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Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles
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That the Truths which we confess concerning God fall under two Modes or Categories
That there is no lightmindedness in assenting to Truths of Faith, although they are above Reason
That the Truth of reason is not contrary to the Truth of Christian Faith
Of the Relation of Human Reason to the first Truth of Faith*
The Order and Mode of Procedure in this Work
Rejection of the aforesaid Opinion, and Solution of the aforesaid Reasons
Reasons in Proof of the Existence of God
That in order to a Knowledge of God we must use the Method of Negative Differentiation*
That in God there is no Passive Potentiality
That in God there is no Composition
That in God Existence and Essence is the same*
That in God there is no Accident
That the Existence of God cannot he characterised by the addition of any Substantial Differentia*
That God is Universal Perfection
How Likeness to God may be found in Creatures
What Names can be predicated of God
That nothing is predicated of God and other beings synonymously*
That the things that are said God and Creatures are said analogously
That the several Names predicated of God are not synonymous
That the Propositions which our Understanding forms of God are not void of meaning
That in God there can be no Evil
That God is the Good of all Good
That in God the Understanding is His very Essence
That God understands by nothing else than by His own Essence
That God perfectly understands Himself
That God primarily and essentially knows Himself alone
That God knows other things besides Himself
That God has a particular Knowledge of all things
Some Discussion of the Question how there is in the Divine Understanding a Multitude of Objects
How there is in God a Multitude of Objects of Understanding
That the Divine Essence, being One, is the proper Likeness and Type of all things Intelligible*
That God understands all things at once and together
That there is no Habitual Knowledge in God
That the Knowledge of God is not a Reasoned Knowledge
That God does not understand by Combination and Separation of Ideas
That the Truth to be found in Propositions is not excluded from God
That the Truth of God is the First and Sovereign Truth
The Arguments of those who wish to withdraw from God the Knowledge of Individual Things*
A list of things to be said concerning the Divine Knowledge
That God Knows Individual Things
That God knows things which are not*
That God knows Individual Contingent Events*
That God knows the Motions of the Will
That God knows infinite things*
That God knows Base and Mean Things*
That the Will of God is His Essence
That the Object of the Will of God in the First Place is God Himself
That God in willing Himself wills also other things besides Himself*
That with one and the same Act of the Will God wills Himself and all other Beings
That the Divine Will reaches to the good of Individual Existences
That God wills things even that as yet are not
That God of necessity wills His own Being and His own Goodness
That God does not of necessity love other things than Himself
Arguments against the aforesaid Doctrine and Solutions of the same
That God wills anything else than Himself with an Hypothetical Necessity*
That the Will of God is not of things in themselves Impossible
That the Divine Will does not take away Contingency from things
That Reason can be assigned for the Divine Will*
That nothing can be a Cause to the Divine Will
That there is a Free Will in God
That there are no Passions in God
That there is in God Delight and Joy
In what sense Virtues can be posited in God
That in God there are the Virtues which regulate Action
That the Contemplative (Intellectual) Virtues are in God
That the Life of God is everlasting
Connexion of what follows with what has gone before.
That the Philosopher and the Theologian view Creatures from Different Standpoints
Order of Matters to be Treated
That it belongs to God to be to other Beings the Principle of Existence
That there is in God Active Power
That God's Power is His Substance
That God's Power is His Action
In what manner Power is said to be in God
That something is predicated of God in relation to Creatures
That the Relations, predicated of God in regard to Creatures, are not really in God*
How the aforesaid Relations are predicated of God
That God is to all things the Cause of their being
That God has brought things into being out of nothing
That Creation is not a Movement nor a Change
Solution of Arguments against Creation*
That Creation is not Successive
That it belongs to God alone to create
That God's Action in Creation is not of Physical Necessity, but of Free Choice of Will
In what sense some things are said to be Impossible to the Almighty
That the Divine Understanding is not limited to certain fixed Effects
That God has not brought things into being in discharge of any Debt of Justice
How Absolute Necessity may have place in Creation
That it is not necessary for Creatures to have existed from Eternity*
Reasons alleged for the Eternity of the World on the part of God, with Answers to the same
Reasons alleged for the Eternity of the World on the part Creatures, with answers to the same
Arguments wherewith some try to show that the World is not Eternal, and Solutions of the same
That the Variety of Creatures does not arise from any Contrariety of Prime Agents*
That the Variety of Creatures has not arisen from Variety of Merits and Demerits
The Real Prime Cause of the Variety of Creatures.
