance is the form of the body, its every operation should be through the body, and thus its every faculty should be the actuation of some part of the body: for the human soul is not one of those forms which are entirely immersed in matter, but of all forms it is the most exalted above matter: hence it is capable of a certain activity without the body, being not dependent on the body in its action, as neither in its being is it dependent on the body.