That Subsistent Intelligences are Voluntary Agents
That Subsistent Intelligences have Free Will
That Subsistent Intelligence is not Corporeal
That in Created Subsistent Intelligences there is a Difference between Existence and Essence
That in Created Subsistent Intelligences there is Actuality and Potentiality
That Subsistent Intelligences are Imperishable
Plato's Theory of the Union of the Intellectual Soul with the Body*
That Vegetative, Sentient, and Intelligent are not in man Three Souls
That the Potential Intellect of Man is not a Spirit subsisting apart from Matter*
That the aforesaid Tenet is contrary to the Mind of Aristotle
Against the Opinion of Alexander concerning the Potential Intellect*
That the Soul is not a Harmony*
Against those who suppose Intellect and Sense to be the same
Against those who maintain that the Potential Intellect is the Phantasy*
How a Subsistent Intelligence may be the Form of a Body
That the Potential Intellect is not One and the Same in all Men
Confutation of the Arguments which seem to prove the Unity of the Potential Intellect
That the Active Intellect is not a separately Subsisting Intelligence, But a Faculty of the Soul
That the Human Soul does not Perish with the Body
That the Souls of Dumb Animals are not Immortal
That the Soul is not of the substance of God
That the Human Soul is not transmitted by Generation*
That the Human Soul is brought into Being by a Creative Act of God
Arguments against the Truth of the Conclusion last drawn, with their Solution
That there are Subsistent Intelligences not united with Bodies*
That Intelligences subsisting apart are not more than one in the same Species*
That an Intelligence subsisting apart and a Soul are not of one Species
That Intelligences subsisting apart do not gather their Knowledge from Objects of Sense
That the Mind of an Intelligence subsisting apart is ever in the act of understanding
How one separately subsisting Intelligence knows another
That Intelligences subsisting apart know Individual Things
Preface to the Book that Follows
That every Agent acts to some End
That every Agent acts to some Good
That Evil in things is beside the Intention of the Agent
Arguments against the Truth of the Conclusion last drawn, with Solutions of the Same
That Evil is not a Nature or Essence*
Arguments against the aforsesaid Conclusion, with Answers to the same
That the Cause of Evil is good
That Evil is founded in some Good
That Evil does not entirely swallow up Good
That Evil is an Accidental Cause
That there is not any Sovereign Evil, acting as the Principle of All Evils
That the End in View of everything is some Good
That all Things are ordained to one End, which is God
How God is the End of all Things
That all Things aim at Likeness to God
How Things copy the Divine Goodness
That Things aim at Likeness to God in being Causes of other Things
That all Things seek good, even Things devoid of Consciousness
That the End of every Subsistent Intelligence is to understand God
That Happiness does not consist in any Act of the Will*
That the Happiness of Man does not consist in Bodily Pleasures
That Happiness does not consist in Honours nor in Human Glory
That Man's Happiness does not consist in Riches
That Happiness does not consist in Worldly Power
That Happiness does not consist in the Goods of the Body
That the Final Happiness Man does not consist in Acts of the Moral Virtues
That the Final Happiness of Man consists in the Contemplation of God
That Happiness does not consist in the Knowledge of God which is to be had by Demonstration
That Happiness does not consist in the Knowledge of God by Faith
[That we cannot find happiness in this life by sharing an angel's natural knowledge of God]*
That the Soul in this life does not understand itself by itself
That we cannot in this life see God as He essentially is*
That the Final Happiness of Man is not in this Life*
How God is seen as He essentially is
That no Created Substance can of its natural power arrive to see God as He essentially is
That a Created Intelligence needs some influx of Divine Light to see God in His Essence
Arguments against the aforesaid statements, and their Solutions
That the Created Intelligence does not comprehend the Divine Substance
That no Created Intelligence in seeing God sees all things that can be seen in Him
That every Intelligence of every grade can be partaker of the vision of God
That one may see God more perfectly than another
How they who see the Divine Substance see all things
That they who see God see all things in Him at once
That by the Sight of God one is Partaker of Life Everlasting
That they who see God will see Him for ever
How in that Final Happiness every Desire of Man is fulfilled
That God governs things by His Providence
That God preserves things in being
That nothing gives Being except in as much as it acts in the Power of God
That God is the Cause of Activity in all Active Agents
That God is everywhere and in all things
Of the Opinion of those who withdraw from Natural Things their Proper Actions
How the Same Effect is from God and from a Natural Agent
That the Divine Providence is not wholly inconsistent with the presence of Evil in Creation
That Divine Providence is not inconsistent with an element of Contingency in Creation*
That Divine Providence is not inconsistent with Freedom of the Will
That Divine Providence is not inconsistent with Fortune and Chance*
That the Providence of God is exercised over Individual and Contingent Things
That the Providence of God watches immediately over all Individual Things
That the arrangements of Divine Providence are carried into execution by means of Secondary Causes
That Intelligent Creatures are the Medium through which other Creatures are governed by God
Of the Subordination of Men one to another
That other Subsistent Intelligences cannot be direct Causes of our Elections and Volitions*
That the Motion of the Will is caused by God, and not merely by the Power of the Will
That Human Choices and Volitions are subject to Divine Providence
How Human Things are reduced to Higher Causes*
In what sense one is said to be Fortunate, and how Man is aided by Higher Causes*
Of Fate, whether there be such a thing, and if so, what it is
Of the Certainty of Divine Providence*
That the Immutability of Divine Providence does not bar the Utility of Prayer
That God does not hear all Prayers
How the Arrangements of Providence follow a Plan
God can work beyond the Order laid down for Creatures, and produce Effects without Proximate Causes
That the things which God does beyond the Order of Nature are not contrary to Nature*
How Separately Subsisting Spirits work certain Wonders, which yet are not true Miracles
That the Works of Magicians are not due solely to the Influence of the Heavenly Spheres*
Whence the performances of Magicians derive their Efficacy*
That the Subsistent Intelligence, whose aid is employed in Magic, is not Evil by Nature*
Arguments seeming to prove that Sin is impossible to Spirits, with Solutions of the same
That in Spirits there may be Sin, and how
That it was necessary for a Law to be given to Man by God
That the main purpose of the Divine Law is to subordinate Man to God
That the End of the Divine Law is the Love of God
That by the Divine Law we are directed to the Love of our Neighbour
That by Divine Law men are obliged to a Right Faith
That by certain Sensible Rites our mind is directed to God
That the Worship of Latria is to be paid to God alone
That the Divine Law directs man to a Rational Use of Corporeal and Sensible Things
That Marriage ought to be Indissoluble
That Marriage ought to be between one Man and one Woman
That Marriage ought not to take place between Kindred
That of no Food is the Use Sinful in itself
How the Law of God relates a man to his Neighbour
That the Divine Government of Men is after the manner of Paternal Government
Of the Counsels that are given in the Divine Law
Arguments against Voluntary Poverty, with Replies
Of various Modes of Living adopted by the Votaries of Voluntary Poverty
In what the Good of Poverty consists
Arguments against Perpetual Continence, with Replies
Against those who find fault with Vows
That neither all Good Works nor all Sins are Equal*
That a Man's Acts are punished or rewarded by God
Of the Difference and Order of Punishments
That not all Punishments nor all Rewards are Equal
Of the Punishment due to Mortal and Venial Sins respectively in regard to the Last End
That the Punishment whereby one is deprived of his Last End is Interminable*
That Sins are punished also by the experience of something Painful
That it is Lawful for judges to inflict Punishments
That Man stands in need of Divine Grace for the Gaining of Happiness
That the Divine Assistance does not compel a Man to Virtue
That Man cannot Merit beforehand the said Assistance
That the Grace which constitutes the State of Grace causes in us the Love of God
That Divine Grace causes in us Faith
That Divine Grace causes in us a Hope of future Blessedness
That Man needs the Assistance of Divine Grace to persevere in Good*
That he who falls from Grace by Sin may be recovered again by Grace
That Man cannot be delivered from Sin except by Grace
That a Man already in Mortal Sin cannot avoid more Mortal Sin without Grace*
That some Men God delivers from Sin, and some He leaves in Sin
That God is Cause of Sin to no Man
Of Predestination, Reprobation, and Divine Election
Of Generation, Paternity, and Sonship in God
The Opinion of Photinus touching the Son of God, and its Rejection*
Rejection of the Opinion of Sabellius concerning the Son of God*
Of the Opinion of Arius concerning the Son of God*
Explanation of the Texts which Arius used to allege for himself
How the Son of God is called the Wisdom of God
That the Holy Ghost is true God
That the Holy Ghost is a Subsistent Person
Of the Effects which the Scriptures attribute to the Holy Ghost in respect of the whole Creation
Of the Effects attributed to the Holy Ghost in the attraction of the Rational Creature to God
Replies to Arguments alleged against the Divinity of the Holy Ghost
That the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son*
That there are only Three Persons in the Godhead, Father and Son and Holy Ghost
Of the Incarnation of the Word according to the Tradition of Holy Scripture
Of the Error of Photinus concerning the Incarnation
Of the Error of the Manicheans concerning the Incarnation
Of the Error of Arius and Apollinaris concerning the Soul of Christ
Of the Error of Theodore of Mopsuestia concerning the Union of the Word with Man
Of the Error of Macarius of Antioch, who posited one Operation only and one Will only in Christ*
The Doctrine of Catholic Faith concerning the Incarnation
Objections against the Faith of the Incarnation, with Replies
Some further Elucidation of the Incarnation
That Christ was born of virgin without prejudice to His true and natural Humanity
That Christ was conceived by the Holy Ghost
That Original Sin is transmitted from our First Parent to his Posterity
Arguments against Original Sin, with Replies
Of the Incarnation as part of the Fitness of Things
Points of Reply to Difficulties touching the Economy of the Incarnation
Of the Difference between the Sacraments of the Old and of the New Law
Of the Number of the Sacraments of the New Law
Of the Conversion of Bread into the Body of Christ
An Answer to Difficulties raised in respect of Place
The Difficulty of the Accidents remaining
What happens when the Sacramental Species pass away
Answer to the Difficulty raised in respect of the Breaking of the Host
Of the kind of Bread and Wine that ought to be used for the Consecration of this Sacrament
That it is possible for a man to sin after receiving Sacramental Grace*
That a man who sins after the Grace of the Sacraments may be converted to Grace*
Of the need of the Sacrament of Penance, and of the Parts thereof
Of the Sacrament of Extreme Unction
Of the Episcopal Dignity, and that therein one Bishop is Supreme
That Sacraments can be administered even by Wicked Ministers
That through Christ the Resurrection of our Bodies will take place
Some Points of Reply to Difficulties on the Resurrection
That Men shall rise again Immortal
That in the Resurrection there will be no use of Food or of the Sexes
That Risen Bodies shall be of the same Nature as before
That the Bodies of the Risen shall be otherwise organised than before
Of the Qualities of Glorified Bodies
Of Sex and Age in the Resurrection
Of the Quality of Risen Bodies in the Lost
That Souls enter upon Punishment or Reward immediately after their Separation from their Bodies
That the Souls of the Saints after Death have their Will immutably fixed on Good
That the Souls of the Wicked after Death have their Will immutably fixed on Evil
Of the General Cause of Immutability in all Souls after their Separation from the Body
AS the immutability of divine providence does not impose necessity on things foreseen, so neither does it bar the utility of prayer. For prayer is not poured out to God that the eternal arrangement of providence may be changed, -- that is impossible, -- but that man may gain what he desires of God. It is fitting for God to assent to the pious desires of His rational creatures, not that our desires move the immutability of God, but it is an outcome of His goodness suitably to carry out what we desire.
4. It is proper for friends to will the same thing. Now God loves His creature (B. I, Chap. XCI) and every creature all the more that the said creature has a share in His goodness, which is the prime and principal object of God's love. But, of all creatures, the rational creature most perfectly partakes in the divine goodness. God therefore wills the fulfilment of the desires of the rational creature. And His will is effective of things.
5. The goodness of the creature is derived in point of likeness from the goodness of God. But it is a point of special commendation in men, not to deny assent to just requests: thereupon they are called 'liberal,' 'clement,' 'merciful and kind.' This therefore is a very great function of divine goodness, to hear pious prayers.*
Hence it is said: He will do the will of them that fear him, and hear their prayers and save them (Ps. cxliv, 9): Every one that asketh receiveth, and he that seeketh findeth, and the door shall be opened to him that knocketh (Matt. vii, 8).
* From what has been said it appears that prayers and pious desires are causes of some things that are done by God. It has been shown above (Chap. LXXVII) that divine providence does not bar the working of other causes, nay, rather it directs them in the work of imposing upon creation the order which providence in its own counsels has determined upon. Thus secondary causes are not inconsistent with providence, but rather carry providence into effect. Thus then prayers are efficacious with God, not however as breaking through the order of divine providence, because this very arrangement, that such a concession be made to such a petitioner, falls under the order of divine providence. Therefore to say that we should not pray to gain any thing of God, because the order of His providence is unchangeable, is like saying that we should not walk to get to a place, nor eat to support life.
Thus a twofold error concerning prayer is excluded. Some have said that there is no fruit of prayer. This was said as well on the part of those who denied divine providence, as the Epicureans did; as also on the part of those who withdrew human affairs from divine providence, as some of the Peripatetics did; as also on the part of those who thought that all things happen of necessity, as the Stoics did. From all these tenets it would follow that prayer is fruitless, and consequently all divine worship in vain:* which error is referred to in Malachy iii, 14: Ye have said: he laboureth in vain who serveth God, and what profit is it that we have kept his ordinances, and that we have walked sad before the Lord of Hosts?
There were others on the contrary who said that the divine arrangement was reversible by prayer. And the prima facie rendering of certain texts of scripture seems to favour this view. Thus, after Isaias by divine command had said Ezechias: Put thine house in order, for thou shalt die and not live; yet upon Ezechias's prayer the word of the Lord came to Isaias, saying: Go and tell Ezechias: I have heard thy prayer, lo I will add to thy days fifteen years (Isa. viii, 1-5). Again it is said in the person of the Lord: I will suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out and pull down and destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall repent of their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them (Jer. xviii, 7, 8); Turn to the Lord your God, for he is gracious and merciful: who knoweth but he will turn and forgive? (Joel ii, 13, 14.) But against construing these texts to mean that the will of God is changeable, or that anything happens to God in time, or that temporal events in creation are the cause of anything coming to exist in God, there are other authorities of Holy Writ, containing infallible and express truth. Thus it is said: God is not as man, that he should die, nor as the son of man, that he should change. Has he said then and shall not do? Has he spoken and shall not fulfil? (Num. xxiii, 19): The victorious one in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to repentance: for he is not a man that he should repent (1 Kings xv, 29): I am the Lord and change not (Malach. iii, 6).
On careful consideration it will appear that all mistakes in this matter arise from failing to note the difference between the system of the universe and any particular system (universalem ordinem et particularem). There is nothing to hinder any particular system being changed, whether by prayer or by any other means; for there is that existing beyond the bounds of the system which is capable of changing it. But beyond the system that embraces all things nothing can be posited whereby such system could possibly be changed, depending as it does on the universal cause. Therefore the Stoics laid it down that the system established by God could nowise be changed. But they failed in a right appreciation of this general system in supposing that prayers were useless, which was taking for granted that the wills of men, and their desires whence their prayers proceed, are not comprehended in that general system. For when they say that the same effect follows whether prayers are put up or not, -- follows, that is, as part of the univeral system of things, -- they manifestly reserve and except prayers as not entering into that general system. Supposing prayers included in the system, then effects will follow from them by divine appointment as from other causes. One might as well exclude the effects of other every-day causes as exclude the effect of prayer. And if the immutability of the divine plan does not withdraw the effects of other causes, neither does it take away the efficacy of prayer.
Prayers then avail, not as changing a system arranged from eternity, but as being themselves part of that system. And there is no difficulty in the efficacy of prayer changing the particular system of some inferior cause, by the doing of God, who overpasses all causes, and who consequently is not bound by the necessity of any system depending on any cause; but on the contrary every necessity of system dependent on any inferior cause is checked by Him, as having been instituted by Him.* Inasmuch then as pious prayers avail to alter some points of the system of inferior causes that was established by God, God is said to 'turn,' or 'repent.' Hence Gregory says that God does not change His counsel, though He sometimes changes His sentence, not the sentence which declares His eternal arrangements, but the sentence which declares the order of inferior causes, according to which Ezechias was to die, or some nation to be punished for its sins. Such change of sentence is called in metaphorical language 'repentance,' inasmuch as God behaves like one repentant, to whom it belongs to change what He has done. In the same way God is said metaphorically to be 'angry,' inasmuch as by punishing He produces the effect of anger. (B. I, Chap. XCI ad fin.)